Assessment[34]
Libya currently possesses the potential to employ short-range ballistic missiles and/or long range artillery rockets against its regional neighbors. This potential can be developed into a real military capability only if Libya can overcome a host of internal organizational and political obstacles endemic to its Armed Forces. A large number of Libya's ballistic missiles and long-range artillery rockets currently possess the capability to delivery chemical, biological or radiological dispersion warheads. If conditions remain favorable Libya possesses the capability to extend the reach of its ballistic missile forces with the Nodong missile to include Southern Europe. A true nuclear weapons delivery capability cannot be achieved without the direct support of a foreign nuclear weapons state. Any one of a host of international or domestic factors, however, could accelerate or delay these predicted developments.
Available information suggests that Libya has a current ballistic missile inventory of 240-440 systems—0-5 al-Fatah prototypes, 36-72 Tochka (SS-21, Scarab), 175-250 R-71E (SS-1c, Scud B), 25-100 Hwasong 6, and 5-25 Nodong/Shehab 3. Estimated launchers include: 1-2 al-Fatah MELs, 60-70 MAZ-543P Scud B TELs, 6-12 Hwasong 6 TELs, 7 Nodong MELs, and an unknown number of fixed (and possibly railroad car mounted) launchers. In addition to these missile systems, Libya possesses approximately 80 FROG-7s long-range artillery rockets with 20 TELs. These figures could be significantly higher if Libya has acquired additional Scud B or Hwasong 6 missiles, or has achieved production status for the Hwasong 6 or al-Jadid.
These missiles and long-range artillery rockets are believed to be organized into four brigades and several independent battalions. Reports suggest that there also exists a missile test and evaluation unit. This unit, possibly stationed at Gawat, probably grew out of elements taken from the FROG-7 and Scud B battalions which were combined with Libyan engineers and technicians working on the various ballistic missile programs. With the arrival of Nodong/Shehab 3 missiles a second a missile test and evaluation unit may have been established.
The chain of command for these units began with General People's Congress (lead by Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi), through the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, to the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces and the individual battalions. Some reports suggest that there is either a "Rocket and Missile Command" or a "Artillery and Missile Command" organization between the Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces and the individual missile units.
From a proliferation standpoint Libya currently presents a number of challenges. Primary among these are:
The continued willingness of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and to a lesser degree the People's Republic of China (PRC) and private European entities and individuals to provide Libya with both missile related technology and components that at the very least exceed the intentions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). This has been complemented somewhat by the willingness of other nations (e.g., Iran and Syria) to cooperate within the realm of ballistic missile development.
- The ongoing ability and willingness of Libya to fund the development of missiles and missile related technology in other countries (e.g., DPRK, Iran and Syria).
- Libya's ballistic missile capabilities are complemented by biological and chemical weapons programs. Which themselves are the recipients of significant foreign assistance.
Hwasong 6 and al-Jadid[37]
Beginning from 1989 and continuing till today ballistic missile related cooperation between Libya and the DPRK has progressed steadily. Following the 1989 collapse of the M-9/DF-15 acquisition effort Libya entered into a wide range of ballistic missile related discussions with the DPRK. Included within these discussions were the acquisition of the Hwasong 6, acquisition of the Nodong (see below), and provision of technology and technical assistance to the al-Jadid program.
In May 1989 Libya concluded an agreement with the DPRK for the acquisition of 140 of the newly developed Hwasong 6 missiles at a cost of $170 million. Of these 140 missiles approximately 80 would be transferred to Syria and 60 would be retained by Libya. This agreement is believed to have also provided for DPRK technology transfer and technical assistance to the al-Jadid program, assistance in establishing a Hwasong 6 assembly (and possibly production) capability, provision of assembly and production equipment, training, and assistance in the expansion of the Gawat missile test facility. It is also likely that some DPRK provided technology and assistance found its way into the al-Fatah program.
The provision of this DPRK assistance was troublesome because of the Western arms embargo upon Libya and DPRK fear of U.S. interception. Thus most of the missile related shipments from the DPRK were circuitously routed through third and fourth parties. For example, during 1992-93 missile related cargo was shipped through Tanzania, to Zimbabwe and then onto Libya. The 1999 Ku-wol San and Gatwick incidents (see history section) illustrate how convoluted some of these delivery efforts have been.
The first Hwasong 6 missiles are believed to have arrived during 1993-1994 and brief test campaigns may have occurred in October-November 1993 and again in mid 1994. Missile assembly (and possibly production) appears to have been centered around the al-Rabta and Tarhuna complexes, although some reports indicate that there were several additional facilities. No organizational changes among Libya's Scud B units are believed to have resulted from the acquisition of the Hwasong 6.
The nature and extent of DPRK technical assistance to the al-Jadid program is unclear. Also unclear is the relationship of the Hwasong 6 to the program. Unconfirmed reports suggest both that the Hwasong 6 replaced any previous efforts in the program, or that the al-Jadid program consists of several subcomponents: the Hwasong 6, a maintenance effort for existing Scud Bs, and an effort to develop an improved Scud B. The effort to establish a production capability for the al-Jadid or Hwasong 6 has suffered numerous setbacks during the 1990s as a result of the Western arms embargo against Libya. Significant examples of this are the 1999 Ku-wol San and Gatwick incidents (see history section). While Libya possesses the capability to maintain and assemble from knock-down kits Scud class ballistic missiles, it is unclear whether it possesses the capability to either manufacture the system or produce major variants.
As part of the al-Jadid and Hwasong 6 programs Libya is believed to have developed (possibly with DPRK and Iranian assistance) submunition and chemical warheads for these systems. It is also believed to have engaged in research and development of a biological warhead, however, the status of this effort is unknown.
From Libya the 500 km Hwasong 6 threatens Tunisia, most of Egypt and Algeria, Malta, Crete, parts of southern Italy, and portions of Niger, Chad and Sudan. However, after disclosure of its WMD and missile capabilities in December 2003, Libya committed itself to eliminate ballistic missiles with more than a 300 km range and 500 kg payload. The Hwasong 6 falls into this category and is the subject of elimination from Libya's stockpiles. According to some reports, five Hwasong 6 missiles, together with various nuclear materials have already been removed from Libya's stockpiles.
Nodong[38] Sometime during the first half of 1991 Libya and the DPRK are reported to have commenced negotiating a contract concerning the development of the Nodong. Although a final agreement concerning the Nodong was probably not signed until several years later Libya apparently agreed to provide financing for the project. This financing was believed to be conditioned upon the missile achieving certain program milestones and Libyan access to all its related technologies. When the system attained production status the DPRK would provide Libya with a small number of missiles and assistance in establishing a production capability.
Whether Libya has actually received complete Nodong missiles from the DPRK is unclear. Published reports, primarily from Israeli sources, indicate the following. Sometime during May 1996 that Libya and the DPRK concluded an agreement for the purchase of a small number of Nodong missiles, MELs, training, and assistance in establishing a production capability in Libya. Subsequent reports, however, indicate that during April 1999 a Libyan delegation traveled to P'yongyang to discuss delivery of Nodong missiles. Six months later Libyan Defense Minister General Abu Bakr Jaber also traveled to P'yongyang and reportedly finalized financing and delivery details for the Nodongs. The final agreement reportedly cost approximately $200 million and called for 50 Nodong missiles, seven MELs, technology transfer, assistance in establishing a maintenance infrastructure, and training over a period of five years. According to Israeli intelligence sources the first consignment of Nodong missiles and MELs reached Libya during July 2000. It arrived by air, aboard Libyan transports, and was accompanied by DPRK missile engineers and technicians. There may have been a second shipment in November 2000 and by August 2001 Libya is believed to have received 36 Nodong missiles and several MELs. Reportedly, the missiles were initially hidden in remote desert locations but were subsequently redeployed toward the coast. At least eleven DPRK missile engineers and technicians are in Libya to assist them in bringing the missiles to operational status. The remaining missiles, MELs, and support equipment will be delivered in three further consignments during 2001-2002. U.S. sources indicate that as of late 2001 Libya and the DPRK were negotiating future Nodong shipments.[39]
In contrast to the above assessment, the December 2001 judgment of the U.S. intelligence community appears to be that Libya has not received complete Nodong missiles.[40]
Throughout the 1990s Iran has maintained an undetermined level of WMD cooperation with Libya. During 1996 Iranian missile technicians traveled to Libya where they exchange information and provided assistance to Libya's missile programs. Reports suggest that Iran was providing technology, components and possibly Shehab 2 or Shehab 3 missiles. What these reports might actually be referring to was joint Iran-Libya-DPRK cooperation in the development or production of the Nodong/Shehab 3 which Libya was financing. During 2001 further reports appeared which indicated that Iranian Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) was installing manufacturing equipment in Libya to produce "advanced Scud missiles" at a factory that is part of Libya's al-Fatah missile program. Whether this equipment was for the Shehab 2 or 3 is presently unknown. It is reported that the first Nodong missiles had arrived in Libya by 2000 and that it was interested in manufacturing the system. Since the Shehab 3 is essentially a Nodong production equipment and technical assistance from Iran would be of value to Libya.
From Libya the 1,300 km Nodong threatens Israel, most of North Africa and southern Europe. Given Libya's longstanding program for the development and production of chemical weapons it is likely that they have a requirement for a Nodong chemical warhead. Whether they have received DPRK or Libyan assistance in this area, or if they are pursuing it independently, is unknown.
There is concern that Libya may also acquire the DPRK developed Taepodong if, and when, it becomes operational. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Libya is already providing funding for the system's development.
[34] Author interview data; "Mideast Missile Race Detailed," Al-Wasat, August 30, 1999, p. 20, as cited in FBIS; Gertz, Bill. "Libya Braces, Fears Attack From West," Washington Times, February 12, 1992, p. A1; Gertz, Bill. "Libya Mobilizing Forces, Taking Out Stored Arms," Washington Times, November 29, 1990, p. A3; "Libya Making ICBMs with W. German Aid," Washington Times, October 9, 1989, p. A2; and Robinson Jr., Clarence A. "France to Put Missile Secrets in Reach of Libya," Washington Times, Tuesday, July 18, 1989, p. A1.
[35] Author interview data; Gertz, Bill. "Beijing Delivered Missile Technology to Libya, U.S. Says," Washington Times, April 13, 2000, p. A1; "German Equipment Intended for Libyan Missiles Seized," Frankfurter Allgemeine, August 13, 1997, p. 4, as cited in FBIS; CIA. The Weapons Proliferation Threat, Nonproliferation Center, March 1995, pp. 8-13; "Firms Suspected of Selling Technology to Libya," Stern, December 1, 1994, p. 213, as cited in FBIS; "Libya Sells Al Fatah Design to Iranians," Flight International, April 14-20, 1993, p. 4; "Al-Qadhdhafi Said to Pass Missile Plans to Iran," Der Standard, April 13, 1993, p. 3, as cited in FBIS; and Gertz, Bill. "China Helps Algeria Develop Nuclear Weapons," Washington Times, April 11, 1991, p. A3.
[36] The official title of this facility is unknown so "Gawat missile test facility" is used here for readability.
[37] Author interview data; "Defense White Paper," Korea Herald, October 5, 1996, p. 3; "DPRK Missile Sales, Production Since Late 1980's," Korea Herald, July 12, 1996, p. 3; "NKorea Shipped 370 Missiles to Middle-East," Reuters, July 11, 1996; "NKorea-Missile," Associated Press, July 11, 1996; "Libya Considering Buying Missiles," Yonhap, May 3, 1996; Donnelly, John, "North Korean Missiles Loom As Top Ballistic Threat," Defense Week, July 3, 1995, pp. 1, 12; Darwish, Adel. "Tehran Missiles 'Can Reach Israel'," Independent, May 2, 1995, p. 10; "Iran-Missiles," Associated Press, February 16, 1993; "Iran/Libya Seek North Korean Missile," Flight International, 13-19 January 1993; Central Intelligence Agency, Address to the Annual Soref Symposium of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Gordan C. Oehler, National Intelligence Officer for Science, Technology, and Proliferation and Director, Nonproliferation Center, April 27, 1992; "Scuds-Mideast," Associated Press, March 13, 1992; "North Reportedly to Develop Missiles With Libya," Hanguk Ilbo, 17 February 1992, p. 1, as cited in FBIS; "DPRK Said Developing Improved Scud Missile;" Gertz, Bill, "Libya May Buy N. Korea Missiles," Washington Times, June 4, 1991, p. 4; "Qadhafi Financing Syrian Purchase of Scud C Missiles," Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, January 28-February 3, 1991, p. 2; and "A Case of Finding Evidence," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 14, 1990, pp. 54-56.
[38] Author interview data; "US. Sees Libyan Threat To Southern Europe," World Tribune, August 17, 2001; "Libya Obtains N. Korean No-Dong Missiles," World Tribune, August 8, 2001; "Kim Chong-il's Slush Funds," Wolgan Choson, November 1, 2001, pp. 222-236, as cited in FBIS; "Recent Study by KIDA Shows North Exports 50 Nodong Missiles," Choson Ilbo, April 6, 2001, as cited in FBIS; "N.K. Sold 540 Missiles to Middle Eastern Nations: Report," Yonhap, April 6, 2001; Gertz, Bill. "Weapons Sales Concern Seoul, United States," Washington Times, March 9, 2001, p. A1; Gertz, Bill and Scarborough Rowan. "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, February 2, 2001; "Report Claims Libya Deployed 'No Dong' Missiles Targeting NATO's European Bases," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 30, 2000, p. 2, as cited in FBIS; Coughlin, Con. "Missiles Deal Puts Israel in Gaddafi Sights," Sunday Telegraph, September 24, 2000; and "N.Korea sells missiles to Syria, Libya," United Press International, May 30, 2000; "UN Decision on Sanctions a Blow to Libyan Efforts," Reuters, November 15, 1996; "Defense White Paper," Korea Herald, October 5, 1996, p. 3; "DPRK Missile Sales, Production Since Late 1980's," Korea Herald, July 12, 1996, p. 3; "NKorea Shipped 370 Missiles to Middle-East," Reuters, July 11, 1996; "NKorea-Missile," Associated Press, July 11, 1996; and "Libya Considering Buying Missiles," Yonhap, May 3, 1996, as cited in FBIS.
[39] Some sources suggest the entire agreement was worth $600 million.
[40] Central Intelligence Agency. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Washington D.C., December 2001.
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