The Second Natural Science Academy, formerly the Academy of Defense Sciences, is responsible for the research and development of all weapons systems in North Korea. The Second Natural Science Academy ostensibly designed and developed the Paektusan-1 by combining two missiles already in the North Korean inventory to create a two-stage missile. The San'ŭm-dong Research and Development Center, which is probably also known as the "Number Seven Factory," likely produced North Korea's first Paektusan-1 prototypes around 1994.[3]

The first stage of the Paektusan-1, the Nodong, was apparently flight tested at the Musudan-ri Missile Test Site in May 1990, but US satellite imagery indicates the test was a failure (see Nodong Overview and Assessment).[4] In late May 1993, North Korea conducted its only successful flight test of the Nodong from Musudan-ri. Iranian and Pakistani government observers were reportedly present the test launch.[5] In March 1994, US intelligence acknowledged the existence of the Paektusan-1 (Taepodong-1),[6] and in June of the same year, US reconnaissance satellites detected static engine tests for both the Paektusan-1 and Taepodong-2.[7]

On 31 August 1998, the first and only flight test of the Paektusan-1 was conducted at the Musudan-ri Missile Test Site. The missile was launched as a three-stage space launch vehicle (SLV), but it failed to place a small satellite, the Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1, into low-earth orbit. The first stage separated about 300km east of Musudan-ri, and the second stage fell into the Pacific Ocean about 330km east of the Japanese port city of Hachinohe, after flying approximately 1,380km from the launch site. The third stage, which used solid fuel, failed to place the satellite into orbit, but the first and second stages separated successfully and functioned properly. Debris from the launch was tracked to nearly 6,400km from the launch site.[8 ]This test had a major impact on US and Japanese assessments of the ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea.

Although the Paektusan-1 is not a "new" missile, the development timeline of its first stage, the Nodong, appears to be almost impossible to achieve without extensive foreign assistance. Pyongyang has received foreign assistance from several sources, including Russia, China, Egypt, and Iran. Foreign assistance has ranged from Iranian financial support and Chinese technical training in aerospace engineering, to the pro-North Korean General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan (Choch'ongnyŏn) providing Japanese semiconductors. There is also strong evidence that North Korea acquired foreign-made precision machine tools that are needed for missile manufacturing.

North Korea began to construct missile bases capable of launching the Paektusan-1 around 1994. Construction of these bases, including Chiha-ri, Sangnam-ri, Yŏngjŏ-ri, Yongnim-kun, should be complete or nearing completion as of 2003.[9] A few Paektusan-1 missiles may have been deployed, but they are of limited strategic significance since they do not have intercontinental range to hit the United States, and North Korea already possessed missiles capable of striking South Korea and Japan, the Hwasŏng-5/6 and the Nodong, respectively.

North Korea has exported a number of Nodong missiles (see export table), but it is unclear whether all Nodongs have been exported as single-stage missiles, or as the first stage of a Paektusan-1 package. Reports indicate the international market price for the Paektusan-1 would be in the range of about $6 million.[10] North Koreas Yong'aksan Trading Company under the Second Economic Committee's External Economic Bureau handles missile exports, and the Ch'anggwang Credit Bank receives payment from buyers.[11] The foreign exchange earnings from missile exports have enabled Pyongyang to continue or expand its procurement of components and technology from abroad in order to continue the missile development program. Unfortunately, there is no credible open source information about North Korea's internal budget or expenditures on the Paektusan-1 or other ballistic missiles.

Technical Assessment

At present, the only information for this missile comes from a sighting in 1994 at the North Korean launch site and the 31 August 1998 launch in the space launch vehicle (SLV) mode.

It is generally accepted that this missile is based on a Nodong-type first stage. However, compared to the basic Nodong missile, a shorter burning time than the standard Nodong was observed in the August 1998 flight. This indicated an increased thrust level since a reduced propellant load must be completely excluded. Similar observations regarding the second stage were made: though this stage is generally thought to comprise a Scud-type system, a significant derivation from the standard burn occurred. Specifically, two thrust levels were noticed with an initial high thrust phase followed by a long low thrust phase. Thus, the second stage was either a significantly modified Scud—for example, through the addition of four vernier engines (possibly with a separate turbo pump) parallel to the main engine—or a different stage was used altogether, possibly a modified SA-5. However, recent North Korean information indicates that the one plus four engine arrangement is more likely.

At present, there are not enough reliable data to establish the history of this missile, including the connections to other programs. However, it should be noted that post-Soviet literature describes what might be called a “mother” of Taepodong-1 with the combination of an R-5 as first stage and an R-11 as second stage. This is an initial indication that the origin of the Paektusan may be a mid- to late 1950s Soviet design.

The first stage propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine probably using the storable propellant combination inhibited red fuming nitric acrid (IRFNA) and kerosene. Ignition is accomplished by a hypergolic (self-igniting) start fuel designated Tonka—the WW II German designator for this propellant—filled into the fuel line at the main fuel valve. The propellant feed system is a turbo pump driven by a bipropellant gas generator using the main propellants. The start and shut down valves are one shot devices, actuated by pyrotechnic charges. Tank pressurization is performed by air stored in a toroidal high-pressure bottle in front of the missile’s guidance section and heated by the turbine exhaust gases.

The second stage is basically of a similar design. The North Korean pre-launch photos seem to show an external propellant line design, similar to that of Scud-A/R-11 or SA-5. Further assessments are difficult to make.

It is estimated that the guidance system effectively resembles the Nodong arrangement with body-mounted free gyros, however, with the modification of an additional gyro for accuracy improvement. Prior to launch, the missile is orientated such that the trajectory plane hits the target and the guidance system keeps the missile in this plane. Two of the three body mounted gyros are used for attitude and the third one for lateral acceleration control; the horizon gyro’s mounting must be capable to move to a horizontal position. A pendulum integration gyro assembly serves for speed measurement. The fins are fixed and thrust vector control is accomplished by four jet vanes in the first stage; for the second stage, either four vernier engines are used or thrust vector control is accomplished similar to the first stage by jet vanes.

The missile is equipped with a separable warhead. Although no further information on the warhead load is available, it is assumed that the general design is based on a conventional HE load. However, the relative small mass for a conventional explosive (or bio-chemical weapon) points to an early nuclear warhead of a late 1950s design.

The SLV launch must be seen as an indication that no suitable re-entry vehicle is available at present.

	Updated May 2003