Location: Taegwan-kun (大館郡), North P’yŏng’an Province (平安北道), North Korea [Note: The facility is located under Mt. Ch’ŏnma, which rises to 1,116m above sea level. Mt. Ch’ŏnma is 40km to the southwest of Taegwan-ŭp, Taegwan-kun, and 30km to the northwest of Kŭmch’ang-ri. No one reportedly lives within 10km of the facility.]

Subordinate to: Probably the 5th Machine Industry Bureau (5機械工業總局), Korean Workers Party (朝鮮勞動黨) [Note: The 5th Machine Industry Bureau was originally under the Atomic Energy Committee (原子力委員會), which is currently called the General Department of Atomic Energy (原子力總局). However, in 1987, when the Atomic Energy Committee was renamed the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry (原子力工業部), the 5th Machine Industry Bureau was directly placed under the Korean Workers Party.]

Size: About 10 rooms; a total of approximately 535 workers, including about 100 management personnel, about 35 technicians, and about 400 political prisoners assigned to dangerous and physically taxing duties. About 16 technicians work in the underground operations.

Primary Function: Milling (production of U3O8, or yellow cake, from uranium ore), possible production of highly enriched uranium (HEU)

Description: Most of the information regarding the Ch’ŏnma-san Uranium Milling Facility is based upon the testimony of North Korean defector Lee Ch’un Sŏn, a former KPA brigadier general who defected to China in 1999. Lee claimed that this facility is known as the “Ch’ŏnma-san Power Plant,” but that it is actually an underground uranium milling facility that produces yellowcake. According to Lee, this facility vents its exhaust fumes at the Kumchang-ri underground facility, which has been suspected of being a clandestine nuclear-related facility. [Note: See the Kŭmch’ang-ri Underground Facility (金昌里地下施設).]

According to Lee, North Korea initially planned to build a “nuclear production base (核 生産基地)” in the Mt. Ch’ŏnma area in 1983. Tunnel excavation began in 1983, and full-scale construction of the facility began in 1984. Lee claimed the Second Division under the Air Force Construction Bureau (空軍建設部) of the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces was in charge of the construction. [Note: This contradicts other reports that claim the Third Engineer Bureau of the Nuclear Development Unit (核開發部隊3工兵局) builds all underground nuclear facilities.] The general explanation for the construction project was that a power plant was being built and the plant needed an underground waterway passing through Mt. Ch’ŏnma. However, the tunnels were actually being constructed to house a nuclear material production site. The tunnel construction was completed at the end of 1986, and technicians began to install equipment in early 1987. The facility began to produce yellow cake at the end of 1989.

Lee claimed that this facility milled uranium ore that had been extracted from mines in Sŏngch’ŏn-kun (成川郡) in South P’yŏng’an Province and Sŏhŭng-kun (瑞興郡) in North Hwanghae Province. However, there are no other reports of uranium mines in these areas. It is possible that Lee was confused with uranium mines in Sunch’ŏn-kun, South P’yŏng’an Province and in P’yŏnsan-kun, North Hwanghae Province. [Note: The pronunciation of “Sŏngch’ŏn-kun” and “Sunch’ŏn-kun” are similar, and they are about 20-40km apart in the same province. Sŏhŭng-kun is adjacent to P’yŏngsan-kun in North Hwanghae Province, and the mine could be in the mountain range that separates the two counties (kun or 郡). Therefore, Lee could have been referring to what is known as the P’yŏngsan Uranium Mine.] A regiment in the Transport Bureau under the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces delivers uranium ore to this facility by truck. The regiment uses about 30 Soviet-made trucks with hauling capacities of five tons.

The facility has three steel security gates between the entrance and the production site. Inside the facility, there are about 10 rooms that are found about 600m to the right from the third security gate. The size and function of each room follows:

• (業務室): A dressing room where technicians and workers change into protective gear. This room is also used as a lounge.
• Ore Room No. One (1號鑛石場): This room contains equipment and tanks for the “separation” or concentration of uranium ore. This room is about 50m x 60m.
• Room No. Two (2號鑛石場): This room contains equipment to further process the output from Ore Room No. One. This room also contains tanks and is about the same size as Ore Room No. One.
  Room (乾燥室): This room is used to “dry” the output from Ore Room No. Two. This room is about 20m x 20m with a 20m-high ceiling.
• Smelting Rooms No. One-Four (1/ 2/ 3/ 4號鎔融室): These rooms house equipment for smelting and are about 20m x 20m with 20m-high ceilings. The walls in these rooms are covered with 20-mm thick aluminum plates.
• Room (包裝室): This room is used to pack the refined uranium in airtight containers. This room is about 20m x 20m with a 4m-high ceiling. The walls in this room are also covered with 20-mm thick aluminum plates.
• Output Storage Room (製品倉庫): This room is used to store the containers of refined uranium. This room is about 30m x 20m with a 4m-high ceiling.

About 100 meters from the Output Storage Room is another tunnel off to the right. At about 20 meters inside the tunnel is an underground nuclear waste disposal area (核廢棄物處分場). This area is about 100m x 50m, and about 5m high. This area is also covered with 5-mm thick aluminum plates. There is also a helicopter pad outside the facility, and two check points to control access to the site.

This facility has a director and three deputy directors responsible for administration, general affairs, and technology. There is also a general technological director. The director and the general technological director are KPA colonels. The deputy directors of administration and general affairs are lieutenant colonels, and the deputy director of technology is a major. The general technological director supervises all technicians and the following seven divisions at the facility:

• Production Division (生産課): Production of nuclear material
• Technology Division (技術課): Technical appraisal of ore and analysis of content
• Planning Division (計劃課): Establishment of production plans and implementation of production directives
• Labor Division (勞務課): Allocation of duties among technicians and workers
• Labor Safety Division (勞動安全課): Supervision of personnel and facility safety
• Equipment and Material Division (機資材課): Purchase, repair, and maintenance of production equipment and materials
• General Affairs Division (庶務課): Administrative matters for employees and their families

Most of the active duty military personnel at the facility are over 40 years of age with families, and they do not wear military uniforms.

In October 2002, North Korea admitted that it possesses a program to enrich uranium, and the Ch’ŏnma-san facility is a suspected or potential site for this uranium enrichment program.

	Updated March 2003

Key Sources:
“Pukhan Inmingun Changsŏnŭi Ch’unggyŏkjŭngŏn,” Shindonga, August 2001, <http://www.donga.com>; Shindonga, “Exclusive—Shocking Testimony of Defected DPRK General, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Material Production Base Exists Under Mt. Ch’onma,” 1 August 2001, pp. 196-204, in “DPRK General: Nuclear Material Production Base Exists Underground Mt. Ch’onma,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20010725000058; “Puk Ch’ŏnmasansŏ Uranium Chŏngnyŏnshisŏl,” Hankook Ilbo, 10 June 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “Nambukjŏngsanghoedam/Kakdang Pan’ŭng Yŏ ‘Pyŏl’il’anida’ Ya ‘Pukchaengnyak Ŭishim’,” Hankook Ilbo, 12 June 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “Pukhan’ŭi Haekkaebal Kujo Mit Ŭiji,” Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute, <http://www.kaeri.re.kr>; Press Statement, Richard Boucher, Spokesman, “North Korean Nuclear Program,” U.S. Department of State, 16 October 2002, <http://www.state.gov>; Joby Warrick, “U.S. Followed the Aluminum,” Washington Post, 18 October 2002, p. A1, <http://www.washingtonpost.com>; David E. Sanger and James Dao, “U.S. Says Pakistan Gave Technology to North Korea,” New York Times, 18 October 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com>; David E. Sanger, “North Korea Says It Has a Program on Nuclear Arms,” New York Times, p. A1, 17 October 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com>; Oh Young-hwan, “North Continued Nuclear-Arms Project,” Joongang Ilbo, 18 October 2002, <http://english.joins.com>.