According to the US State Department, in October 2002 North Korea admitted to a US government delegation that it had a uranium enrichment program. However, North Korean officials subsequently claimed they only admitted to having "a plan to develop nuclear weapons." At this time, it is uncertain whether North Korea has enriched any uranium. According to a November 2002 unclassified CIA assessment, "North Korea embarked on the effort to develop a centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program about two years ago."[1] Moreover, the CIA report estimated that North Korea is building a centrifuge plant that could be fully functional by "mid-decade" and could then produce enough weapons-grade uranium (typically greater than 90% enriched uranium) for two or more weapons per year. North Korea's uranium enrichment program may have begun as early as 1995, possibly with the assistance of Pakistan.[2] In March 2000, then-President Bill Clinton could not certify that North Korea was not manufacturing or otherwise acquiring HEU.
The "mid-decade" estimate for full operational capability of the enrichment plant may overestimate North Korea's technical success. Presumably, this estimate is based on the assumption that North Korea will not experience significant delays in acquiring enough centrifuges, connecting them in a functioning enrichment cascade, and mastering the maintenance required to keep the equipment operating. Under this scenario, the DPRK may have an HEU program producing about 100kg of weapons-grade uranium per year by 2005 at the earliest.[3] Presently, North Korea may have a pilot-scale uranium-enrichment program underway.
In addition to concerns about North Korea's weapons-grade uranium program, the DPRK upgraded its IRT-2000 research reactor from 10% to 80% enriched uranium fuel in 1987. At that time, the Soviet Union supplied this fuel to North Korea, and Russia has now apparently stopped providing the enriched uranium fuel. However, the amount of 80% enriched fuel that North Korea has stockpiled is unknown.
[1] CIA unclassified assessment as quoted in Appendix I of "Beyond the Agreed Framework: The DPRK's Projected Atomic Bomb Making Capabilities, 2002-09," An Analysis of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), December 2002, <http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/nuc/cap/%5C1>.
[2] Larry A. Niksch, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program," Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, updated 22 January 2003, <http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/nuc/cap/%5C1>.
[3] "Beyond the Agreed Framework: The DPRK's Projected Atomic Bomb Making Capabilities, 2002-09," An Analysis of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), December 2002, <http://www.npec-web.org/projects/fissile2.htm>; Daniel A. Pinkston and Stephanie Lieggi, "North Korea's Nuclear Program: Key Concerns," CNS North Korea Special Collection report, 17 January 2003, <http://www.nti.org/db/profiles/dprk/nuc/cap/%5C1>.
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