Al-Fatah[35]
The al-Fatah program began during the early 1980s and has commenced—in one form or another—till present. During the 1990s it is believed to have been split into two components "al-Fatah I" and "al-Fatah II." This, however, remains to be confirmed. Although the project has continued progress has been disappointing as a result of the international arms embargo upon Libya. Despite this a limited number of MELs and prototype missiles have been constructed and reports suggest that a number of test flights were conducted during the 1990s from the Gawat missile test facility.[36]
There are several reports that suggest that during 1993 Libya provided Iran with access to the al-Fatah program and that the two countries would jointly develop the system. While Libya may have shared data from the al-Fatah it is unlikely that Iran was very interested in it since it was already heavily committed to the Shehab 3 and 4 programs. What these reports might actually be referring to was Iran-Libya-DPRK cooperation in the development or production of the Nodong/Shehab 3 which Libya was financing.
In June 1998 PRC missile technicians were linked to the al-Fatah program. Their exact role, however, is unclear. In March 1999 the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Company entered into negotiations with Libya concerning a number of missile related technologies. In December of that year both parties concluded an agreement in which CPMIEC would provide Libya with a hypersonic wind tunnel. The wind tunnel would be utilized designing and testing key elements of a ballistic missile's design (e.g., nose cone design, warhead separation, terminal characteristics, etc.). It is believed that while the wind tunnel was acquired primarily for the al-Fatah program, it would also benefit the al-Jadid and al-Fajer efforts.
Despite DPRK, Iranian, and PRC assistance real progress within the al-Fatah program has been disappointing. This appears to have been directly attributable to the arms embargo against Libya, the vagaries and mercurial nature of the Qadhdhafi government, and deficiencies in personnel. Personnel deficiencies in technical fields probably began to resolve themselves during the mid 1990s as students from the late 1980s and early 1990s began to enter the various WMD programs. Deficiencies in project managers, especially those qualified in systems integration, are believed to still present significant problems.
Almost all-available information indicates that one of the goals of the al-Fatah program was to equip the system with a chemical warhead. This, combined with Libya's extensive chemical weapons program, strongly suggests that it has developed such a warhead. The effectiveness of such a warhead, however, is called into question for a variety of technical reasons, not the least of which is the reported small payload of the current variant of the missile.
Libyan efforts in 1999 to expand its Gawat missile test facility may indicate that some progress is being made within the al-Fatah program. Alternately, it might also indicate that Libya is preparing to test the Nodong.
[35] Author interview data; Gertz, Bill. "Beijing Delivered Missile Technology to Libya, U.S. Says," Washington Times, April 13, 2000, p. A1; "German Equipment Intended for Libyan Missiles Seized," Frankfurter Allgemeine, August 13, 1997, p. 4, as cited in FBIS; CIA. The Weapons Proliferation Threat, Nonproliferation Center, March 1995, pp. 8-13; "Firms Suspected of Selling Technology to Libya," Stern, December 1, 1994, p. 213, as cited in FBIS; "Libya Sells Al Fatah Design to Iranians," Flight International, April 14-20, 1993, p. 4; "Al-Qadhdhafi Said to Pass Missile Plans to Iran," Der Standard, April 13, 1993, p. 3, as cited in FBIS; and Gertz, Bill. "China Helps Algeria Develop Nuclear Weapons," Washington Times, April 11, 1991, p. A3.
[36] The official title of this facility is unknown so "Gawat missile test facility" is used here for readability.
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Updated April 2004 |
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