North Korea ranks among the largest possessors of chemical weapons in the world. If official reports and testimonies from North Korean defectors are to be believed, the DPRK military possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons. (It is not clear, however, if this amount includes the munitions or only the CW agents themselves.) Reportedly, the CW agents in the North Korean arsenal include all of the major classes, such as phosgene (choking), hydrogen cyanide (blood), mustard (blister) and sarin (nerve agent). However, a 2002 report from the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, General Thomas A. Schwartz, also suggests that North Korea is self-sufficient only in World War I era CW agents--these would include compounds such as phosgene, Lewisite, and mustard blister agents, but not the more potent nerve agent classes. Recent reports and documentary evidence from North Korean defectors suggest that the regime tested chemical agents on humans, especially prisoners, as recently as 2002.

During the three decades after the establishment of the DPRK (in 1947), the North Korean CW program had uneven success in obtaining and weaponizing CW agents. However, Pyongyang appears to have increased its capacity in the last two decades not only in CW agent production but also the development and deployment of a variety of chemical delivery systems. According to defector accounts, North Korea's long-range missiles such as the Nodong, and other ballistic rockets and artillery pieces with calibres larger than 80mm, are capable of delivering CW agents. North Korea appears to be continuing to improve its CW delivery capability, as evidenced by the recent development of the KN-2 short-range missile. Despite North Korea's moribund economy, the quantity and quality of new artillery placed near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) have increased in the last several years. Many of these artillery platforms, including multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) of up to 320mm, are forwardly deployed near the DMZ. This deployment represents a significant threat to heavily populated Seoul, as well as to the entire peninsula in the event of a southward invasion by the Korean People's Army (KPA).

Background

As early as 1947, the KPA manual addressed at least the theory of CW operational doctrine. It noted the utility of forcing the enemy to "suit up" in preparation for real or imagined use of chemical agents, for doing so would degrade the fighting ability of enemy forces. By 1954, the KPA established nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense units, probably along the lines of the Soviet model. According to some accounts, North Korea's offensive CW program also began at this time, relying mostly on Chinese assistance for chemical weapons development. Kim Il Sung's "Declaration for Chemicalization" in 1961 called for the further development of a chemical industry to support chemical weapons production, and the basic organization of the current Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) was also established during this time.

In 1966, for reasons that are unclear, North Korea turned to the Soviets for assistance in its CW development, mostly in the form of training manuals and small quantities of nerve and mustard agents. Following this period of Soviet-led assistance, North Korea made substantive gains in the area of chemical warfare. Still, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated in May 1979 that North Korea had only a defensive capability in CW, while noting that its development of offensive chemical weapons would have been the next logical step. By the late 1980s, it was reported that North Korea was able to produce CW agents in large quantity, and deployed large numbers of chemical ordnance. In January 1987, the South Korean defense ministry told the South Korean press that Pyongyang possessed up to 250 tons of chemical weapons, including blister (mustard) and nerve agents. Recent estimates of North Korean chemical ordnance by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) have since been raised to the thousands of tons, probably based on recent information provided by North Korean defectors, including former members of DPRK military and NBC defence organizations. In its 2006 defense white paper, the ROK MND estimated that North Korea possessed 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical agents, including nerve agents.

The Suspected North Korean Chemical Weapons Arsenal

North Korea is believed to maintain mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-series nerve agents. (Other reports from DPRK defectors--including allegations of a "nitrogen, sulfur, and mercury" chemical weapon that causes "respiratory paralysis""are considered less credible.) Officials at the South Korean Agency for Defense Development have estimated that North Korea's chemical weapons production capability is 4,500 tons annually in peacetime, and this could increase to 12,000 tons in wartime. An unknown quantity of CW agents is stored in bulk, but a significant portion is reported to be filled into artillery shells and rocket warheads. Due to challenges posed by a limited source of indigenously produced precursors for CW agents, it is believed that North Korea emphasizes production of phosgene, mustard, sarin, and V-agents. (Previous reports have also alleged a large stock of sarin nerve agent.) In 2001, it was estimated that there were 12 facilities in North Korea where raw chemicals, precursors, and CW agents are produced and/or stored. CW agents are then moved to either a Sakchu- or Kanggye-based chemical weapons facility for weaponization, i.e., the filling of weapons with agents for deployment. It is also reported that shipments of CW agents are conducted in such a way so as not to attract undue attention, and are camouflaged as ordinary military cargo.

CW Agents

Open-source assessments of North Korean chemical weapons stockpiles have changed significantly over the past decade. Reports by defectors and other accounts in the open literature indicate that North Korea currently possesses blister (e.g., mustard), nerve (e.g., sarin), choking (e.g., phosgene), and blood agents (e.g., hydrogen cyanide). A North Korean defector in 1997 told a U.S. Congressional committee that the DPRK possessed the blister agent Lewisite in its arsenal. VE and VG nerve agents are also mentioned in South Korean assessments of North Korea's chemical weapons, although these reports do not appear to be based on hard data but rather on inference. A 1999 report by the U.S. Congress stated the following with regard to how the North Korean military views chemical weaponry:

"Reflecting Soviet military doctrine, the DPRK has traditionally viewed chemical weapons as an integral part of any military offensive. There are no indications that this view has altered since the end of the Cold War. The most obvious tactical use of chemical weapons by the DPRK would be to terrorize South Korean civilians. Seoul lies within easy striking distance of North Korea's artillery and rocket systems and, today, the South Korean civilian population has no protection against CW attack."

Allegations of Chemical Agent Experimentation on Humans

In 2004, the BBC produced a documentary, entitled "Access to Evil," which alleged that North Korea had executed political prisoners using chemical agents for the purpose of chemical weapons development. The documentary featured the testimony of a former North Korean prison officer who witnessed entire families being gassed. In addition, rare documentary evidence, in the form of prisoner "letter of transfer" forms that had been smuggled out of North Korea by an engineer at the February 8 Vinalon Complex in Hamhung, was presented to corroborate the officer's story. Other defectors have made similar claims previously (and since), but hard documentary evidence has been scarce. While North Korea naturally denies charges made by defectors, it must be noted that South Korea generally expresses public skepticism of defector claims (possibly in order to avoid inflaming tensions with the North). As observed by the US Department of State in its 2007 International Religious Freedom Report, defector allegations are extremely difficult to verify rigorously due to the closed nature of the North Korean state.

Delivery Systems

Over half of North Korea's 1.2 million-man army is deployed within 90 miles of the DMZ, as are thousands of artillery systems. Because chemical weapons are best suited for delivery with larger caliber artillery pieces, it is worth noting that over the last two years the North has further increased the number of long-range 240mm multiple rocket launcher systems and 170mm howitzers, all placed in hardened sites near the DMZ.

North Korea's chemical defense force is estimated to be around 13,000 personnel, probably making it the third-largest CW service in the world, with chemical defense units incorporated at the regimental level. The Hamhung Chemical Engineering College is responsible for much of the training of the Korean People's Army in CW defense. Two main factories located in the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu are reportedly tasked with the final preparation, filling, and distribution of CW agents in artillery shells from 80 mm and larger, as well as 240mm caliber artillery rockets. Testing of agents is also reportedly performed at these two locations, possibly in very large underground facilities. In addition to thousands of artillery rounds, hundreds of forward deployed Scud-B, Frog-5 and Frog-7 missiles, plus about 30 Scud-C missiles could be armed with chemical warheads. In October 2007, a South Korean lawmaker, citing intelligence data, claimed that North Korea had developed a new short range missile known as the KN-2, reportedly derived from a Russian SS-21. The solid fuel-propelled KN-2 reportedly has a 120 km range, is capable of delivering a 500 kg payload, and can carry chemical agents.

All of these weapons systems could easily strike much of South Korea. A South Korean security analyst suggested that DPRK artillery pieces of calibers 170mm and 240mm "could fire 10,000 rounds per minute to Seoul and its environs." Given all of North Korea's artillery along on the DMZ, it has been estimated that the KPA could fire over 5 million artillery shells per hour.

Photo from the Republic of Korea
2000 Defense White Paper
(Ministry of National Defense)

Status

North Korea faces many obstacles in actually employing CW agents, not to mention their manufacture and storage. The wide availability of oil-derived intermediates, especially ethylene oxide, makes the large-scale manufacture of simple CW agents such as mustard well within the capabilities of the DPRK. However, it is not clear how well North Korea would be able to manufacture large quantities of nerve agents, such as sarin, soman, and VX, without putting a great burden on already limited resources.

During the 1990s, the unavailability of precursors required to manufacture some nerve agents may have challenged Pyongyang's logistical supply network. For example, in 1996 an ethnic Korean in Japan was caught exporting 50kg of sodium fluoride to North Korea by way of cargo vessels bringing food aid to the DPRK. Ostensibly, this chemical was intended for use by a North Korean entity for electroplating purposes. But because sodium fluoride is also a precursor for sarin and soman nerve agents, the Japanese authorities arrested the individual (himself a Japanese citizen) for trading in a controlled substance. The relatively small amount (50kg) of this chemical had little consequence in terms of producing militarily significant amounts of nerve agent.

A more serious episode occurred in September 2003, when North Korea successfully imported more than 100 tons of sodium cyanide from a South Korean businessman via China. As a dual-use chemical, sodium cyanide could be used to prepare both blood (hydrogen cyanide) and nerve (tabun) agents, although the North Korean government claimed the material would be used for peaceful purposes only. The incident underscores the challenge associated with preventing the proliferation of equipment and materials associated with chemical weapons. But these incidents also point to a serious problem faced by North Korea, namely the lack of domestically manufactured chemical precursors, even relatively simple ones.

Nonetheless, the DPRK has also shown a single-minded emphasis on buttressing its military capabilities despite a poverty-stricken economy and populace. Although the majority of the CW stockpile in the North may not be of the more sophisticated and lethal nerve agent variety, it may contain a large quantity of casualty agents such as mustard, phosgene, and Lewisite, all compounds that are relatively easy to manufacture. North Korea has refused to acknowledge its chemical arsenal, much less destroy it and its other weapons of mass destruction programs, as called for UN Security Council Resolution 1718, which was passed in October 2006 following North Korea's test of a nuclear device.

North Korea and the Chemical Weapons Convention

In the early 1990s--according to reports from North Korean defectors--the North Korean Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces debated over whether to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Although the foreign ministry was apparently in favor of participating in the regime, the military was opposed, and Kim Chong Il apparently sided with the latter.

Since 1997, the South Korean government has insisted that the North join the CWC, to no avail. North Korea has also rebuffed efforts on the part of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as well as the Japanese government, to persuade it to participate in the chemical disarmament regime. If North Korea wishes to foster a viable chemical industry, a case could be made that its accession to the CWC would make long-term economic sense by giving it access to trade in treaty-controlled chemicals and technology. In the short term, however, a knowledgeable official at the OPCW noted that North Korea would not reap immediate benefits by joining the CWC regime.

Key Sources:
North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, US House of Representatives, November 1999; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001) p. 227; Mun Hui-sang, "How North Korea and South Korea Are Heading for Arms Reduction," Sisa Journal (Seoul), online version, 5 July 2000, translated in FBIS Document ID KPP20000710000086; Pak Hon-ok, "DPRK Military Policy in 2000," Pukan, 1 December 2000, pp. 66-75, translated in FBIS, Document ID: KPP20001212000032; Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655; Katsuhiro Kuroda, "DPRK Manufactures Chemical Weapons," Sankei Shimbun, 10 June 2000, online version, translated in FBIS Document ID: JPP20000610000025; "South Estimates DPRK Has 5,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons, Mostly Sarin," Seoul Sinmun, 15 April 1995, p. 1, in BBC Summary of World Broadcast; Ch'oe Son Yong, "Why the Discrepancy between ROK, DPRK Joint Communique Regarding Military Authorities Talks," Yonhap Internet site, Korean version, 8 April 2002, translated in FBIS Document KPP20020408000065; Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee, 5 March 2002, p. 8; Andrew Ward, "North Korea Gassed Prisoners to Test Weapons, Says BBC," Financial Times (London), 2 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com; `Jasper Becker and Dermot Tatlow, "North Koreans Take Revenge on Chemical Tests Whistleblowers," Independent of Sunday (London), 8 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com; Samuel Len, "Skepticism Over Gas Tests; Seoul to Await Probe After Report on North," International Herald Tribune, 3 February 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com; "North Korean Scientist Recounts Chemical Tests on Prisoners," Agence France Presse, 28 July 2004, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com; Park Chan-kyong, "ROK Says Sodium Cyanide Shipped to North Korea via China Sep 2003," Agence France Presse, 24 September 2004, OSC Document JPP20040924000085; Ministry of Defense, Republic of Korea, 2006 Defense White Paper (English translation), May 2007, p. 74, www.mnd.go.kr; "North Korea Develops Short-Range Chemical Warhead Capable Missile," BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 11 October 2007, in Lexis-Nexis, www.lexisnexis.com.

Key Sources:
North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, US House of Representatives, November 1999; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001) p. 227; Mun Hui-sang, "How North Korea and South Korea Are Heading for Arms Reduction," Sisa Journal (Seoul), online version, 5 July 2000, translated in FBIS Document ID KPP20000710000086; Pak Hon-ok, "DPRK Military Policy in 2000," Pukan, 1 December 2000, pp. 66-75, translated in FBIS, Document ID: KPP20001212000032; Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655; Katsuhiro Kuroda, "DPRK Manufactures Chemical Weapons," Sankei Shimbun, 10 June 2000, online version, translated in FBIS Document ID: JPP20000610000025; "South Estimates DPRK Has 5,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons, Mostly Sarin," Seoul Sinmun, 15 April 1995, p. 1, in BBC Summary of World Broadcast; Ch'oe Son Yong, "Why the Discrepancy between ROK, DPRK Joint Communique Regarding Military Authorities Talks," Yonhap Internet site, Korean version, 8 April 2002, translated in FBIS Document KPP20020408000065; Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee, 5 March 2002, p. 8.

	Updated July 2008