| Year/Date |
Exporter |
Item(s) |
Remarks |
Late 1962
|
USSR
|
Battalion of SA-2 SAMs
|
|
1967
|
USSR
|
Unknown number of SS-N-2 Styx anti-ship missiles
|
|
1967-68
|
USSR
|
Unknown number of SSC-2b Samlet missiles
|
|
1968
|
USSR
|
27 to 63 FROG-5 artillery rockets, nine TELs, approximately 12 FROG-6 trainer vehicles
|
Agreements signed in 1965 and 1967.
|
1968-69
|
USSR
|
five batteries of SSC-2b Samlet missiles
|
|
1968-70
|
USSR
|
Unknown number of FROG-3, FROG-5 and FROG-7 rockets
|
|
Late 1960s
|
China
|
Unknown number of HQ-2 SAMs and HY-1 anti-ship missiles
|
HQ-2 SAM is Chinese version of the Soviet SA-2.
|
Late 1960s
|
USSR
|
Unknown number of BM-21 122mm-caliber MRLs
|
|
Early 1970s
|
China
|
Technical assistance
|
China provides technical assistance for the maintenance and assembly programs for SA-2b SAMs, SS-N-2b (Styx) and SSC-2 (Samlet) anti-ship missile cruise missile, and FROG-5 ballistic missiles, all originally provided by the USSR.
|
Early 1970s
|
USSR
|
SSC-2b Samlet anti-ship missiles
|
Missiles supplied in “knock-down” kits; North Korean military assembles and tests after receiving Soviet training.
|
1970s
|
China
|
Components for HY-1 production
|
|
1970s
|
China
|
Missile expertise
|
China and North Korea cooperate on development of single stage DF-61 tactical ballistic missile; project collapses in 1978.
|
1972
|
USSR
|
20 Scud-B missiles
|
First possible Scud-B delivery, but unconfirmed; reported quid pro quo for Soviet access to captured USS Pueblo.
|
1974
|
Egypt
|
SA-7 Grail (9K32 Strella) SAMs
|
|
1974
|
USSR
|
Unknown number of SA-7 SAMs
|
|
1975-76
|
Egypt
|
24 to 56 FROG-7B artillery rockets
|
|
1976
|
Egypt
|
two Scud-B missiles
|
Initial deliveries of Soviet-made Scud-Bs still uncertain.
|
1979-80
|
Egypt
|
small number of Scud-Bs and MAZ-543 TELs
|
1981
|
Egypt
|
two Scud-B missiles and an unknown number of MAZ-543 TELs
|
Late 1970s
|
China
|
HY-2 (Silkworm) anti-ship missiles
|
|
1980s
|
China
|
HY-2 sustainer motors and guidance systems
|
|
Early 1980s
|
China
|
Technical assistance for reverse engineering of the Scud-B
|
China provides assistance for engine design, metallurgy and airframe technology.
|
1980s
|
China
|
Advanced missile technology and components
|
From Joongang Ilbo citation of a “CIA report that was leaked to the press.”
|
Mid-1980s
|
China
|
Unknown number of HJ-73 and HN-5A SAMs
|
|
1985-88
|
USSR
|
About 240 Scud-B missiles
|
Unconfirmed; report claims 100 of the Scud-Bs were resold to Iran.
|
Late 1980s
|
USSR
|
SS-21 ballistic missiles
|
Possible response to US deployment of Lance missiles in South Korea. The SS-21 could have been the third stage of the Paektusan-1 that was test launched on 31 August 1998.
|
1988-91
|
China
|
Missile expertise and technology
|
A reported 230 military officials and weapons specialists travel to Yinchuan, China to learn “nuclear testing technology” and “missile flight testing technology;” delegation also travels to China’s Dalian naval base for missile technology.
|
1989
|
Japan via China
|
Spectrum analyzers
|
Originated in Japan, but transshipped via Beijing.
|
Late 1980s through 1990s
|
USSR
|
9K34 Strela 3 (SA-14 Gremlin) and 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) SAMs
|
|
Early 1990s
|
China
|
Advanced missile technology, possibly related to the CSS-2
|
In February 1994, US satellites detect new “missile simulator” in Pyongyang. The mock-up appears to be a two-stage missile with the first stage resembling the Chinese CSS-2. China denies providing North Korea with advanced missile technology.
|
1990s
|
Egypt
|
Advanced missile technology, possibly including carbon-carbon and advanced gyroscopes
|
US and Israeli intelligence sources believe Egypt supplied North Korea with technology received from the US and other Western nations.
|
1990-92
|
Russia
|
Technical assistance for a re-entry vehicle
|
Approximately 30 to 50 specialists from Russia and Eastern Europe secretly visited North Korea to work on heat-resistance materials for re-entry vehicles.
|
1991
June
|
Russia
|
10 Scud-C missiles
|
|
1992
|
Russia
|
Missile expertise
|
In August, 10 Russian scientists traveled to North Korea to discuss modernizing North Korea’s missile program. In late 1992, a large number of Russian scientists were prevented from traveling to North Korea.
|
| 1992-1996 |
Russia |
35 Styx/P-20 anti-ship missiles |
|
| 1994 |
Japan |
one or more jet mills |
Jet mills are used to grind materials into a fine powder using compressed air. Jet mills have commercial applications in the pharmaceutical industry, but they are also used to make solid fuel for ballistic missiles, and thus are MTRC-controlled items. |
1994
|
Russia
|
10 to 12 Golf II-class submarines
|
Western defense analysts claim the submarines could be modified to launch Nodong missiles or other weapons. Russia insisted the submarines were only good for scrap metal.
|
Mid-1990s
|
China
|
About 125 C-802 cruise missiles
|
|
1995
|
China
|
Missile expertise; satellite technology
|
In 1995, US intelligence discovers 200 North Korean missile specialists traveling to China. Intelligence officials believe the training may be related to the Taep’odong-2 program. However, later reports indicate the US National Security Agency discovered in 1998 that China and North Korea were cooperating on satellite development.
|
1997
|
Russia
|
Maraging steel
|
Intercepted; British customs seize the shipment at Gatwick Airport on flight from Moscow. The flight was to continue to Islamabad. Part of the shipment was to stay in Pakistan and part was to be transferred to North Korea.
|
1998
|
China
|
Specialty steel
|
Probably maraging steel
|
1999
|
Russia/China
|
Fiber-optic gyroscopes
|
The gyroscopes were originally sold to China’s Changda Corporation by the Russian company Fizoptika and later transferred to North Korea.
|
1999
|
China
|
At least 10 tons of powdered aluminum
|
North Korea transfers 10 tons of the powdered aluminum to Syria.
|
1999
|
China
|
Accelerometers, gyroscopes, and “special high-tech machinery”
|
The US Defense Intelligence Agency believes that the technology transfer, containing material of US-origin, was in response to the NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade.
|
Late 1999
|
China
|
Unknown missile related products
|
This is based on a report issued by the NSA.
|
Late 1990s
|
China
|
Warhead data
|
A US House national security aide reportedly says missile cooperation between China and North Korea probably included the transfer of warhead data.
|
2000
|
Russia
|
Special aluminum alloy, laser gyroscopes, and connectors and relays used in missile electronics
|
These transfers were reportedly a cooperative effort between Russia and Uzbekistan.
|
2000-01
|
China
|
Dual-use missile technology and raw materials
|
Most of the missile related transfers came form North Korean firms based in China.
|
2001
|
Russia
|
Possible ICBM data
|
In August, Kim Jong Il visited Khrunichev Space Center on the outskirts of Moscow. Western intelligence sources are concerned that North Korean missile experts may have accompanied Kim to learn more about long-range missiles.
|
