Hwasong 6 and al-Jadid[37]
Beginning from 1989 and continuing till today ballistic missile related cooperation between Libya and the DPRK has progressed steadily. Following the 1989 collapse of the M-9/DF-15 acquisition effort Libya entered into a wide range of ballistic missile related discussions with the DPRK. Included within these discussions were the acquisition of the Hwasong 6, acquisition of the Nodong (see below), and provision of technology and technical assistance to the al-Jadid program.
In May 1989 Libya concluded an agreement with the DPRK for the acquisition of 140 of the newly developed Hwasong 6 missiles at a cost of $170 million. Of these 140 missiles approximately 80 would be transferred to Syria and 60 would be retained by Libya. This agreement is believed to have also provided for DPRK technology transfer and technical assistance to the al-Jadid program, assistance in establishing a Hwasong 6 assembly (and possibly production) capability, provision of assembly and production equipment, training, and assistance in the expansion of the Gawat missile test facility. It is also likely that some DPRK provided technology and assistance found its way into the al-Fatah program.
The provision of this DPRK assistance was troublesome because of the Western arms embargo upon Libya and DPRK fear of U.S. interception. Thus most of the missile related shipments from the DPRK were circuitously routed through third and fourth parties. For example, during 1992-93 missile related cargo was shipped through Tanzania, to Zimbabwe and then onto Libya. The 1999 Ku-wol San and Gatwick incidents (see history section) illustrate how convoluted some of these delivery efforts have been.
The first Hwasong 6 missiles are believed to have arrived during 1993-1994 and brief test campaigns may have occurred in October-November 1993 and again in mid 1994. Missile assembly (and possibly production) appears to have been centered around the al-Rabta and Tarhuna complexes, although some reports indicate that there were several additional facilities. No organizational changes among Libya's Scud B units are believed to have resulted from the acquisition of the Hwasong 6.
The nature and extent of DPRK technical assistance to the al-Jadid program is unclear. Also unclear is the relationship of the Hwasong 6 to the program. Unconfirmed reports suggest both that the Hwasong 6 replaced any previous efforts in the program, or that the al-Jadid program consists of several subcomponents: the Hwasong 6, a maintenance effort for existing Scud Bs, and an effort to develop an improved Scud B. The effort to establish a production capability for the al-Jadid or Hwasong 6 has suffered numerous setbacks during the 1990s as a result of the Western arms embargo against Libya. Significant examples of this are the 1999 Ku-wol San and Gatwick incidents (see history section). While Libya possesses the capability to maintain and assemble from knock-down kits Scud class ballistic missiles, it is unclear whether it possesses the capability to either manufacture the system or produce major variants.
As part of the al-Jadid and Hwasong 6 programs Libya is believed to have developed (possibly with DPRK and Iranian assistance) submunition and chemical warheads for these systems. It is also believed to have engaged in research and development of a biological warhead, however, the status of this effort is unknown.
From Libya the 500 km Hwasong 6 threatens Tunisia, most of Egypt and Algeria, Malta, Crete, parts of southern Italy, and portions of Niger, Chad and Sudan. However, after disclosure of its WMD and missile capabilities in December 2003, Libya committed itself to eliminate ballistic missiles with more than a 300 km range and 500 kg payload. The Hwasong 6 falls into this category and is the subject of elimination from Libya's stockpiles. According to some reports, five Hwasong 6 missiles, together with various nuclear materials have already been removed from Libya's stockpiles.
[37] Author interview data; "Defense White Paper," Korea Herald, October 5, 1996, p. 3; "DPRK Missile Sales, Production Since Late 1980's," Korea Herald, July 12, 1996, p. 3; "NKorea Shipped 370 Missiles to Middle-East," Reuters, July 11, 1996; "NKorea-Missile," Associated Press, July 11, 1996; "Libya Considering Buying Missiles," Yonhap, May 3, 1996; Donnelly, John, "North Korean Missiles Loom As Top Ballistic Threat," Defense Week, July 3, 1995, pp. 1, 12; Darwish, Adel. "Tehran Missiles 'Can Reach Israel'," Independent, May 2, 1995, p. 10; "Iran-Missiles," Associated Press, February 16, 1993; "Iran/Libya Seek North Korean Missile," Flight International, 13-19 January 1993; Central Intelligence Agency, Address to the Annual Soref Symposium of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Gordan C. Oehler, National Intelligence Officer for Science, Technology, and Proliferation and Director, Nonproliferation Center, April 27, 1992; "Scuds-Mideast," Associated Press, March 13, 1992; "North Reportedly to Develop Missiles With Libya," Hanguk Ilbo, 17 February 1992, p. 1, as cited in FBIS; "DPRK Said Developing Improved Scud Missile;" Gertz, Bill, "Libya May Buy N. Korea Missiles," Washington Times, June 4, 1991, p. 4; "Qadhafi Financing Syrian Purchase of Scud C Missiles," Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly, January 28-February 3, 1991, p. 2; and "A Case of Finding Evidence," Jane's Defence Weekly, July 14, 1990, pp. 54-56.
 |
| |
Updated April 2004 |
|
|
