North Korea probably converted either the Man'gyŏngdae Electric Machinery Factory or the No. 125 Factory, or possibly both facilities, to assemble the Hwasŏng-6 when full-scale production began around 1990-1991. These plants, both in the Pyongyang area, probably produced the Hwasŏng-5 (Scud-B). The Second Economic Committee, under the National Defense Commission, is responsible for all ballistic missile production in North Korea.

The development timeline of the Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 appears to be almost impossible to achieve without extensive foreign assistance. Pyongyang has received foreign assistance for its missiles from several sources, including Russia, China, Egypt, and Iran. Foreign assistance has ranged from Iranian financial support and Chinese technical training in aerospace engineering, to the pro-North Korean General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Choch'ongnyŏn) providing Japanese semiconductors. There is also strong evidence that North Korea acquired foreign-made precision machine tools that are needed for missile manufacturing.

North Korea's first reported flight test of a "Scud-C" was in May 1986, but this single report is almost certainly erroneous.[2] Pilot production of the Hwasŏng-6 reportedly began in late 1989, which precedes the first credible report of a successful flight test in June 1990.[3] There is one report of a failed flight test sometime between 1990 and August 1992, but this could be a mistaken reference to the Nodong flight test failure in May 1990.[4] Around the time of the first successful flight test in June 1990, North Korea was already starting full-scale production (about four-five missiles per month) and helping Egypt set up a Scud-C production facility outside of Cairo.[5]

As the Hwasŏng-6 began rolling off the production line, North Korea already had bases for their deployment. In the mid-1980s, the North Korean Air Force Construction Department under the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces Construction Bureau had broken ground on the construction of Hwasŏng-5 missile bases, including a base in Shin'gye-kun, North Hwanghae Province.[6] Since the external dimensions, fuel, oxidizer and other components of the Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 are essentially identical, the missiles should be interchangeable at missile bases and launch sites.

The Yong'aksan Trading Company (龍岳産貿易商社) under the Second Economic Committee's External Economic Bureau handles missile exports, and the Ch'anggwang Credit Bank (創光信用銀行) receives payment from buyers.[7] The foreign exchange earnings from missile exports have enabled Pyongyang to continue or expand its procurement of components and technology from abroad for missile development. Unfortunately, there is no credible open source information about North Korea's internal budget or expenditures on the Hwasŏng-6 or other ballistic missiles.

On 10 December 2002, Spanish and US naval ships intercepted the North Korean ship Sŏsan en route to Yemen. The Sŏsan cargo included 15 Scud missiles, conventional warheads, and 85 drums of "inhibited red fuming nitric acid," which is used as an oxidizer for Scud missile fuel.[8] North Korea declared the interception of the Sŏsan an "act of piracy" and has demanded "compensation for the losses and personal trauma experienced by the crew members."[9] It is unclear whether the missiles were Scud-B or Scud-C models.

North Korea has an "inventory of over 500 Scud missiles of various types," but the distribution of Hwasŏng-5 and Hwasŏng-6 missiles among this 500 is not clear.[10] On 29 April 2002, Lieutenant General Daniel R. Zanini, Commander Eighth United States Army, said that North Korea's missile inventory "approaches 1,000" during a speech at a Korea Institute for Defense Analyses seminar in Seoul.[11] Zanini's statement was widely misquoted in the press as "North Korea possesses 1,000 missiles" or "over 1,000 missiles." However, considering Nodong and possible Paektusan deployments, "approaching 1,000" is a credible rough estimate of North Korea's arsenal of ballistic missiles.

Technical Assessment
This missile originates from the Soviet R-17 missile and is designed for maximum performance using the same engine, and probably the guidance system, as the R-17. At present, available data are too limited to properly establish the history of this missile, including its connections to other programs. This holds especially true for the possible relationship between the Soviet Union and North Korea concerning the system.

The missile resembles a typical guided liquid rocket designed for maximum propellant load. It consists of a main engine, one propellant tank with a common bulkhead with an internal fuel line, a separate guidance compartment, and a conical warhead.

The basic construction material is stainless steel plus some air frame structural elements made of aluminum alloy. In this respect, and in terms of dimensions, it does not differ from Hwasŏng-5.

The propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine using the storable propellant combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acrid (IRFNA) and kerosene. Ignition is accomplished by a hypergolic (self-igniting) start fuel designated Tonka--the WW II German designator for this propellant--filled into the fuel line at the main fuel valve. The propellant fed system is a turbo pump driven by a bipropellant gas generator using the main propellants. The start and shut down valves are one shot devices, actuated by pyrotechnic charges. For improving accuracy, the engine is equipped with mechanical controls for the correct thrust level and mixture ratio. Tank pressurization is performed by air stored in high-pressure bottles in the missile's tail section and heated by the turbine exhaust gases.

The guidance system basically resembles that of the A4/V2 arrangement, however, with some modifications for accuracy improvement. Prior to launch, the missile is orientated such that the trajectory plane hits the target and the guidance systems keeps the missile in this plane. Three body-mounted gyros are used for attitude and lateral acceleration control. A pendulum integration gyro assembly serves for speed control. Thrust vector control is accomplished by four jet vanes.

The warhead with approximately 75 percent explosive material is initiated by an impact fuse.

The missile is transported and launched by the Soviet MAZ 543 erector and launcher.

[1] Interview with Kim Kil Sŏn by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 10 April 2001, Seoul; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 272-273; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 14-15; Kyodo News Service, "Asian News; N. Korea Deploys Scuds, May Reach Whole S. Korea in 1992," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; United Press International, "North Korea Builds Own Scud Missiles," 2 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Yonhap News Agency, 2 February 1991, in "Information Provided on DPRK Scud Missiles," JPRS-TND-91-003, 25 February 1991, pp. 6-7.
[2] Korean language news articles quoting the South Korean Defense Minister around 24 June 1993 do not include information regarding a Scud-C flight test in 1986. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) translation could be in error. See Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19.
[3] For reports of pilot production of the Scud-C (Hwasŏng-6), see Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 16; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), p. 273. For reports of the first successful Scud-C flight test, see Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, p. 185; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 272-273; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 203; "A Lonely State of Defiance," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 August 1992, pp. 26-27; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.
[4] For a report of the possible Scud-C launch failure, see "A Lonely State of Defiance," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 August 1992, pp. 26-27. For reports of the failed Nodong flight test, see Bill Gertz, "Libya May Buy N. Korean Missiles," Washington Times, 4 June 1991, p. 4; Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry: May Nodong-1 Test Successful," FBIS-EAS-93-120, 24 June 1993, p. 19; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 21; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, April 1995, p. 186; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 280-281; "Pukhan, Sae T'ando Missile Saengsan-Haekt'apchae Kanŭng," Joongang Ilbo, 5 June 1990, <http://www.joins.com>; "Pukhan Kaebal T'ando Missile Ch'otshihŏmbalsa--Mijŏngbogigwandŭl Punsŏk," Joongang Ilbo, 6 July 1990, <http://www.joins.com>.
[5] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 16; Steven Emerson, "The Postwar Scud Boom," Wall Street Journal, 10 July 1991, p. A12.
[6] Interview with North Korean defector Im Yŏng Sŏn by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 14 December 2001, Seoul.
[7] Lee Kyo Kwan, "[NK Report] Pukhan Missile Such'ul Ŏddŏhke Hana?" Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, <http://www.chosun.com/>; Yi Kyo-kwan, "How Does North Korea Export Missiles?" Chosun Ilbo, 5 March 2002, in "DPRK Said to Export Body, Main Parts of Missiles Separately," FBIS Document ID KPP20020305000112.
[8] Matt Kelley, "Ship Carrying Dozen North Korean Missiles Intercepted in Arabian Sea," Associated Press, 11 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Scud Missile Found on Ship from Yemen," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Tom Raum, "Ship Carrying Dozen North Korean Missiles Intercepted in Arabian Sea," Associated Press, 10 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Yiftah S. Shapir, "North Korean Missiles for Yemen: Is There a Missing Link?" Tel Aviv Notes, 22 December 2002, No. 59, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies; "15 Scud Missiles Found on Ship from N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
[9] "Chosŏn'oemusŏng Taebyŏn'in Mi'gug'ŭi <Sŏsan>Ho Ch'imbŏm'ŭn Haejŏkhaeng'wi," Korean Central News Agency, 13 December 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/>; Central Broadcasting Station, 13 December 2002, in "North Korea Calls for Apology, Compensation in 'Raiding' of 'Cargo Ship' Incident," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 13 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
[10] "Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command & Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress Senate Armed Services Committee, 5 March 2002, p. 8, <http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/
statemnt/2002/Schwartz.pdf>; "Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Leon J. LaPorte, USA Nominee for the Position of Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces Korea," April 2002, <http://www.senate.gov/~armed_services/statemnt/%202002/April/LaPorte.pdf>.
[11] "US Commander Warns of NK's Enhanced Missile Capabilities," Korea Times, 30 April 2002, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/>; "North Korea Possesses 1,000 Ballistic Missiles says Zanini," Joongang Ilbo, 1 May 2002, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Yonhap News Agency, 29 April 2002, in "Eighth US Army Commander Reportedly Notes DPRK's 'Big Increase' in Missiles," FBIS Document ID: KPP20020429000092; Yu Yong Wŏn, "[Mi 8 Kunsaryŏnggwan] 'Pukhan, Kosŏngnŭng Missile 1000 Kiboyu'," Chosun Ilbo, 29 April 2002, <http://www.chosun.com/>; Sŏng Dong Ki, "'Puk Missile 1000 Yŏgae Poyu' Mi 8 Kun SaryOnggwan Palghyŏ," Donga Ilbo, 29 April 2002, <http://www.donga.com/>; Kim Min Sŏk, "Puk, T'ando Missile 1 Ch'ŏnbal," Joongang Ilbo, 30 April 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.

	Updated May 2003