Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1991
Russian nuclear physicists secretly travel to North Korea. According to defector Lee Ch’ung Kuk, the physicists are accommodated in P’ot’onggang-kuyŏk (普通江區域), Pyongyang and stay for an unknown amount of time.
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in “Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations,” FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 40.

1991
North Korea’s Nuclear-Chemical Defense Bureau begins annual training exercises for senior officials on how to cope with a nuclear war.
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in “Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations,” FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 40.

1991-1993
Kim Il Sung sends special envoys to meet with former President Jimmy Carter. The envoys invite Carter to visit Pyongyang because the US government will not recognize or negotiate with Kim Il Sung. Carter continues to ask the White House for approval to visit, but is denied until the nuclear crisis in June 1994.
—KBS-1 Television (Seoul), 10 August 2001, in “ROK’s KBS-1 TV Interviews Former US President Carter on Korean Issues,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20010811000003.

9 January 1991
During summit talks in Seoul with President Roh Tae Woo, Japanese Prime Minster Toshiki Kaifu says that Japan will formally request that North Korea sign an IAEA safeguards agreement when Japanese and North Korean delegations meet later in the month the discuss the normalization of diplomatic relations.
—“Il, Pukhan’e ‘Haek Hyŏpchŏng’ Ch’okku’k’iro/Han-Il 1 Ch’a Chŏngsanghoedam,” Taehan Maeil, 10 January 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

10 January 1991
During a meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama says that Japan will not compromise over the issue of nuclear inspections when Tokyo holds talks to normalize bilateral ties with Pyongyang.
—“Pukhan ‘Haeksach’al’ Suyonghaeya Sugyo,” Segye Ilbo, 11 January 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

17 January 1991
US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Soloman says the United States has no thoughts or intention of threatening North Korea with nuclear weapons.
—Chŏng Yŏn Ju, “‘Pukhan’e Haek Wihyŏp Ŭisaŏptta’/Mi Soloman Ch’agwanbo Palghyŏ,” Hankyoreh Shinmun, 19 January 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

26 January 1991
North Korea’s Foreign Ministry condemns the joint US-South Korean military exercise “Team Spirit” as a ''test nuclear war against the northern half of Korea.” The exercise has been held since 1976.
—“North Korea Condemns U.S-South Korean Joint Military Exercise,” United Press International, 26 January 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Pukhan Team Spirit Pinan/Nambuk Yaehwa’nŭn Kyesokhaltŭt,” Joongang Ilbo, 29 January 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

30-31 January 1991
During a two-day meeting between Japan and North Korea at which the two countries begin negotiations to normalize diplomatic relations, chief Japanese delegate Noboro Nakahira urges North Korea to accept IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. The North Korean delegation reiterates its position that it will not allow inspections until the United States removes all nuclear weapons from South Korea.
—“N. Korea Rejects Japan’s Call on IAEA Check,” Jiji Press Ticker Service, 31 January 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Japan, North Korea Still Far Apart at Normalization Talks,” Asahi News Service, 31 January 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

February 1991
Radio Havana reports that Cuba has signed new nuclear cooperation agreements with Mexico and North Korea.
—Radio Havana, 10 February 1991, in “Cuba; New Nuclear Cooperation Agreements with Mexico and North Korea,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

February 1991
At an IAEA council meeting, South Korea requests that the IAEA “take punitive measures against North Korea” for failing to sign an IAEA safeguards agreement. Australia then proposes a resolution asking North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.
—Ch’oe Maeng Ho, “Pukhan ‘Haeg’anjŏnhyŏpchŏng Ch’egyŏl’ T’ongbo/IAEA Soshikt’ong,” Donga Ilbo, 8 June 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Choe Maeng-ho, Donga Ilbo, 8 June 1991, p. 1, in “DPRK Reportedly to Sign Nuclear Accord,” FBIS-EAS-91-111, 10 June 1991, p. 16.

21 February 1991
During a North Korean diplomatic mission to Japan, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama urges North Korea to conclude a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Kim Yong Sun, the Korean Workers Party Secretary for International Affairs, states that South Korea must simultaneously allow international inspections of the nuclear facilities on its territory before North Korea will allow any inspections. Former Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa urges North Korea to hold bilateral talks with the United States in order to overcome the impasse in allowing IAEA inspections.
—“N. Korea Slams Maneuvers But Will Strive for Peace, Kim,” 21 February 1991, Japan Economic Newswire, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “N. Korean Official Optimistic on Talks with Japan,” Japan Economic Newswire, 21 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 February 1991
In Japan, Kim Yong Sun, the Korean Workers Party Secretary for International Affairs, says that North Korea will accept nuclear inspections only if US military bases in South Korea also receive inspections.
—“North Korea: U.S. Bases Check in Exchange for Showing Nuclear Facilities,” United Press International, 22 February 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “‘Namhan’giji Konggaeha’myŏn Pukhan Haek Sach’al Hŏyong’/Pang’il Kim Yong Sun Chujang,” Chosun Ilbo, 23 February 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

26 February 1991
At the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, 16 of the 35 governors call on North Korea to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement. North Korea claimed that it would not sign an agreement until the United States promised not to launch a preemptive nuclear attack.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 February 1991, in “IAEA Governors Ask North Korea To Sign Nuclear Safeguards Accord,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 March 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 March 1991
US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Carl Ford hails Japan’s moves to improve relations with North Korea, but states that Japan should not normalize relations until Pyongyang consents to IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—“Japan - N. Korean Ties Conditional on Nuke Verification,” Jiji Press Ticker Service, 7 March 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11-12 March 1991
In Tokyo for the second round of normalization talks, the North Korean delegation led by Vice Foreign Minister Chŏn In Ch’ŏl rejects a Japanese request that North Korea sign an IAEA safeguards agreement before normalizing diplomatic relations and receiving compensation for Japanese colonialism.
—Naoaki Usui, “North Korea Rejects Japanese Plea to Sign NPT Safeguards Agreement,” Nucleonics Week, 14 March 1991, p. 5; Lee Nak Yŏn, “Haeksach’alchŏnhubosang I’gyŏn Yŏ’jŏn/Pukhan’il Su’gyohoedam,” Donga Ilbo, 12 March 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Lee Nak Yŏn, “Pukhan Haeksach’al Suyongmunje Su’gyo Chŏnjejo’gŏn Anida,” Donga Ilbo, 13 March 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

18 March 1991
According to a senior Japanese official, the United States urges Japan to press North Korea to allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. Japan and North Korea are currently conducting talks on normalizing their diplomatic relations. According to the Japanese official, “the US asked us to be firm” on making the issue a precondition of normalizing relations.
—Shiro Yoneyama, “U.S. Urges Japan To Press N. Korea on Nuclear Inspection,” Japan Economic Newswire, 19 March 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 March 1991
The Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, publishes an editorial that declares North Korea will not submit to IAEA safeguards inspections unless the United States withdraws its nuclear weapons from South Korea.
—“‘Chuhanmi’gun Ch’ŏlsu’jŏn Haeksach’al Kyesok Pulhŏ’/Pukhan,” Kukmin Ilbo, 20 March 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, , <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

April 1991
The Korea International Chemical Joint Venture Company begins operations. [Note: The plant in Hamhŭng is suspected of being a dual-use facility that processes monazite and other rare earth metals.]
—“International Chemical Corporation,” Korean Central News Agency, 18 November 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Kukchehwahakhab’yŏnghoesa Hŭit’oryujep’um Saengsan, Kukcheshijangdŭl’edo Ch’ulp’um,” Korean Central News Agency, 18 November 2002, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>.

12 April 1991
South Korean Defense Minister Lee Chong Ku says that South Korea is prepared to respond with force if North Korea does not accept nuclear safeguards inspections. He says North Korea is expected to acquire nuclear weapons by 1995 or 1996, and that strong counter-proliferation measures would be appropriate. The remarks are later retracted by the Defense Ministry, but North Korean President Kim Il Sung says that the announcement is a “virtual declaration of war.”
—“Sabyŏng Pongmudanch’uk Kŏmt’o/Lee Kukpang/Pang’wibyŏngjedo Kaesŏndŭng P’oham,” Hankook Ilbo, 13 April 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Charles Lane, “A Knock on the Nuclear Door,” Newsweek, 29 April 1991, pp. 38-40; “Pukhan Haekshisŏl Ŭngjin P’ilyo/Lee Kukpang Pal’ŏn Mulŭi Ch’wiso Sodong,” Hankyoreh Shinmun, 13 April 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

16 April 1991
Vladlen A. Martynof of the Soviet Academy of Sciences announces that all Soviet supplies to the North Korean facility at Yŏngbyŏn will be cut if North Korea continues to deny IAEA inspections. [Note: The Soviet Union supplies fuel rods for the IRT-2000 research reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.]
—David A. Sanger, "Furor in Seoul Over North's Atom Plant," New York Times, 16 April 1991, p. A3; “Pukhan Haeksach’al Kŏbuddaen So Haeg’yŏllyo Konggŭp Chungdan/So Kowi’gwalli,” Kukmin Ilbo, 16 April 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

16 April 1991
At the Soviet Union’s request, China urges North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 16 April 1991, in “China ‘Urging’ North to Sign Nuclear Agreement,” FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-91-073, 16 April 1991, p. 19.

24 April 1991
In testimony before the National Assembly, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Chong Ku explains his remarks earlier in the month that were interpreted to mean South Korea was prepared to conduct pre-emptive strikes against North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Lee says that his remarks were made in an effort to strongly encourage Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons program, and that in case North Korea does acquire nuclear weapons, he will do everything he can to prevent war by using every possible means within the US-South Korean military alliance.
—“Hanbo Pijagŭm Ch’ujŏkhara/Chilmun/‘Pukhan Haek’ŭngjing’ Ŭn P’ogi Ch’okkuhan’gŏt/Tappyŏn,” Joongang Ilbo, 25 April 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

24 April 1991
Lee Ch’ŏl, North Korea’s ambassador to Geneva, says that Pyongyang is prepared to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement as soon as the nuclear threat against North Korea is removed, and that North Korea will not allow inspections until US military bases in South Korea are also inspected.
—“Pukhan, So Amnyŏg’edo Haeksach’al Kŏbu/Chujeneba Taesa,” Taehan Maeil, 25 April 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

29 April 1991
In testimony before the National Assembly, South Korean Defense Minister Lee Chong Ku says that North Korea will probably be able to complete construction of its plutonium reprocessing facility by 1993.
—“‘Pukhan’ŭi Haek Chaech’ŏri Shisŏl/93 Nyŏn Wan’gongdoel’gŏt’/I Kukpang Kukhoe Tappyŏn,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, 30 April 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

May 1991
Mid-level North Korean diplomat Ko Yŏng Hwan defects to South Korea and reports that North Korea has “vast underground plants” for the manufacture of missiles and the testing of nuclear weapons.
—Michael Breen, “N. Korea Goes Underground with Nuclear Plants,” Washington Times, 25 October 1991, p. A11.

May-June 1991
South Korean intelligence claims that North Korea conducts tests on a triggering device for a nuclear bomb in Yŏngbyŏn.
—John Fricker, publisher, Milavnews, Vol. 30, No. 357, July 1991, pp. 19-20.

2 May 1991
The Korean Central News Agency strongly criticizes the United States for trying to force North Korea to allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—“Mi Haeksach’al Amnyŏk/Pukhansŏ Maengbinan,” Donga Ilbo, 3 May 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

9 May 1991
The Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, publishes an article that says North Korea does not have nuclear weapons and that North Korea has had no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons since signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 12 December 1985.
—Lee Yŏng Kŭn, “Pukhan ‘Haek Ŏbtta’/Rodongshinmun Chujang,” Donga Ilbo, 10 May 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

20-22 May 1991
During Japanese-North Korean normalization talks held in Beijing, Noboru Nakahira, Japan’s special ambassador, says that North Korea must accept full-scope safeguards before Japan will normalize relations. Japan withholds $600 million in economic assistance and possible payment of war reparations for its occupation of Korea during the Second World War. The North Korean delegation, which includes Vice Foreign Minister Chŏn In Ch’ŏl, rejects Japan’s demand. According to Chŏn, diplomatic relations between the two countries are necessary before North Korea will consider inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—George Leopold and Naoaki Usui, “N. Korea Rejects Reactor Probes,” Defense News, 27 May 1991, pp. 4, 37; “‘Il Haeksach’alyogu Pudang’/Pukhandaep’yo Chujang,” Hankook Ilbo, 21 May 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

23 May 1991
Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vitaly Churkin states that the USSR strongly believes that North Korea should fulfill its obligation as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and promptly sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Churkin claims that North Korea’s stated precondition that the United States remove its nuclear presence on the Korean Peninsula is a demand “which is not directly related to the NPT.” However, Churkin states that the USSR believes that the United States and North Korea should compromise in order to “create a more favorable and constructive atmosphere” for the signing of a safeguards agreement.
—Igor Peskov and Rostislav Gertsev, “Korea Should Sign an Agreement with IAEA - Spokesman Says,” ITAR-TASS, 23 May 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

23 May 1991
Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vitaly Churkin states that the USSR strongly believes that North Korea should fulfill its obligation as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and promptly sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Churkin claims that North Korea’s stated precondition that the United States remove its nuclear presence on the Korean Peninsula is a demand “which is not directly related to the NPT.” However, Churkin states that the USSR believes that the United States and North Korea should compromise in order to “create a more favorable and constructive atmosphere” for the signing of a safeguards agreement.
—Igor Peskov and Rostislav Gertsev, “Korea Should Sign an Agreement with IAEA - Spokesman Says,” ITAR-TASS, 23 May 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

23 May 1991
Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Vitaly Churkin states that the USSR strongly believes that North Korea should fulfill its obligation as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and promptly sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Churkin claims that North Korea’s stated precondition that the United States remove its nuclear presence on the Korean Peninsula is a demand “which is not directly related to the NPT.” However, Churkin states that the USSR believes that the United States and North Korea should compromise in order to “create a more favorable and constructive atmosphere” for the signing of a safeguards agreement.
—Igor Peskov and Rostislav Gertsev, “Korea Should Sign an Agreement with IAEA - Spokesman Says,” ITAR-TASS, 23 May 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Igor Peskov and Leonid Timfeyev, “Soviet Briefing on Current World Affairs,” ITAR-TASS, 23 May 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 May 1991
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Taizo Watanabe reiterates Japan’s demand that North Korea accept IAEA safeguards.
—Naoaki Usui, “Pyongyang Refuses NPT Safeguards, Japanese Normalization Deadlocked,” Nucleonics Week, 30 May 1991, pp. 17-18.

30 May 1991
An IAEA spokesman reports that in a letter to IAEA Director General Hans Blix, North Korea expressed a willingness to resume talks on a safeguards agreement. The letter noticeably lacked any reference to US nuclear weapons in South Korea. [Note: In the past North Korea has stated that the removal of US nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula is a precondition for concluding a safeguards agreement with the IAEA.]
—Moscow Radio in Korean, 30 May 1991, in “DPRK Reported for Nuclear Talks,” in FBIS-SOV-91-105, 31 May 1991, p. 21.

1 June 1991
According to Kyodo News Service, Kim Il Sung tells a group of visiting Japanese journalists that both North Korea and South Korea should have nuclear inspections. “Inspections should be made simultaneously, not only on our side, which does not have nuclear weapons, but in South Korea, which has them.”
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 3 June 1991, in “DPRK Reportedly to Build New Scud Missile,” JPRS-TND-91-009, 24 June 1991, pp. 7-8.

7 June 1991
A delegation of senior North Korean diplomats led by Chin Ch’ung Kuk meets with IAEA Director General Hans Blix in Vienna. North Korea says it will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and allow international inspections of all of its facilities, including facilities in Yŏngbyŏn-kun that the United States suspects are being used to build nuclear weapons. Officials from both sides are scheduled to meet in July 1991, and the agreement should be ready for approval by 1 September 1991. According to IAEA representative Hans Friedrich Meyer, North Korea will sign an inspection agreement as soon as technical matters, such as inspections scheduling and procedures, are negotiated.
—“North Korea Said Willing to Sign Accord on Nuclear Inspection,” Agence France Presse, 8 June 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, “North Korea Agrees to Nuclear Plant Inspections,” New York Times, 9 June 1991, p. 10; Gamini Seneviratne, “North Korean Safeguards Pact and Iraq Status to IAEA,” Nucleonics Week, 13 June 1991, pp. 14-15; Vladimir Solntsev, “DPRK Ready to Sign Accord with IAEA on Nuclear Safeguards,” ITAR-TASS, 8 June 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Pukhan, ‘Haeg’anjŏnhyŏpchŏng Ch’egyŏl’ T’ongbo/IAEA’e T’ŭksa Ponae,” Taehan Maeil, 9 June 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Ch’oe Maeng Ho, “Pukhan ‘Haeg’anjŏnhyŏpchŏng Ch’egyŏl’ T’ongbo/IAEA Soshikt’ong,” Donga Ilbo, 8 June 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Choe Maeng-ho, Donga Ilbo, 8 June 1991, p. 1, in “DPRK Reportedly to Sign Nuclear Accord,” FBIS-EAS-91-111, 10 June 1991, p. 16.

8 June 1991
North Korea insists on altering some of the wording in the standard IAEA safeguards agreement before signing it.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 8 June 1991, in “Unconditional Signing Urged,” in FBIS-EAS-91-111, 10 June 1991, p. 16.

10 June 1991
South Korean officials announce that South Korea will seek an IAEA resolution calling on North Korea to sign a safeguards agreement “immediately” despite Pyongyang’s recent pledge to sign an agreement by 1 September 1991. The officials claim that there need to be further diplomatic effort at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting beginning on 17 June because “there remain some problems that make it hard to trust North Korea.”
—Yonhap (Seoul), 10 June 1991, in “South to Seek Resolution on Inspecting North,” in FBIS-EAS-91-111, 10 June 1991, pp. 16-17.

10 June 1991
A senior South Korean Foreign Ministry official denies as “unfounded” a 7 June Los Angeles Times report that the United States is consulting with Seoul about removing its nuclear weapons from South Korea in order to entice North Korea into allowing international inspections of its nuclear facilities and giving up any possible nuclear weapons capabilities. The official claims that the position of South Korea is to deal with the issue of US nuclear weapons separately form “North Korea’s liability as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty.”
—Yonhap (Seoul), 10 June 1991, in “U.S. Paper’s Report on Nuclear Weapons Viewed,” in FBIS-EAS-91-111, 10 June 1991, p. 17.

10 June 1991
Twenty political parties and public organizations in North Korea release a joint statement calling for the removal of the nuclear threat from the Korean Peninsula. In the statement, the organizations claim that the presence of over 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed by the United States in South Korea “constitutes the main cause which creates dangers not only for the existence of the Korean people, but also to the peace and security of Asia.” They also state that if North Korea allows nuclear inspections, the United States must open its nuclear bases in South Korea to international inspections at the same time. First Vice-Chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee Vladimir Tolstikov expresses his support of the joint statement and reiterates the demand that the United States remove its nuclear weapons from South Korea.
—KCNA (Pyongyang), 11 June 1991, in “Twenty Organizations Issue Nuclear Statement,” in FBIS-EAS-91-112, 11 June 1991, pp. 9-11; “International Inspections in U.S. Nuclear Bases in South Korea Must Be Made at the Same Time,” KCNA (Pyongyang), 11 June 1991, in “International Inspection of U.S. Bases Urged,” in FBIS-EAS-91-114, 13 June 1991, p. 4; KCNA (Pyongyang), 13 June 1991, in “Soviet Official Interviewed on Nuclear Inspections,” in FBIS-EAS-91-114, 13 June 1991, p. 7.

10 June 1991
The North Korean delegation abruptly leaves an IAEA meeting after Japanese Ambassador Tetsuya Endo begins questioning North Korea as to why it has been so reluctant to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. Endo had also asked the North Korean delegation to clarify a few points regarding their responsibilities as a signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Endo asked whether North Korea would allow IAEA inspections of all its nuclear facilities. Representatives from Australia, Canada, and other countries support Endo’s line of questioning.
—Im Tong Myŏng, Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 11 June 1991, p. 2, in “North Reportedly Walks Out on IAEA Meeting,” in FBIS-EAS-91-113, 12 June 1991, p. 21; Kyodo (Tokyo), 11 June 1991, in “IAEA: Government Agrees to Nuclear Inspections,” in FBIS-EAS-91-112, 11 June 1991, p. 9.

11 June 1991
North Korean Ambassador Chin Chong Guk, speaking to South Korean journalists, claims that North Korea will sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA without insisting, as it had in the past, that the United States remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea. He claims that North Korea has dropped the precondition because of the stated possibility of bilateral negotiations with the United States on the issue of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 June 1991, in “North May Sign Nuclear Accord Unconditionally,” in FBIS-EAS-91-112, 11 June 1991, p. 23.

11 June 1991
The North Korean ambassador to Geneva demands that the United States remove all nuclear weapons from South Korea even if North Korea signs a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Claiming that the removal of nuclear weapons is of vital importance even though it is no longer stated as a precondition for signing a safeguards agreement, the ambassador says, “One should not look at this issue unilaterally. We are also hoping the US will move.”
—Kyodo (Tokyo), 12 June 1991, in “Envoy: U.S. Must Rid South of Nuclear Weapons,” in FBIS-EAS-91-113, 12 June 1991, pp. 10-11.

11 June 1991
Pak Kil Yŏn, head of North Korea’s observer mission to the UN, calls for simultaneous inspections of nuclear facilities in North Korea and South Korea.
—Yonhap (Seoul), 11 June 1991, in “Envoy Urges ‘Simultaneous’ Nuclear Inspections,” in FBIS-EAS-91-113, 12 June 1991, p. 21.

14 June 1991
The Japanese government welcomes North Korea’s announcement that it will allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. However, Japanese Foreign Ministry spokesman Taizo Watanabe says that it remains unclear whether North Korea will sign the safeguards agreement unconditionally.
—“Government ‘Cautious’ on DPRK Nuclear Pledge,” Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 14 June 1991 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-91-115, 14 June 1991.

14 June 1991
North Korean special envoy to the IAEA Chin Chung Kuk announces at the Board of Governor’s meeting that North Korea is ready to sign a safeguards agreement opening its nuclear facilities to international inspections. According to Chin, a North Korean delegation will travel to Vienna in mid-July to meet with the IAEA in order to finalize the text of the agreement. In September, the text of the agreement is to be submitted to the board for approval. North Korea dropped the long-standing precondition that the United States remove all of its nuclear weapons from South Korea because, as Chin indicated, the presence of US nuclear weapons in South Korea is a bilateral issue to be dealt with in separate talks between the United States and North Korea.
—Korea Times, 14 June 1991, p. 1, in “North’s Envoy to IAEA Criticizes Japan,” in FBIS-EAS-91-115, 14 June 1991, pp. 10-11.

14 June 1991
Lee Kye Paek, chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Social Democratic Party, issues a statement reiterating the demand, made in the joint statement by 20 political parties and organizations, that the United States remove the nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula before North Korea will allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—“U.S. Nuclear Arms in South Korea Must Be Opened to the Public and Inspection of Them Be Made, States KSDP (Korean Social Democratic Party) Chairman,” KCNA (Pyongyang), 14 June 1991, in “Yi Kye-paek Reiterates Nuclear Inspection Stand,” in FBIS-EAS-91-116, 17 June 1991, pp. 14-15.

15 June 1991
Asahi Television in Japan reports there are about 20 North Koreans studying at the Soviet Union’s Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. The report cites sources at the institute.
—“Soryŏn Pukhan Haek Kisulcha Yangsŏng,” Hankryoreh Shinmun, 18 June 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Korea Daily, 17 June 1991, p. 1, in “Soviets Training DPRK Nuclear Scientists,” FBIS-EAS-91-117, 18 June 1991, pp. 21-22.

20 June 1991
According to North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng Nam, North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement soon. However, North Korea will not allow inspections until: (1) inspections are conducted to verify the removal of US nuclear weapons allegedly stationed in South Korea, and (2) North Korea receives “legal assurances” that the United States will not pose a nuclear threat against it.
—Don Oberdorfer and T.R. Reid, “North Korea Issues Demand for Mutual Nuclear Inspections,” Washington Post, 21 June 1991, p. A19.

26 June 1991
A South Korean “military intelligence official” says that evidence of high explosives tests for nuclear weapons has been discovered in the area around Yŏngbyŏn.
—“Pukhan Yŏngbyŏnsŏ Kop’okpalshilhŏm/Haengmugigaebal Chŏndangye Ch’ujŏng/Kundangguk Hwag’in,” Kukmin Ilbo, 27 June 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

July 1991
North Korea begins a three-year development plan for science and technology. The plan is placed under the direction of Kim Jong Il and includes a national meeting of North Korean scientists in October 1991. The scientists draft a plan with targets for 2000 that include the development of advanced technologies in the fields of computers and atomic energy.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 56-57.

10 July 1991
The Soviet Union informs South Korea that it has suspended all technical support for North Korea’s nuclear program, including the supply of nuclear fuel rods. [Note: The fuel rods are for the IRT-2000 research reactor, which requires enriched uranium.]
—“So, Pukhan’e Haeg’yŏllyo’gonggŭp Chungdan/Urijŏngbu’e T’ongbo,” Taehan Maeil, 11 July 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

10 July 1991
North Korea says that it wants an additional clause in the IAEA safeguards agreement that will release it from mandatory inspection if: (1) there are nuclear weapons in South Korea, and (2) there is a nuclear threat against North Korea.
—“Government May Propose Special IAEA Meeting,” Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 June 1991 in FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-91-117, 18 June 1991.

10 July 1991
South Korean Defense Minister Lee Chong Ku tells the National Assembly that if North Korea accepts international inspections of its nuclear facilities and proves that it has abandoned its nuclear weapons program, South Korea will consider simultaneous inspections of both countries’ military facilities.
—John Fricker, publisher, Milavnews, Vol. 30, No. 357, July 1991, pp. 19-20; “Pukhan Haek Kaebal Wanjŏnp’ogiddaen/Nambuk Kunsashisŏl Tongshisach’al,” Hankryoreh Shinmun, 11 July 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

10-15 July 1991
North Korea holds talks with the IAEA to determine the terms of the safeguards agreement.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 9 July 1991, in “South Korea Reports North Sends Negotiators to Sign IAEA Accords,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 10 July 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 July 1991
North Korea initials a safeguards agreement with the IAEA but has yet to officially sign it. According to the head of the North Korean Foreign Ministry working delegation to the IAEA, although the draft of a nuclear safeguards agreement has been completed, implementation may still remain a problem. The fact that the United States poses a “nuclear threat” to North Korea could create problems in implementing the IAEA safeguards agreement.
—Andrew Mack, Pacific Research, Vol. 4, No. 3, August 1991, p. 14; KCNA (Pyongyang), 18 July 1991, in “Delegation Head Briefs Newsman on IAEA Issue,” FBIS-EAS-91-138, 18 July 1991, p. 11.

26 July 1991
Admiral Charles R. Larson, Commander in Chief of the US Pacific Command, says that it is difficult to predict the outcome of North Korea’s nuclear program but that most intelligence estimates indicate North Korea will be able to produce an atomic bomb by 1995. He describes North Korea’s nuclear program as, “My greatest security concern in the region.”
—John Fricker, publisher, Milavnews, Vol. 30, No. 358, August 1991, pp. 17-18; Andrew Mack, Pacific Research, Vol. 4, No. 3, August 1991, p. 14; “Pukhan 90 Nyŏndae Chungban Haekpoyu/Mi T’aep’yŏngyangsaryŏnggwan Palghyŏ,” Joongang Ilbo, 27 July 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

30 July 1991
The North Korean Foreign Ministry proposes the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In the proposal it suggests that Seoul and Pyongyang jointly declare the peninsula a nuclear-weapon-free-zone and call on the nuclear weapons states to guarantee the nuclear-free status.

—Yonhap (Seoul), 1 August 1991, in “Discussion on North Denuclearization Proposed,” in FBIS-EAS-91-149, 2 August 1991, p. 17; “Naenyŏn’kkaji Hanbando Pihaekchidaehwa/Pukhan Oegyobu Cheŭi,” Donga Ilbo, 30 July 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

August 1991
Ko Yŏng Hwan, a mid-level North Korean diplomat and former interpreter for Kim Il Sung who defected in May 1991, identifies underground missile manufacturing plants where nuclear weapons tests are conducted. One is the January 18th Machine Plant in Kagam-ri, Kaech’ŏn-kun, South P’yŏng’an Province. Another is at Man’gyŏngdae, where ground-launched anti-ship missiles are produced.
—“Defector on North’s Nuclear Development,” Seoul Shinmun, 9 October 1991, p. 5, in JPRS-TND-91-017, 7 November 1991, pp. 8-9; Michael Breen, “N. Korea Goes Underground with Nuclear plants,” Washington Times, 25 October 1991, p. A11.

1 August 1991
Responding to the 30 July North Korean proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea indicates, for the first time, that it will consider talks on nuclear nonproliferation with North Korea only after North Korea accepts full international inspections of all its nuclear facilities including those at Yŏngbyŏn.
—“Korean Nuclear Move,” Financial Times (London), 2 August 1991, p. 4; Yonhap (Seoul), 1 August 1991, in “Discussion on North Denuclearization Proposed,” in FBIS-EAS-91-149, 2 August 1991, p. 17; Korea Times, 2 August 1991, p. 1, in “Further on Denuclearization Proposal,” in FBIS-EAS-91-149, 2 August 1991, pp. 17-18; “Hanbando Haekkunch’ungmunje Yŏn’gye/Chŏngbu, Tanggukchahoedam Cheŭik’iro,” Hankryoreh Shinmun, 2 August 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

3 August 1991
South Korea announces a three-step plan that includes asking North Korea to sign a joint declaration to make the Korean Peninsula a nuclear-weapons-free zone. First, North Korea would accept inspections of its nuclear facilities, and then North and South Korea would jointly issue a declaration to establish a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The third step would include high-level talks and multilateral support from countries in the region. The proposal may suggest simultaneous IAEA inspections, or a system by which the two Koreas may conduct bilateral inspections.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 4 August 1991, in “Seoul Considers Joint Denuclearization Offer,” FBIS-EAS-91-150, 5 August 1991, p. 32; “Hanbando 3 Tan’gye Pihaekchŏngch’aek Ch’ujin,” Joongang Ilbo, 4 August 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

5 August 1991
South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Sang Ok says that South Korea has no plan to develop nuclear weapons, and no plan to use military force against North Korean nuclear facilities, even if Pyongyang refuses to accept full nuclear safeguards inspections.
—“Pukhan Haeksach’al Kŏbuhaedo Han’guk, Haekkaebal Koryŏ’anhae/I Oemu Oejihoe’gyŏn,” Joongang Ilbo, 6 August 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

7 August 1991
The Yomiuri Shimbun reports that in bilateral normalization talks later this month, the Japanese government will link financial compensation to North Korea for past Japanese colonialism with North Korea’s completion of an IAEA safeguards agreement.
—Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, “Chinese Signature on NPT May Pressure North Korea,” Nucleonics Week, 15 August 1991, pp. 14-16; Kang Ch’ŏn Sŏk, “Il, ‘Kyŏnghyŏppangshik Paesang’ Chean/Pukhan’gwa Su’gyohoedamddae,” Chosun Ilbo, 8 August 1991, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

7 August 1991
A “high-level official in the South Korean government” says that the United States is seriously considering the withdrawal of its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in order to encourage North Korea to accept nuclear safeguards inspections.
—“Mi’gun Chŏnsulhaek Ch’ŏlsu T’ongbohandŭt/Mi, Han’gug’e/Pukhan Haeksach’al Chokchin Wihae,” Hankryoreh Shinmun, 8 August 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

Late August 1991
An anonymous North Korean defector says North Korea has been building a “major reprocessing facility to reprocess plutonium” in Yŏngbyŏn. The defector also claims that North Korea had previously built a small-scale experimental reprocessing facility, and may have already reprocessed some plutonium. According to Joseph Bermudez, the defector worked for 20 years at North Korea’s Ministry of Public Security, and was the president of the Taeyang Trading Company under the Korean Workers Party when he defected in May 1988. He was reportedly the deputy director of the Ministry of Public Security’s Supply Section, Third Engineering Bureau, from 1983 to 1987. During this time, he was “responsible for supplying materials to major construction projects, especially projects under the nuclear program.”
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “N Korea on Way to ‘Decisive’ Weapon,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 16, No. 15, 12 October 1991, p. 653.

September 1991
Twenty-three IAEA member states adopt a strong resolution to allow the IAEA to conduct “special” inspections (inspections on demand) in addition to ones regularly scheduled. The resolution is partially aimed at North Korea, whose continued refusal to allow IAEA inspections is causing real concern at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna. North Korea calls the resolution a hostile act and delays efforts to cooperate with the IAEA. According to North Korean defector Ko Yŏng Hwan, the North Korean government never had any intention of allowing international inspections; rather it only signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to buy time for its nuclear weapons program. Ko says North Korea’s program is only “one or two years away from producing a crude enriched-uranium bomb.” Ko also claims North Korea has an underground nuclear research facility at Pakch’ŏn. [Note: The underground facility may be at Pakch’on Air Base.]
—Mark Hibbs, Anne Maclachlan and Naoaki Usui, “North Korean Weapons Suspicions Bring Heated Discussions at IAEA,” Nucleonics Week, 19 September 1991, p. 14; Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 81; Don Oberdorfer, “North Korea Balks at Nuclear Accord; Government Cites Outside ‘Pressure,’ Says Signing Is Still Possible,” Washington Post, 17 September 1991, p. A10; John Fricker, publisher, Milavnews, Vol. 30, No. 360, October 1991, p. 17; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “N Korea on Way to ‘Decisive’ Weapon,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, Vol. 16, No. 15, 12 October 1991, p. 653.

3 September 1991
At the Defense Ministry in Seoul, 12 US government officials, including members of the CIA, brief the South Korean government on North Korea’s nuclear program. This reportedly is the first time that the United States formally shares this intelligence with South Korea. The 89-member South Korean delegation includes representatives from a number of government agencies.
—“Mi ‘Puk Kaekkaebal’ Sŏlmyŏng/Kukpangbusŏ/Kunsajŏngbo Ch’ŏt Kongshik Briefing,” Donga Ilbo, 3 September 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “‘Pukhan Su’nyŏnnae Haengmujang’/Hanmi Kunsabogohoe/Kaebalchŏji Kongdongnoryŏk Hab’ŭi,” Donga Ilbo, 4 September 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

12 September 1991
IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution calling on North Korea to quickly ratify the safeguards agreement and move without delay from signature to actual implementation. The resolution, spearheaded by Japan, Australia and 15 other countries, including the United States and USSR, passes with a vote of 27 to 1, with only Cuba voting against it. In response to this resolution, North Korea’s ambassador to the IAEA, O Chang Rim, refuses to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. A few days after the resolution passes, the North Korean Foreign Ministry denounces the resolutions as a “wanton encroachment” on North Korean sovereignty. In the statement the Foreign Ministry claimed that North Korea would sign the accord “if pressure put upon us is removed.”
—Don Oberdorfer, “North Korea Balks at Nuclear Accord; Government Cites Outside ‘Pressure,’ Says Signing Is Still Possible,” Washington Post, 17 September 1991, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Haekhyŏpchŏng Ch’okkuan Ch’aet’aek/IAEA/Pukhansŏn Hanbando Haeg’iyu Nansaek,” Chosun Ilbo, 13 September 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

Mid-September 1991
IAEA Director General Hans Blix meets with the five permanent members of the UN Security Council to suggest plans to pursue more aggressive inspections of nuclear states suspected of violating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He says he would like to create a unit of the IAEA that would analyze information gathered from national intelligence operations, such as images from spy satellites, in order to inspect sites within a country even if they have not been placed under IAEA safeguards. During the meeting, US Energy Secretary James Watkins says that the United States supports a more aggressive inspection regime to uncover clandestine nuclear weapons programs as sanctioned by the NPT. The Soviet Union and European Union also support the proposal.
—Paul Lewis, “U.N. Maps Plan to Nab Atomic Cheats,” New York Times, 11 October 1991, p. A10; Michael Wise, “UN Tightens Checks on Nuclear Arms,” The Independent (London), 21 September 1991, p. 11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Olivia Ward, “New Curbs Urged on Nuclear Arms,” Toronto Star, 22 October 1991, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late September 1991
According to KBS-1 Television in Seoul, North Korean President Kim Il Sung claims that North Korea will accept IAEA inspections of its facilities if US facilities in South Korea are also inspected. [Note: This is the first time that Kim Il Sung has spoken personally about international inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities.]
—Chon Yo-ok, KBS-1 Television Network Broadcast (Seoul), 2 October 1991, in “Kim Il-song Cited on Allowing Nuclear Inspections,” in FBIS-EAS-91-192, 3 October 1991, pp. 19-20.

27 September 1991
US President George Bush announces that the United States will withdraw all short-range land- and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. However, there is no precise schedule for their removal. According to North Korean Prime Minister Yŏn Hyŏng Muk and Vice Foreign Minister Chŏn In Ch’ŏl, North Korea will sign a safeguards agreement after all nuclear weapons are removed from South Korea.
—Don Oberdorfer, “U.S. Decides to Withdraw A-Weapons From S. Korea; North Korea to Be Pressed to Halt Program,” Washington Post, 19 October 1991, pp. A1, A19; Bill Gertz, “North Korea Fortifies Air Defenses; Fears U.S.-led Strike on Nuclear Arms Plant,” Washington Times, 28 November 1991, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, “Bush’s Arm Plan; Asia Exhibits Support and Quiet Misgivings,” New York Times, 29 September 1991, p. 14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 September 1991
According to Korean Workers Party Secretary Kim Yong Sun, in order for North Korea to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement, the United States should guarantee that it will never use nuclear weapons against North Korea.
—Clayton Jones, “US Arms Plan Puts Pressure on North Korea,” Christian Science Monitor, 2 October 1991, p. 6; “Pukhan ‘Haeksach’al Suyong’yong’ŭi’/Misŏ Haengmugi Taebuk Pulsayong Pojang Cho’gŏn,” Chosun Ilbo, 30 September 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

October 1991
North Korea convenes a national meeting for scientists as part of a three-year development plan for science and technology that began in July 1991. The scientists draft a plan with targets for 2000 that include the development of advanced technologies in the fields of computers and atomic energy.
—Lee Chae Sŭng, Pukhan’ŭl Umjig’i’nŭn Technocrat (Seoul: Ilbit, 1998), pp. 56-57.

2 October 1991
North Korean Prime Minister Yŏn Hyŏng Muk tells the UN general Assembly in New York that once all US nuclear weapons are withdrawn from South Korea in accordance with President Bush’s declaration that the United States would withdraw it nuclear weapons from overseas, it will be possible for Pyongyang to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement.
—Kim Sŭng Yŏng, “‘Nambuk Chŏngsanghoedam Kaech’oe Ka’nŭngsŏng’/Pukhan Yŏn Hyŏng Muk Yu’en’yŏnsŏl,” Chosun Ilbo, 4 October 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

4 October 1991
South Korean President Roh Tae Woo warns North Korea that if it continues with its nuclear weapons program and refuses international inspections, international sanctions may be imposed on North Korea.
—“Measures to Stop North N-Arms Program Planned,” Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 4 October 1991 in FBIS-EAS-91-193, 4 October 1991.

21 October 1991
Addressing the UN General Assembly in a review of his annual report, IAEA Director General Hans Blix reiterates that the IAEA needs means other than inspections of declared nuclear facilities to determine whether a state is developing a clandestine nuclear weapons program. “If a state fails to declare nuclear installations—as Iraq did—the inspectors must learn through other sources where to look.” Speaking of the ability of Iraq to work clandestinely on a nuclear weapons program, he said, “What we can learn from these lessons is that the ability of the regular inspections under the NPT to uncover possible undeclared nuclear installations and material would increase drastically if the IAEA were to be routinely provided with relevant information available to member states—that is, through satellites.”
—Olivia Ward, “New Curbs Urged on Nuclear Arms,” Toronto Star, 22 October 1991, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “IAEA: Greater Need for Nuclear Plant Verification,” Europe Energy, No. 366, 31 October 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 October 1991
A South Korean official announces that North Korea is likely to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement when the IAEA Board of Governors meets in February 1992.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 21 October 1991, in “North ‘Likely To Sign’ IAEA Agreement in Feb,” FBIS-EAS-91-204, p. 19.

22 October 1991
North Korea informs the United Nations that all nuclear weapons must be removed from South Korea before it can sign the IAEA safeguards agreement. The European Union, Australia, United States, Poland, Austria, Japan, Romania, New Zealand, Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and South Korea agree that North Korea should immediately sign the agreement and allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. South Korean Ambassador No Chang Hŭi expresses “serious concern” that North Korea is delaying signing the IAEA safeguards agreement.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 October 1991, in “North Sticks to Nuclear Signing Stance at UN,” FBIS-EAS-91-205, 23 October 1991, p. 27.

22 October 1991
In Pyongyang, North Korean Prime Minister Yŏn Hyŏng Muk says that North Korea will not yield to pressure to allow nuclear inspections.
—“Amnyŏg’ŭihan haeksach’al Kyŏlk’o Ŭnghalsu Ŏptta/Pukhan Yŏn Ch’ongni Palghyŏ,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, 23 October 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

23 October 1991
In a meeting with South Korean Prime Minister Chŏng Wŏn Shik, North Korean Prime Minister Yŏn Hyŏng Muk presents a new set of conditions that must be met in order for North Korea to allow international inspections of its facilities. These conditions include: (1) South Korea’s renunciation of the US “nuclear umbrella”; and (2) discontinuation of US flights over Korea and port calls to South Korea by planes and ships containing nuclear weapons.
—Steven R. Weisman, “North Korea Adds Barriers to A-Plant Inspections,” New York Times, 24 October 1991, p. A3.

Late 1991
North Korea begins concealing its nuclear waste storage activities at “Building 500” by burying pipes connecting the building to the nearby radiochemical laboratory, and later by building up the earth around the facility to conceal the entire lower level, which is suspected of housing large waste storage cells. [Note: When IAEA inspectors visit the two-story “Building 500” in 1992, the building appears to have only one level.]
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Infrastructure,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 1994, p. 79.

1983-November 1991
North Korea conducts about 80 high explosives tests that are believed to be part of its nuclear weapons development program.
—Lee Shin U, “Pukhan Haekkaebal/Hanbando Tŏp’ch’in Sae ‘Kinjangbogo’,” Kukmin Ilbo, 18 June 1990, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

1 November 1991
The Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, publishes a commentary that says even if the United States withdraws its nuclear weapons from South Korea, Pyongyang will still feel threatened if Seoul remains under the protection of the US “nuclear umbrella.”
—“‘Haeg’usan’ Ittnŭnhan Sach’al Kŏbubangch’im/Puk Rodongshinmun,” Donga Ilbo, 2 November 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

8 November 1991
South Korean President Roh Tae Woo declares that South Korea will not manufacture, possess, or use nuclear and chemical weapons. Roh also urges North Korea to make the same pledge.
—T. R. Reid, “S. Korean Leader Pledges Policy of No Nuclear Arms; Communist North Korea Asked to Make Same Commitment,” Washington Post, 8 November 1991, p. A27, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Patrick Minn, “Roh’s Non-Nuclear Plan May Boost Rapprochement with North,” Agence France Presse, 8 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Raymond Whitaker, “Roh Denounces Nuclear Arms on Korean Peninsula,” The Independent (London), 9 November 1991, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “No Taet’ongnyŏng Pihaekhwasŏn’ŏn,” Hankook Ilbo, 9 November 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; “Chuhan Chisanghaek Wŏnjŏn’iyong/Hanmihyŏb/ŭi/Kungnaesŏ Haech’ae...Nongch’uk Uranium Ch’uch’ul,” Kukmin Ilbo, 9 November 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

10 November 1991
In response to Roh Tae Woo’s anti-nuclear declaration, the Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers Party, says the declaration is insignificant because it did not mention US nuclear weapons in South Korea. The commentary, which was carried by the Korean Central News Agency, claims that Roh “intends to reduce the Korean nation to a nuclear hostage of the United States.”
—Kyodo News Service, “N. Korea Blasts S. Korean Nuclear-Free Statement,” Japan Economic Newswire, 10 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 November 1991
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement that says Roh Tae Woo’s anti-nuclear declaration is “nothing new.” The ministry spokesman says that the only way to create a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula is for the United States to hold direct talks with North Korea “instead of trying to avoid its responsibility by manipulating its junior agent [South Korea].” The statement criticizes Roh’s declaration for not mentioning the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons in South Korea.
—Kyodo News Service, “North Korea Rejects Seoul’s Denuclearization Offer,” Japan Economic Newswire, 12 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “No Taet’ongnyŏng Pihaekhwa Chean/Pukhan’oe’gyobu Kŏbu Sŏngmyŏng,” Hankryoreh Shinmun, 13 November 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

25 November 1991
North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as the United States begins to remove its nuclear weapons from South Korea. North Korea proposes a direct meeting with the United States to discuss simultaneous inspections of North Korean facilities and US nuclear sites in South Korea.
—Don Oberdorfer, “North Korea Shifts Stance on Inspection; Proposal Would Hinge on U.S. Nuclear With Drawals,” Washington Post, 27 November 1991, p. A19; Kathy Chenault, “North, South Korea Close Gap on Nuclear Inspection Issue,” Associated Press, 25 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “U.S. Has Begun To Withdraw Nuclear Weapons, Report Says,” Associated Press, 28 November 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 November 1991
North Korean Ambassador to China Chu Chang Chun reiterates the proposal initially made on 25 November 1991, which stated that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement following the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from South Korea.
—David Holley, “N. Korea Opens Door to Nuclear Facilities Pact,” Los Angeles Times, 28 November 1991, pp. A1, A13.

28 November 1991
Citing unnamed Bush administration officials, the Washington Times reports that North Korea is strengthening air defenses around the nuclear facilities located in Yŏngbyŏn-kun in anticipation of a possible US or South Korean air strike. The caliber of the anti-aircraft guns is not specified.
—Bill Gertz, “North Korea Fortifies Air Defenses; Fears U.S.-led Strike on Nuclear Arms Plant,” Washington Times, 28 November 1991, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

December 1991
During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, Director General Hans Blix suggests that the IAEA create a separate agency or department to collect and analyze intelligence data from member states to help monitor undeclared nuclear activities. His suggestion is met with little enthusiasm. In the past, the United States has refused to give the IAEA intelligence information for security reasons. The IAEA prepares to make another request for intelligence information at the next Board of Governors meeting scheduled for 24 February 1992. If the request is granted, only two IAEA staff members will have access to the information. During the meeting, South Korean representatives reportedly ask the Agency to cease technical support for North Korea’s nuclear program. Support for the North’s nuclear program was granted in connection with ongoing IAEA inspections of the small reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. The IAEA currently has plans to spend more than $300,000 in North Korea on five major projects in 1992, and will assist North Korean scientists in areas ranging from uranium ore exploitation to finding industrial uses for radioactive isotopes.
—Mark Hibbs, “Special Inspections: A Transatlantic Turf War for Post-Iraq Powers,” Nucleonics Week, 30 January 1992, pp. 14-16; Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 82.

11 December 1991
The Prime Ministers of North and South Korea make separate proposals for a nuclear-free Korea. The proposals are the first to be introduced at an official meeting and are more similar than any past proposals. Both call for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and a ban on manufacture, possession or deployment of nuclear weapons. There remain, however, some points of contention. The South Korean proposal calls for the destruction of nuclear reprocessing plants and uranium enrichment facilities in North Korea. The North Korean proposal demands a ban on US nuclear protection of South Korea and calls for the withdrawal of all US troops and a halt to the annual Team Spirit joint military exercises. Despite the differences, North Korean Prime Minister Yŏn Hyŏng Muk describes South Korea’s willingness to denuclearize as “a step forward.”
—C.W. Lim, “Rival Koreas Present Joint Surprise Proposals for Nuclear Free Korea,” Associated Press, 10 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 December 1991
North and South Korea sign an historic accord in which the two nations pledge non-aggression and officially recognize each other’s existence. The two nations remain divided on the nuclear issue, but both have stated as goals a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. Bilateral talks on nuclear issues are set for later in December.
—Paul Blustein, “Two Koreas Pledge to End Aggression,” Washington Post, 13 December 1991, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kelly Smith Tunney, “Rival Koreas Reach Historic Agreement on Rapprochement,” Associated Press, 12 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Reconciliation Accord Ends Inter-Korean Tension,” Japan Economic Newswire, 13 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Haekkwallyŏn Nambuksŏn’ŏn(an),” Hankook Ilbo, 12 December 1991, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

Mid-December 1991
North Korea informs visiting US Congressman Stephen Solarz that it is ready to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—“Reassure North Korea on Arms,” New York Times, 28 December 1991, p. 12.

18 December 1991
South Korean President Roh Tae Woo announces that South Korea is nuclear-free, effectively confirming the withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons.
—Shigemi Sato, “North Korea Snubs South Korea’s Nuclear-Free Declaration,” Agence France Presse, 20 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis,<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Pyongyang Skeptical Over S. Korea Non-Nuclear Claim,” Agence France Presse, 22 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis,<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kelley Smith Tunney, “North Announces Intention to Sign Nuclear Safeguards; Solarz Skeptical,” Associated Press, 23 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis,<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 December 1991
North Korean President Kim Il Sung announces that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as it is assured that US nuclear weapons have been removed from South Korea, and that inspections of North Korean facilities will be conducted simultaneously with those of US facilities in South Korea.
—Steven R. Weisman, “Leader of North Korea Denies Atom Arms Plan,” New York Times, 20 December 1991, p. A14.

20 December 1991
North Korea ignores South Korean President Roh Tae Woo’s announcement two days earlier that South Korea is free of nuclear weapons. A commentary in Rondong Sinmun, the newspaper of the ruling Workers Party, says, “If the United States truly wants peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Asia and the rest of the world, it should show this by practical deeds for denuclearization of the peninsula.”
—Shigemi Sato, “North Korea Snubs South Korea’s Nuclear-Free Declaration,” Agence France Presse, 20 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 December 1991
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea will sign the IAEA safeguards agreement as soon as the United States confirms it has removed all nuclear weapons form South Korea.
—Kelly Smith Tunney, “North Announces Intention to Sign Nuclear Safeguards,” Associated Press, 23 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Puk, Haeksŏ’myŏngsach’alsuyong Ch’ŏnmyŏng/Pug’oe’gyobu Sŏngmyŏng/Nam ‘Haekpujae’ Misŏ Hwaeg’in’gidae,” Donga Ilbo, 23 December 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

23 December 1991
South Korean President Roh Te Woo says he is opposed to the United States and North Korea holding direct talks over North Korea’s nuclear program.
—“Mibuk Chikchŏphyŏpsang Pandae/No Taet’ongryŏng,” Segye Ilbo, 24 December 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

26 December 1991
According to North Korean UN Ambassador Hŏ Jong, North Korean officials have begun negotiating with the IAEA on the nature and timing of inspections. Ho indicates that North Korea believes ratification of the IAEA safeguards agreement is inevitable. However, if the IAEA adopts more condemnatory resolutions, as it did in the September 1991 Board of Governors meeting, “this issue will be ruined.” Hŏ also states that while Pyongyang welcomes South Korean President Roh Tae Woo’s statement that South Korea was free of nuclear weapons, he says he cannot “100 percent believe this.”
—Michael Mazarr, North Korea And The Bomb: A Case Study In Nonproliferation, (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), p. 82; “N. Korea to Start Talks with IAEA,” Agence France Presse, 26 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mun Il, “Sach’al’amnyŏg’e Pulman/Chuyu’en Pukhan Taesa,” Kukmin Ilbo, 26 December 1991, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

26 December 1991
South Korean spokesman Lee Dong Bok says that during North-South Korean talks, North Korea promised to sign the IAEA safeguards agreement and permit international inspections of its nuclear facilities “at an early date.” South Korea demands that the North do so by 15 January 1992. North Korea is no longer demanding that the United States officially confirm the withdrawal of its nuclear weapons from South Korea.
—“North Korea Vows Atom Inspections,” New York Times, 27 December 1991, p. A3; Reuters, “2 Koreas Narrow Differences But Nuclear Issue is Unsettled,” Los Angeles Times, 27 December 1991, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 December 1991
North Korea’s chief delegate to the Joint Nuclear Control Commission talks with South Korea, Ch’oe U Chin, comments on the South’s demand that it sign the safeguards agreement by 15 January 1992, saying that the “imposition of a timetable on [North Korea] is an interference with [its] national integrity.”
—C.W. Lim, “North Korea Pledges to Sign Accords in Prelude to Nuclear Inspections,” Associated Press, 26 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; C.W. Lim, “North Korea Promises to Sign Nuclear Safeguards Agreements,” Associated Press, 26 December 1991, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

	Updated January 2004