Although some recent developments have shed light on North Korea's BW-related procurement strategies, little is known about North Korean transfers or acquisition of BW-related technology, equipment, pathogens, or media. Some assessments report that much, if not all, of North Korean work in biological weaponry has been indigenously produced, while others cite fragmentary evidence of outside assistance from other nations. For example, in one account, authors in the book Plague Wars (Mangold and Golderg, 1999):

Western military analysts have long been suspicious that the North Koreans modeled their BW program after the Soviet military's program. Some US officials suspected (but had no proof) that the Soviets helped the North Korean BW program during the Cold War--prior to 1991--because everything the North Koreans seemed to be doing was a poor copy of the Soviet system, facilities, and agents. Further suspicions about Soviet-North Korean cooperation centers around the special make-up of North Korean anthrax, [that] has a distinctive Soviet fingerprint on it.

Other reports have suggested possible collaboration with other nations; these suspicions are in part due to reports of visits by the DPRK military's chief of general staff, Ch'oe Kwang, bioscience and biotechnology institutes in places such as Cuba, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, and Syria. It is unknown from the open literature if North Korea has exported BW-related technology or pathogens to other nations or groups.

Biological agents/pathogens: Imports

Pak Tong Sam reported in the South Korean journal of North Korean affairs, Pukhan, that in 1968 North Korea imported pathogen cultures, such as Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague), and Vibrio cholerae (cholera) probably from culture collections in Japan. No more details are provided as to their virulence or stated purposes for research (presumably for public health). In May 1994, citing an unidentified source, a report by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency claimed that Russia had sent smallpox virus to North Korea and Iraq some time in the late 1980s or early 1990s.

DPRK Trade in Dual-Use Biotechnology Imports

In 1984, Kim Il-sung visited the former East Germany, from which loans and a turnkey plant for agar (growth media) were reportedly obtained. While such growth media could have numerous uses, South Korean and other analysts have used this purchase as basis for estimating North Korean BW production.

Much of North Korea's advanced biotech-related equipment are of Japanese origin and were likely acquired with the assistance of North Koreans residing in Japan through illegal export practices. Japanese authorities announced in May 2003 that they identified six trading companies associated with North Korean residents which had received purchase orders from North Korea for dual-use equipment. In a highly publicized case in 2006, Japanese police raided about 10 locations, including the offices of the company Seishin, on suspicion that the company exported a freeze dryer (which could be used to produce biological weapons) to North Korea via Taiwan in 2002.

North Korea has also acquired equipment from other nations, including a peptide sequencer produced by Advanced Chemtech (USA). The latter instrument was probably purchased second hand by way of Germany, according to statements by the original manufacturer. In late 2007, Taiwan announced it was investigating the transfer to North Korea of an industrial filtering device that could be used in the preparation of biological weapons.

According to reports in open source literature, including North Korean media, the DPRK's "Aeguk" (patriotic) biological institutes perform research and development of vaccines (including a North Korean version of hepatitis B vaccine), diagnostics, and production of "effective microorganisms" for agriculture. North Korean research institutes are also exploring genetic engineering techniques (for agricultural purposes), cloning, and toxin isolation for therapeutics, despite the country's poor economic condition, antiquated laboratories, and isolation from the world's scientific community. With little or no communication with the outside world, North Korea must rely on personnel at its diplomatic posts to secure scientific information which may assist these research efforts. While theoretically these manufacturing methods and microbial techniques have dual-use implications, there is no evidence to show that these facilities are involved in BW-related research or development.

	Updated January 2008

Key Sources:
Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001) p. 231;  Pak Tong Sam, "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655; William J. Broad and Judith Miller, "Government Report Says 3 Nations Hide Stocks of Smallpox," New York Times, 13 June 1999, p. 1; Yi Son-ho, "North Korea's Technology for the Development of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Its Ability," Pukhan, November 1998, pp. 38-51, translated in FBIS Document SK2111131598; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing the North Korean BW Arsenal," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 8, August 1998, pp. 28-29; “Six Japanese Firms Received Orders for WMD-Related Materials from DPRK,” Sankei Shimbun (Tokyo), 19 May 2003, OSC Document JPP20030520000099; “Illicit Trafficking: Japanese Export Controls Under Scrutiny as Revelations of Illicit Transfers Continue,” International Export Control Observer, March 2006, p. 9, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/observer/pdfs/ieco_0603e.pdf; Daniel Pinkston and Dave Kim, “North Korea's Financial Network is the Target of Wide-Ranging Nonproliferation Sanctions,” WMD Insights, December 2006/January 2007, p. 21, http://www.wmdinsights.com/PDF/WMDInsights_
DecJan07Issue_corrected.pdf; Richard Stone, “A Wary Pas de Deux,” Science 305 (17 September 2004), p. 1696.