North Korea is the most advanced of the "late missile developers" and since the demise of the Soviet Union has probably become the greatest exporter of complete ballistic missile systems, components, and technology. Pyongyang received foreign assistance over the years, most notably from the former Soviet Union and China, but the complete details of all foreign assistance are still sketchy. The North Korean missile program is notable because there have been relatively few flight tests. North Korea has deployed about 600-800 Scud missile variants, about 150-200 Nodong missiles, and perhaps 10 Paektusan-1 missiles, which are more commonly known as Taepodong-1 missiles.
In 2003, U.S. satellite imagery detected a new ballistic missile under development that appears to be based upon the Soviet R-27 (SS-N-6), which is a liquid-fueled submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of at least 2,500km. The land-based version is 12 meters long and 1.5 meters in diameter with a range of 2,500-4,000km. North Korea reportedly considered displaying 10 of the missiles and five mobile launchers on 9 September 2003, which is the anniversary of the founding of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. However, the display was apparently cancelled for political reasons. In May 2004, a report indicated that North Korea was building two underground bases for the new missile, and that construction of the bases was about 70-80 percent complete.
North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and missile exports are one of Pyongyang's greatest sources of foreign exchange. On 10 December 2002, Spanish and U.S. naval ships intercepted the North Korean ship Sŏsan en route to Yemen. The Sŏsan cargo included 15 Scud missiles, conventional warheads, and 85 drums of "inhibited red fuming nitric acid," which is used as an oxidizer for Scud missile fuel. North Korea declared the interception of the Sŏsan an "act of piracy" and has demanded "compensation for the losses and personal trauma experienced by the crew members."
On 11 January 2003, one day after the DPRK declared its withdrawal from the NPT, North Korea's ambassador to China suggested that Pyongyang might lift its flight-test moratorium that has been in effect since September 1999. North Korea imposed the moratorium after holding bilateral talks with the U.S. in the late 1990s. Washington asked for the moratorium after the test launch of the Paektusan-1, which failed to place a small satellite into earth orbit on 31 August 1998. North Korea's next flight test would probably be the untested Taepodong-2 in a space-launch configuration.
On 24 February and 10 March 2003, North Korea tested surface-to-ship cruise missiles on the east coast. The missile test on 24 February was considered provocative because it was only one day before the inauguration of South Korean President Roh Mu Hyun, and the same day that U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell arrived in Seoul to attend the inauguration. Both missiles landed in the Sea of Japan (East Sea), but the fight tests were not considered a violation of North Korea's ballistic missile flight test moratorium.
History
North Korea first entered the field of rockets and missiles in the early 1960s with the production of multiple rocket launchers.[1] By 1965, Kim Il Sung had probably made the political decision to seek an indigenous ballistic missile production capability. That year marked the establishment of the Hamhŭng Military Academy, where North Korean personnel began to receive training in missile development.[2] In general, the 1960s marked the procurement of rockets, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), anti-ship missiles, and the initial development of human resources to support a missile program.
There are different schools of thought on the motivations for Pyongyang's ballistic missile program. Those who believe North Korea is a revisionist state argue that Pyongyang's motivations are malign and constitute a serious external threat. This school of thought has ample evidence to support its claims: North Korea's initiation of the Korean War, acts of terrorism, forward-deployed military forces, a constitution that states that the DPRK is the sole legitimate government for all of Korea, and Korean Workers Party bylaws calling for a "completion of the revolution in the south."
On the other hand, some believe North Korea is a state satisfied with the status quo and that it seeks peaceful coexistence with South Korea and the international community. Proponents of this school often argue that North Korea's motivations for developing missiles are defensive in nature and designed to deter external threats to the DPRK. Evidence to support this argument includes the July 4 North-South Joint Communiqué of 1972; the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea of 1991 (the so-called "Basic Agreement"); the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1992; the summit meeting of June 2000; the Agreed Framework with the United States; and reunification proposals that would recognize "two systems" for the north and south. However, critics argue that Pyongyang's behavior is inconsistent and that this evidence is not credible.
There were a number of factors that likely motivated the North Korean leadership to acquire and produce ballistic missiles. First, U.S. intervention at the outbreak of the Korean War thwarted Kim Il Sung's attempt to unify Korea by force. Kim might have viewed ballistic missiles as weapons to deter or defeat U.S. military forces in a subsequent conflict. Second, rocky alliance relationships with both the Soviet Union and China caused Kim to question the credibility of Moscow's and Beijing's commitments to aid Pyongyang in the event of another war. Kim Il Sung had been disappointed with Moscow's limited support during the Korean War, and he was appalled by Khrushchev's "collapse or cowardice" during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962.
In a probable response to perceived alliance uncertainty, and to the military coup d'état in South Korea in 1961, the Korean Workers' Party (KWP) Central Committee adopted a policy in December 1962 to "modernize" the military, and ballistic missiles were likely on the list of desired weapons systems. The KWP also held a party leader conference in October 1966, at which Kim Il Sung declared the need to develop military and economic capabilities in tandem.[3] However, this policy actually began to split the military economy, or "second economy," from its civilian counterpart. The Second Economic Committee was established in the early 1970s to oversee the promotion of domestic defense industries, and this institutional arrangement enabled the state to increasingly divert more resources to the missile development program.
Early Ballistic Missile Development
During the late 1960s, Pyongyang acquired surface-to-ship missiles and FROG-5/7 rockets from Moscow,[4] and by 1970, Beijing was delivering surface-to-ship missiles, SAMs, and technical assistance.[5] Although North Korea sought to acquire Soviet ballistic missiles as early as the mid-1960s, Moscow declined, at least initially, so Pyongyang turned to Beijing for help to produce ballistic missiles. In September 1971, North Korea signed an agreement with China to acquire, develop, and produce ballistic missiles and other weapon systems; however, substantial cooperation did not begin until about 1977 when Korean engineers were able to participate in a joint program to develop the DF-61.[6]
The development of North Korean human resources was necessary, but not sufficient for the relatively rapid progress in Pyongyang's missile development program. North Korea, as practically every national missile program since the introduction of the German V-2, has relied upon the transfer of hardware and technology from more advanced producers. North Korea obtained Soviet-made Scud-B missiles to begin a reverse-engineering program, but the timing and conditions of the procurement are still unclear. The earliest reported possibility of North Korea acquiring Scud-Bs is from the Soviet Union in 1972.[7] However, the general view is that Egypt provided the first Scud-Bs to North Korea in 1976, or at some time between 1979 and 1981.[8]
Timeline of North Korean Hwasŏng-5 (Scud-B; R-17) Development
Source
First Scud Imports
Initial Production
Flight Test
First Exports
Sources: Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999); Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/; personal interview data; SIPRI, SIPRI Yearbook 1989: World Armaments and Disarmament (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000 Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000).
Reports generally cite the number of missiles received as "a few." The ambiguity in the number and timing of the delivery makes it difficult to extrapolate or estimate the development path of what is generally considered an indigenous reverse-engineering program. However, the later the delivery and the smaller the number of missiles received, the more likely that North Korea was dependent upon foreign technical assistance. This assistance could range from licensed production to covert assistance from firms or individuals. Many questions about foreign assistance may only be of historical interest for the Hwasŏng-5/6 (Scud-B/C) programs because Pyongyang's production of these short-range missiles is probably sustainable without foreign assistance. However, foreign materials and technical assistance could be critical for the production and development of North Korea's intermediate-range and long-range missile programs.
By 1984, North Korea had produced and flight-tested an indigenous version of the Scud-B, and in 1985 Pyongyang reached an agreement with Tehran to obtain financial assistance for missile development and production in exchange for Iran's option to purchase North Korean missiles in the future.[9] Iran's ballistic missile "war of the cities" with Iraq created an opportunity for North Korea to earn foreign exchange and increase scale economies in production. Furthermore, Tehran's use of the Hwasŏng-5 provided Pyongyang with performance data that would have required extensive flight testing in Korea. Although North Korea avoided the political costs of conducting flight tests at home, Pyongyang's missile exports had destabilizing effects in the Middle East.
During 1985-1986, North Korea had begun to construct missile bases for the Hwasŏng-5, which entered serial production by 1987. As soon as, or shortly after, mass production of the Hwasŏng-5 began, North Korea began development of the Hwasŏng-6 (Scud-C), before rapidly starting the Nodong development program. The deployment of the Hwasŏng-5, production of the Hwasŏng-6, and the beginning of the Nodong program all coincide around 1987-1989. This prompt sequence of development is remarkable, and historically unprecedented for a small developing country. Late-industrializing countries can reduce the time required for industrialization, and the same is true in the area of missiles. However, accelerated development is a function of foreign technology transfers, so Pyongyang's extremely rapid progress in missile development suggests a high level of foreign technical assistance.
By the late 1980s, North Korea had begun construction for intermediate-range missiles that were still under development. Around 1990-1991, serial production of the Hwasŏng-6 began, or at about the same time the first Nodong prototypes were built. Meanwhile, Pyongyang began to provide technology transfers, and even turnkey Scud factories, to countries in the Middle East.
Intermediate-Range Missile Development In the late 1980s, North Korea's Second Natural Science Institute began development of the so-called "Nodong" intermediate-range ballistic missile. U.S. reconnaissance satellites detected a Nodong on the launch pad at the Musudan-ri missile test site in May 1990, but subsequent imagery revealed burn marks on the pad, which indicated a probable test failure. Nevertheless, North Korea reportedly was able to obtain Nodong sales contracts with Libya, Iran, and possibly with Syria and Pakistan before the Nodong was successfully flight tested in late May 1993. Although the Nodong was later flight tested in Iran and Pakistan, the 1993 flight test is still Pyongyang's only test. It is worth noting that North Korea was unable to test the Nodong to full range for geographic reasons. Nevertheless, Pyongyang began to deploy the Nodong shortly after the 1993 flight test, and about 100 have now been deployed to North Korean missile bases.
As North Korea was nearing completion of the Nodong's development, engineers were also working on the Paektusan-1, which is more commonly known as the "Taepodong-1." The Paektusan-1 does not have a new airframe nor engine design, but it is a two-stage missile with a Nodong as the first stage and Hwasŏng (Scud) variant as the second stage. The Paektusan-1 was flight tested in a space launch configuration on 31 August 1998, but it failed to place a small satellite named "Kwangmyŏngsŏng-1" into earth orbit. The space launch vehicle (SLV) version of the Paektusan-1 included a solid-fueled third stage that failed during the 1998 launch.
In the mid-1990s, North Korea had begun design and development of the so-called "Taepodong-2," which has a new airframe for the first stage, and reportedly will have a Nodong for its second stage. In July 1998, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, headed by Donald Rumsfeld, reported that North Korea "was hard at work on the Taepodong-2 ballistic missile and could deploy the missile within five years." Although Pyongyang agreed to a missile flight test moratorium in September 1999, North Korean engineers continued design work and static testing of the Taepodong-2. U.S. intelligence estimates that North Korea has the capability to test the Taepodong-2 at any time, and that it could deliver a small payload to the western part of the continental United States, although with low confidence in its accuracy.
Key Sources: [1] Christopher F. Foss, editor, Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 719. [2] Yun Dŏk Min, "Mi-Puk Missile Hyŏpsang'ŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Chŏnmang," ROK IFANS policy paper, 22 November 2000, p. 2; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 2; Testimony of Ko Yŏng Hwan, former North Korean Foreign Ministry official, before the US Senate, 21 October 1997. [3] The Second Machine Industry Ministry, under the party secretary in charge of military industries, was established shortly after Kim's declaration. The Second Machine Industry Ministry was renamed the "Second Economic Committee" in 1971. The Second Economic Committee is responsible for the production of all armaments. See Joseph S. Bermudez, The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 45-46; "Minsaeng Hŭisaengwi Kunsusanŏp Pŏnch'ang," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 31 March 1997, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Kim Kwang In, "'Twaejigongjang' Sŏn Missile Saengsan," Chosun Ilbo, 11 February 2001, <http://www.chosun.com/>; "'Pyongyang Pig Factory' Produces Missiles," Chosun Ilbo, 12 February 2001, <http://www.chosun.com/>. [4] Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 246-247; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, pp. 4-5; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203-207; Christopher F. Foss, editor, Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749. [5] Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The North Korean 'Scud B' Program," Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review, May 1989, pp. 203-207; Christopher F. Foss, editor, Jane's Armour and Artillery 1991-92 (Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group, 1991), p. 749; Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's Missile Sales—Few Changes for the Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 560. [6] The DF-61 was designed to be a liquid-propelled ballistic missile with a range of about 600km while delivering a 1,000kg warhead. The program was cancelled because of Chinese domestic political reasons in 1978. See Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 3; Hua Di, "One Superpower Worse that Two," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter, September 1991, pp. 14-15; John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms Export Enigma," International Security, Fall 1992, pp. 5-40; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 248-249. [7] A high-level North Korean defector claims that Pyongyang leveraged its capture of the USS Pueblo and the hardware on board to bargain with Moscow and get a contract for the delivery of 20 Scud-B missiles. This report and any details about an agreement for subsequent deliveries or technology transfers have not been substantiated. Interview with North Korean defector by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 1 November 2000, Seoul. [8] Yonhap News Agency, 24 June 1993, in "Defense Ministry Says Nodong-1 Test in May Successful," JPRS-TND-93-020, 28 June 1993, p. 1; ROK Ministry of Unification, Information Analysis Bureau, "Pukhan Missile Munjae Kwallyŏn Ch'amgojaryo," press release, 3 November 2000, p. 1; "Pukhan, Sajong 1 Ch'ŏn Kilometer Isang Missile Kaebalchung," Joongang Ilbo, 8 November 1991, <http://www.joins.com/>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 249, 266; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Ambitions Ascendant," Jane's Defence Weekly, 10 April 1993, pp. 20, 22; Chang Chun Ik, Pukhan Haek-Missile Chŏnjaeng (Seoul: Sŏmundang, May 1999), pp. 249-250, 257, 266; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202; Hajime Ozu, Missile 2000: Reference Guide to World Missile Systems (Tokyo: Shinkigensha, 2000), p. 95; "Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves," International Defense Review, Vol. 33, No. 10, 1 October 2000, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>. [9] For reports of North Korea's initial production of an "indigenous Scud-B," see Yun Dŏk Min, "Mi-Puk Missile Hyŏpsangŭi Hyŏnhwanggwa Chŏnmang" IFANS policy paper, 22 November 2000, p. 1; interview with Kim Kil Sŏn by CNS senior research associate Daniel A. Pinkston, 10 April 2001, Seoul; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10; for information on bilateral North Korean-Iranian missile cooperation during this period, see Korean Central News Agency, 25 October and 26 October 1983, in "Iranian Prime Minister's Visit to North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 October 1983, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/>; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Ballistic Missile Development in Egypt," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October 1992, pp. 452-458; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1999, p. 10; Lee Jŏng Hun, "FROGesŏ Taepodong Kkaji: Pukhan Missile Game," Shindonga, August 1999, p. 202.
