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No. 102 Factory (第102號工場)

Other names:
Factory 102 , July 7th Complex (7月7日聯合企業所), Ŭndŏk-kun Chemical Factory (恩德郡化學工場), 7.7 Complex

[Note: The No. 102 Factory is one of the four affiliated factories of the July 7th Complex (Ŭndŏk-kun Chemical Factory). The 102 Factory is responsible for Chemical Weapons production.]

Location: July 7th Complex (7月7日聯合企業所), in a mountainous village north of Ŭndŏk-kun, south of Songhak-ri (松鶴里), Songnimgol (송림골), Ŭndŏk-ŭp
(恩德邑), Ŭndŏk-kun (恩德郡), North Hamgyŏng Province (咸鏡北道), North Korea

Subordinate to: July 7th Complex (7月7日聯合企業所), 5th Machine Industry Bureau (第5機械産業總局), the Second Economic Committee (第2經濟委員會). [Note: In 1994, following a restructuring of the Korean People's Armed Forces, control of the No. 102 Factory was transferred from the Operations Bureau (作戰局) to the Technology and Equipment Bureau (技術裝備局) within the General Staff Department (總參謀部) under the Ministry of People's Armed Forces (MPAF). At the end of 1994, the No. 102 Factory was placed under the administration of Second Economic Committee (第2經濟委員會).]

Size: Approximately 200 employees. Around 50-100 are management personnel and 10-35 are technicians. There are approximately 120 political prisoners who are in charge of carrying out physically challenging and dangerous duties.

Primary Function: Production of unknown chemical agents

Description: Details on this facility are mostly provided by defector Lee Ch'un Sŏn. According to Lee, ammonia (NH3) and nitrogen dioxide (NO2) are delivered here via pipes from a separate Ŭndŏk chemical factory. Nitrogen dioxide is then mixed with sulfur dioxide (S02), heated, and combusted with mercury. The product, its exact chemical formula unknown, is brought in sealed tanks and filled into glass bottles, presumably after being put under pressure. These glass vessels are then transported by helicopter to the No. 108 Factory in Kanggye, which produces artillery shells. Each projectile weighs about 46kg, and has a diameter of 255mm. This ordnance is "aimed at killing and wounding human beings through respiratory paralysis.

Construction of the No. 102 Factory began in 1989 under the supervision Major General Kim Man Nyŏn. Dr. Lee Yŏng Hŭi supervised the technical aspects of the facility's construction. Lee, daughter of Lee Sŏng Il, a famous North Korean scholar in applied chemistry, earned a doctorate in chemical engineering in Moscow. The staff is active duty soldiers but the technicians are presumed to be civilians. According to Lee Ch'un Sŏn, Major Lee Yŏng Paek was facility's manager at least until the time of his defection, which was in 2001. Housing for staff and families are located about 3km south of the July 7th Complex, and workers ride a bus to get to the factory.

Ironically, while attempting to show it is involved in chemical weapons manufacture, Lee Ch'un Sŏn's very detailed testimony about the workings in the No. 102 Factory actually fails to substantiate allegations that the facility has any clear role in the production of CW agents. The chemical process explained by Lee is unrelated to any known CW agent. Sulfur and nitrogen oxides are well known as lung irritants; however, their effectiveness as battlefield gases (these agents would be in true gaseous form) would be insignificant. Lee Ch'un Sŏn is likely describing something closer to nitric acid production, or explosives manufacturing. For example, nitroglycerine is produced with nitric acid and sulfuric acid. The use of mercury is difficult to assess here, although some initiating explosives (fulminate of mercury) may also be produced at Factory 102.



 

Updated April 2003

Key Sources:
"Pukhan Inmingun Changsŏnŭi Ch'unggyŏkjŭng'ŏn," Shindonga, August 2001, <http://www.donga.com/>; Choi Yŏng Jae, "Miguk'ŭi Pukhan Saenghwahangmugi Appak Chŏllyak," Shindonga, January 2002, <http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine>; Ch'oe Yong-chae, Shindonga, 1 January 2002, pp. 300-313, in "US Strategy Pressuring DPRK on Biological, Chemical Weapon," FBIS Doc ID: KPP20011220000016; Katsuhiro Kuroda, Sankei Shimbun, 10 June 2000, in "DPRK Manufactures Chemical Weapons," FBIS Document ID: JPP20000610000025.



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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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