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Isotope Production Laboratory (同位原素生産加工硏究所)

Other Names:
Isotope Processing Laboratory, Isotope Processing Research Institute, Radioactive Isotope Processing Laboratory, Radioisotope Use Institute, Radioisotope Utilization Research Institute

Location: Pun’gang-chigu (分江地區), Yŏngbyŏn-kun (寧邊郡), North P’yŏng’an Province (平安北道), North Korea

Subordinate to: Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Center (寧邊原子力硏究센터), General Department of Atomic Energy (原子力總局), Cabinet (內閣); and/or the 5th Machine Industry Bureau (5機械工業總局), Korean Workers’ Party (朝鮮勞動黨) [Note: The 5th Machine Industry Bureau was originally under the Atomic Energy Committee (原子力委員會), which is currently called the General Department of Atomic Energy Industry. However, in 1987, when the Atomic Energy Committee was renamed the Ministry of Atomic Energy Industry (原子力工業部), the 5th Machine Industry Bureau was directly placed under the Korean Workers' Party.]

Size: The laboratory has seven hot cells and glove boxes.

Primary Function: Production of isotopes for medical and industrial use, handling of radioactive materials, extraction of plutonium from spent fuel rods, and research and development

Description: North Korea probably established a research or administrative arm for this laboratory around 1965 at the Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Center with Soviet assistance. The current site of the laboratory was probably established later. In 1992, North Korea told IAEA inspectors that in 1975 it extracted about 300mg of plutonium from its IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor; however, this information was reportedly excluded from its initial declaration submitted to IAEA. North Korea claims that the Isotope Production Laboratory conducts basic nuclear research in order to produce radioactive materials for agricultural and medical uses. Even though this facility has successfully extracted small amounts of plutonium, the laboratory is not frozen under the Agreed Framework and it is not under IAEA safeguards. In January 2002, IAEA officials paid a visit to the laboratory, but the facility still has not been fully inspected. The IAEA has suggested that safeguards inspections resume under a three-step process, beginning with an inspection of the Isotope Production Laboratory.



 

Updated April 2003

Key Sources:
“Pukhanŭi Haekkwanryŏn Yŏnguhwaldong,” Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, http://www.kaeri.re.kr/ >; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng, (Seoul: Sŏmundang, 1999), p. 129; “Pukhanŭi Wŏnjaryŏk Iyonggaebal Hyŏnhwang ,” Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, <http://www.kaeri.re.kr/ >; Kim Yŏng Shik, “Haek Kaebal Ch’ongbonsan P’yŏngbuk Yŏngbyŏndanji,” Segye Ilbo, 30 April 1997, p. 17, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Michael May, ed., “Verifying the Agreed Framework,” The Center for Global Security Research Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and The Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, April 2001, p. 68, <http://cisac.stanford.edu/>; David Albright, “How Much Plutonium Did North Korea Produce?,” in David Albright and Kevin O’Neill, eds., Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle, (Washington, D.C.: Institute For Science And International Security, 2000), p. 122; “Pukhan Wŏnjŏndanji 60 Nyŏndae Kŏnsŏl,” Hankryoreh Shinmun, 14 April 1992, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kang Tae Ho, “Puk-Mi ‘Haek’yŏnguso Sach’al’ Chaengjŏm Pusang,” Hankyoreh Shinmun, 12 April 2002, p. 8, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kang Tae Ho, “Tongwiwŏnsoyŏn’guso Sach’al: ‘Kwagŏ Haekkyumyŏng’ Puk-Mi Hyŏpsang Saekukmyŏn,” Hankyoreh Shinmun, 12 April 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Oh Young-hwan, "3-Step Nuclear Inspections," Joongang Ilbo, 11 December 2001, <http://english.joins.com/ >; Oh Yong Hwan, "Kukchewonjaryokkigu Taebuk 3 Tan'gye Sach'al' an," Joongang Ilbo, 10 December 2001, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “IAEA in Talks with North Korea over Wider Nuclear Inspections,” Agence France Presse, 10 December 2001, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.



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