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IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor (IRT-2000硏究用原子爐)

Other Names:
IRT-DPRK, KP-0001, Reactor No. 1 (第1原子爐), Modified IRT-2000, 8MWt IRT-DPRK Reactor, 8-megawatt-thermal Research Reactor, Research Reactor No. 1 (第1實驗用原子爐), Yŏngbyŏn No.1 Light Water Reactor (寧邊1號輕水爐)

Location: Pun’gang-chigu (分江地區), Yŏngbyŏn-kun (寧邊郡), North P’yŏng’an Province (平安北道), North Korea

Subordinate to: Nuclear Physics Research Institute (核物理硏究所), Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Center (寧邊原子力硏究센터), General Department of Atomic Energy (原子力總局), Cabinet (內閣)

Size: 8MW(th) [Note: The reactor was originally 2MW(th), but North Korea expanded its capacity to 4MW(th) in 1974, and to 8MW(th) in 1987.]

Primary Function: Research and development, analyzing physical and chemical processes that occur under the impact of ionizing radiation, producing various radioisotopes (including Sodium-24, Sulfur-35, Phosphorus-32, and Cobalt-60), and training personnel

Description: The IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor is a pool-type reactor that uses light water as a moderator and coolant. The reactor was probably supplied as part of the agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy that was signed by North Korea and the USSR in September 1959. Construction of the reactor began in 1962 and was completed in 1965 under the supervision of Soviet scientist Vladislav Kotlav. The IRT-2000 first went critical in August 1965, but did not become fully operational until 1967 after two years of testing. The reactor was originally rated at 2MW(th), but it was expanded to 4MW(th) in 1974, and to 8MW(th) in 1987. The reactor initially used 10 percent enriched uranium fuel, but used 36 percent enriched uranium after it was upgraded to 8MW(th). According to the IAEA, Russia (and former USSR) has provided the fuel for the reactor. In July 1977 North Korea signed a INFCIRC/66 trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA that permitted IAEA monitoring of the IRT-2000 reactor and the 0.1MW(th) Critical Assembly. According to South Koreas Technology Center for Nuclear Control, the reactor first came under IAEA inspections in 1978.

In 1992, North Korean officials admitted to IAEA inspectors that technicians separated about 300mg of plutonium in 1975 at the Isotope Production Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn. The IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor was the source of this plutonium. There are concerns about the IRT-2000’s spent fuel as a source for plutonium since some analysts argue that the reactor has not been under close and continuous monitoring by the IAEA. Furthermore, the IRT-2000 reactor has not been frozen by the Agreed Framework. The amount of plutonium that could have been extracted since the reactors installation in 1965 is dependent upon the reactors operational history and North Koreas reprocessing technology. Jared S. Dreicer, a technical staff member at the Los Alamos National Laboratory , says that 5.8kg of plutonium is an upper bound, but that 4.0kg is a more realistic figure for the maximum amount of plutonium that North Korea could have extracted from this reactors spent fuel over the years. David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security says that the spent fuel from this reactor could have provided North Korea with no more than 2.8-3.6kg of reprocessed plutonium.

General Data

Owner: Probably the General Department of Atomic Energy (原子力總局)
Operator: Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Center
(Center for Atomic Energy)
Licensing: Probably the General Department of Atomic Energy (原子力總局)
Construction Date: 1 March 1963
Criticality Date: 15 August 1965
Operation Date: 1967
Initial Cost: W1,804,600 (North Korean Won)
Total Staff: 20
No. of Operators: 16
Status: Operational

Technical Data and Experimental Facilities

Reactor Type: Pool, (Soviet Research Reactor) IRT
Power (Thermal): 8MW
Moderator: Light Water
Coolant: Light Water
Reflector: Graphite
Reflector Number of Sides: 15
Number of Horizontal Channels: 10
Number of Vertical Channels: 9

Fuel Data

Origin of Fissile Material: Russia
Enrichment Supplier: Russia
Fuel Fabricator: Russia
Cladding Material: Aluminum Alloy

Utilization

Hours per Day: 2
Days per Week: 3
Weeks per Year: 20
MW Days per Year: 70
Materials/fuel test experiments: No
Isotope Production: No
Neutron Scattering: No
Neutron Radiography: No
Neutron capture therapy: No
Activation Analysis: No
Transmutation: No
Geochronology: No
Teaching: No
Training: No
Other Uses: No

Technical references: IAEA, “Nuclear Research Reactors in the World” database, 30 July 1996, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb>; Kim Byŏng Ku et al., Pukhaekkisulch’ongsŏ-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project), KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr>.



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Updated May 2003

Key Sources:
Kim Byŏng Ku et al., Pukhaekkisulch’ongsŏ-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project), KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr/>; Jared S. Dreicer, “How Much Plutonium Could Have been Produced in the PRK IRT Reactor?” Science and Global Security, 2000, Volume 8, pp. 273-286; David Albright and Kevin O’Neil, “Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle,” 2000, pp. 122, 148-149; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 120-125; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏg’iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>; KAERI, “Pukhanŭi Haekkwallyŏn Yŏn’guhwaltong,” <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/>; Gregory Karouv, “A Technical History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Relations,” in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia, (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 17; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 February 1994, p. 77; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korea's Nuclear Programme," Jane’s Intelligence Review, September 1991, p. 406; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “Exposing North Korea’s Secret Nuclear Infrastructure—Part Two,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 1999, p. 41; IAEA, “Nuclear Research Reactors in the World,” <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/rrdb>.



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