This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

6 January 2004
Libya officially ratifies the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It signed the treaty in November of 2001.
—Libya Country Profile, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission, <http://ctbto.org>.

12 January 2004
A former chief of Israeli intelligence (Mossad), Danny Yatom, says Libya would have produced a bomb well before Iran. Yatom explained that Israel was primarily concerned about Libya's development of a nuclear-tipped missile with a 1,000-km range.
—Leslie Susser, "Ex-Mossad Chief Yatom: Libya was Closer that Iran to Nuclear Bomb," Jerusalem Report, 12 January 2004.

22 January 2004
The United States flies the first shipment of WMD components out of Libya. The 55,000 pounds of WMD components included uranium enrichment centrifuge parts and guidance kits for Scud-C missiles that Libya had acquired from North Korea. Also included was a "full set" of nuclear weapons designs purchased from the nuclear network of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. The equipment will likely be evaluated at the Oak Ridge nuclear weapons plant in Tennessee.
—"U.S. Congressional Delegation Visits Libya," United Press International, 1 March 2004; Barry Schweid, "U.S. Plane Carrying Components of Libya's Nuclear and Missile Programs Arrives in the United States," Associated Press, 27 January 2004.

2 February 2004
Pakistan's most prominent nuclear weapons scientist, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, admits to proliferating nuclear secrets to Libya, Iran, and North Korea during the 1980s and 1990s. Khan alleges that nuclear proliferation to Libya was committed without the Pakistani government's awareness or approval. US administration officials later say Libya paid at least $100 million for the nuclear weapons equipment it got from Khan's underground network.
—John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, "Pakistan Confesses to Aiding Nuclear Efforts," The Washington Post, 2 February 2004; Matt Kelley, "U.S. Displays Some of Nuclear Equipment Seized in Libya," Associated Press, 15 March 2004.

11 February 2004
Libyan Foreign Minister Rahman Shalgam says Libya decided more than 10 years ago not to develop weapons of mass destruction. "We had the equipment, we had the material and the know-how and the scientists. But we never decided to produce such weapons. To have flour, water and fire does not mean that you have bread."
—Mary Dejevsky, "Libya Decided 10 Years Ago Against Developing WMD Without Pressure, Foreign Minister Says," Financial Times Global News Wire, 11 February 2004.

12 February 2004
Spanish judge Baltazar Garzon announces that Spanish companies may have supplied nuclear equipment to Libya through a secret procurement network. An investigation was launched in June 2003 after allegations surfaced that Spanish companies exported dual-use, high-precision machinery and equipment that may have aided Libya's nuclear program. Spain's intelligence agency, CNI, warned the Economy Ministry in 2001 that Spanish companies could be implicated in the underground nuclear components market. The multimillion dollar network was revealed after Libya renounced its WMD programs last December.
—Elizabeth Nash, "Spanish Firms in Secret Arms Trade to Libya," The Independent (London), 12 February 2004.

16 February 2004
Documents handed over by Tripoli as part of its WMD dismantlement process reveal that China was the source for nuclear arms designs that passed through Pakistan and ended up in Libya. The documents consisted of instructions for assembling an implosion-type nuclear bomb that could fit on a ballistic missile. US administration officials confirmed the reports.
—Hugh MacLeod, "Nuclear Designs Sent to Libya from Pakistan were Chinese," The Independent (London), 16 February 2004; "U.S. Official Confirms China Nuclear Technology's Transfer to Libya," Kyodo News Service, 17 February 2004.

20 February 2004
An IAEA report states that Libya processed uranium into a small amount of plutonium, but had not produced enriched uranium. The report says Libya's undeclared nuclear program included nuclear material and facilities, and uranium conversion and enrichment activities. Libya said it had imported 2,263 tonnes of uranium ore concentrate (UOC) between 1978 and 1981. The report finds that from the early 1980s through the end of 2003, Libya imported nuclear materials, acquired nuclear weapon designs, and conducted a wide variety of nuclear activities in violation of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Libya agrees to provide the IAEA with a full picture of its nuclear activities; and the IAEA continues an investigation into all aspects of Libya's undeclared nuclear program.
—Report by the General Director, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya," International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2004/12, 20 February 2004, pp. 7-8.

20 February 2004
Malaysian police release a report of their investigation into Scomi Precision Engineering SDN BHD (SCOPE), which has been named publicly as a supplier to Libya's secret nuclear program. The report includes many new details about the operations at the SCOPE plant and the roles played by foreign technical, manufacturing, and transshipment experts, including A.Q. Khan and his associates at the Khan Research Laboratories in Pakistan, B.S.A. Tahir in Malaysia and Dubai, and several Swiss, British, and German nationals.
—Albright, David and Hinderstein, Corey, Libya's Gas Centrifuge Procurement: Much Remains Undiscovered, Institute for Science and International Security, 1 March 2004.

21 February 2004
Malaysian authorities' interrogation of one of the principal scientists involved in the Pakistani nuclear proliferation network, Bukhary Seyed Abu Tahir, yields much information about Pakistan's aid to Libya's nuclear program. Tahir reports that Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan shipped partly processed uranium (UF6) to Libya aboard a Pakistani airplane in 2001, and provided Libya's nuclear program with the fuel stock, designs, and equipment to make a bomb. The uranium shipment was one of many deliveries of nuclear components to Libya that supposedly started after a 1997 meeting in Istanbul between Khan and Libyan officials. One Turkish company supplied aluminum castings and another electrical cabinets and voltage regulators. Tahir also reports that a number of complete centrifuges, possibly P-1 models, were flown to Libya directly from Pakistan during the year following the UF6 shipment.

The report mentions that a well-known German proliferator, Gotthard Lerch, tried and failed to buy pipes from South Africa for Machine Shop 1001. Tahir's report also provides details on Project Machine Shop 1001, the codename for Libya's efforts to build a centrifuge components manufacturing shop. Tahir alleges that Peter Griffin, a British engineer investigated by authorities since the late 1970s for collaborating with Pakistan in nuclear activities, supervised the project and provided the plan and a lathe for Machine Shop 1001. Machines for the shop came from Spanish and Italian companies, and Griffin arranged for eight Libyan technicians to go to Spain to train in the machines operation. Griffin also supplied an Italian-made furnace used in refining certain centrifuge components.

Khan ordered sensitive components that were later consolidated for shipment to Libya through Gulf Technical Industries, a company set up by Griffin in Dubai and partly owned by his son, Paul. Paul and Peter Griffin deny any illegal activities.
—Raymond Bonner and Craig S. Smith, "Pakistani Sent A-Fuel to Libya, Report Says; Tripoli Had All Parts for Nuclear Bomb, Malaysians Assert," International Herald Tribune, 21 February 2004; Dominic Kennedy, "Briton's 'Bomb Link' to Libya and Pakistan," The Times (London), 1 March 2004.

24 February 2004
IAEA chief Mohammed El Baradei says the IAEA will help Libya develop nuclear technology for civilian purposes after Libya dismantles its weapons of mass destruction.
—"IAEA to Help Libya Develop Nuclear Technology for Civilian Purposes," Xinhua General News Service, 25 February 2004.

28 February 2004
Malaysia denies that it aided Libya's nuclear program in any way, an accusation that surfaced after reports revealed that a Malaysian company manufactured 14 centrifuge pieces for a client in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates. The parts were produced for uranium-enrichment centrifuges, which could be used for both civilian and military purposes.
—"Malaysia Denies Collaboration in Nukes Program with Libya," Xinhua General News Service, 28 February 2004.

28 February 2004
The United States announced that money from the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program could not be used to retrain Libyan nuclear scientists because the Nunn-Lugar Act prohibits aid to countries under sanctions.
—David E. Sanger, "Bush Lifts Some Libya Sanctions; But Nuclear-Safety Aid May Face a Legal Delay," The New York Times, 28 February 2004.

28 February 2004
Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi calls for all African countries to abandon WMD.
— "Libya Call for WMD-Free Africa," Xinhua General News Service, 29 February 2004.

8 March 2004
Libya returns 88 nuclear fuel assemblies to Russia that it had originally received between 1980 and 1984. The fuel assemblies—bundles of rods that contain fuel used for reactors—were returned from Libya's Tajura research center outside Tripoli. The shipment consisted of fuel components containing about 28.7 pounds of 80 percent enriched uranium-235, and about 6.6 pounds of non-fissile uranium.
—Stever Gutterman, "Libya Returns Nuclear Fuel to Russia," Associated Press, 8 March 2004.

9 March 2004
Libya signs the Additional Protocol to its NPT safeguards agreement, which grants IAEA inspectors "broader rights of access" to Libyan nuclear sites. IAEA Director ElBaradei complimented Libya on its commitment to shift from weapons of mass destruction to a focus on peaceful uses of nuclear applications.
—"Libya Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards," IAEA website, 10 March 2004, <http://www.iaea.org>.

10 March 2004
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution recognizing Libya's cooperation with the IAEA, but noting its breach of its Safeguards Agreement and its acquisition of nuclear weapons designs. The resolution requests that the Director General report Libya's past failures to meet its Safeguard Agreement obligations to the UN Security Council for information purposes, and also requests that Libya continue to cooperate fully with the IAEA.
—IAEA Board of Governors Resolution "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" (GOV/2004/18), adopted March 10, 2004.

12 March 2004
Japanese diplomats reveal that a Japanese company supplied Libya with uranium conversion plant in 1984. The diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that the components were so large that they could not have been shipped from Japan without the government knowing about it.
-- "Japan Company Sold Atomic Plant to Libya," Associated Press, 12 March 2004.

15 March 2004
US Department of Energy and White House officials host a briefing at the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge, Tennessee, complex where equipment retrieved from Libya's nuclear facilities was displayed for reporters. Officials displayed a dozen uranium centrifuges from what they said was a cache of about 4,000, although the items displayed were centrifuge casings lacking rotors.
—William J. Broad, "U.S. Wrong on Libya, Group Says; Nuclear Capabilities 'Distorted' in Briefing," The New York Times, 26 March 2004.

29 March 2004
US and British officials say they have found evidence that Libya traded nuclear and missile expertise with Egypt. Officials state that the evidence confirmed suspicions of a three-year long secret trade between Cairo and Tripoli in strategic weapons obtained from North Korea. In 2002, Egypt denied US allegations that Cairo was conducting secret missile and WMD trade with Libya. The allegations were based on satellite photographs.
—"Libyan Inspections Find Evidence of Collaboration with Egypt," WorldTribune Online, 29 March 2004, <http://www.worldtribune.com>.

23 April 2004
As a reward for undertaking genuine and verifiable steps towards WMD program dismantlement, the United States removes Libya from the "Iran and Libya Sanctions Act," but continues to apply sanctions deriving from Libya's continued presence on the US Department of State's state sponsors of terrorism list.
—"Statement by the White House Press Secretary; U.S. Eases Economic Embargo Against Libya," PR Newswire, 23 April 2004.

28 May 2004
CNN reports that a leaked report from the IAEA states that highly enriched uranium was found in centrifuges in Libya's nuclear facilities, but there was no determination as to the source of the uranium.
—"IAEA: Traces of enriched uranium found in Libya," CNN.com, 28 May 2004, <http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/05/28/libya.nuclear/index.html?headline=IAEA>.

28 May 2004
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei reveals that a shipping container loaded full of L-2 advanced uranium enrichment centrifuge components was successfully smuggled to Libya three months after Colonel Qadhdhafi announced his decision to discontinue Libya's weapons of mass destruction programs. The German ship, the BBC China, was initially seized by Italian authorities and passed on to American officials. The ship was then released with the L-2s on board and continued on to Libya. The container arrived in Libya in March 2004. The illegal shipment originated in Malaysia as part of Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's black market network.
-- "Western Agents Let Nuclear Equipment Slip Past to Libya," The Guardian (London), 29 May 2004.

1 June 2004
An International Atomic Energy Agency report implicates South Africa in the network though which Libya developed its clandestine nuclear program. The report alleges that a South African entity provided Libyan scientists with specialized engineering training.
-- "Military: Libya-South Africa: Nuclear Programme Aided," Global Newswire, 1 June 2004.

2 June 2004
International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohammed ElBaradei states that recent examinations of agency dossiers on Iran and Libya reveal possible evidence of highly enriched uranium in both countries. Though both documents are confidential and released on to IAEA Board member-states, portions of the two dossiers are leaked to the press. In Libya, the presence of highly enriched uranium was detected on centrifuges presumed to be of Pakistani origin.
-- "Inspection of Nuclear Dossiers of Libya, Iran Arouse Concern," ITAR-TASS News Agency, 2 June 2004.

10 June 2004
The ongoing investigation by the IAEA reveals that suppliers from Turkey and Libya provided Libya's secret nuclear weapons program with technology and expertise. In March 2004 a container of Turkish-made components for Libya's uranium enrichment program arrived in Tripoli. The shipment was reported to the IAEA and arrived aboard the infamous BBC China. The Turkish parts, including centrifuge motors and frequency converters, are more sophisticated than the Malaysian parts that arrived in the same shipment. The IAEA also reports that Libyan scientists studied centrifuge equipment during a visit to "another African country", which diplomats indicate is South Africa.
-- "Turks and South Africans 'Helped Libya's Secret Nuclear Arms Project'," Financial Times, 10 June 2004.

16 June 2004
The International Atomic Energy Agency decides to further investigate Libya's abandoned nuclear weapons program in order to uncover the network through which it was supplied.
-- "UN Nuclear Watchdog Decides to Investigate Libya Nuclear Program Further," Agence France Presse, 16 June 2004.

19 June 2004
Japanese Senior Vice Foreign Minister Ichiro Aisawa discloses in a lecture at the Ritsumeikan University in Tokyo that he has obtained information regarding nuclear and missile technology exchanges between Libya and North Korea when he met with Colonel Qadhdhafi.
-- "Japan Official Claims to Have Information on Libya-N Korea Nuclear Exchange," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 20 June 2004.

21 June 2004
IAEA officials tell Arms Control Today that Libyan officials have said that they have not received some of the centrifuge components they ordered, implying that they were duped by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan. This may signify that a third party may be in possession of proscribed materials ordered by Libya.
-- "IAEA: Questions Remain About Libya," Arms Control Today, July/August 2004.

30 June 2004
An International Atomic Energy Agency report alleging possible North Korean involvement in Libya's discontinued nuclear weapons program is made available to The Associated Press. The report states that some equipment ordered by Libya from North Korea remains missing, leaving open the possibility that proscribed technologies may have been shipped to other states or groups. The report focuses on the origin of two cylinders of uranium hexaflouride, which some speculate may have come from the black market, Pakistan, or North Korea.
-- "Confidential U.N. Report Leaves Open Possibility of N. Korean Nuclear Technology Supply to Libya," Associated Press, 30 August 2004.

2 September 2004
A South African man is arrested on suspicion of playing a major role in the nuclear black market that supplied Libya's clandestine nuclear weapons program. Arrests and raids are carried out over the previous week in South Africa, Germany, and Switzerland. Johan Andries Muller Meyer, director of a South African manufacturing firm Trade Fin, is charged with three criminal counts of trafficking in sensitive nuclear equipment.
-- "S. African's Arrest Seen as Key to Nuclear Black Market," Washington Post, 4 September 2004.

7 September 2004
A statement issued by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs indicates that on 1 September 2004 a Trade Fin Engineering facility in Vanderbijlpark was searched by members of the Office of the National Director of Public Prosecutions, the South African Police Service, and inspectors as well as other South African technical advisors. Agents discovered 11 shipping containers which contained components of a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant and related documentation. Mr. Johan Meyer, director of Trade Fin Engineering, was arrested on 2 September 2004.
-- "RSA Reportedly 'Emerging as Key Node" in Global Nuclear Black Market," South African Press Association, 7 September 2004.

8 September 2004
The Government of South Africa withdraws charges against Director of Trade Fin Engineering Johan Meyer related to the sale and trafficking of nuclear weapons-related technology. Charges are reportedly dropped against Meyer in exchange for compliance in the ongoing investigation into an illicit network that has supplied proscribed nuclear technology to Libya and Iran.
-- "Accused in WMD Case Withdraws Bail Application; Case Postponed to 11 Oct," South African Radio, 8 September 2004; "State drops Charges Against Man Arrested Under Laws Governing Making WMD," This Day (Johannesburg), 9 September 2004.

9 September 2004
Two South African men are arrested in conjunction with an investigation into the illicit nuclear trafficking of Trade Fin Engineering. Gerhard Wisser and Daniel Geiges of Krisch Engineering are arrested in connection with South Africa's investigation into illicit smuggling networks. Wisser was charged in his native Germany last month and released on bail after being charged with violating arms control legislation and "assisting treason". Wisser owns Krisch Engineering.
-- "State Drops Charges against Man Arrested Under Laws Governing Making WMD," South African Press Association, 9 September 2004; "Nuclear Trade Smugglers Home in on Loopholes in South Africa," Financial Times (London), 14 September 2004.

9 September 2004
Bill Gertz of The Washington Times reports that numerous individuals from varying countries have been implicated in the illicit smuggling network that supplied Libya's secret nuclear weapons program. These agents include Peter Griffin, a British national and former head of Gulf Technical Industries, Heinz Mebus, an engineer who helped A.Q. Khan smuggle centrifuge designs into Iran in the mid 1980s, Gotthard Lerch, a German national who tried to help Libya import specialty pipes from South Africa, Gunas Jireh, a Turkish national who Khan hired to supply aluminum casting and a centrifuge dynamo for the Libyan nuclear program, Selim Alguadis, a Turkish engineer who supplied Libya with electrical cabinets and voltage-regulator equipment, and members of the Tinners family of Switzerland, who procured assorted nuclear components from Britain, Franc, and Taiwan.
-- "Libyan Sincerity on Arms in Doubt," The Washington Times, 9 September 2004.

9 September 2004
Former American Republican Senator and Presidential candidate Bob Dole visits Libya and meets with Colonel Qadhdhafi.
-- "American Senator Bob Dole Visits Libya," al-Fajr al-Jadeed, 9 September 2004.

15 September 2004
The parliament of Pakistan, a major supplier to Libya's clandestine nuclear weapons program, passes legislation tightening export controls aimed at preventing nuclear proliferation. The bill proposes to "regulate and control export, re-export, trans-shipment and transit of goods and technologies, materials and equipment related to nuclear and biological weapons and missiles capable of delivering such weapons." Violators of the new legislation would face up to 14 years in prison and fines of up to $285,000. The laws are designed to follow guidelines set out in a United Nations Security Council resolution of April 2004 aimed at preventing black market trading of weapons of mass destruction related materials.
-- "Pakistan Adopts Bill to Tighten Controls on Nuclear Materials," Agence France Presse, 15 September 2004.

September 2004
Japanese-made high-precision measuring instruments used for centrifuge separators in uranium enrichment are found in a nuclear facility in Libya during inspections. Three measuring instruments, including a three-dimensional profilometer, are discovered by the IAEA in inspections earlier in the year.
--"Japan-Made Measuring Instruments Found in Libyan Nuke Facility," Jiji Press, 9 September 2004.

September 2004
The United States removes the economic restrictions placed on Libya and renews oil imports to America from Libya.
--"Removal of American Restrictions on Oil Imports from Libya," Financial Times, 24 October 2004.

October 2004
The United States lifts most sanctions on Libya after it gives up its nuclear weapons program. However, Libya still remains on the US Department of State's list of state "sponsors" of terrorism.
--"The Strongman Is Still Making Trouble," Newsweek, 1 November 2004.

November 2004
French Newspaper Liberation alleges that the Libyan nuclear program was not intended to serve Libya alone, but was also to serve Egypt clandestinely.
--"Egypt Denies Nuclear Link with Libya," Cairo Al-Sha'b, 5 November 2004, in FBIS Document GMP20041108000282.

24 November 2004
French President Jacques Chirac arrives in Libya to discuss France's cooperation in the development of a civilian nuclear program subject to IAEA controls.
--"President Chirac Offers Libya Help with Nuclear Power Stations," Paris La Tribune, 25 November 2004, in FBIS Document EUP20041125000028.

21 December 2004
Libyan ambassador to Japan states that Libya will continue its efforts to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear programs. Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi urges Libya to continue to persuade North Korea to find a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue.
--"Libya Assures Japan of Support over N. Korea Nuke Issue," Jiji Press, 21 December 2004.

	Updated September 2005