January 2003
US satellite imagery analysts observe covered trucks repeatedly transporting material away from the facility temporarily storing 8,000 spent fuel rods in Yongbyon-kun. US intelligence analysts suspect that the trucks are transporting the fuel rods to a reprocessing facility where they could be converted into weapons-grade plutonium.
—David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Satellite Said to See Activity at North Korean Nuclear Site," New York Times, 31 January 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

January 2003
According to US and Japanese government sources, North Korea begins preparing to reactivate the nuclear reprocessing facility located in the Yongbyon nuclear complex. US and Japanese intelligence reportedly detect shipments of coal arriving at the heat supply boiler facility that is adjacent to the reprocessing facility. The boiler, which is used to maintain the temperature of a nitric acid solution used in reprocessing, becomes active by early February as reconnaissance satellites detect smoke billowing from the facility.
—Kyodo News Service, 28 February 2003, in "N. Korea Set to Restart Nuclear Reprocessing Facility: Sources," FBIS Document ID JPP20030228000203.

1 January 2003
The last two members of the three-member IAEA inspection team leave North Korea.
—P.S. Suryanarayana, "IAEA Inspectors Leave N. Korea," The Hindu, 1 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 January 2003
US President George W. Bush reaffirms his intention to address North Korea's decision to restart its previously frozen nuclear facilities diplomatically. Speaking to reporters on his ranch in Crawford, Texas, Bush says that the situation with North Korea is not a military problem but rather a diplomatic problem.
—Ivan Lebedev, "North Korean Nuclear Programme Should Be Settled Peacefully-Bush," ITAR-TASS, 3 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 January 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi agree to continue using diplomatic means to pressure North Korea into reversing its decision to abandon the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
—Kyodo News Service, 5 January 2003, in "Kawaguchi, Powell in Talks on North Korea Nuclear Crisis," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 5 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 January 2003
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution that "deplores in the strongest terms the DPRK's unilateral acts to remove and impede the functioning of containment and surveillance equipment at its nuclear facilities and the nuclear material contained therein, including the expulsion of IAEA inspectors, which renders the Agency unable to verify, pursuant to its safeguards agreement with the DPRK, that there has been no diversion of nuclear material in the DPRK." Addressing the Board of Governors, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei states that the Agency is "regrettably at present unable...to verify that the DPRK is not diverting nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and it is also at present unable to verify that the DPRK has declared to the Agency all the nuclear material that is subject to the safeguards."
—Report by the Director General on the Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement Between the Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2003/3, 6 January 2003; Introductory Statement by IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei to the Board of Governors, 6 January 2003, International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Press/ Statements/2003/ebsp2003n001.shtm1>.

6 January 2003
In an interview with Interfax News Agency, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov states that North Korea must readmit IAEA inspectors. However, Ivanov adds, "it is necessary to provide North Korea with security guarantees, otherwise the situation could become unpredictable."
—"N. Korea Must Get Security Guarantees to Avoid Crisis Worsening: Moscow," Agence France Presse, 6 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 January 2003
US President George Bush states that the United States has no intention of invading North Korea. Speaking at a cabinet meeting, Bush says, "We have no intention of invading North Korea. I believe this will be resolved peacefully and I believe it can be resolved diplomatically."
—"US Has No Intention To Invade DPRK: Bush," Xinhua News Agency, 7 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6-7 January 2003
Representatives from the United States, Japan and South Korea hold a meeting of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in Washington to discuss North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. On 7 January, representatives from the three nations issue a joint statement urging North Korea to eliminate its nuclear program while reiterating their intention to "pursue a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the issue."
—"US Willing to Talk to North Korea But No Quid Pro Quo," Agence France Presse, 7 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Anwar Iqbal, "Allies Urge N. Korea to Quit Nuclear Plans," United Press International, 7 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 January 2003
The Korean Central News Agency states that US claims of a missile threat from North Korea are merely attempts to justify the establishment of a missile defense system. According to a KCNA report, the United States' desire to deploy a missile defense system further illustrates its attempts at global supremacy. The report also claims that North Korea "has increased its self-defensive military capability to cope with the US intensified policy to invade and stifle it with nukes." The report concludes, "If the US unleashes a nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula, it will not escape its destruction."
—"KCNA on US Moves for MD Establishment," Korean Central News Agency, 7 January 2003, <www.kcna.co.jp>.

7 January 2003
The Korean Central News Agency reports that any attempt US to impose economic sanctions on North Korea would mean war. The report states, that "the US should opt for dialogue with the DPRK, not for war, clearly aware that it will have to pay a very high price for such reckless acts." The report also includes a demand for an apology from the US for what it refers to as the "piracy" against the North Korean ship Sosan in December 2002.
—"US Urged to Apologize and Compensate for Its Piracy against DPRK Ship," Korean Central News Agency, 7 January 2003, <www.kcna.co.jp>.

8 January 2003
KCNA accuses the United States of increasing the threat of nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula. According to the news agency, the US has created the rumor of North Korea's clandestine nuclear weapons program in order to prevent reconciliation of North and South Korea and keep tensions on the peninsula high.
—"KCNA Accuses US of Increasing Danger of Nuclear War in Korea," Korean Central News Agency, 8 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

9-11 January 2003
Han Song Ryol and Mun Jong Chol, two representatives of North Korea's permanent mission to the UN, travel to Santa Fe, New Mexico and meet with New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, a former US ambassador to the UN. The two sides discuss ways in which to resolve the conflict between the US and North Korea over North Korea's nuclear program. According to Bush administration officials, the meetings are unofficial, and Richardson is only authorized to reiterate the message that the administration has already stated publicly. Speaking to reporters after the talks, Richardson announces that Han informed him that "North Korea has no intention of building nuclear weapons." Richardson adds that he believes the talks were successful in conveying to the North Korean representatives "the depth of international concern over this issue." Commenting on the high level of inflammatory rhetoric coming from North Korea, Richardson says that North Koreans "don't negotiate like we do. They don't have our same mentality. They believe in order to get something they have to lay out additional cards, step up the rhetoric, be more belligerent."
—Barry Schweid, "Richardson Says North Korean Diplomat Says His Country Does Not Intend to Build Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 11 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Seth Mydans, "Threats and Responses: Nuclear Standoff; North Korea Says It Is Withdrawing from Arms Treaty," New York Times, 10 January 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Barry Schweid, "United States Condemns North Korea's Decision to Quit Nuclear Arms Treaty," Associated Press, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Leigh Strope, "North Korea Ready to Negotiate Despite Increasing Rhetoric," Associated Press, 12 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 January 2003
Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan says that the best way to resolve the dispute between the US and North Korea is through direct dialogue. Speaking at a meeting with his French counterpart Dominique de Villepin, Jiaxuan also says, "The framework agreement reached by the two sides in 1994 should be maintained and continue to be carried out."
—Xinhua News Agency, in "Chinese Foreign Minister, Visiting French Counterpart Urge US-North Korea Talks," BBC Monitoring International Reports," 9 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 2003
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei meets with US Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington to discuss North Korea's decision to resume its nuclear program. While in Washington, ElBaradei also meets with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee.
—"UN Nuclear Monitoring Chief to Meet Powell in Washington," Agence France Presse, 9 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Gollust, "Powell: US Committed to Seeking Diplomatic Solution with N. Korea," Voice of America News, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Says North Korea Disrespect for NPT Must Be Dealt With; ElBaradei Says Inspectors Seek More Proactive Iraqi Cooperation," Federal Information and News Dispatch, Inc. State Department, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 2003
The North Korean government announces that the country no longer considers itself bound by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea reportedly decided to withdraw from the NPT because the United States persistently tries to suppress North Korea through force and the IAEA is nothing more than a tool of the United States to accomplish this goal. According to the government statement, while North Korea is no longer party to the NPT and is no longer bound by its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, "we have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity." [NOTE: North Korea's announcement elicits multiple condemnations from the international community, including China, North Korea's closest ally.]
—"Statement of DPRK Government on Its Withdrawal from NPT," Korean Central News Agency, 10 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; "Chosonjongbusongmyomg Haengmugijonp'abangjijoyageso T'alt'oe," Korean Central News Agency, 11 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Christopher Torchia, "North Korea Withdraws from Nuclear Arms Control Treaty, Warns of 'Third World War,'" Associated Press, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 2003
Responding to Pyongyang's announced decision to withdraw from the NPT, US Secretary of State Colin Powell states that in withdrawing from the treaty, "North Korea has thumbed its nose at the international community. It is a very serious situation," says Powell, adding, "We are not going to be intimidated."
—Barry Schweid, "Richardson Says North Korean Diplomat Says His Country Does Not Intend to Build Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 11 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 2003
Yun Kuk Hui, deputy general director of North Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy states that the atomic energy industrial sector fully supports Pyongyang's decision to withdraw from the NPT and establish a "chuch'e-oriented nuclear power industry." Yun adds that North Korea's atomic energy sector will "thoroughly implement the policies of our party and the republic government" and continue "using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in the future as we did in the past."
—Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 10 January 2003, in "North Korean Atomic Energy Bureau Chief Expresses 'Full Support' for Policy," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 10 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 January 2003
Lee Che Son, director general of North Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy, sends a letter to IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei stating that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT is now in effect. In the letter, Lee states, "Under the prevailing situation where the United States seeks to destroy the DPRK by force, and the IAEA is incapable of observing the principle of impartiality, the DPRK government issued a statement on January 10, 2003 declaring an automatic, immediate and effectual withdrawal from the NPT on which it declared a moratorium."
—"DPRK's Withdrawal from NPT Now Effectual: Official," Xinhua News Agency, 11 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Chong Hun, "NPT T'alt'oe Songmyonghu Pukhanp'yojong/Min'gan'gun Ch'ongdongwon 'Taemi Kyoljonuiji' Kwashi," Donga Ilbo, 13 January 2003, p. 10, in KINDS,<http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

11 January 2003
Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Yukio Takeuchi and Im Song Chun, South Korean presidential envoy, meet in Japan and agree that Japan, South Korea and the United States should work together to end the North Korean nuclear crisis. The two officials reportedly agree to use their respective diplomatic channels to urge Pyongyang to engage in dialogue. They also agree that tough economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council could do more harm than good.
—Kyodo News Service, 11 January 2003, in "Japan, South Korea Agree on Trilateral Work with US on North Korea," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 11 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 January 2003
Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, prints a commentary accusing the United States of responding to North Korea's "sincere proposal for concluding a nonaggression treaty" by threatening a blockade and military action. The commentary continues, "If the US evades its responsibility and recklessly challenges the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the army and people of the DPRK will never miss the chance but certainly make them pay for the blood and turn the stronghold of the enemy into a sea of fire." The commentary continues, "It is the unshakeable revolutionary principle and stand of the DPRK to respond to a hard-line with a super hard-line. It has nothing to be afraid of even under the worst situation." The commentary also asserts that North Korea pulled out of the NPT because the US threatened it with nuclear war, thus openly violating the treaty. However, North Korea's decision to restart its indigenous nuclear program, according to the Rodong Sinmun commentary, was based on the country's energy needs, not security concerns.
—Korean Central News Agency, 12 January 2003, in "North Korean Media Warn of 'Sea of Fire,'" BBC Monitoring International Reports, 12 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 12 January 2003, in "North Korea Says Nuclear Admission Was US 'Fabrication,'" 12 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 January 2003
South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun meets with US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and informs him that South Korea will play a "leading role" in resolving the North Korean nuclear standoff. Roh also reiterates his belief that the nuclear issue should be resolved through peaceful dialogue. Speaking to reporters after the meeting, Kelly states that the US is willing to talk to North Korea. Kelly says, "Once we get beyond nuclear weapons, there may be opportunities with the US, with private investors, with other countries to help North Korea in the energy area."
—"DPRK Issue Should Be Settled Peacefully: S. Korean President-Elect," Xinhua News Agency, 13 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Howard W. French, "Aides Declare US 'Willing to Talk' in Korea Dispute," New York Times, 14 January 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Insists on US Talks to End Nuclear Row, Mediation Continues," Xinhua News Agency, 15 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 January 2003
Pak Ui Ch'un, North Korean ambassador to Russia, dismisses as "hypothetical" the allegations made by US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons. Pak claims that Kelly is responsible for raising tension on the peninsula by making such an allegation. In addition, Pak calls any efforts by the US to adopt UN sanctions against North Korea a "declaration of war." Speaking to an ITAR-TASS reporter, Pak states that if the United States agrees to a nonaggression treaty, North Korea will consider allowing IAEA inspectors to return. However, Pak stresses, the IAEA "must stop working as a protйgй of America and the United States must stop trying to use the IAEA as in instrument for pressuring North Korea." According to Pak, North Korea is willing and ready to prove that it has not developed nuclear weapons if the US drops its hostile policy.
—"N. Korean Ambassador Denies Pyongyang Has Nuclear Program," Agence France Presse, 13 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap, 13 January 2003, in "DPRK Envoy in Russia on Possession of Weapons 'More Powerful' Than Nuclear Weapons," FBIS Document ID: KPP20030114000011.

13 January 2003
Andrew Natsios, head of the US Agency for International Development, says that the United States is withholding food aid until monitors can verify that it is not being diverted to the North Korean military. Natsios denies that the US is withholding food aid in order to pressure North Korea into giving up its nuclear weapons program, claiming that the demand to monitor aid distributions dates from 7 June 2002, before the most recent nuclear crisis.
—Steven Edwards, "Washington Denies It Is Wielding Food Weapons: US Insists It Monitor Distribution in North Korea," National Post, 14 January 2003, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 January 2003
During US Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly's visit to Beijing, China offers to host talks between the United States and North Korea to resolve the growing tension over North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
—"North Korea Threatens New 'Options' as China Offers to Mediate in Crisis," Guelph Mercury, 15 January 2003, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Hong In P'yo and Kim Kwang Ho, "Pukhaek Chungwoegyo 'Shihommudae' Puk, Mihoedam Changsojegong Koron'dung Chungje Umjigim," Kyunghyang Shimmun, 16 January 2003, p. 11, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

14 January 2003
US President George W. Bush announces that the US would consider giving energy and food aid to North Korea if Pyongyang gives up its nuclear weapons program. But on 15 January, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman dismisses Bush's offer, calling it "a deceptive drama" that is meant "to mislead world public opinion." The spokesman says that Washington's "loudmouthed supply of energy and food aid is like a painted pie in the sky as they are possible only after the DPRK is totally disarmed."
—Knight Ridder, "Bush Offers Energy, Food Aid for North Korean Nuke Talks," Vancouver Province, 15 January 2003, p. A19, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Bush Says Shift by North Korea Could Bring Aid," New York Times, 15 January 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Chosonwoemusong Taebyonin Migugui <Taehwa> Solun Kimanguk," Korea Central News Agency, 15 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; "DPRK FM Spokesman on US Rumor about Dialogue," Korean Central News Agency, 15 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

14 January 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell says that the 1994 Agreed Framework cannot sufficiently prevent North Korea from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Powell says that the United States needs "a new arrangement" by which the United States may meet North Korea's energy needs by means other than building light-water nuclear reactors. [Note: Many critics of the 1994 Agreed Framework, including those in the Bush Administration, have suggested providing North Korea with coal burning power plants instead of light-water reactors.]
—Steven R. Weisman, "Solving the North Korean Puzzle: Once Again, the US Will Try Persuasion." New York Times, 15 January 2003, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Carla Anne Robbins and David S. Cloud, " Leading the News: Powell Urges Tougher North Korea Nuclear Pact-Citing Flaws in 1994 Deal, He Says US Seeks to Curb Capacity to Make Weapons," Wall Street Journal, 14 January 2003, p. A3, in Proquest, <http://www.il.proquest.com/proquest/%3e.

14 January 2003
The Korean Central News Agency reports that the nuclear crisis will only be resolved through bilateral talks between North Korea and the United States. Another KCNA report claims the United States is responsible for the current nuclear crisis by placing North Korea on a list of potential targets for a preemptive nuclear strike in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review.
—"KCNA Accuses U.S. of Mocking at UN and International Community," Korean Central News Agency, 14 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; "KCNA Refutes U.S. Sophism about DPRK's Decision," Korean Central News Agency, 14 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

14 January 2003
A commentary in published in Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, warns the United States not to pursue a policy of stifling North Korea. The commentary warns that North Korea "has so far shown the utmost self-control and patience," but if US provocations continue, North Korea will exercise its secret "options."
—"DPRK, Too, Has Options," Korean Central News Agency, 14 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

14 January 2003
The Rodong Sinmun warns Japan not to support the US in provoking North Korea over the ensuing nuclear crisis. A Rodong Sinmun commentary broadcasted on Pyongyang Radio states that North Korea has made clear its position on Japan: "For Japan to seek to crush us by following in the footsteps of the United States would lead to its own self-destruction."
—Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, 15 January 2003, in "North Korea Warns Japan against 'Following in the Footsteps' of USA," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14-18 January 2003
A delegation of Australian diplomats travels to Pyongyang to convey the international community's concerns over steps taken by North Korea to reactivate its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon. The delegation led by Murray McLean, chief of the North Asia division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, reportedly delivers a letter from Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer to his North Korean counterpart Paek Nam Sun. During the meetings, North Korean officials reportedly deny that Pyongyang is pursuing a uranium enrichment program. North Korean officials also reportedly tell the Australian delegation that they are concerned that the United States will push for regime change in North Korea after it has disarmed Iraq. Upon returning to Australia, members of the delegation inform the press that Pyongyang's concern of becoming a US target of counter-proliferation efforts has overshadowed concerns about economic aid and trade. Members of the delegation subsequently inform officials in Washington, Seoul and Tokyo about the results of the diplomatic trip.
—"DPRK Insists on US Talks to End Nuclear Row, Mediation Continues," Xinhua News Agency, 15 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Don Kirk, "Pressure Mounts on North Korea: Calls to Halt Nuclear Program Increase as US Seems to Ease Stand Against Talks," International Herald Tribune, 15 January 2003, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Australia Informs S. Korea of Pyongyang Trip Results," Xinhua News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Axis of Evil' Slam Blocks N. Korea Nuclear Resolution: Paper," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Denies Enriching Uranium, Open to Multilateral Talks," Malaysia General News, 26 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 January 2003
A commentary printed in the North Korean newspaper Minju Joson claims that North Korea withdrew from the NPT because of the hostile policies of the US. The commentary says that North Korea will not compromise on issues related to its "sovereignty and dignity." The commentary adds that in order to protect its sovereignty and dignity North Korea is prepared to take "self-defensive measures" stronger than withdrawing from the NPT.
—"Minjujoson Hyon Sat'aeui Ch'aegimun Chonjoguro Mi'gug'e Itta," Korean Central News Agency, 15 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Korean Central News Agency, 15 January 2003, in "North Korean Paper Blames USA for Current Crisis," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 15 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Serious Challenge to Korea's Reunification," Korean Central News Agency, 16 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

15 January 2003
White House spokesman Ari Fleisher says that the United States will not agree to a nonaggression pact with North Korea until Pyongyang complies with earlier agreements and gives up its nuclear weapons program. "The issue is not: what is the United States going to do? The issue is: what is North Korea going to do?" Fleisher says. "North Korea needs to begin by dismantling its nuclear programs in a verifiable and irreversible way. That comes first."
— Richard Tompkins and Eli J. Lake, "North Korea Dismisses US Deal Offer," United Press International, 15 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003
Pyongyang Radio broadcasts a bellicose commentary warning the United States not to underestimate North Korea's resolve and capability to fight and win a war. The commentary warns that "the US imperialists should not by any means listen absentmindedly to the warning of our army and people that there is no limit to our target range and that we would make the entire United States into a sea of fire." Claiming that these threats are not merely "empty words," the commentary states that if the United States forces a war on the Korean Peninsula, "we will blast the entirety of your land off the face of the earth with powerful attack capabilities beyond anything the world can imagine – a frightful attack beyond anything ever seen or heard."
—Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 16 January 2003, in "Pyongyang Radio Commentary Accuses USA of Underestimating North Korea," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 16 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003
South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi and says that while he will not tolerate North Korea's attempts to develop a nuclear weapons program, "the issue should be resolved through dialogue." Roh says that "cooperation between South Korea and Japan is very important in solving the North Korean nuclear issue." Later in the day, Roh tells reporters that he believes once North Korea escapes its status as a rogue state, it should abandon its nuclear weapons program. Roh also says that he would not consider a military strike against North Korea even if it was found to be reprocessing nuclear fuel for use in a bomb.
—Yonhap News Agency, 16 January 2003, in "South Korea's Roh Stresses Dialogue, Cooperation to Resolve North Issue," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 16 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Howard W. French, "South Korea's President-Elect Rejects Use of Force Against North Korea," New York Times, 17 January 2003, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003
Speaking before the National Assembly's National Defense Committee, South Korea's Defense Minister Lee Jun says that a war between North and South Korea would be "unavoidable" if the United States carried out a preemptive attack on the North's suspected nuclear weapons facilities. Lee says that while South Korea is not certain that the North is developing uranium-based nuclear weapons, the probability is high. Lee also claims that US and South Korean forces are prepared for a "worst-case scenario." [Note: On 18 January, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense says that Lee's statements did not indicate that the security situation on the peninsula was becoming increasingly precarious, but rather the statements were meant to reiterate the readiness of South Korea's armed forces to handle any contingencies that might arise.]
—Yonhap News Agency, 16 January 2003, in "South Korean Minister Says Peninsula War 'Unavoidable' if USA Strikes North," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 16 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Howard W. French, "South Korea's President-Elect Rejects Use of Force against North Korea," New York Times, 17 January 2003, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 18 January 2003, in "South Korean Defence Ministry Downplays 'Inevitable' War Statement by Its Chief," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 18 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003
A Korean Central News Agency commentary once again blames the United States and the IAEA for North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The commentary claims that "the DPRK can no longer be bound by the NPT and the IAEA now that they are being used for the US moves to stifle the DPRK."
—"KCNA on Unjust Behavior of IAEA," Korean Central News Agency, 16 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Korean Central News Agency, 16 January 2003, in "North Korean Agency Blames Treaty Withdrawal on 'Menacing' Atomic Agency," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 16 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Chosonjungang T'ongshin Ronp'yong Kukchewonjaryokkiguui Pudanghan Ch'osa," Korean Central News Agency, 16 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

16 January 2003
A commentary appearing in Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, blames the United States for the current nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. According to the commentary, "the DPRK was compelled to withdraw from the NPT as a self-defense step taken after careful consideration to cope with the grave situation where its supreme interests are most seriously threatened by the US." The commentary continues, "The nuclear issue surfaced on the Korean Peninsula as the US has posed a nuclear threat to the DPRK for scores of years by massively deploying and stockpiling nukes in and around South Korea, pursuant to its hostile policy towards Pyongyang in line with its strategy to dominate the world."
—"The US is Chiefly to Blame for the Worst Situation on the Korean Peninsula," Rodong Sinmun, 16 January 2003, in KCNA, 17 January 2003, in "Pyongyang Blames US for Situation on Korean Peninsula," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticizes North Korea for practicing "nuclear blackmail". Speaking to reporters in Moscow, ElBaradei says, "The international community is ready to look favorably at North Korea's security concerns and economic needs, but not under nuclear blackmail."
—"IAEA Chief Denounces North Korea's 'Nuclear Blackmail,'" Agence France Presse, 16 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 January 2003
Son Chun Yong, South Korea's ambassador to the UN, says that the North Korean nuclear crisis will eventually be resolved through dialogue, but he speculates that a peaceful resolution will take at least two years. Son claims that while both the US and North Korea are using strong rhetoric, both sides have stressed a desire to resolve the issue through dialogue. However, Son points out that the 1993 nuclear crisis required over a year and half before it was resolved, and since the current crisis involves nuclear, missile and biochemical weapons, "it will take at least two years for the issue to be resolved."
—Yonhap News Agency, 17 January 2003, in "S. Korean UN Envoy Says 'At Least Two Years Needed' to Resolve Nuclear Issue," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 January 2003
US Ambassador to Japan Howard Baker meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi, and the two agree that the United States, Japan and South Korea should cooperate in finding a peaceful solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. According to Baker, the two discuss the nature of Pyongyang's intentions and try to anticipate what Pyongyang might do next.
—Kyodo News Service, 17 January 2003, in "Japan, USA Reaffirm Cooperation over North Korea," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 January 2003
US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tells reporters that President George Bush and Secretary of State Colin Powell "have spoken out that we have no hostile intentions to North Korea." However, Armitage states that the United States has no intention of concluding a nonaggression pact with North Korea since Congress would certainly fail to pass such an agreement. Armitage also says that the United States has no intention of changing Kim Jong Il's regime in North Korea.
—"U.S. Ready to Assure N. Korea of Nonaggression: Armitage," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 18 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Natalie Obiko Pearson, "Senior U.S. Official Says United States Willing to Grant North Korea Security Guarantee," Associated Press, 18 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 January 2003
North Korean Ambassador to China Ch'oi Chin Su tells reporters that the current nuclear standoff can be resolved through dialogue if the United States first pledges not to invade the North, recognizes North Korea's sovereignty, and does not impede the North's economic development.
—"N. Korea Sets Conditions for Ending Nuclear Standoff," Japan Economic Newswire, 18 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Pak Yong Ch'ae, "Puk, Haekp'ogi '3 Tae Chogon' Cheshi-Pulgach'im, Chaju'gwon Injong, Kyongjesang'e Paejedung," Kyungyang Shinmun, 20 January 2003, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

18 January 2003
A commentary appearing in the North Korean publication Minju Joson warns Japan not to support the United States' hostile policy toward North Korea.
—Korean Central News Agency, 18 January 2003, in "North Korea Urges Japan 'To Mind Its Own Business' in Pyongyang Nuclear Issue," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 18 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 January 2003
Choson Sinbo, a newspaper published by the pro-Pyongyang General Association of Korean Residents in Japan, reports that North Korea's Ministry of Power and Coal Industries is taking actions to resume nuclear activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex and to build additional nuclear facilities.
—Yonhap News Agency, 20 January 2003, in "North Korea Could Build More Nuclear Plants after Initial Success at Yongbyon," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mun Song-hui, Choson Sinbo, 26 February 2003, in "Pro-DPRK Paper Says DPRK's 'Peaceful' Nuclear Developments Began in 1961," FBIS Document ID KPP20030227000123.

19 January 2003
US Ambassador to South Korea Thomas Hubbard says that if North Korea abandons its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable way, the United States would consider economic cooperation with North Korea that goes beyond food aid.
—Yonhap News Agency, 19 January 2003, in "US Ambassador Says Economic Cooperation with N Korea Possible," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19-20 January 2003
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang and presents a "package plan" for resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Losyukov also reportedly meets with Kim Jong Il for six hours to deliver a message from Russian President Vladimir Putin and discuss the proposed "package plan." The "package plan" reportedly calls for a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, security guarantees for North Korea and the resumption of economic aid in exchange for North Korea's abandoning its nuclear weapons program. [Note: Before and after the trip to Pyognyang, Losyukov stops in Beijing to discuss the trip with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Yang Wenchang.]
—Hans Greimel, "Russian Reportedly Submits Nuclear Settlement Plan to North Korea," Associated Press, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Russian Special Envoy Says Talks with Kim Jong Il 'Substantive,'" Xinhua News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Officials Continue Talks with Russian Envoy," Xinhua News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Russian Envoy to Pyongyang back in Beijing," Xinhua News Agency, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 January 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell meets in New York with Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan and French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin, and the three agree that North Korea's nuclear program is an international problem and should be resolved accordingly. Later in the day, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sok Chu issues a statement condemning the United States for attempting to "internationalize" the issue and trying to get the UN involved. Kang says, "The DPRK and the US should sit face-to-face to solve the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula."
—William C. Mann, "Administration Tries to Widen Perspective on North Korea to an International Problem," Associated Press, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Karl Malakunas, "North Korea Rejects International Efforts to End Nuclear Crisis," Agence France Presse, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Konghwagukchongbu Russia Taet'ongryong T'uksarul Wihayo Yonhoe," Korean Central News Agency, 19 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; "Special Envoy of Russian President Feted," Korean Central News Agency, 19 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

19 January 2003
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says that while the Bush administration is committed to resolving the nuclear standoff with North Korea peacefully, it has not ruled out the use of force if the crisis escalates.
—Charles Hoskinson, "Diplomacy for Now with NKorea, But Force Not Ruled Out: US," Agence France Presse, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 January 2003
White House National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice says that the Bush administration has not ruled out any options in dealing with North Korea's nuclear program but remains committed to resolving the issue diplomatically. Rice also says that the nuclear crisis is an international issue, not a bilateral issue between the US and North Korea.
—Charles Hoskinson, "Diplomacy for Now with NKorea, But Force Not Ruled Out: US," Agence France Presse, 19 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 January 2003
US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly meets with Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi in Tokyo to discuss issues related to North Korea. During the meeting, Kelly describes US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's proposal to offer a written non-aggression statement in exchange for a pledge from North Korea that it will end its nuclear weapons program. Kawaguchi expresses support for this new proposal and the two officials agree that Japan and the US will cooperate with South Korea, China and Russia to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis.
—"US Stance on North Korea Pleases Gov't," Yomiuri Shimbun, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Tokyo Wants in on Any US Deal with N. Korea," Asahi News Service, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Govt Backs US, Pyongyang Plan," Daily Yomiuri, 20 January 2003, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003
US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton meets with Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Wang Guangya in Beijing to discuss various issues related to strategic security, multilateral arms control and nonproliferation. The two reportedly discuss in depth how best to address North Korea's decision to withdraw from the NPT and its decision to reactivate nuclear facilities in Yongbyon-kun. After the meeting, Bolton tells reporters that the two did not discuss the possibility of imposing economic sanctions against North Korea. However, Bolton adds that he did not detect any opposition to bringing the issue of North Korea's nuclear program before the UN Security Council.
—"China, US Hold First Round of Vice-Foreing Ministerial Level Consultations," Xinhua News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Pushes Hard for UN Involvement in N. Korea Nuclear Standoff," Channel NewsAsia, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ted Anthony, "US Envoy: China Wouldn't Oppose Security Council Involvement in North Korea Issue," Associated Press, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003
Speaking before the UN Security Council, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan says that China is committed to a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and a peaceful resolution of the current crisis. He states that China does not rule out any option for resolving the issue diplomatically, but he adds that China has learned from past experiences that direct dialogue between North Korea and the United States is key to resolving any crisis on the peninsula.
—"Chinese FM on Iraq, Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issues," Xinhua News Agency, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003
Pakistani Foreign Minister Khursheed Mehmood Kasuri denies that Pakistan has ever assisted North Korea in developing a nuclear program. Kasuri states that there has been no cooperation in the field of nuclear energy with North Korea either under current Pakistani President Musharraf or his predecessors.
—"Pakistani Minister Denies Nuclear Contacts Btw Pakistan, N Korea," ITAR-TASS, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003
The Korean Central News Agency calls the Bush administration's claim that it has no intention to invade North Korea "no more than a hypocritical farce to mislead the world public. The report warns that "the Bush administration is well advised to act with discretion, mindful that the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula can be settled only when the US provides security to the DPRK by law through the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty."
—"KCNA on Deceptive and Hypocritical Balderdash on Dialogue," Korean Central News Agency, 20 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

20 January 2003
A commentary read over Pyongyang Radio claims that withdrawing from the NPT was in the best interest of North Korea. The commentary also states that the United States is fully responsible for bringing the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war by designating North Korea as possible target for a preemptive nuclear strike.
—Central Broadcasting Station, (Pyongyang), 20 January 2003, in "North Korean Radio Commentary Calls on US Not to Criticize NPT Withdrawal," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003
Lee To Sop, North Korean consul-general in Hong Kong, tells the Ming Pao Daily News that North Korea will view economic sanctions as a declaration of war by the United States, and North Korea will react accordingly. Lee also claims that the current standoff over North Korea's nuclear program can only be resolved through bilateral US-North Korean negotiations, stating that "the role of mediators...is basically not important." He also adds that North Korea will not attack South Korea in order to fight against the United States.
—Yonhap News Agency, 20 January 2003, in "N. Korean Diplomat Downplays Role of Intermediaries in Resolving Nuclear Issue," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Kwang Hoe, "'Miwa Ssaugi Wihae Puk, Hangukkonggyok Anhae' Hong Kong Chujae Pukch'ongyongsa Palkyo," Chosun Ilbo, 21 January 2003, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.

20-22 January 2003
Carl Ford, US Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, travels unannounced to Seoul. Ford reportedly meets with President-elect Roh Moo Hyun, opposition leaders and members of the National Intelligence Service to discuss ways in which to resolve the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program.
—Yonhap News Agency, 23 January 2003, in "US State Department Intelligence Official Visits South Korea Unannounced," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Top US Official Paid Secret Visit to Seoul," Agence France Presse, 24 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 January 2003
Georgiy Mamedov, Russian deputy foreign minister, meets with Alexander Vershbow, US ambassador to Moscow, to discuss various issues, including the situation on the Korean Peninsula. After the meeting, the Russian Foreign Ministry issues a statement confirming that "despite considerable nuances in the approaches, the mutual efforts towards solving these issues in the spirit of the new Russian-American partnership prevail."
—Interfax News Agency, (Moscow), 20 January 2003, in "Russia, US Agree to Work Together on North Korean Nuclear Dispute," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 20 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21-23 January 2003
US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton meets with high ranking South Korean officials to discuss ways of resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Bolton meets with Foreign Minister Ch'oi Song Ho, Deputy Foreign Ministers Lee T'ae Shik and Defense Ministry officials in an attempt to coordinate US and South Korean policies concerning North Korea's nuclear brinkmanship diplomacy. On 21 January, Bolton tells members of the press that even though the United States is aiming to bring the issue of North Korea's nuclear program to the UN Security Council, "the issue of imposing sanctions against North Korea is a very different question." Following talks on 22 January, Bolton tells members of the press that the Agreed Framework had run its course and the United States was unlikely to attempt to re-implement it during the course of negotiations with North Korea.
—"South Korean Defense Minister Meets with US Official," Xinhua News Agency, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Bolton Arrives in Seoul Today to Discuss NK Nuke Issue," Korea Times, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US to Bring North Korea Crisis to Security Council," Deutsche Presse Agentur, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 21 January 2003, in "South Korean Defense Chief, US Oficial Discuss North's Nuclear Standoff," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Divided over Taking N. Korea Crisis To Security Council," Agence France Presse, 22 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cho Sung Jin, "Panghan Bolton Migungmuch'a'gwan 'Mi, Taebuk Pulgach'im Pojang Kanung'," Taehan Maeil, 22 January 2003, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.

21 January 2003
North Korea's Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, runs a commentary accusing the United States of giving rise to the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. According to the commentary, the United States has infringed on North Korea's sovereignty by listing it as a possible target for a preemptive nuclear strike. The commentary also claims that Washington's stated intention to resolve the issue through dialogue is merely a "deceptive act" since Washington first requires North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons program, an "unfair" precondition, according to the commentary, to which Pyongyang is not willing to agree. The commentary concludes that the only way of resolving the crisis is for the United States to first provide legally binding security assurances.
—"Assuring Legal Security Assurances Is the Key to Resolving Nuclear Issue," Nodong Sinmun, 21 January 2003, in Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 21 January 2003, in "North Korea Radio Claims Non-Agression Treaty with US 'Key' to Nuclear Issue," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 2003
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan "strongly urges" North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the NPT. Speaking before the Conference on Disarmament, Annan says, "Recent challenges to the existing nonproliferation regimes, in particular the announcement by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, raise serious concerns."
—"Kofi Annan Urges N. Korea to Reconsider NPT Withdrawal," Channel NewsAsia, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 2003
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Zhang Qiyue says that China remains open to any suggestions for maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but "at the present stage...dialogue is the only effective way."
—"FM Spokeswoman: Dialogue Remains Effective Way to DPRK Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22-24 January 2003
North and South Korea hold the ninth round of inter-Korean ministerial talks in Seoul. The five-member North Korean delegation is headed by senior cabinet member Kim Yong Song, and the South Korean delegation is headed by Unification Minister Chong Se Hyon. In his keynote speech at the opening of the talks, Kim states that North Korea's nuclear program is only for generating electricity, and accuses the United States of politicizing the nuclear issue in an attempt to gain control over both North and South Korea. The South Korean delegation demands that North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons program and retract its decision to withdraw from the NPT, but according to delegation spokesman Lee Bong Jo, the South Korean delegation is disappointed that North Korea refuses to make any concrete commitments during the meeting. The two sides agree to continue cooperating in order to resolve peacefully the conflict over North Korea's nuclear program, and at the conclusion of the talks, they agree to meet again in April. [Note: The tenth round of talks is scheduled to take place from 7 to 10 April in Pyongyang, but since North Korea fails to confirm that it will participate in the talks and does not invite the South Korean delegation to Pyongyang, the talks are postponed until 27 April.]
—"DPRK's Ministerial Delegation Arrives in S. Korea," Xinhua News Agency, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cho Kyung, "S. Korea Demands N. Korea End Nuclear Programs," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Christopher Toricha, "North Korean Delegation Arrives in Seoul for High-Level Talks," Associated Press, 21 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North and South Korea Agree on Peaceful Solution to Atomic Strife," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "South Korea Says Cabinet-Level Talks Stalled, Want Action from North," Agence France Presse, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cho Kyung, "Koreas Vow to Resolve Nuclear Standoff Peacefully," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Brooke, "Korean Talks Make Little Progress on Arms Issue," New York Times, 24 January 2003, p. A16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea Regrets N. Korea's Cancellation of Ministerial Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 April 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 January 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell tells reporters that while "negotiating with North Korea is a very difficult, arduous process," there has been some progress in talks aimed at bringing North Korea into compliance with multilateral and bilateral nonproliferation agreements.
—"US Sees 'Progress' in North Korea Standoff," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 22 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Says Progress Made on DPRK Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 January 2003
In an interview published in Choson Sinbo, North Korean Minister of Power and Coal Industries Shin Yong Son claims that North Korea is just a few weeks away from reactivating its graphite moderated nuclear reactors. However, Sin reiterates that the reactors will only be used to generate electricity.
—"North Korea 'a Few Weeks' Away from Reactivating Nuclear Plant," Agence France Presse, 22 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Will Re-Operate Nuclear Facilities within a Few Weeks to Produce Electricity," Interview with Sin Yong Song, Vice Minister of Power and Coal, The People's Korea, 30 January 2003, <http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/>; Choi Hup, "Puk, Idalmal Wonjaro Chaegadong/Choch'ongryon Kigwanji 'Yongbyonso Sujunae Chollyoksaengsan'," Chosun Ilbo, 23 January 2003, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

22 January 2003
The Rodong Sinmun, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, denounces the IAEA, claiming that it "has been totally reduced to a shock brigade and a henchman executing the U.S. policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK."
—"IAEA Urged Not to Follow U.S. Anti-DPRK Policy," Korean Central News Agency, 22 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

23 January 2003
US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that North Korea's nuclear program is a matter "of concern to the entire international community," and thus should be referred to the UN Security Council. Boucher says, "We do think the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors needs to report the issue to the Security Council. That's one of their responsibilities under their charter, and certainly the issue, as it affects international peace and security, is something the Security Council needs to have on its plate."
—US Department of State, Daily Press Briefing by Spokesman Richard A. Boucher, 23 January 2003, <http://www.state.gov>.

23 January 2003
Russian President Vladimir Putin calls US President George W. Bush to brief him on Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Losyulov's recent diplomatic trip to Pyongyang. Putin tells Bush that based on Losyulov's visit he believes there is a good chance to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula peacefully.
—Interfax News Agency, 23 January 2003, in "Putin, Bush Discuss Iraq, North Korea by Phone," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Putin Consults with Bush on DPRK, Iraq," Xinhua News Agency, 23 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 January 2003
Former US Secretary of Defense William Perry claims that North Korea has begun reprocessing 8,000 nuclear fuel rods that had been sealed and monitored under the 1994 Agreed Framework. Perry, speaking at the Brookings Institute, states that by reprocessing the fuel rods and pursuing a uranium enrichment program, North Korea poses an imminent threat to the United States. [Note: Other sources state that North Korea has made preparations for reprocessing the fuel rods but has not actually begun reprocessing.]
—"Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: Implications for US Policy in Northeast Asia," Speech by William Perry, Brookings Institute, 24 January 2003.

25 January 2003
A North Korean Foreign Ministry official says that North Korea will not address its nuclear program in any multilateral forum, insisting that the issue can only be resolved through bilateral talks with the United States.
—"DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on 'Multi-Party Talks,'" Korean Central News Agency, 25 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

25 January 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that talks with North Korea will come "eventually," but he adds, "We will work out what the proper manner and form is." Speaking in Zurich, on his way to the World Economic Forum, Powell says, "There is a strong desire on the part of the North Koreans to talk directly to us." However, Powell adds, "We believe that the problem that exists in North Korea is not a US-DPRK problem. Other nations are involved."
—James Brooke, "North Koreans Still Demand Direct Talks with the US," New York Times, 26 January 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

26 January 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell criticizes North Korea for violating the Agreed Framework pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment program. However, speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Powell says that the United States has "no intention of attacking North Korea."
—"No US Intention to Attack North Korea, Powell Says," Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 26 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27-29 January 2003
Im Tong Won [Lim Dong Won], special envoy of South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, travels to Pyongyang in an attempt to diffuse mounting tensions on the Korean Peninsula. North Korean officials reportedly tell Im that North Korea does not possess a uranium-enrichment program. [Note: North and South Korea had reportedly agreed that Im would meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, but after waiting for three days, North Korean officials inform Im that Kim will not be able to meet with him.]
—"NK Denies Running Uranium-Based Nuclear Weapons Program: Lim," Chosun Ilbo, 31 January 2003, <http://www.nkchosun.com>; "S. Korean Envoy Meets DPRK Official on Nuclear Crisis," Xinhua News Agency, 27 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles Whelan, "North Korea's Envoy Snub an 'Unacceptable Insult': S. Korean Press," Agence France Presse, 30 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Don Kirk, "Kim Jong Il Refuses to See Envoy from Seoul," International Herald Tribune, 30 January 2003, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 30 January 2003, in "Incoming South Korean Leader Has Asked North Korean Leader to Visit Seoul," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 30 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 January 2003
The New Yorker publishes a story by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh detailing the nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea. Citing a former high level Pakistani official, Hersh reports that by 1997 Pakistan had "no more money" to pay for North Korean missile imports. The former Pakistani official tells Hersh that in 1997 Pakistan began paying for North Korean missiles by providing "some of the know-how and the specifics" of a nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. In addition to actual uranium enrichment technology, Pakistan reportedly helped North Korea conduct several "cold tests," simulated nuclear tests using natural uranium used to test the effectiveness of warhead designs. According to the former Pakistani official, Pakistan also provided North Korea with information on how to hide a uranium enrichment facility from international inspectors and foreign intelligence services.

Hersh also quotes a US intelligence official who, referring to the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate's assessment of the source of North Korea's uranium enrichment program, says, "It points a clear finger at the Pakistanis. The technical stuff is crystal clear – not hedged and not ambivalent."
—Seymour M. Hersh, "The Cold Test: What the Administration Knew about Pakistan and the North Korean Nuclear Program," New Yorker, 27 January 2003, pp. 42-47.

27 January 2003
Delegates of the North and South Korean militaries meet in Panmunjom for working level talks. The two sides agree to provide military assurances to each other while making preparations for the construction of a temporary road which would traverse the demilitarized zone and connect North and South Korea.
—"S. Korean Envoy in Pyongyang; Inter-Korean Talks Agree on Passage of MDL," Xinhua News Service, 27 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 27 January 2003, in "Koreas Agree to Security Terms on Military Demarcation Line," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 27 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January 2003
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying, "We oppose all attempts to internationalize the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula and are authorized to state that we shall not take part in any 'multilateral talks,' whatever the format." The Foreign Ministry adds, "The only way to reach a peaceful and fair settlement of the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula is direct and equitable talks between North Korea and the US. No other options are possible."
—Interfax News Agency, 28 January 2003, in "North Korea Rejects Multilateral Talks," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 28 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; ITAR-TASS News Agency, 28 January 2003, in "North Korea's Moscow Embassy Rejects Multilateral Talks to Defuse Crisis," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 28 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January 2003
US President George W. Bush delivers the annual State of the Union address, in which he claims that the United States will not be blackmailed by North Korea into giving concessions based upon the threat of developing nuclear weapons. President Bush says, "America is working with the countries of the region—South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia—to find a peaceful solution, and to show the North Korean government that nuclear weapons will bring only isolation, economic stagnation, and continued hardship." President Bush also labels the ruling regime in North Korea an "oppressive regime" that "rules a people living in fear and starvation." "The gravest danger in the war on terror, the gravest danger facing America and the world," President Bush continues, "is outlaw regimes that seek to possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons."
—"President Delivers 'State of the Union,'" Office of Press Secretary, The White House, 28 January 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.

28 January 2003
The Korean Central News Agency reports that contrary to the wishes of the North Korean government, the situation on the Korean Peninsula has reached a level at which war may be inevitable. The KCNA report claims that the United States has begun making preparations for a preemptive attack.
—"Report of Korean Central News Agency," Korean Central News Agency, 28 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 January 2003
A commentary broadcasted on Pyongyang Radio condemns the Bush administration's recent calls for a peaceful resolution to the nuclear crisis as "a mere deceptive trick aimed at covering up its sinister war plot to invade our Republic and mislead the world's public opinion."
—Pyongyang Central Broadcasting Station, 29 January 2003, in "DPRK Commentary Says US U-2 Crash 'Due Mishap' for Raising DPRK Nuclear Issue," FBIS Document ID KPP20030129000102.

29 January 2003
A Korean Central News Agency commentary denounces the United States for adopting a policy of "tailored containment" toward North Korea, by which the United States hopes to "escalate the economic and political pressure to the extremes and push North Korea to collapse."
—"KCNA Blasts US 'Tailored Containment' Strategy," Korea Central News Agency, 29 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

29 January 2003
Pakistani Minister of for Information and Media Development Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed claims that Pakistan has never assisted North Korea in developing its nuclear program. Speaking to reporters in Qatar, Ahmed says, "We have our own scientists and technology and there are no relations whatsoever with North Korea in this regard."
—"No Pak N-Deal with N Korea: Minister," Gulf Times, 30-31 January 2003, <http://www.gulf-times.com>.

30 January 2003
Chang Jun Shik, North Korea's ambassador to the UN Conference on Disarmament, says that North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) because of the United States' "hostile policy," and the 6 January "impartial and unilateral resolution adopted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which encroached upon our sovereignty and dignity." Jang also reiterates that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT became effective on 11 January, one day after it was announced.
—Final Record of the Nine Hundred and Eighteenth Plenary Meeting of the United Nations Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.918, 30 January 2003.

30 January 2003
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement condemning US President George W. Bush's State of the Union address as "an undisguised declaration of aggression to topple the DPRK system."
—"Bush Hit for Slandering DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 30 January 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp;> "DPRK Condemns Bush's State of Union Address," Xinhua News Agency, 31 January 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 January 2003
The EU Parliament adopts a resolution condemning North Korea for withdrawing from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The resolution also condemns Pakistan for helping North Korea with uranium enrichment technology.
—Report from the Daily Notebook issued by the European Parliament on 30 January, in "EU Parliament Condemns North Korea's Withdrawal from Nonproliferation Treaty," FBIS Document ID EUP20030130000286.

31 January 2003
The New York Times, citing US intelligence officials, reports that US spy satellites have observed trucks transporting material from a nuclear storage facility, part of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Intelligence officials suspect that the trucks, which have been observed for the past month, are transporting 8,000 spent nuclear fuel rods to a reprocessing facility where they will be converted into weapons-grade plutonium. In this case, according to intelligence officials, North Korea could begin producing weapons-grade plutonium by March. In addition to the increased truck traffic around the storage facility, one defense official, without elaborating, says that the United States has detected other activities "you'd associate with an active weapons facility."

Some US officials remain skeptical about the interpretation of the satellite imagery. "There's still a debate about exactly what we are seeing and how provocative it is," one senior official is quoted as saying. "The North Koreans made no real effort to hide this from us."
—David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Satellites Said to See Activity at North Korean Nuclear Site," New York Times, 31 January 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com>; Timothy L. O'Brien and Erik Eckholm, "US Warns North Korea Not to Advance Nuclear Arms Program," New York Times, 31 January 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com>; Pauline Jelinek, "US Says Spy Satellites See Increased Activity at North Korea Nuclear Plant," Associated Press, 1 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 January 2003
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei says that North Korea could have a "significant" amount of weapons-grade nuclear material within six months. He also calls the recent discovery of increased activity around a storage facility in Yongbyon-kun "a matter of grave concern."
—Timothy L. O'Brien and Erik Eckholm, "US Warns North Korea Not to Advance Nuclear Arms Program," New York Times, 31 January 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

31 January 2003
Ch'oi Chin Su, North Korea's ambassador to China, announces that the only way to resolve the growing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is through bilateral negotiations between the US and North Korea. Ch'oi says, "If the United States will sign a nonaggression treaty that will have binding force after being ratified by Congress, North Korea has a willingness to prove that it is not producing nuclear weapons." Ch'oi disregards the assertion by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that during his October 2002 visit to Pyongyang North Korean officials admitted to pursuing a nuclear weapons program based on enriched uranium. According to Ch'oi, the assertion is merely "a sinister plot invented by the extreme warmongers in the United States." The ambassador adds that Kelly had taken "an arrogant attitude during his visit to our country, groundlessly urging us to admit" to the clandestine program. Thus, according to Ch'oi, "we took the attitude of neither denying it nor confirming it."
—Timothy L. O'Brien and Erik Eckholm, "US Warns North Korea Not to Advance Nuclear Arms Program," New York Times, 31 January 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com>.

February 2003
A former North Korean spy, Kinki Aoyama (pseudonym), tells the Japanese government that North Korea has nuclear weapons and has an "information sharing alliance" with Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. Aoyama claims that he learned of the nuclear weapons program and the cooperation with Pakistan, Iran and Iraq while he was an industrial spy in China during the 1990's.
—"Japanese-Born Former Spy Says Pyongyang Has Nuclear Weapons," Channel NewsAsia, 5 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early February 2003
According to South Korean and Japanese government officials, KEDO executive board members unofficially agree to slow down the project to construct two light-water reactors in North Korea by postponing the purchase of equipment necessary in order to proceed with the construction. The executive board, consisting of the United States, Japan, South Korea and the European Union, also reportedly agreed to halt air services between South Korea and the construction site in North Korea, and freeze a training program for North Korean engineers in South Korea.
—Kyodo News Service, 28 February 2003, in "KEDO to Delay Nuclear Reactor Project in N. Korea," FBIS Document ID JPP20030228000194; Yonhap News Agency, 1 March 2003, in "KEDO Members Said to Agree on 'Provisional Measure' to Delay Reactor," FBIS Document ID KPP20030301000009; So Hyon-chin, "KEDO Project Hits Snag," Korea Herald, 3 March 2003, in "ROKG Official Denies Delayed KEDO Project 'Deliberate Measure' to Slow Pace," FBIS Document ID KPP20030302000045.

1 February 2003
The Washington Post reports that in November 2001 intelligence analysts at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory sent a classified report to President George W. Bush in which they determined that North Korea had begun constructing a uranium enrichment facility. The Washington Post also quotes a "senior US official" as saying that Pakistan provided some of the new intelligence on North Korea after the United States dropped economic sanctions against Pakistan.
—Walter Pincus, "N. Korea's Nuclear Plans Were No Secret: US Stayed Quiet as It Built Support on Iraq," Washington Post, 1 February 2003, p. A1.

2-9 February 2003
Chung Tae Chol, South Korean President-elect Roh Moo Hyun's special envoy, travels to the United States and Japan to meet with top government officials and convey President-Elect Roh's intention to resolve the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula peacefully, as well as strengthen the US-South Korean alliance and South Korean-Japanese relationship. During 3-5 February, Chung is in Washington D.C. and meets with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell. While meeting with Rumsfeld, Chung reportedly conveys President-elect Roh's desire to make the South Korean-US alliance a "true partnership." While meeting with Vice President Dick Cheney, Chung and Cheney agreed to establish a bilateral forum in which the United States and South Korea could discuss important issues of mutual concern such as North Korean nuclear program. While in Tokyo, Chung meets with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the two agree to remain committed to resolving issues related to North Korea's nuclear program peacefully.
—Yonhap News Agency, 2 February 2003, in "South Korean President-Elect's Envoy to Deliver Letter to Bush on North's Issue," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 2 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ken Guggenheim, "Envoy of South Korean President-Elect Meets with Top U.S. Officials," Associated Press, 4 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 7 February 2003, in "Japan, South Korean Envoy to Urge North to Scrap Nuclear Programme," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea, US to Set Up New Body to Discuss N. Korea Policies," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 2003
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld orders twelve B-52 and twelve B-1 bombers on alert for possible deployment from bases in the United States to Guam. [Note: A few days earlier, Admiral Thomas Fargo, commander of US forces in the Pacific, reportedly requested additional air and naval forces as a deterrent against North Korea as the crisis over North Korea's nuclear program escalates. The bombers are deployed in early March and arrive in Guam on 6 March.]
—Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, "US Bombers on Alert to Deploy as Warning to the North Koreans," New York Times, 4 February 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David A. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Admiral Seeks Deterrent Force in Korea Crisis," New York Times, 1 February 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>;David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, "US Sending 2 Dozen Bombers in Easy Range of North Koreans," New York Times, 5 March 2003, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sang Hun Choe, "US Heavy Bombers Arrive in Guam to Deter Hostility in West Pacific," Associated Press, 6 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 2003
The Korean Central News Agency claims that the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula cannot be settled unless the United States accepts North Korea's demands for "direct and equal negotiations and the conclusion of a nonaggression treaty."
—"US Hit for False Information," Korean Central News Agency, 3 February 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

3 February 2003
The US State Department releases its proposed budget for fiscal year 2004 and does not earmark any funds for the administrative costs of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) or heavy-fuel oil shipments to North Korea. [Note: The State Department earmarked $3.5 million for KEDO administrative costs in fiscal year 2003.]
— US Department of State, Special Briefing on 2004 Request for International Affairs Budget, Christopher B. Burnham, Assistant Secretary of State for Resource Management; Joseph W. Bowab, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Assistance Programs and Budget; and Sharon A. Nell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for State Programs, Operations and Budget, 3 February 2003, <http://www.state.gov>; "US Not to Fund KEDO Administration Costs," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 February 2003
US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Bush administration is committed to resolving the nuclear standoff with North Korea peacefully. Armitage also says that even though the administration will consider all options in dealing with matters of national security, the situation with North Korea dictates that diplomacy is the best option "at this time." When committee chairman Richard Lugar urges the administration to begin direct talks with North Korea, Armitage replies, "Of course we are going to have direct talks with the North Koreans—there is no question about that."
—Prepared Statement of Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, WMD Developments on the Korean Peninsula, Hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 108th Congress, 1st session, 4 February 2003; "US Will Talk Directly to DPRK: Senior US Official," Xinhua News Agency, 4 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ken Guggenheim, "Envoy of South Korean President-Elect Meets with Top US Officials," Associated Press, 4 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 February 2003
Following a hearing of the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tells reporters that the United States has assessed that North Korea possesses one or two nuclear weapons, and, given the rising tensions on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea might soon declare itself a nuclear power.
—"N. Korea May Become Declared Nuke State, Rumsfeld Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 February 2003
The Korean Central News Agency quotes a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying, "The DPRK is now putting the operation of its nuclear facilities for the production of electricity on a normal footing after their restart." The spokesman adds that the nuclear program would be limited to peaceful uses "at the present stage." [Note: The North Korean Foreign Ministry later denies that North Korea has restarted its nuclear facilities, claiming that the Western media misinterpreted its 5 February statement.]
—"US Anti-DPRK International Pressure Campaign Assailed," Korean Central News Agency, 5 February 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; "North Korea Has No Nuclear Arms But Can Make Some – Russian Scientists," ITAR-TASS, 6 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 February 2003
Lee Pyong Gap, a deputy director in the North Korean Foreign Ministry, tells the British daily Guardian that North Korea reserves the right to launch a preemptive attack on US forces stationed in South Korea. However, Lee also urges the British to encourage the US to hold direct talks with North Korea.
—Richard Tomkins, "US Has 'Robust Plans' if N. Korea Attacks," United Press International, 6 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jonathan Watts, "Pyongyang Asserts Right to Pre-emptive Attack Tensions Rise Over American Build-up," The Guardian, 6 February 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk>; US White House, Daily Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, 6 February 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov>.
.

6 February 2003
The Rodong Sinmun, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, claims that a US preemptive attack on its nuclear facilities would trigger "all-out war." A commentary published in the paper and broadcasted on Pyongyang Radio states, "It is foolish for the US to think that we sit idle with folded arms to wait until it gives orders for a forestalling attack to be started. We will answer a forestalling attack with a powerful counterattack and all-out war with all-out war."
—"Prelude to Provocation of War of Aggression," Rodong Sinmun, in Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 6 February 2003, in "North Korean Daily Warns 'Secret' US Plan to Destroy Nuclear Facilities," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 6 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 February 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell, speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, says that while the United States is committed to resolving the issue of North Korea's nuclear program peacefully, the US is "still looking for the right formula" to provide North Korea with the security guarantees they are demanding. However, Powell says that the United States is "not going to just say you've got these guarantees and then hope they will satisfy our concerns and the world's concerns about what they have been doing with respect to plutonium activities and uranium enrichment." Powell reiterates that the best way to resolve the issue is through a multilateral framework that consists of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as well as Australia, the European Union, Japan, South Korea and North Korea. Powell also tells the committee that the Bush administration has not taken any options off the table in dealing with North Korea.
—"US Mulling 'Right Formula' for N. Korea Nuke: Powell," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Powell Fields Questions from Senate Foreign Relations Committee," Channel NewsAsia, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 February 2003
US President George W. Bush claims that the United States is committed to resolving the nuclear crisis with North Korea diplomatically, but adds that "all options are on the table," inferring that the United States has not ruled out military force or economic sanctions.
—"Bush: 'All Options' Available in Resolving N. Korea Standoff," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US President Says 'All Options' on Table to Deal with DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jennifer Loven, "President Bush Says 'All Options on the Table' to Deal with North Korea," Associated Press, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 February 2003
The Korean Central News Agency claims that the United States is attempting to avoid its responsibility of resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula by insisting on multilateral talks. KCNA also claims that the current nuclear crisis on the peninsula is a result of the United States' hostile policy toward North Korea.
—"KCNA Urges US to Respond to Direct Talks with DPRK," Korean Central News Agency, 7 February 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

7 February 2003
A commentary appearing in the Rodong Sinmun, official newspaper of the Korean Workers Party, claims that the US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's decision to place 24 bombers on standby for redeployment to Guam proves that the United States is not interested in resolving the nuclear crisis peacefully. The commentary says, "This situation compels the DPRK to take due precaution and a counter-measure."
—Korean Central News Agency, 7 February 2003, in "North Korean Agency Says US 'Dangerous' Build-Up 'Blatant Challenge,'" BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 February 2003
The Joongang Ilbo reports that US reconnaissance satellites have detected steam billowing from North Korea's 5MW(e) reactor in Yongbyon-kun, indicating that the reactor has been reactivated on what US and South Korean officials believe to be a test basis. Another Seoul official, who said he was not familiar with the imagery, said the reactor could have been put into operation because the loading of the 8,000 fuel rods is probably complete. He added, however, that because the plant has been idle since 1994, it is probably not operating at full capacity.
—"N. Korea's Reactor May Reach Full Operation after Mid-Feb.," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Oh Young Hwan, "North May Have Started Its Reactor, Officials Say," Joongang Ilbo, 7 February 2003, <http://joongangdaily.joins.com>.

8 February 2003
A Rodong Sinmun commentary states that North Korea will never participate in multilateral talks to resolve issues related to its nuclear program.
—Pyongyang Broadcasting Station, 8 February 2003, in "North Korean Party Paper Rejects US Call for Multilateral Talks," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8-11 February 2003
Indonesian presidential envoy Nana Sutresna travels to Pyongyang in order to convey to North Korean officials that Indonesia is opposed to North Korea's nuclear weapons program and wants to help resolve the issue peacefully. North Korean officials reportedly reply that its nuclear program is an issue to be discussed only between the United States and North Korea.
—Shin Yong Bae, "NK Insists on Direct US Talks," Korea Herald, 14 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 February 2003
South Korean Prime Minister Kim Sok Su says that he does not believe that North Korea has nuclear weapons.
— Lee Jong Heon, "S. Korea, US to Consult on N. Korea," United Press International, 10 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Christopher Torchia, "South Korea's Prime Minister Says He Doubts North Korea Has Nuclear Weapons," Associated Press, 10 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10-12 February 2003
Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, travels to Seoul and meets with high ranking South Korean government officials, including President Kim Dae Jung and President-elect Roh Moo Hyun, to discuss ways to resolve issues related to North Korea's nuclear program peacefully. Solana says that the EU remains committed to resolving the crisis through dialogue and plans to send a high level delegation to Pyongyang to help defuse the growing tension on the Korean Peninsula. Speaking at a press conference in Seoul following the meetings, Solana says that economic sanctions against North Korea would be counterproductive and serve only to inflame the already high tensions.
—"S. Korean President Meets Visiting EU Senior Official," Xinhua News Agency, 11 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Solana Reconfirms EU Plan to Send Delegation to N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jong Heon Lee, "EU Seeks to Resolve N. Korea Nuke Crisis," United Press International, 12 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 February 2003
In testimony before the US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, CIA Director George Tenet says, "Kim Jong Il's attempts this past year to parlay the North's nuclear weapons program into political leverage suggest he is trying to negotiate a fundamentally different relationship with Washington—one that implicitly tolerates the North's nuclear weapons program." Tenet also states that profits from missile exports are necessary for North Korea to continue funding its missile, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons programs.
—"The Worldwide Threat in 2003: Evolving Dangers in a Complex World," Prepared Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, 108th Congress, 1st session, 11 February 2003.

11 February 2003
Chung Tae Chol, a South Korean politician and recently returned envoy to the United Stated of President Kim Dae Jung, says that intelligence authorities believe North Korea possesses three plutonium based nuclear weapons.
—Yonhap News Agency, 11 February 2003, in "South Korean Lawmaker Says North Believed to Have up to Three Nuclear Bombs," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 11 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11-14 February 2003
Representatives from North and South Korea meet for the fourth round of inter-Korean economic talks. During the talks the South Korean delegation stresses that economic cooperation between the two countries is hindered mainly by suspicions of a North Korean nuclear weapons program. The North Korean delegation refuses to comment on its nuclear program, stating only that it is a matter to be resolved through direct talks with the United States.
—"Inter-Korea Talks End without Date for Cross-Border Rail," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pyongyang Sidesteps Nuclear Issue at Inter-Korean Economic Talks," Korea Times, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 February 2003
Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director George Tenet states that North Korea "probably" has one or two plutonium-based nuclear warhead. When asked by Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN) if North Korea currently possesses the capability of striking the West Coast of the United States with a ballistic missile, Tenet replies, "I think the declassified answer is yes, they can do that." When asked to clarify whether or not North Korea currently has the capability to couple a nuclear warhead to an ICBM, Tenet says that he will address the issue in the closed session.
—US Senate Committee on Armed Services, Threats to U.S. National Security: Hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, 108th Congress, 1st session, 12 February 2003.

12 February 2003
The IAEA Board of Governors adopts a resolution finding North Korea "in further non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement." Noting North Korea's continuing non-compliance and the IAEA's inability to verify that North Korea has not diverted nuclear material to a nuclear weapons program, the Board of Governors decides to report the issue to the UN Security Council.
—"IAEA Board of Governors Adopts Resolution on Safeguards in North Korea," International Atomic Energy Agency, Media Advisory 203/48, 12 February 2003, <http://www.iaea.org>; Report by the Director General on the Resolution Adopted by the Board on 6 January 2003 and of the Agreement between the IAEA and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, International Atomic Energy Agency, GOV/2003/3, 22 January 2003.

13 February 2003
US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly tells the House International Relations Committee that North Korea's nuclear weapons program may prompt Japan to pursue a nuclear weapons program.
—"N. Korea Nuke to Affect Japan Nonnuclear Policy: US Official," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 February 2003
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, says that North Korea poses a larger threat as a proliferator of nuclear weapons than as an aggressor in Northeast Asia. Rumsfeld also says that the United States is working with South Korea to redeploy US forces further south on the peninsula away from Seoul and the demilitarized zone. Rumsfeld says that he would like to see US forces "more oriented toward an air hub and a sea hub with the ability to reinforce so that there is still a strong deterrent, and possibly with our improved capabilities of moving people, some of those forces come back home."
—Barry Schweid, "Powell: North Korea Rejects US Proposal for Regional Talks on Nukes," Associated Press, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Bradley Graham, "US May Shift Troops in Korea," Washington Post, 14 February 2003, p. A20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 February 2003
US Secretary of State Colin Powell tells the House Budget Committee that US-North Korean bilateral talks are not an acceptable way to address issues related to North Korea's nuclear program, saying that North Korea poses such a threat to neighboring countries, such as China, Japan, Russia and South Korea, that a multilateral talks, incorporating all concerned states, is the only option.
—Barry Schweid, "Powell: North Korea Rejects US Proposal for Regional Talks on Nukes," Associated Press, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 February 2003
South Korean Prime Minister Kim Sok Su tells the National Assembly that North Korea has extracted enough plutonium to make two nuclear weapons, but Kim adds that the South Korean National Intelligence Service cannot confirm whether or not North Korea has actually succeeded in construction nuclear weapons.
—Shin Yong Bae, "Seoul Claims No Knowledge of Nuclear Bombs in North," Korea Herald, 13 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 February 2003
North Korean ambassador to the UN Pak Kil Yon says the only way to resolve the current standoff over North Korea's nuclear program is for the United States to sign a nonaggression pact. Claiming that North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was a self-defensive maneuver, Pak says, "It is a big mistake if the United States thinks North Korea will sit idle while the United States is recklessly moving to overthrow the North Korean regime."
—Yonhap News Agency, 14 February 2003, in "Pyongyang to Resist US 'Overthrow' Attempt – North Korean Envoy," BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 14 February 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 February 2003
Delegates from the United States and North Korea hold unofficial talks in Berlin on ways to resolve the standoff over North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. Official representatives from the United States and North Korea do not participate in the talks, but the experts on each side reportedly have close ties to their respective governments. At the 10 hour meeting, the North Korean delegation reportedly asked the US experts about the specifics of how the US government planned to verify the dismantlement of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program.
—"N. Korea, US Held Private Talks in Berlin over Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 February 2003
The Korean Central News Agency condemns the IAEA for referring the issue of North Korea's nuclear program to the UN Security Council. KCNA states that since North Korea officially withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty on 11 January, the IAEA, which it denounces as merely a tool of the United States, has no authority to discuss North Korea's nuclear program.
—"KCNA Blasts IAEA's Irresponsible Decision," Korean Central News Agency, 14 February 2003, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

Mid February 2003
Kim Tae Ho, a North Korean defector who reportedly worked at North Korean nuclear facilities from 1985 to 1992, tells Japanese media that, in preparation for a special IAEA inspection in 1992, North Korea concealed the full amount of nuclear activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex by using lead boards to eliminate radiation traces emanating from secret underground levels dedicated to a nuclear weapons program. Kim also reports second hand that missile base located in Musudan-ri was constructed at that location to launch nuclear missiles at US forces stationed in Japan in the event of a war with the United States. [Note: In early 2003, Kim, who reportedly worked at the April Enterprise in the Yongbyon nuclear complex and the Namch'on Chemical Complex in North Hwanghae Province, published a book in Japan entitled, The Truth about the North Korea Nuclear Plants That I Saw, in which he details his eight years working for North Korea's nuclear industry.]
—Tokyo Seiron, 3 April 2003, pp. 88-95, in "Ex-DPRK Nuclear Plant Worker on Facilities in Yongbyon, P'yongsan," FBIS Document ID JPP20030313000011; Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 February 2003, p. 7, in "Japan: DPRK Defector Says Yongbyon Facility Ready to Resume Operations Any Time," FBIS Document ID JPP20030218000028; Tokyo Shimbun, 19 February 2003, p. 5, in "Defector Interviewed on Poor Saf