Nodong[38] Sometime during the first half of 1991 Libya and the DPRK are reported to have commenced negotiating a contract concerning the development of the Nodong. Although a final agreement concerning the Nodong was probably not signed until several years later Libya apparently agreed to provide financing for the project. This financing was believed to be conditioned upon the missile achieving certain program milestones and Libyan access to all its related technologies. When the system attained production status the DPRK would provide Libya with a small number of missiles and assistance in establishing a production capability.
Whether Libya has actually received complete Nodong missiles from the DPRK is unclear. Published reports, primarily from Israeli sources, indicate the following. Sometime during May 1996 that Libya and the DPRK concluded an agreement for the purchase of a small number of Nodong missiles, MELs, training, and assistance in establishing a production capability in Libya. Subsequent reports, however, indicate that during April 1999 a Libyan delegation traveled to P'yongyang to discuss delivery of Nodong missiles. Six months later Libyan Defense Minister General Abu Bakr Jaber also traveled to P'yongyang and reportedly finalized financing and delivery details for the Nodongs. The final agreement reportedly cost approximately $200 million and called for 50 Nodong missiles, seven MELs, technology transfer, assistance in establishing a maintenance infrastructure, and training over a period of five years. According to Israeli intelligence sources the first consignment of Nodong missiles and MELs reached Libya during July 2000. It arrived by air, aboard Libyan transports, and was accompanied by DPRK missile engineers and technicians. There may have been a second shipment in November 2000 and by August 2001 Libya is believed to have received 36 Nodong missiles and several MELs. Reportedly, the missiles were initially hidden in remote desert locations but were subsequently redeployed toward the coast. At least eleven DPRK missile engineers and technicians are in Libya to assist them in bringing the missiles to operational status. The remaining missiles, MELs, and support equipment will be delivered in three further consignments during 2001-2002. U.S. sources indicate that as of late 2001 Libya and the DPRK were negotiating future Nodong shipments.[39]
In contrast to the above assessment, the December 2001 judgment of the U.S. intelligence community appears to be that Libya has not received complete Nodong missiles.[40]
Throughout the 1990s Iran has maintained an undetermined level of WMD cooperation with Libya. During 1996 Iranian missile technicians traveled to Libya where they exchange information and provided assistance to Libya's missile programs. Reports suggest that Iran was providing technology, components and possibly Shehab 2 or Shehab 3 missiles. What these reports might actually be referring to was joint Iran-Libya-DPRK cooperation in the development or production of the Nodong/Shehab 3 which Libya was financing. During 2001 further reports appeared which indicated that Iranian Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) was installing manufacturing equipment in Libya to produce "advanced Scud missiles" at a factory that is part of Libya's al-Fatah missile program. Whether this equipment was for the Shehab 2 or 3 is presently unknown. It is reported that the first Nodong missiles had arrived in Libya by 2000 and that it was interested in manufacturing the system. Since the Shehab 3 is essentially a Nodong production equipment and technical assistance from Iran would be of value to Libya.
From Libya the 1,300 km Nodong threatens Israel, most of North Africa and southern Europe. Given Libya's longstanding program for the development and production of chemical weapons it is likely that they have a requirement for a Nodong chemical warhead. Whether they have received DPRK or Libyan assistance in this area, or if they are pursuing it independently, is unknown.
There is concern that Libya may also acquire the DPRK developed Taepodong if, and when, it becomes operational. Unconfirmed reports suggest that Libya is already providing funding for the system's development.
[38] Author interview data; "US. Sees Libyan Threat To Southern Europe," World Tribune, August 17, 2001; "Libya Obtains N. Korean No-Dong Missiles," World Tribune, August 8, 2001; "Kim Chong-il's Slush Funds," Wolgan Choson, November 1, 2001, pp. 222-236, as cited in FBIS; "Recent Study by KIDA Shows North Exports 50 Nodong Missiles," Choson Ilbo, April 6, 2001, as cited in FBIS; "N.K. Sold 540 Missiles to Middle Eastern Nations: Report," Yonhap, April 6, 2001; Gertz, Bill. "Weapons Sales Concern Seoul, United States," Washington Times, March 9, 2001, p. A1; Gertz, Bill and Scarborough Rowan. "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, February 2, 2001; "Report Claims Libya Deployed 'No Dong' Missiles Targeting NATO's European Bases," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, September 30, 2000, p. 2, as cited in FBIS; Coughlin, Con. "Missiles Deal Puts Israel in Gaddafi Sights," Sunday Telegraph, September 24, 2000; and "N.Korea sells missiles to Syria, Libya," United Press International, May 30, 2000; "UN Decision on Sanctions a Blow to Libyan Efforts," Reuters, November 15, 1996; "Defense White Paper," Korea Herald, October 5, 1996, p. 3; "DPRK Missile Sales, Production Since Late 1980's," Korea Herald, July 12, 1996, p. 3; "NKorea Shipped 370 Missiles to Middle-East," Reuters, July 11, 1996; "NKorea-Missile," Associated Press, July 11, 1996; and "Libya Considering Buying Missiles," Yonhap, May 3, 1996, as cited in FBIS.
[39] Some sources suggest the entire agreement was worth $600 million.
[40] Central Intelligence Agency. Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015, Washington D.C., December 2001.
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Updated April 2004 |
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