This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
Iran acquires about 125 C-802 cruise missiles from China. Iran ordered about 250 of the missiles, but China suspends the transaction after the US demands a halt to the sales in 1996. Iran reportedly ships some of the missiles to North Korea in April or May 1999, and the two countries are reported to be jointly developing a copy of the missile in February 2000.
—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea, Iran Jointly Developing Missile: Newspaper," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "N. Korea, Iran Jointly Develop Missile: Report," Korea Times, 17 February 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Kyodo News Service, 16 February 2000, in "Sankei Shimbun: DPRK, Iran Jointly Developing Missile," FBIS Document ID JPP20000217000006; Chŏn Hyŏn Il, "Puk-Iran, Chungje Sunhang Missile Kongdong Kaeryang Yŏn'gye," Segye Ilbo, 18 February 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Shim Kyu Sŏn, "Puk-Iran Missile Kongdonggaebal Ch'ujin," Donga Ilbo, 18 February 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea begins construction of six new missile bases, in addition to the two existing bases at Shin'gye-kun, North Hwanghae Province, and at Shin'o-ri, Unchŏn-kun, North P'yŏng'an Province. According to the South Korean Defense Ministry, the Nodong missile base at Shin'o-ri had already been built by the mid-1990s. [Note: Scud missiles were reportedly deployed at Shin'gye-kun in 1988.]
—Kim Min Sŏk, "Puk Missile Kiji Kyesok Chŭngsŏl," Joongang Ilbo, 6 March 2001, p. 8, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
The North Korean Military Construction Bureau completes construction of a missile base in Chungganjin, Chagang Province. The construction began in 1990. [Note: The actual name of the location is Chunggang-kun, Chagang Province.]
—Testimony of Ko Yŏng Hwan, former North Korean Foreign Ministry official, before the US Senate, 21 October 1997.
US intelligence discovers 200 North Korean missile specialists traveling to China for training.
—Bill Gertz, "China Assists North Korea in Space Launches," Washington Times, 23 February 1999, p. A1.
According to an article by Kim Yŏng Hun, director of a South Korean research group, published in the May 1996 edition of Kunsa'nondan (Military Forum), North Korea begins development of the Taepodong-3, with an estimated range of 6,000-7,500km. Kim claims North Korea is aiming to complete development of the missile by 1998.
—"Pukhan Migukpont'o Kangt'a Missile Kaebal," Joongang Ilbo, 18 March 1996, <http://www.joins.com/>.
According to an official at the South Korean National Unification Board, North Korea completes development of the Paektusan-1 [Taepodong-1].
—Kim Yŏn Kwang, "Puk, Yŏn'gan Scud Paekki Saengsan/Kukkam Charyo," Chosun Ilbo, 26 September 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kang Yŏng Chin, "Puk Missile Nyŏn 100 Yŏgi Saengsan Nŭngnyŏk," Joongang Ilbo, 26 September 1996, p. 15, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; O Il man, "Puk, 'Scud' Yŏn 1 Paekki Saengsan/T'ongilwŏn Kukkamjaryo," Taehan Maeil, 26 September 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Lee Dae Kun, "Puk Scud Missile Yŏn 1 Paeg'yŏgi Saengsannŭngnyŏk/Iran Tŭng'e 4 Paekki Such'ul," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 26 September 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Cho Min Ho, "Puk, Missile Yŏn 100 Ki Saengsannŭngnyŏk/Arapchiyŏk 4 Paekki Such'ul/T'ongilwŏn Charyo," Segye Ilbo, 26 September 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea probably produces the first Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) and Taepodong-2 prototypes.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 29.
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director James Woolsey states, "We are moving from an era of Scuds of single-stage missiles into an area of Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) and Taepodong-2s with ranges in the few thousands of kilometers—not quite intercontinental yet, but the path is clear." Defense Intelligence Agency head Air Force Lt. Gen. James Clapper adds that while the Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 could potentially strike Alaska, these missiles pose no threat to the continental United States. Clapper believes many countries might be able to develop a ballistic missile and WMD warhead with a range of 500-1,000km by the year 2000, but no country would be able to develop a missile that could strike the US mainland within the next 10 years.
—Tony Capaccio, "DIA, CIA See No Immediate Threat from Long Range Missiles," Defense Week, 23 January 1998, pp. 8-9; US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Special Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate: January 4, 1995 to October 3, 1996," US Government Printing Office, 28 February 1997.
"US officials confirm assertions by South Korean intelligence that Tehran has received the medium-range Nodong missile from North Korea."
—Steve Rodan, "What the US is Whispering to Israel about Iran," Jerusalem Post, 13 January 1995, p. 9, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
US officials confirm that North Korea makes up to six Nodong-1 missiles operational on mobile launchers. The missiles are capable of delivering a payload of 500-750kg.
—Paul Beaver, "Flash Points," Jane's Defence Weekly, 24 June 1995, p. 22.
The Director General of the Iranian Foreign Ministry's Far Eastern division, Hassan Taherian, denies missile cooperation with North Korea. According to Taherian, "we deny this...for lack of need and also self-sufficiency in military productions, our military cooperation is very limited. It is about zero."
—"Iran Denies Missile Cooperation with North Korea," Reuters, 19 February 1995, in Executive News Service, 20 February 1995.
According to Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Igarashi Kozo, North Korea tests "Chinese-made" Silkworm anti-ship missiles (ASMs) on the Sea of Japan. Igarashi later says the tests are part of normal training exercises. There are conflicting reports on the missile's range. Agence France Presse quotes Japanese press reports as saying the range is about 80km, but the Joongang Ilbo quotes Igarashi as saying the range of Chinese Silkworm missiles is about 100km. Kyodo News Service quotes "military experts" as saying the modified version has a range of 200km.
—"North Korea Test-Fires Missile, Warns Against US Anti-Missile System," Agence France Presse, 7 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; "Japanese Government Confirms North Korean Naval Missile Test In March," Agence France Presse, 7 April 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Tested Missile over Japan Sea in Late March," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 April 1995, , in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Kim Kuk Chin, "Puk Tto Missile Shilhŏm Chi'nandalmal Tonghaesŏ," Joongang Ilbo, 8 April 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "'Puk, Tonghaero Missile Shihŏmbalsa'/Il Kwanbang 'T'ongsangjŏk Hullyŏn'," Kukmin Ilbo, 8 April 1995, p., 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
The CIA reports that North Korea has recently transferred at least four Scud transporter erector launchers (TELs) to Iran. The TELs were transferred in late-1994 and can launch Scud-B and -C missiles. The CIA report is in response to questions submitted by the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on 10 January 1995.
—Tony Capaccio, "North Korea Has Transferred Mobile Scud Launchers To Iran," Defense Week, 1 May 1995, pp. 1, 14; Barbara Starr, "Iran Gets 'Scud' TELs from North Korea," Jane's Defence Weekly, 13 May 1995, p. 5; Paul Mann, editor, "CIA Disclosures," Aviation Week and Space Technology," vol. 142, no. 19, 8 May 1995, p. 19, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.
n Israeli intelligence report cites Israeli and western intelligence sources as saying that North Korea has transferred a dozen or more Nodong-1 ballistic missiles to Iran. According to the report, the missiles were shipped to Iran earlier this year. Also referred to as the Scud-D, the Nodong-1 is said to have a range of 1,500km.
— Adel Darwish, "Tehran Missiles 'Can Reach Israel'," Independent (London), 2 May 1995, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>; Adel Darwish, Independent (London), "2 May 1995, in "Israel Claims Government Received DPRK Missiles," FBIS-NES-95-085, 2 May 1995.
North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng Nam visits Tehran, and Iran offers to pay for some $300 million worth of Scud missiles purchased from North Korea with oil. Previously, North Korea had insisted on hard currency for missile sales to Iran. According to US Secret Service sources, Iran may have paid in the past with counterfeit $100 bills.
—"Oil for Missiles with DPRK," Iran Brief, 1 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com/>.
Robert Galluci says that the United States intends to discuss North Korea's production and export of ballistic missiles in talks with Pyongyang.
—Yonhap News Agency, 16 June 1995, in "Gallucci on Talks, Liaison Office," FBIS-NEA-95-116, 16 June 1995, p. 33.
US officials say that North Korea and China have sold Scud missiles to Iran, and that Iran has also tried to obtain Nodong missiles from North Korea.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "Iran's Missile Technology Linked to China, Report Says," Washington Post, 17 June 1995, p. A14, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com/>; "Iran, Puk 'Nodong Missile' Kuipch'ujin/Washington Post Chi Podo," Chosun Ilbo, 18 June 1995, p. 15, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Pukhan Nodong Missile/Iran'sŏ Kumaech'ujin," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 18 June 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
A Japanese government source discloses that US reconnaissance satellites have identified cranes and trucks in North Korea transporting missiles for a possible test-launch that could occur as soon as the end of June 1995. According to Japanese government sources, North Korea might only conduct jet-propulsion tests rather than full-scale test launches to avoid complicating negotiations with the United States over the supply of nuclear reactors.
—"N. Korea Poised for Missile Test Firing," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 19 June 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com/>; Andrei Varlamov, "North Korea Reported to Make Preparations for Missile Launching," ITAR-TASS, 19 June 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com/>; Sankei Shimbun, 19 June 1995, p. 1, in "'Source': DPRK Preparing to Test Missiles," FBIS-EAS-95-117, 19 June 1995, p. 1; "'Puk, Wŏllae Missile Palsashilhŏm'/Mi Chŏngbowisŏng P'och'ak," Taehan Maeil, 20 June 1995, p. 4, , in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Lee T'ae Hyŏng, "Puk, Missile Palsashilhŏm Chunbi/Ilchi Podo/Bbarŭmyŏn Idalchung Shilshi Ka'nŭngsŏng," Kukmin Ilbo, 19 June 1995, p. 2, , in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kim Kuk Chin, "Puk, Missile Palsashihŏm Chunbi/Il Sank'eshinmun Podo," Joongang Ilbo, 20 June 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
North Korea upgrades one of its Scud missile regiments to a brigade.
—Kim Sŏng Gŏl, "'Pukhan'gun Chŏ''yŏk Chŭnggang'/Kukpangbu Palp'yo," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 13 August 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
Iranian President Rafsanjani says that Iran and North Korea "share identical views on their foreign policies as well as their internal issues." Rafsanjani also suggests that the two countries should increase economic cooperation, and cooperation in the oil sector.
—"Oil for Missiles with DPRK," Iran Brief, 1 August 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis.nexis.com/>.
According to Israeli sources, North Korea has halted development of the Nodong missile program due to either technical difficulties or political pressure from the United States.
—"North Korea Freezes No-Dong Programme," Flight International, 30 August 1995, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
South Korean intelligence officials, citing Russian intelligence, say that North Korea could deploy the Taepodong-2 missile by the year 2000. According to the US Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) computer simulations, the Taepodong-2 might have a range of 4,300-6,000km. According to Russian sources, however, North Korea could extend the range of the Taepodong-2 to 9,600km if it resolved difficulties related to the missile's inertial navigation system, warhead weight, and the fuel injection device. The Taepodong-2 is said to have a 16-meter long Nodong as the second stage. North Korea has reportedly been continuing research and development of the Taepodong-1 and Taepodong-2 at the San'ŭm-dong test facility, and has recently been conducting engine tests.
—Park Chae Bŏm, "Puk, Sajŏng 1 Man km Missile Kaebal/ 'Taepodong 2 Ho' Chŏngbo Russia'sŏ Ipsu," Taehan Maeil, 11 September 1995, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Pak Chae Pom, Seoul Shinmum, 11 September 1995, p. 3, in "U.S. Reportedly Within New North Missile Range," FBIS-EAS-95-175, 11 September 1995, p. 49; Bill Gertz, "N. Korean Missile Could Reach U.S., Intelligence Warns," Washington Times, 29 September 1995, p. A3;
South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reports that North Korea has deployed its Nodong-1 surface-to-surface missile (SSM).
—Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo), 15 September 1995, p. 8, in "JSC Head on DPRK Nodong Missile Deployment," FBIS-EAS-95-181, 19 September 1995, p. 7.
In response to a Yonhap News Agency report on 12 September, Tetsuya Nishimoto, chairman of Japan's Joint Staff Council (JCS) of the Self Defense Forces, says that the "possibility of North Korea deploying these missiles [the Nodong-1] is low."
—Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Tokyo), 15 September 1995, p. 8, in "JSC Head on DPRK Nodong Missile Deployment," FBIS-EAS-95-181, 19 September 1995, p. 7.
South Korea's National Unification Board submits a report to the National Assembly that says North Korea has about one ton of biological and chemical weapons, and that they can be delivered by FROG-5s, FROG-7s, and Scud missiles.
—Kang Sŏng Bo, "Puk Saenghwahangmugi 1 Ch'ŏnt'on Poyu/Yŏndaegŭpkkaji Hwahaksodae P'yŏnsŏng Hullyŏn," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 23 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kim Rang Ki, "Puk, Saenghwahangmugi 1 Ch'ŏn t Poyu/T'ong'ilwŏn Kukkamjaryo," Chosun Ilbo, 23 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; "Seang-Hwahangmugi/1 Ch'ŏn t Poyu/Pukhan/T'ong'ilwŏn Kukkamjaeryo," Taehan Maeil, 23 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
South Korea's Foreign Ministry submits a report to the National Assembly that says North Korea has between 1,000 and 5,000 tons of biological and chemical weapons. The report says that most of North Korea's artillery and multiple rocket launchers are capable of delivering chemical weapons to Seoul. Furthermore, North Korea's Scud missiles are capable of striking all of South Korea.
—Kim Yŏn Kwang, "Puk Hwahangmugisudo'gwan'I Sajŏnggwan/Scud Changch'ak Ddaen Hanbando Chŏn'yŏk," Chosun Ilbo, 24 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
US intelligence warns that North Korea could extend the range of its Taepodong-2 missile by the year 2000 to target the western United States. The missile is estimated to have a range of 10,000km. Intelligence officials believe that China is assisting North Korea in developing a long-range ballistic missile (LRBM) and training 200 North Korean missile engineers in China.
—Bill Gertz, "N. Korean Missile Could Reach U.S., Intelligence Warns," Washington Times, 29 September 1995, p. A3; Pak Tu Shik, "Mi 'Puk Taepodong II Sajŏng 1 Man km'/5 Nyŏnnae Kaebal," Chosun Ilbo, 30 September 1995, <http://www.chosun.com>.
In testimony before the National Assembly, General Kim Hong Rae, South Korean Air Force chief of staff, says that North Korea has deployed about 600 FROGs and Scuds. General Kim says that North Korea has chemical weapons and is developing nuclear weapons. Kim also says the United States has three intelligence satellites monitoring North Korean military activities.
—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Said to Have Deployed Hundreds of Missiles," Japan Economic Newswire, 29 September 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "Puk, Scud 6 Paekki Paech'i/Kongch'amch'ongjang Kukkam Poko," Joongang Ilbo, 30 September 1995, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Hwang Yu Sŏng, "'Puk Missile 6 Paekki Chakchŏn Paech'i'/Kongch'amch'ongjang Kukkam Tappyŏn," Donga Ilbo, 30 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Lee Chung Kŭn, "'Puk Scud 6 Paekki Chakchŏnbaech'i'/Hanbandojŏn'yŏk'I Sajŏnggwŏn/Konggunbonbu Kukkam," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 30 September 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Hŏ Yong Pŏm, Hong Sŏk Chun, and Kwŏn Sang Ŭn, "Puk, Scud Subaekki Paech'i/Kongch'amch'ongjang Kukkamdappyŏn/Namhan Chŏn'yŏk Sajŏnggwŏn," Chosun Ilbo, 30 September 1995, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
South Korea's Ministry of National Defense releases its 1995-1996 Defense White Paper, which claims that North Korea can produce about 100 Scud-B missiles a year. Despite a serious food shortage, North Korea continues to develop its Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1) and Taepodong-2 missiles. North Korea has also produced and deployed SA-16 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and is also developing a new version of the Silkworm anti-ship missile (ASM) with an extended range.
—The Ministry of National Defense, the Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1995-1996 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, October 1993), p. 61; Choi Sang Yŏn, "Puk, Changgŏri Missile Kaebal Kyesok—'Scud' Nŭn Nyŏn Paeg'yŏ'gi Saengsan," Joongang Ilbo, 3 October 1995, <http://www.joins.com/>.
North Korea has approximately 30 launchers for its 300km Scud-B and 500km Scud-C ballistic missiles and approximately 500 high-explosive warheads.
—Son Tae Kyu (sic), Hankook Ilbo, 4 October 1995, p. 5, in "Seoul Paper Expresses Unease Over North's Scud Missiles," BBC Summary of World News, 6 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Son Kyu T'ae (sic), "Sudogwŏn Chipchung Konggyŏkddaen K'ŭn P'ihae Ŭryŏ/Pur'anhan Puk Scud," Hankook Ilbo, 4 October 1995, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
A top South Korean National Defense Ministry source says that North Korea will be ready to deploy Nodong-1 missiles by the end of 1996. The official says that North Korea has 450 FROG rockets and a total of 500 Scud missiles.
—Son Tae Kyu, Hankook Ilbo, 10 October 1995, p. 1, in FBIS-EAS-95-195, "North To Deploy Nodong Missiles by 'End of 1996'," 10 October 1995, p. 61; Son T'ae Kyu, "Puk, Nodong 1 Ho Naenyŏn Shilchŏnbaech'i/Scud Kaeryanghyŏng/Kukpangbu Tanggukcha," Hankook Ilbo, 10 October 1995, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
In a press conference in Seoul, Ch'oe Ju Hwal, a former colonel who defected from North Korea, says that North Korea has been secretly manufacturing 1,000km-range ballistic missiles at the Toaeji (pig) Plant in Pyongyang since 1993. According to Ch'oe, North Korea has missiles with ranges of 400km to 500km and has tested a 1,000km-range missile. However, in a personal interview with Ch'oe, he reveals that he knows nothing about North Korean missile production or missile capabilities, and that others have provided him with information about North Korean missiles.
—Interview with Ch'oe Ju Hwal by Daniel A. Pinkston, analyst for the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 9 April 2001, Seoul; Ko Chae hak, "Kwisun Ch'oe Ju Hwal Sangjwa Kija Hoegyŏn Ilmun'ildap," Hankook Ilbo, 14 October 1995, p. 10, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Sŏn Chong Ku, "'Pukch'eje 4~5 Nyŏnnae Munŏjilgŏt'/Kwisun Pukhan'gun Ch'oe Ju Hwal Sangjwa Ilmun'ildap," Segye Ilbo, 14 October 1995, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kim Yŏn Gwang and Sŏn U Jŏng, "Kwisun Pukhan'gun Ch'oe Ju Hwal Sangjwa/Ilmun'ildap," Chosun Ilbo, 14 October 1995, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; KBS-1 Television Network (Seoul), 13 October 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-198, 13 October 1995, pp. 49-50; KBS Television, 13 October 1995, in "Defector Says North Korea Will Focus Attack on US Forces," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 October 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
A recent US intelligence study claims North Korea will soon be able to produce ballistic missiles with blast fragmentation warheads capable of carrying approximately 100 submunitions, with each bomblet weighing about 5kg. The submunitions, loaded with metal or chemicals, could be dispersed from an altitude of 60km above the launch [sic] area. All 100 submunitions would follow a ballistic trajectory, hitting the target over a span of 20 seconds. [Note: The reference to "launch area" should be "target area."]
—Re'uven Pedatzur, "A New Threat to the Arrow," Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), 15 October 1995, p. B1, in "New Missiles Seen Making Arrow Obsolete," FBIS-NES-95-199, 16 October 1995, pp. 52-53.
According to CIA Director John Deutch, North Korea may begin deploying the Nodong-1 by the end of 1996. The CIA believes that North Korea is working on acquiring the capability to arm its Nodong and Taepodong missiles with nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads.
—Barbara Starr, "CIA Expects Nodong Deployment Next Year," Jane's Defence Weekly, 11 November 1995, p. 16.
Marshall Ch'oe Gwang, vice chairman of the National Defense Commission and minister of the People's Armed Forces, leads a North Korean delegation to Pakistan. Ch'oe is believed to have visited missile production facilities in the Faisalabad-Lahore area and possibly Jhelum, the site where the Ghauri was subsequently flight-tested. The visit is believed to have resulted in the conclusion of an agreement for North Korea to provide Pakistan with key components for the Nodong and/or Taepodong missile programs, about 12 to 25 Nodong missiles, and at least one transporter erector launcher (TEL) or mobile erector launcher (MEL).
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 23-24.
Some 10 director-level officials from the Russian Foreign Ministry, Atomic Energy Ministry, and others meet in secret to assess the North Korean nuclear and missile development programs. Their report concludes that the Nodong-1 is "not useful as a military weapon since serious problems have been found in the engine design, performance, accuracy, target directional feature [sic] and flight safety" during a 1993 test-firing in the Sea of Japan. [Note: The translation is poor. "Accuracy" should be "precision" in reference to the specifications of various missile production parameters. "Target directional feature" means "accuracy" or "CEP."]
—Yu Min, Seoul Shinmun, 5 January 1996, p. 2, in "'South Korean Paper Quotes Russian Reporter on North's Nuclear Intentions," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 January 1996, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Yu Min, "'Pukhan Haekkaebal P'ogi'anh'nŭnda'/Seoul Shinmun, Russia Chŏngbu P'yŏnggabogosŏ Ipsu," Taehan Maeil, 5 January 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
In a letter to Senator Carl Levin regarding the future ballistic missile threat to the United States, CIA Director of Congressional Affairs Joanne Isham states, "A North Korean missile potentially capable of reaching portions of Alaska—but not beyond—may be in development, but the likelihood of it being operational within five years is very low."
—Joanne Isham letter to Carl Levin, 1 December 1995, cited in Harry L. Stimson Center Online, <http://www.stimson.org/rd-table/levin.htm>.
US intelligence sources say that from April to October 1995, Peru held clandestine meetings with North Korea to discuss a $52.5 million purchase of Scud-C missiles. On 20 December, the day after the Washington Times reported on the meetings, Peru's President Alberto Fujimori denies the allegations.
—Bill Gertz, "Peru Negotiating To Buy Scud Missiles From North Korea," Washington Times, 19 December 1995, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; America Television (Lima), 20 December 1995, in "Peruvian President Denies Reported Negotiations By Peru To Buy Scud Missiles," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 December 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "US Sidesteps Queries on Alleged Peru-N. Korea [sic] Missile Deal," Agence France Presse, 19 December 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
Iran denies that it ever bought long-range missiles from North Korea. According to Iranian Minister for Defense and Armed Forces Logistics Mohammad Foruzandeh, "Iran's policy is to ignore unfounded Western allegations." Foruzandeh says that if Iran had purchased the missiles, they would have publically revealed the acquisition. Western experts believe, however, that Iran is not only trying to buy 1,000km-range Nodong missiles from the North Korea, but is also working to jointly produce them.
—"Iran Denies Long-Range Missile Purchase from DPRK," Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 30 December 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.
A South Korean "source" reveals that the United States and North Korea have agreed to begin talks concerning North Korea's Scud missiles exports. The final date and place have yet to be decided, but the talks may begin as early as the first half of 1996. South Korean officials believe that North Korea may be increasing its Scud sales to alleviate recent food shortages.
—Ku Song Chae, Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 31 December 1995, p. 2, in "'Significant' USA-North Korea Talks Over Scud Missiles Sales," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 31 December 1995, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Ku Sŏng Chae, "Mibuk Kwan'gyegaesŏn 'Sokto' Naeltŭt/Scud Hyŏpsang Puktaepyodan Pangmi Ŭimi," Chosun Ilbo, 31 December 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Ku Sŏng Chae, "Puk Missile Such'ulgwallyŏn Mi, Pukkwa Tokchahyŏpsang/Such'ulhwaktaejedong P'ir'yoddara," Chosun Ilbo, 31 December 1995, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.
