Therefore, the above evidence indicates North Korea likely has the capability to produce nuclear weapons. Not until December 2001 did the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) determine that North Korea has developed one to two nuclear weapons.[3] This assessment was a departure from previous intelligence reports, which concluded that the DPRK had enough plutonium for at most up to two nuclear weapons. However, the 30 January 2002 CIA report to Congress apparently backtracks from the December 2001 NIC report by stating, "We assess that North Korea has produced enough plutonium for at least one, and possibly two, nuclear weapons."[4] US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's opinion of such reports is that "the US intelligence community has for years had an unclassified assessment that North Korea may possess one or two nuclear weapons."[5] Political spinning aside, the uncertainty over the exact status of North Korea's nuclear weapons capacity remains. To paraphrase Secretary Rumsfeld, "We don't know what we don't know."

The number of nuclear weapons that North Korea may have depends on its level of technical sophistication, which may range from a high level requiring little fissile material to a much lower level of expertise requiring significantly greater quantities of HEU or plutonium. At the high end of technological sophistication, North Korea might be capable of using 3kg of weapons-grade plutonium or 10kg of weapons-grade uranium per weapon. Therefore, North Korea could currently produce two to three nuclear weapons with the 6 to 10kg of separated weapons-grade plutonium it is estimated to have. At the low end of weapons engineering sophistication, North Korea may need about 8kg of weapons-grade plutonium or 25kg of HEU per nuclear weapon, applying the IAEA quantities of concern. In that case, North Korea may only be able to produce at most one nuclear weapon with the up to 10kg of separated plutonium it may have. Finally, about 5kg or so of weapons-grade plutonium or about 16kg of HEU per bomb--amounts between the low and high ends of technological sophistication--are reasonable estimates of how much fissile material could be required for North Korea to produce a first-generation nuclear weapon, assuming the DPRK was able to make full use of available expertise, including possible assistance from other countries. In this scenario, North Korea may be able to produce up to two nuclear weapons with the up to 10kg of separated weapons-grade plutonium it may presently have.

In sum, North Korea may have already produced from one to three implosion-type fission nuclear weapons from separated weapons-grade plutonium.

Based on the available open source evidence, future nuclear weapons production capacity from the uranium-enrichment program, the 50MW(e) and 200MW(e) reactors under construction, and the 8,000 spent fuel rods is summarized in the following table.

Time Span	Material Source[6]	Number of Additional Weapons	Total Number
Today (Feb. 2003)	Plutonium from 1989 extraction (material for 1 to 2 weapons)	---	1-2
Plus 1 to 3 months (May 2003)	Reprocessed 8,000 spent fuel rods in storage (estimated material for 5 weapons)	5	6-7
Plus 1 year (2004)	5MW(e) Reactor: 5.5kg plutonium per year (about enough for 1 weapon)	1	8-9
Plus 2 years (2005)	5MW(e) Reactor: 5.5kg plutonium per year	1	15-16
	HEU program: about 100kg HEU per year[7]	6
Plus 3 years (2006)	5MW(e) Reactor: 5.5kg plutonium per year	1	29-33
	HEU program: about 100kg HEU per year	6
	Completed 50MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun: 55kg of Pu per year (7-10 bombs)[8]	7-10
Plus 4 years (2007)[9]	5MW(e) Reactor: 5.5kg plutonium per year	1	73-90
	HEU program: about 100kg HEU per year	6
	Completed 50MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun: 55kg of Pu per year (7-10 bombs)	7-10
	200MW(e) reactor in T'aech'ŏn-kun: 220kg of Pu per year[10]	30-40

Does North Korea have the ability to produce more sophisticated nuclear weapons, in particular, boosted or fission-fusion weapons? For North Korea to do this, a prerequisite would be to acquire sufficient amounts (at least grams worth) of tritium and deuterium, heavy forms of hydrogen, that fuse together inside such weapons. Although deuterium is relatively easy to acquire, for example from water, tritium is more difficult to produce because it is radioactive and has a relatively short half-life. Perhaps North Korea obtained supplies of tritium from Pakistan or some other supplier. However, there is no reliable open-source evidence for this acquisition or indigenous production of tritium. Therefore, the available evidence suggests that North Korea has not made sophisticated nuclear weapons. This conclusion is significant because it sets limits on North Korea's ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons. Such miniaturization may be necessary for the DPRK to be able to launch nuclear weapons over long distances using its current group of long-range ballistic missiles. If North Korea does not have either an indigenous or foreign source of tritium to enable miniaturization, it would have to turn to aircraft or some other non-missile delivery vehicle to use any nuclear weapons that it may possess, unless the payload of its ballistic missiles is on the order of hundreds of kilograms or more.

	Updated April 2003