Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

Early 1993
Russia withdraws six nuclear experts from North Korea.
—Joongang Ilbo (Seoul), 20 September 1993, p. 1, in "Russia Withdraws Six Nuclear Experts from DPRK," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, pp. 38; Joongang Ilbo (Seoul), 22 September 1993, p. 2, in "Russia Says DPRK 'Incapable' of Developing Nuclear Weapons," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, pp. 38-39; "Pukhanp'a'gyŏn Haekhakcha/Russia Ch'ŏlsujoch'i," Joongang Ilbo, 20 September 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "'Pukhan Myŏtnyŏnnae Haekkaebalmothae'/Russia Wŏnjaryŏkpu/Uri Taesa'gwan'e T'ongbo," Joongang Ilbo, 22 September 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr.

Early 1993
According to North Korean defector Lee Ch'ung Kuk, North Korea develops "equipment that automatically monitors nuclear explosions" (haekp'okpal chadong kwangch'ŭkki) using indigenous technology. The equipment reportedly measures an explosions sound, light, and heat.
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 39.

January 1993
North Korea responds to the IAEA's requests for "visits" of the two suspected nuclear waste sites. It says that "a visit by officials cannot be turned into an inspection," and furthermore, that inspections of non-nuclear military facilities "might jeopardize the supreme interests" of North Korea. —Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 276.

13 January 1993
According to David Kyd, the Information Director of the IAEA, North Korea will shut down its 5MW(e) reactor around the middle of 1993 to change the core. IAEA inspectors are expected to be there when the reactor is shut down. If they are given access to the natural uranium core of the reactor, it might be possible to determine whether any material has been removed. —Don Oberdorfer, "Gates Remains Suspicious of N. Korea; CIA Chief Sees 'Disturbing' Attempts at Deception on Nuclear Issue," Washington Post, 13 January 1993, p. A17, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 January 1993
The German weekly Focus reports that North Korea is helping Iran develop nuclear missiles and that Iran has two 40-kiloton nuclear warheads. The report also claims that a German firm supplied guidance equipment to Iran.
—South Korean News Agency [sic], 26 January 1993, in "German Weekly Says DPRK Helping Iran Develop Nuclear Weapons," BBC Summary of Broadcasts, 29 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 January 1993
During a meeting of the chairs of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC), South Korean Director-General of the Foreign Ministry's American Affairs Bureau Chŏng Tae Ik formally notifies North Korea that it will resume the Team Spirit joint military exercise in March. Chŏng claims that "the Team Spirit resumption is a clear indication of Washington's continued determination to deter North Korea's nuclear development." The two sides left the meeting without setting a date for the next JNCC session.
—South Korean News Agency [sic], 25 January 1993, in "South Notifies North of Resumption of "Team Spirit" Exercise," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nambukhaekhyŏpsang Kyŏllyŏl/'T'im' Hullyŏn Chaegae Puk'e T'ongbo/Ŏje Haekt'ongjegongdong'wi Chŏpch'ok," Chosun Ilbo, 26 January 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

26 January-6 February 1993
IAEA inspectors conduct the sixth round of nuclear inspections in North Korea. The purpose of the inspections is to clarify inconsistencies found in plutonium samples that were taken at an earlier date. One of the inconsistencies identified is that between "the composition and quantity of plutonium [North Korea] declared to the IAEA" and the IAEA's test results. The second discrepancy is between the isotopic composition of plutonium extracted by North Korean technicians and liquid waste samples. Prior to the inspections, North Korea said that the latter inconsistency occurred when "the solution from the basic experiment of plutonium extraction in 1975 was put together in the waste tank of the Radiochemistry Laboratory." North Korea also denies access to two undeclared sites, which are suspected nuclear waste facilities. North Korean officials argue that the sites were not included in the original list of sites subject to inspection. —"Report: North Korea Refused to Open Nuclear Waste Plant to Inspection," Associated Press, 31 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Vows 'Self-Defense' Against U.S. – South Korean Exercises," Associated Press, 1 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Letter and Memorandum from the UN Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the President of the UN Security Council" (United Nations Security Council Document),17 March 1993, pp. 1-10; "Pukhan, Haekp'yegijang Konggae Kŏbu/Yŏngbyŏn Tŭng Mishin'goshisŏl 2 Kot/IAEA Sach'aldan'e," Joongang Ilbo, 31 January 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

29 January 1993
Son Sŏng P'il, North Korea's ambassador to Russia, warns that the US and South Korean Team Spirit joint military exercise scheduled for March 1993 may force North Korea to close its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection. Son says that North Korea views the exercises as preparation for a potential nuclear war and that they are incompatible with the basic clauses of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Additionally, the situation does not allow North Korea "to normally fulfill its commitments" to IAEA inspections. —Vladimir Nadashkevich, "Kunadze Urges North Korea to Abide By Non-Proliferation Treaty," ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 1 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Refused IAEA Nuclear Check, S. Korean Paper," Japan Economic Newswire, 31 January 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Team Spirit Chaegaehamyŏn IAEA Haeksach'al Kŏbu/Churŏ Pukhandaesa," Donga Ilbo, 31 January 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

29 January-1 February 1993
North Korea gives assurances to visiting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Georgy Kunadze that it will not employ Russian missile and nuclear scientists and engineers. The North Korean decision follows threats by Kunadze to suspend diplomatic relations if demands not to employ Russian technicians were not met. According to reports, Russia gives the United States a detailed report about Kunadze's trip.
—Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Urged Not to Hire Russian Nuclear Scientists," Japan Economic Newswire, 17 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

February 1993
According to a "reliable western news source," Kim Il Sung secretly meets with China's leader Deng Xiao Ping in order to ensure China's support if North Korea withdraws from the NPT. According to the report, China promises maintain North Korea's interests while playing a mediating role between Pyongyang and the UN.
—"Report: North Korea Quit Nuclear Pact with China's OK," Associated Press, 27 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Kim Il Sung Tŭng So P'yŏng Pimilhoedam/Chinan 2 Wŏl Pangchung/Haengmunjegyŏnghyŏphwaktaedŭng Chungjŏmnon'ŭi," Taehan Maeil, 27 March 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "Kim Il Sung Chinandal Kŭkpi Pangjung/Tŭng So P'yŏng Gwa Hoedam," Kukmin Ilbo, 27 March 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>. February 1993
Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service publishes a report on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The report lists both North and South Korea as countries capable of producing nuclear weapons, but concludes that neither country possesses nuclear bombs at this time.
—Yun Kuk Han, "Namhan Haekshisŏl Pukhanboda Ap'sŏtta/Russia Taewoech'ŏppoguk 'Nambukhan Haek' Pogosŏ," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 2 November 1993, p. 8, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

2 February 1993
Western diplomatic sources announce that US intelligence suspects that the two undeclared sites in North Korea, which the IAEA visited in 1992, are key sites in North Korea's nuclear program. The sixth IAEA inspection team in North Korea requests access to the sites; the request is denied. According to one source, if the team returns with no new information on the sites, the United States will apply pressure to obtain the IAEA Board of Governors authorization for special inspections. The United States will take such a course of action because "no better rationale could be imagined [than for] a country suspected of clandestine non-peaceful (nuclear) activities [to deny] access to a non-declared site to the IAEA." —Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, "IAEA Inspected North Korean Sites U.S. Intelligence Now Says Are Key," Nucleonics Week, 4 February 1993, p. 18.

8 February 1993
North Korea publicly states that it might take "countermeasures of self-defense" if the United States and other countries press for inspections of certain facilities in North Korea. During the week of 1 February 1993, North Korea denies IAEA inspectors access to several of its facilities that are suspected to be part of its nuclear program. North Korea states that the sites are "non-nuclear." The denial of access marks a change in North Korea's policy towards the IAEA in which it formerly stated that IAEA inspectors could "travel anywhere in the country." —David E. Sanger, "In Reversal, North Korea Bars Nuclear Inspectors," New York Times, 9 February 1993, p. A13.

10 February 1993
IAEA Director General Hans Blix formally requests that North Korea open two undeclared sites for special inspections. In early February 1993, the IAEA's sixth inspection team was denied access to the sites. According to North Korea, the team was denied access because the United States and South Korea decided to resume Team Spirit military exercises. North Korea is told that it must respond to the request by 18 February 1993. If North Korea refuses the request, the IAEA will call an extraordinary session of the Board of Governors before the regularly scheduled meeting set for 21 February 1993. According to US intelligence, it is believed that one of the sites houses drums of reprocessed waste that was separated at a date later than what North Korea has told the IAEA. If true, this will mean that North Korea has not declared its entire stock of separated plutonium to the IAEA. —Mark Hibbs, "IAEA North Korean Mission Ends; Blix to Seek Special Inspection," Nucleonics Week, 11 February 1993, p.15; Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Special Inspection Effort Meeting Diplomatic Resistance," Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1993, pp. 16-17; South Korean News Agency [sic] (Seoul), 12 February 1993, in "IAEA Requests Special Inspection in North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 February 1993
Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns that North Korea "will take a self-defensive measure if the United States and the South Korean authorities impose any unreasonable measure on us as regards the 'nuclear problem' with a view to using the problem between us and the International Atomic Energy Agency for other military and political purposes." The report continues, "The problem of nuclear inspection must, by nature, be solved between us and the IAEA."
—"North Korea Warns It Will Take 'Self-Defensive Measure,'" Associated Press, 12 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Haekshisŏl Kamch'un Kŏt Ŏpta'/Pukhan, Tŭkpyŏlsacha'l Panbal," Joongang Ilbo, 13 February 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

16 February 1993
The IAEA announces that the analysis of plutonium samples from North Korea has revealed discrepancies and that the separation had, in fact, taken place later than 1990. Western intelligence believes that North Korea separated additional amounts of plutonium in the late 1960s using Soviet expertise. Western intelligence also believes that the hot-cell separation of plutonium took place at a different location than was declared by North Korea. According to diplomatic sources in New York, IAEA Director General Hans Blix is facing opposition from China and Russia on conducting a special inspection in North Korea. However, the remaining three members of the Security Council (the United States, United Kingdom, and France) strongly support Blix's proposal. The special inspection will be conducted in an attempt to resolve the plutonium separation issue. After hearing objections and concerns from Brazil and India, Blix decides to "pursue persuasion" with North Korea and therefore, delay special inspections. —Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Special Inspection Effort Meeting Diplomatic Resistance," Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1993, pp. 16-17.

20-21 February 1993
IAEA officials use isotopic analysis of a small batch of high-level waste provided by North Korea to determine that North Korea reprocessed spent fuel from its 5MW(e) reactor in 1989, 1990 and 1991. Officials find three different levels of americium-241 in a plutonium sample, which indicates that the material had been separated in each of the three aforementioned years. North Korea previously said that it separated plutonium only once in 1990. However, following the IAEA's test results, North Korea admits that it had also reprocessed "a small quantity" of plutonium in 1975. During IAEA meetings, North Korea reportedly claims that the discrepancies between its report and the IAEA's findings occurred due to contamination by material that was reprocessed in 1975. However, experts do not believe this to be an adequate explanation for the discrepancy.
—Mark Hibbs, "Isotopics Show Three North Korean Reprocessing Campaigns Since 1975," Nuclear Fuel, 1 March 1993, pp. 8-9.

21 February 1993
North Korean Minister of Atomic Energy Ch'oe Hak Kŭn informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea will not allow special inspections of the two sites suspected of storing nuclear waste. —Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Boaard Will Not Take North Korea Dispute to Security Council," Nucleonics Week, 25 February 1993, pp. 16-17.

22 February 1993
Nearly one dozen US intelligence satellite photographs of North Korean installations and deception attempts at the facilities in Yŏngbyŏn-kun are presented to a closed session of the IAEA Board of Governors. The senior North Korean representative at the meeting, Yun Ho Jin, says that the photographs are fake. —Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 277.

22 February 1993
Lee Ch'ŏl, North Korea's permanent representative to the United Nations, says that North Korea has the right to "tear up" the IAEA safeguards agreement if inspectors continue to demand access to the two disputed sites in North Korea. —Reuters, "N Korea Atomic Accord in Peril," The Independent (London), 23 February 1993, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis%20.com>.

22-29 February 1993
During the IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the North Korean representatives are shown US satellite imagery and chemical evidence indicating that North Korea had been producing plutonium from nuclear waste for a minimum of three years beginning in 1989. The imagery depicts a Soviet-style nuclear waste dump for both liquid and solid waste. The chemical evidence shows impurities in the plutonium samples, which suggests that the plutonium had been produced in three separate amounts over three years. Diplomatic officials believe that North Korea now has enough plutonium to build at least one nuclear weapon.
—David E. Sanger, "West Knew of North Korea Nuclear Development," New York Times, 13 March 1993, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 February 1993
The IAEA passes a resolution stating that North Korea has until 25 March to grant inspectors access to two sites suspected of being part of its nuclear weapons program. The IAEA says that access to the sites is "essential and urgent." As a concession to Chinese requests, the Board provides a one-month grace period for North Korea's compliance on the inspection. The Board makes it clear that if North Korea does not act, it will take the issue to the UN Security Council for international sanctions or other actions. —Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 278; Jeffrey Smith, "North Korea Gets More Time to Accept Nuclear Inspections," Washington Post, 26 February 1993, p. A29, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Rejects Nuclear Inspections," United Press International, 1 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Withdraws from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; Military Exercises, Inspections Cited," Facts on File World News Digest, 18 March 1993, p. 183, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1994, Vol. 50, No. 5, <http://www.thebulletin.org>.

25 February 1993
In testimony before the US Congress, newly appointed CIA Director James Woosley states that North Korea's plutonium production capability is the United States' "most grave current concern." He claims that there is a "real possibility that North Korea has manufactured enough fissile material for at least one nuclear weapon."
—Ruth Sinai, "CIA Director Says North Korea May Have Made a Nuclear Weapon," Associated Press, 24 February 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jeffrey Smith, "North Korea Gets More Time to Accept Nuclear Inspections," Washington Post, 26 February 1993, p. A29, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
26 February 1993
IAEA Director General Hans Blix sends a telex to the North Korean Foreign Ministry requesting that IAEA inspectors be permitted to travel to Yŏngbyŏn-kun on 16 March 1993 to examine the two suspected nuclear waste sites. Blix also notifies the UN Security Council of the telex. —Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 279.

1 March 1993
North Korean broadcast media condemn the IAEA demand that it open two suspected nuclear facilities to international inspections as a "wanton infringement" of its sovereignty. Pyongyang also claims that the IAEA is being manipulated by the United States.
—"North Korea Rejects Nuclear Inspections," United Press International, 1 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
8 March 1993
In a message to IAEA headquarters in Vienna, North Korea refuses once again to accept special inspections of its suspected sites, ostensibly because of the Team Spirit military exercise and the "state of semi-war" in the country. IAEA Director General Hans Blix rejects North Korea's "excuses" and repeats the inspection demand. —Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 279.

10 March 1993
North Korea sends a message to the IAEA that it is unable to accept special nuclear inspections because of the Team Spirit joint military exercise conducted by the United States and South Korea.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 11 March 1993, "Refuses IAEA Inspections," in FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, p. 17.
12 March 1993
North Korea announces it is withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). It cites the treaty's escape clause on defending supreme national interests. North Korea's two reasons for withdrawing are: (1) the Team Spirit "nuclear war rehearsal" military exercises, and (2) the IAEA demand for special inspection of two suspect sites. North Korea attaches a statement to its withdrawal notice that is sent to the three NPT depository states and the 154 NPT member states, in which it accuses the IAEA of violating its sovereignty and interfering in its internal affairs, attempting to stifle its socialism, and of being a "lackey" of the United States. According to North Korea, the United States influenced officials of the IAEA Secretariat and member states at the IAEA Board of Governors meeting on 25 February 1993 to adopt a resolution requiring North Korea to open military sites to inspection that are not nuclear-related. —Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 280; Gamini Seneviratne, "IAEA Struggling to Stand Firm and Find Face-Saver for North Korea," Nucleonics Week, 18 March 1993, p. 10; "Letter from Kim Yong-nam, DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs," 12 March 1993; David E. Sanger, "West Knew of North Korea Nuclear Development," New York Times, 13 March 1993, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 March 1993
Following the 7th session of the 9th Central People's Committee in Pyongyang, North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea says the decision is made because of IAEA efforts to conduct a special inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities, and because of the resumption of the joint Team Spirit military exercise conducted by the United States and South Korea. The NPT stipulates that a nation's withdrawal becomes effective three months after the intention to withdraw is announced.
—"International News Briefs," IAEA Bulletin, February 1993, pp. 44-45; "North Korea More Isolationist," The Daily Yomiuri, 13 March 1993, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; Korean Central Broadcasting Network (Pyongyang), 12 March 1993, in "CPC Decision Reported," FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, pp. 17-18; Korean Central Broadcasting Network (Pyongyang), 12 March 1993, in "Statement Notes Withdrawal," FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, pp. 18-19; Korean Central News Agency, 12 March 1993, in "KCNA Reports Statement," FBIS-EAS-93-047, pp. 19-20; Korean Central News Agency, 12 March 1993, in "News Conference on Withdrawal," FBIS-EAS-93-047, 12 March 1993, pp. 20-22.

Mid March 1993
According to a US House Republican research committee, North Korea possesses six nuclear weapons that are in "operational status."
—Task Force on Terrorism & Unconventional Warfare, House Republican Research Committee, "Iran, North Korea, and the Threat of the New Korean War, 7 February 1994, p. 10.

17 March 1993
The North Korean Foreign Ministry sends the president of the UN Security Council a letter regarding IAEA inspections. The letter states that North Korea has made "sincere efforts" to implement the IAEA safeguards agreement by providing "the IAEA with lists of those nuclear facilities exempt from the safeguards and of scientific research institutes." In 1992, North Korea invited the IAEA to inspect both safeguarded nuclear facilities, "facilities exempt from the safeguards as well as other non-nuclear-related facilities." When requested, North Korea compiled samples of highly radioactive liquid waste at the radiochemical laboratory and the measurements of the damaged fuel at the experimental nuclear power station.
With regard to the recent analysis of plutonium samples, the IAEA secretariat has stated that "inconsistencies in principle" exist between its measurements and those included in North Korea's initial report. According to North Korea, discrepancies exist because of "the IAEA's own disregard of our conditions for the operation of facilities and the characteristic features of our nuclear activities and also from the artificial fabrication by some officials of the IAEA secretariat of the result of the inspection." North Korea says that the IAEA should take into consideration the fact that the nuclear facilities "were still at the experimental stage, [and] not in regular operation."

The letter also comments on the official IAEA-North Korean talks conducted before the fourth inspection from 2-14 November 1992. North Korea claims that during the meeting, the IAEA "attempted to 'threaten' us, saying that 'more nuclear material should be declared,' that this would be 'the last chance to modify the initial report' and that 'a tragic consequence would follow if the chances were passed up'." During the IAEA inspections in November 1992, North Korea offered the team scientific and technological explanations of how the facilities operated. It also offered the team "detailed consultations with the operators."

The sixth IAEA inspection team, which was in North Korea from 26 January-6 February 1993, has said that "two inconsistencies in principle" were found in plutonium samples that required "urgent clarification." According to the IAEA secretariat, the first discrepancy was that "the composition and quantity of plutonium [North Korea] declared to the IAEA" did not correspond to the IAEA results. The second discrepancy was that the isotopic composition of plutonium extracted by the radiochemical laboratory that did not correspond to the liquid waste. North Korea says that the inconsistency occurred when "the solution from the basic experiment of plutonium extraction in 1975 was put together in the waste tank of the radiochemical laboratory."

With regard to the two undeclared facilities, North Korea says that they are not nuclear-related. The IAEA only wants to inspect the site in order "to confirm the espionage information provided by a third country." Despite the fact that the facilities were not nuclear-related, North Korea allowed inspections of the site since it was the first request IAEA Director General Hans Blix had made to North Korea. According to North Korea, the two sites are "a shop producing daily necessities" and "a military installation." After the IAEA conducted the inspection, it declared that the sites were not nuclear-related. Blix has requested additional inspections of the sites. North Korea, however, will not allow Blix to return to the sites for "formal" or "informal" visits. When North Korea requested further clarification of the legal grounds under which the IAEA may use information from a third country, the IAEA avoided the question by saying that "it takes too much time to explain it on a legal basis." North Korea objects and says that according to a "relevant article...the IAEA is not legally entitled to use 'intelligence information' from a third country in the implementation of the safeguards agreement. The IAEA is not the police and such an attempt by the IAEA is a breach of its own statue, the safeguards agreement, the spirit of the December 1991 meeting and the February 1992 resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors, etc." According to North Korea, a member of the IAEA mission admitted that, "the use of espionage information from a third country is not stipulated explicitly in the basic documents of the IAEA."
—"March Letter and Memorandum from the UN Permanent Representative of the DPRK to the President of the UN Security Council" (United Nations Security Council Document), 17 March 1993, pp. 1-10.

17 March 1993
The IAEA Board of Governors meets to discuss North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, as well as the line of action it should now take. —Gamini Seneviratne, "IAEA Struggling to Stand Firm and Find Face-Saver for North Korea," Nucleonics Week, 18 March 1993, p. 10.

18 March 1993
The IAEA Board of Governors meets to review a resolution adopted at the 25 February 1993 meeting regarding IAEA inspections in North Korea. The resolution requests that North Korea grant the IAEA access to and information on two additional undeclared sites and that it implement the May 1992 IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/403). Based on the fact that North Korea has announced it will withdraw from the NPT "at a time when the IAEA is seeking specific clarifications regarding the correctness and completeness of the initial report on nuclear material submitted by [North Korea]," the Board of Governors approves the Secretariat's implementation of the resolution per internal document GOV/INF/683. The Board of Governors reaffirms and supports IAEA Director General Hans Blix and the Secretariat's attempt to persuade North Korea to implement the Safeguards Agreement. The Board also confirms that under document INFCIRC/403, the safeguards agreement implemented with North Korea "remains in force." The IAEA Board of Governors extends the deadline for North Korea to open two suspected nuclear waste sites to international inspections to 31 March. —IAEA Press Release (PR 93/6), 18 March 1993; "North Korean Ambassador Says IAEA Extension Irrelevant," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 March 1993
Hŏ Jong, North Korean Ambassador to the UN, dismisses as irrelevant the IAEA's extension of the deadline to open two suspected nuclear waste sites to international inspections. According to Hŏ, the extension to 31 March "does not matter" and North Korea will not allow the sites to be inspected "unless the continued and increases nuclear threat of the United States is removed and the impartiality of the IAEA is restored."
—"North Korean Ambassador Says IAEA Extension Irrelevant," Japan Economic Newswire, 19 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 March 1993
Tadashi Ikeda, Director-General of the Japanese Foreign Ministry's Asian Affairs Bureau, announces that Japan, the United States, and South Korea are prepared to take North Korea's refusal of IAEA inspections to the UN Security Council. —"N. Korea Nuke Issue may Be Brought to UNSC," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 23 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 March 1993
Newly appointed South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sŏng Ju leaves for talks with UN and US officials about North Korea's announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). —"S. Korean Foreign Minister Leaves for U.S., Japan," Xinhua News Agency, 23 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 March 1993
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen announces that China opposes any international sanctions placed on North Korea for withdrawing form the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He says that the treaty does not call for punitive measures to "punish those who stay away or pull out." According to Qian, China also opposes raising the issue before the UN Security Council.
—Barry Schweid, "Christopher Threatens Sanctions Against North Korea," Associated Press, 25 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 March 1993
South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sŏng Ju meets with the Chinese representative to the UN Chen Jian in order to persuade China to support dealing with North Korea's nuclear issue in the UN. Representative Jian says that China shares South Korea's goal of a nuclear free Korean Peninsula, but it feels that North Korea's nuclear issue should be resolved first through the IAEA.
—KBS Radio (Seoul), 25 March 1993, in "South Korea Hopes China Will Persuade North Korea Not to Withdraw from NPT," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 27 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 March 1993
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher announces that the United States is considering punitive sanctions against North Korea for withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Christopher tells a House appropriations subcommittee that the sanctions might include the denial of oil, gas, and even food. According to Christopher, "There seems to be a number of ways in which pressure can be put on them. Perhaps we won't have to get to that point because they'll realize earlier on that they made a mistake in withdrawing from this convention." Christopher also discusses the option of sanctions with top officials from South Korea and Japan.
—Barry Schweid, "Christopher Threatens Sanctions Against North Korea," Associated Press, 25 March 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 March 1993
The Tokyo Shimbun reports that North Korea begins dialogue with South Korea and the United States over its nuclear program. According to the report, the secret contacts begin during a European trip by Korean Workers' Party Secretary Kim Yong Sun. The purpose of the trip is to make contact with the United States and South Korea.
—KBS Radio (Seoul), 11 April 1993, in "Japanese Paper: North Korea in Secret Contact with ROK and USA on Nuclear Issue," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late March 1993
North Korea sends a letter to the UN announcing that it will not attend the UN Disarmament Conference to be held in Kyoto starting on 13 April. This will mark the first time North Korea has been absent form the conference since it began in 1990. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the topics to be discussed at the conference.
—"N. Korea Boycotts Conference," The Daily Yomiuri, 10 April 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, 9 April 1993, in "North Korea Reportedly Not Sending Representatives to Disarmament Conference," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 March 1993
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement that says, "We will be compelled to take a powerful self-defensive measure" if the United States and other nations request that the UN Security Council impose punitive sanctions on North Korea.
—Reuters, "North Korea Defies Order to Allow Nuclear Inspection," Toronto Star, 30 March 1993, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 March 1993
North Korea refuses to allow inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. —David A. Sanger, "Atomic Energy Agency Asks U.N. To Move Against North Koreans," New York Times, 2 April 1993, p. A2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, "North Korea Bends a Little on Nuclear Inspections Today Is Deadline for Disputed Sites," The Gazette (Montreal), 1 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 March-1 April 1993
The IAEA Board of Governors convenes a special meeting to discuss developments in North Korea. The Board concludes that North Korea is not complying with the terms of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and, and in accordance with Article 19 of the agreement, approves a resolution to call for the UN Security Council to intervene. The resolution claims that "the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material [to] nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." Only China and Libya vote against the resolution. The United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom also issue individual statements calling on North Korea comply with its safeguards agreement and reverse its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). —"Inspection Refusal goes to UN Security Council," Nuclear News Vol. 36 No. 7, 1 May 1993, pp. 54-55; David A. Sanger, "Atomic Energy Agency Asks U.N. To Move Against North Koreans," New York Times, 2 April 1993, p. A2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 April 1993
According to Kim Kwang Sŏp, North Korea's envoy in Vienna, the IAEA resolution to refer the North Korean nuclear issue to the UN Security Council is an "unreasonable step," and will not resolve the problem but only lead to more confrontation. In order to deal with the development, according to Kim, North Korea will take necessary self-defense measures for its own security. —South Korean News Agency (Seoul), 1 April 1993, in "North And South Korean Officials React to IAEA Vote," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, "North Korea Bends a Little on Nuclear Inspections Today Is Deadline for Disputed Sites," The Gazette (Montreal), 1 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 April 1993
During a defense industry conference in Seoul, Shin Sŏng T'aek, a researcher at the Korean Institute for Defense Analyses, says that North Korea is developing a nuclear warhead for its ballistic missiles. Shin says that North Korea will not conduct a full-scale nuclear test, but that North Korea has already conducted secret nuclear-related tests underground.
—"'Puk, Haekt'an Missile Changch'ak Chikchŏn'/Kukpangyŏn Shin Sŏng T'aek Paksa," Segye Ilbo, 3 April 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

4 April 1993
The North Korean Foreign Ministry accuses the United States and the IAEA of applying double standards. A foreign ministry spokesman claims that the IAEA had carried out 115 inspections in South Africa without reporting any suspicions, but after only six inspections North Korea is being reported to the UN Security Council.
—"Inspection Refusal goes to UN Security Council," Nuclear News Vol. 36 No. 7, 1 May 1993, pp. 54-55.

6 April 1993
North Korea's Foreign Ministry accuses some officials of the IAEA secretariat and some member nations of deliberately ignoring North Korea's reasonable proposal and patient efforts to settle the nuclear issues. Even after declaring its intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the North Korea points out that it was prepared to let the IAEA monitor its nuclear installations and prevent any diversion of nuclear materials for bomb-making.
—Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 59.

6 April 1993
IAEA Director-General Hans Blix briefs the UN Security Council on the IAEA's inability to verify North Korea's nuclear production based on the denial of access to two suspected nuclear waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—"North Korea: Council Expresses Concern at Nuclear Situation," Inter Press Service, 8 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 April 1993
The UN Security Council expresses concern over North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Stopping short of sanctions in light of China's threat to veto any punitive measures against North Korea, Security Council President Jamsheed Marker of Pakistan calls on the IAEA to resume negotiations with North Korea.
—"North Korea: Council Expresses Concern at Nuclear Situation," Inter Press Service, 8 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Opposes Submitting Nuclear Issue to Security Council," Xinhua News Agency, 10 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 April 1993
Kim Jong Il is named chairman of North Korea's National Defense Commission. As the head of the commission, Kim will now oversee North Korea's military affairs.
—K.P. Hong, "North Korean Heir Bolsters Power with New Defense Post," Associated Press, 9 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 April 1993
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman expresses Pyongyang's opposition to the IAEA's having brought the issue of North Korean compliance before the UN Security Council. The spokesman claims that the issue is one to be dealt with through US-North Korean bilateral talks.
—"DPRK Opposes Submitting Nuclear Issue to Security Council," Xinhua News Agency, 10 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 April 1993
Speaking at an annual meeting of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix reiterates the call on North Korea to open the two suspected nuclear waste sites to international inspections. However, taking a softer stance than he has in the past, Blix claims that if North Korea is refusing inspections for national security reasons, the IAEA will consider excluding military facilities from inspections.
—"IAEA's Blix Takes Softer Stance on N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 14 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Wants To Resume Agreed Inspections in N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Chief Says North Needs To Open to Inspections To Gain Trust," Associated Press, 14 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis.lexis.com>.

15 April 1993
A Japanese Foreign Ministry official announces that North Korea has rejected Japan's offer for bilateral talks on North Korea's nuclear program and its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
—"N. Korea Refuses Japan's Offer for Talks on Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 15 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Rejects Bilateral Talks," Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 April 1993, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 April 1993
A South Korean government official announces that South Korea and the United States have agreed to consider high-level US-North Korean talks in order to persuade Pyongyang not to withdraw form the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 17 April 1993, in "Yonhap: USA Agrees to High Level Contacts with DPRK," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 April 1993
South Korea announces that it will not resume dialogue or economic cooperation with North Korea until the suspicions of its nuclear activity are resolved.
—"Seoul Rules Out Dialogue, Economic Cooperation with DPRK," 20 April 1993, Xinhua News Agency, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1993
General Robert RisCassi, Commander US Forces Korea, tells the US Senate Armed Services Committee that North Korea is unstable politically and economically, and that North Korea could launch an invasion of South Korea. RisCassi says that North Korea considers its nuclear weapons program as the key to state survival, and that North Korea appears to be selling missiles, missile technology and chemical and biological weapons to countries in the Middle East for oil and hard currency.
—Douglass Jehl, "U.S. Agrees to Discuss Arms Directly With North Korea," New York Times, 23 April 1993, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kyodo News Service, "U.S. Commander in S. Korea Sees Threat from N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Kyŏng Hyŏng, "'Pukhan'gunbu'nŭn Kim Jong Il Mitchi Anhnŭnda'/RisCassi Saryŏnggwan Mi Sangwŏn Chŭng'ŏnyoji," Taehan Maeil, 23 April 1993, p. 6, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

22 April 1993
The IAEA acquiesces to limited inspections of the North Korean nuclear installations.
—Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 62.

22 April 1993
In a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in Bangkok, South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sŏng Ju says that Seoul would drop its long-standing opposition to Washington-Pyongyang talks if China, in return, agrees not to veto a UN Security Council resolution calling on North Korea to comply with international nuclear inspections and remain a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
—Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), p. 283

22 April 1993
US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff announces that the United States and North Korea will soon begin high-level talks to discuss Pyongyang's nuclear activities and decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Tarnoff announces that he will represent Washington at the talks, but he does not indicate the date and location at which the talks are to be held.
—"U.S., DPRK to Hold High-Level Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 22 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 April 1993
In a telephone interview with South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, an anonymous North Korean official at the North Korean Embassy in Cairo says that North Korea has already decided to cancel its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The South Korean media also report that a diplomatic source in Hong Kong has recently met North Korean officials in China who have also made this statement.
—"North Korea Denies Report of Plans to Rejoin Nuclear Pact," Associated Press, 23 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Report: North Korea Rescinds Decision to Withdraw from Nuke Treaty," Associated Press, 22 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pyongyang Return to Atom Pact Reported," Los Angeles Times, 23 April 1993, p. A14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Puk, Haekkŭmjoyak Pokkwi Kyŏlchŏng'/K'airojujae Konggwan'wŏn Hwag'in," Taehan Maeil, 23 April 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

22 April 1993
North Korean Ambassador to the UN Pak Kil Yŏn denies reports that North Korea has decided to return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Pak says, "There is no change in [North Korea's] position."
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 April 1993, in "North Korean UN Ambassador Denies Reports of Return to Nuclear Treaty," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 24 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Su Chong, "Puk, T'alt'oech'ŏlhoe Puin," Hankook Ilbo, 24 April 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

23 April 1993
Kono Yohei, a "top Japanese government spokesman," says Japan does not see any evidence that North Korea is preparing a military attack against South Korea. The statement is in response to General Robert RisCassi's testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 21 April 1993.
—Kyodo News Service, "Japan Sees No Sign N. Korea Preparing to Invade South," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 April 1993
Vice Marshall Ch'oe Kwang, chief of the general staff of the Korean People's Army, claims that North Korea will take a "countermeasure for self-defense" if the UN imposes sanctions for its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
—"N. Korea Military Chief Warns Against U.N. sanctions," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 April 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 April 1993
The five permanent members of the UN Security Council hold informal consultations to discuss drafting a resolution to call on North Korea to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities and reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
—Debra Lau, "UNSC Takes up North Korea," Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 April 1993, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 April 1993
The IAEA announces that North Korea has expressed its intention to allow IAEA inspectors to return, but the exact date of the visit has not been decided. An IAEA source claims that the purpose of the visit will be limited to checking "the cameras and other inspection equipment" installed at declared nuclear facilities.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 30 April 1993, in "North Korea Reportedly Expresses Intent To Allow IAEA Experts To Visit," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

May 1993
According to North Korean defector Lee Ch'ung Kuk, North Korea begins construction of "the Nuclear Watch Guard Post" at Solbong in Man'gyongdae-kuyŏk, Pyongyang. "The Nuclear Watch Guard Post" is reportedly completed in November.
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38.

May 1993
Negotiations between North Korea and Iran over the sale of up to 150 Nodong missiles reach "an advanced stage" before the flight-tests of the Nodong on 29-30 May. However, a DIA official claims the sale is scrapped as part of a secret side agreement when the United States and North Korea sign the Agreed Framework in October 1994.
—"Iranian Missile Deal with N Korea Falters," Flight International, 23 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 May 1993
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman claims that Pyongyang will not accept any resolution drafted by the UN Security Council calling on North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw form the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to the spokesman, any such resolution would be an intolerable infringement upon North Korea's sovereignty.
—"DPRK Urges U.N. Not to Pass Draft Resolution Against It," Xinhua News Agency, 1 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 May 1993
North Korea accepts the proposed visit of IAEA inspection team comprising of two inspectors and one technician, to carry out maintenance work on the safeguard equipment installed at the North Korean nuclear facilities. North Korean Minister of Atomic Energy Ch'oe Hak Kŭn said that refueling of the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor would not take place soon because refueling was still in "the stage of technical and practical preparation."
—David Albright, Kevin O'Neil, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2000), p. 271.

2 May 1993
North Korea informs the United Nations that it will participate in the NPT Preparatory Committee scheduled to begin on 10 May.
—KBS Television (Seoul), 2 May 1993, in "North Korea Reportedly to Attend 10th May Nuclear Treaty Meeting," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 May 1993
North Korean Information Minister Kim Ki Yong announces that North Korea will rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if the following conditions are met: (1) the IAEA must remain neutral; (2) the IAEA must give assurances that military facilities will remain closed to foreign inspections; (3) the United States must guarantee that it will not use nuclear weapons against North Korea; and (4) the United States must withdraw all nuclear weapons and facilities from South Korea.
—Kyodo News Service (Tokyo), 3 May 1993, in "North Korean Minister Sets Out Conditions for Rejoining Nuclear Treaty," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
Early May 1993
About one month before the 12 June deadline for North Korea's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) withdrawal to become effective, a North Korean diplomat at Pyongyang's UN Mission in New York telephones Kenneth Quinnones, the US State Department's country officer for North Korea, and asks for a US-North Korea meeting. On further consideration, the State Department takes the North Korean initiative as a hopeful sign of eagerness to avoid a confrontation over the nuclear issue. The administration later decides to move ahead with talks. —Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 283-284.

5 May 1993
United States and North Korean emissaries meet in Beijing to lay the groundwork for high-level bilateral talks dealing with North Korea's decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
—Reuters, "U.S. And N. Korean Envoys Meet over Nuclear Issue," Los Angeles Times, 6 May 1993, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 May 1993
State Department Spokesman Joe Snyder says, "The United States is willing to meet with North Korea to help resolve the current situation involving actions North Korea has taken in the nuclear area," but he refuses to comment on the details of the meeting.
—Reuters, "U.S. And N. Korean Envoys Meet over Nuclear Issue," Los Angeles Times, 6 May 1993, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 May 1993
North Korea strongly denounces the proposed UN resolution that urges North Korea to stay within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). North Korea threatens unspecified additional measures if the UN passes the resolution and the IAEA identifies a violation by North Korea.
—"North Korea has Eased Slightly, But Not Yielded," Nuclear News, Vol. 36 No. 8, June 1993, p. 23.

7 May 1993
France, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom present a resolution to the UN Security Council calling on North Korea "to honor its nonproliferation obligations under the treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement with IAEA." Brazil and Pakistan, both nonparties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), express concern over the language and propose amending the resolution. China has opposed any consideration of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in the Security Council, but according to diplomatic sources, the backers of the resolution had gained Beijing's assurance that it would abstain from the vote and not veto the resolution. Due to lack of support for the document as it is, the Security Council decides to defer action on the resolution.
—"Security Council Defers Demand That North Korea Remain in Nuclear Treaty," Agence France Presse, 8 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 May 1993
North Korea approves a visit by three IAEA officials.
—"IAEA Wa Sach'alchaegae Non'ŭi/Puk Taep'yodan Kot P'a'gyŏn/Hŏ Jong Pukhanbudaesa," Kukmin Ilbo, 14 May 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

10-14 May 1993
An IAEA ad hoc inspection team visits North Korea to perform technical work related to maintenance and replacement of the safeguards equipment installed at North Korean nuclear facilities. When questioned about when fuel rods would be removed from the 5MW(e) reactor, North Korean officials claim that they cannot determine the specific date due to "technical problems." Samples from the fuel rods are necessary to determine how many times spent fuel has been removed from the reactor core for possible plutonium reprocessing.
—David Albright, Kevin O'Neil, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Science and International Security Press, 2000), p. 271; Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 20 May 1993, in "North Korea Reportedly Refusing to Change Reactor Fuel Rods," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 May 1993
The UN Security Council passes a resolution calling on North Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The resolution passes by a vote of 13 to 0, with China and Pakistan abstaining. The resolution urges North Korea to "honor its nonproliferation obligations under the treaty and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA as specified by the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of February 12, 1993," which calls on North Korea to accept special inspections at two suspected nuclear waste sites not included in Pyongyang's initial list of declared facilities. While the resolution stops short of imposing sanctions on North Korea, it states that the Security Council will consider further action if necessary.
—"U.N. Urges Pyongyang to Accept Nuclear Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>;"Disarmament: U.N. Urges North Korea to Revise Withdrawal Decision," Inter Press Service, 11 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.N. Asks North Korea to Reverse Nuclear Proliferation Decision," Agence France Presse, 11 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 May 1993
While visiting South Korea, US Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry says that the number of US troops stationed in South Korea will remain the same and the United States will not consider reductions until North Korea rejoins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and adopts more peaceful policies.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 May 1993, in "US Deputy Defence Secretary Discusses DPRK Nuclear Issue in South Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 May 1993
North Korea's Foreign Ministry issues a statement condemning the UN Security Council resolution calling on North Korea to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to the statement, if the Security Council "puts unjust pressure on us in the form of sanctions and so forth, we can only regard this as a declaration of war." North Korea insists that the issue can only be resolved through bilateral talks with the United States.
—Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 12 May 1993, in "North Korea Denounces UN Resolution," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>;

13 May 1993
In a telephone interview with South Korea's Yonhap News Agency, Hŏ Jong, North Korea's deputy ambassador to the UN, says North Korea and the IAEA will soon discuss the resumption of North Korea's nuclear facilities.
—"Pyongyang Signals Readiness to Negotiate with IAEA," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Wa Sach'alchaegae Non'ŭi/Puk Taep'yodan Kot P'a'gyŏn/Hŏ Jong Pukhanbudaesa," Kukmin Ilbo, 14 May 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>;

13 May 1993
Speaking before the NPT Preparatory Committee, North Korean Ambassador to the UN Pak Kil Yŏn claims that the United States has been using the IAEA to spy on North Korean military facilities. He also states that any international sanctions will be met with "effective self-defense measures."
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 14 May 1993, in " North Korean Envoy Addresses Nuclear Treaty Preparatory Committee," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 May 1993
South Korea's top intelligence agency, the Agency for National Security Planning, submits a report to the National Assembly's National Defense Committee in which the agency claims North Korea could possess two or three nuclear bombs by 1994 or 1995 unless the international community blocks its nuclear activities.
—"N. Korea May Have Nukes by 1994, Intelligence Agency Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 May 1993
US State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher announces that the United States and North Korea will hold high-level meetings beginning 2 June in an attempt to persuade Pyongyang to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US and North Korean delegation will be headed respectively by Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs Robert Gallucci and First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok Chu. Pyongyang announced on 12 March that it will withdraw from the NPT after the three-month waiting period required by the treaty.
—Sid Balman Jr., "U.S., North Korea to Discuss Nuclear Weapons Treaty Enforcement," United Press International, 25 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea to Hold High-Level Meeting," Xinhua News Agency, 25 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 May 1993
According to a senior State Department official, the United States has not ruled out the use of sanctions against North Korea. Although the United States has agreed to hold high-level talks with North Korea, the official says that there will be "absolutely no discussion" about improving relations "until the North Koreans comply fully with the demands with regard to the NPT, the inspection regime of the IAEA, and the North-South denuclearization agreement."
—"U.S. Says Sanctinos Still Possible Against N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 May 1993
Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Robert Gallucci says that in the upcoming high-level talks with North Korea, the United States might be willing to offer concessions if Pyongyang rejoins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and allows IAEA inspectors to return. Without mentioning details, Gallucci says, "What we're prepared to do is to address concerns that we regard as legitimate security concerns that they have raised to date," but, Gallucci continues, "There is nothing on the table that would affect the security of South Korea."
—Ruth Sinai, "U.S. Hints at Concessions of North Korea Opens Nuclear Facilities," Associated Press, 26 May 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Douglas Jehl, "U.S. May Bargain with Korea on Atom Issue," New York Times, 27 May 1993, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 June 1993
After three lower-level exchanges to set up the US-North Korea talks on the nuclear issue, Robert L. Gallcci, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs, and North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sŏk Chu meet at the UN headquarters in New York on 2 June 1993. The meeting remains inconclusive, and according to the State Department, the two sides make "no significant progress." However, Kang describes the talks as "sincere" and the two sides agree to meet again on 4 June 1993.
—Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 284-285; "U.S., North Korea Meet on Nuclear Issue," United Press International, 2 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "No Progress Made in Discussions between U.S., DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 3 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 June 1993
The United States and North Korea meet at the US mission to the UN for the second meeting of high-level talks dealing with North Korea's nuclear program and decision to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The meeting ends without any agreement, but the head of the North Korean delegation Kang Sŏk Chu says that "the talks haven't failed yet," and he expects the next round of talks before 12 June, the date at which North Korea's announces withdrawal from the NPT becomes effective.
—Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 284-285; "U.S. DPRK Adjourn Talks on Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 4 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Louis Meixler, "U.S., North Korea Fail to Break Nuclear Deadlock," Associated Press, 4 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>

7 June 1993
US officials led by Kenneth Quinnones, the North Korea country officer in the State Department, resume unofficial dialogue with North Korean officials in a New York coffee shop on 7 June 1993.
—Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 285-286.

7 June 1993
US State Department Spokesman Mike McCurry announces that the United States and North Korea will resume high-level talks on 10 June.
—"U.S., DPRK to Hold Another Round of Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 7 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. and North Korea to Resume Nuclear Talks," Associated Press, 7 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1993
The United States and North Korea resume high-level talks after the held on 2 and 4 June failed to produce an agreement. According to Kang Sŏk Chu, head of the North Korean delegation, the "negotiations were serious but not conclusive." The two sides agree to meet for a fourth round of talks on 11 June.
—Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 285-286; "DPKK, U.S. to Continue Nuclear Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 10 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 June 1993
Robert Gallucci and Kang Sŏk Chu decide on a six-page joint statement. The key points of the statement are American security assurances, an agreement to continue their official dialogue and, in return, a North Korean decision to suspend its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for "as long as it considers necessary." [Note: According to North Korea, this decision does not return North Korea to IAEA safeguards. North Korea characterizes its position as somewhere between full-member and non-member status. However, the IAEA considers North Korea subject to full safeguards.]
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "N. Korea Won't Quit Nuclear Ban Treaty; Inspection of Two Key Sites Still Rejected," Washington Post, 12 June 1993, p. A1; Don Oberdorfer, Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Reading, 1997), pp. 285-286; J. T. Nguyen, "North Korea Postpones Decision to Abandon Nuclear Treaty," United Press International, 11 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Wright, "North Korea Remains in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," Associated Press, 12 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 June 1993
The United States responds to the North Korean decision to suspend withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) through a unilateral statement on 12 June 1993, saying that it would regard additional reprocessing, any break in the continuity of nuclear safeguards or a withdrawal from the NPT as harmful and inconsistent with the US efforts to resolve the nuclear issue through dialogue.
—Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 64.

17 June 1993
North Korean ambassador to China Chu Ch'ang Chun says that North Korea will reopen its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection when the agency proves that it is impartial and not a tool of the United States.
—"N. Korea Throws Nuclear Issue in IAEA Court," Agence France Presse, 17 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>. 24 June 1993
South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sŏng Ju says that the UN Security Council will impose sanctions against North Korea unless North Korea resolves the problem of allowing IAEA inspectors to return.
—"North Korea's Nuclear Inspection Issue Must Be Resolved within Weeks," Agence France Presse, 24 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 June 1993
The United States and North Korea agree to resume high-level talks on North Korea's nuclear activities on 14 July in Geneva. Robert Gallucci and Kang Sŏk Chu will be the respective heads of the US and North Korean delegations.
—"U.S., DPRK to Resume Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 28 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea to Discuss Nuclear Inspections Next Month," United Press International, 28 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nuclear Talks to Resume July 14," Associated Press, 28 June 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 June 1993
The IAEA receives a letter from North Korean Minister of Atomic Energy Industry Ch'oe Hak Kŭn that says that North Korea will not negotiate with the IAEA until after high-level talks with the United States scheduled for 14 July.
—South Korean News Agency [sic], 2 July 1993, in "DPRK Reportedly Rejects IAEA Proposal for Discussions before Talks with USA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 July 1993
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher warns North Korea that if it is using ongoing talks with the United States as a stalling tactic in order to further develop its nuclear weapon program the talks will be broken off. In a press briefing, Christopher says, "The discussion will continue only as long as they appear to be productive."
—Barry Schweid, "Christopher Warns North Korea about Stalling on Nuclear Controls," Associated Press, 2 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Christopher Says U.S. to Press Trade Issue at Summit," Asahi News Service, 2 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 July 1993
While on a visit to Japan, President Bill Clinton says, "The United States has no intention at this moment or in the future of weakening its security ties in the Pacific." Clinton continues, "The United States will maintain troops in South Korea and keep providing nuclear deterrence to its allies."
—"Clinton Vows to Keep Troops and Nuclear Deterrence in South Korea," Agence France Presse, 6 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 July 1993
The United States and North Korea hold high-level talks in Geneva. Robert Gallucci, head of the US delegation, says that the seven hour meeting was "useful". The two sides agree to meet again on 16 July. While neither side comments on the details of the negotiations, it is believed that, during this meeting, North Korea proposes replacement of its gas-graphite nuclear reactors with comparatively less proliferation-prone light water nuclear reactors. —Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 68; Alexander Higgins, "U.S., North Korea Report Progress in High-Stakes Talks," Associated Press, 14 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Progress Reported in Nuclear Talks with North Korea," Agence France Presse, 14 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea Discuss Nuclear Treaty," United Press International, 14 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 July 1993
The United States and North Korea hold a second round of high-level nuclear talks. Robert Gallucci and Kang Sŏk Chu, the heads of the delegations, agree that the talks were productive. The two sides agree to meet again on 19 July.
—Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 68; "U.S., N. Korea to Continue Nuclear Talks on Monday," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alexander Higgins, "U.S., North Korea Raise Hopes of Breakthrough," Associated Press, 16 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 July 1993
The United States and North Korea reach an agreement and draft a joint statement on North Korea's nuclear program. In the joint statement, the United States pledges to consider ways to replace North Korea's gas-graphite nuclear reactors "as part of a final resolution of the nuclear issue, and on a premise that a solution to the provision of light water nuclear reactors is feasible." Kang Sŏk Chu, head of the North Korean delegation, says the proposal to replace the graphite moderated reactors is to demonstrate to the international community that North Korea "has no intention to develop nuclear weapons."
—Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 69; "U.S. to Help DPRK Restructure Civil Reactors," Xinhua News Agency, 19 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alexander Higgins, "U.S., North Korea Announces Compromise to Ease Nuclear Tensions," Associated Press, 19 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Roundup: Great Progress Achieved in DPRK-U.S. Talks," Xinhua News Agency, 21 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 July 1993
South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sŏng Ju warns North Korea that if it does not allow international inspections within two months the United Nations will impose sanctions.
—Kyodo News Service, "S. Korea Warns North Not to Drag out Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 July 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3-10 August 1993
IAEA inspectors return to North Korea for the first time since North Korea's 12 March declaration that it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The three-member team replaces monitoring equipment and conducts other unspecified routine inspections, but they are not allowed to visit the two suspected nuclear waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—"IAEA Inspectors Arrive in Pyongyang for Nuke Checks," Japan Economic Newswire, 3 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alison Smale, "IAEA Inspectors in North Korea," Associated Press, 3 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 August 1993
The South Korean Prime Minister proposes to his North Korean counterpart that the two countries resume meetings of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission, which was tasked with setting up an inter-Korean bilateral nuclear inspection regime. Hwang proposed the meeting be held on 10 August at the truce village of Panmunjom.
—"S Korea Proposes Resumption of Inter-Korean Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 4 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 August 1993
South Korean Unification Minister Han Wan Sang says that South Korean will not assist North Korea in acquiring light water nuclear reactors until the suspicions about its nuclear activities are resolved.
—South Korean News Agency [sic], 4 August 1993, in "South 'Would Help' North with New Reactor if Nuclear Issue Resolved," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 August 1993
North Korea rebuffs South Korea's proposed resumption of the Joint Nuclear Control Commission (JNCC) talks. Citing the joint US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercise as the obstacle to resuming the JNCC talks, a Pyongyang spokesman says, "If the South side has the intention to resolve the nuclear problem through dialogue with us, it must discontinue nuclear war exercises incompatible with this."
—"N Korea Scuttles Plan to Resume Inter-Korean Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 9 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 August 1993
The IAEA announces that during the recent trip to North Korea inspectors were only allowed to service monitoring equipment. According to IAEA Spokesman David Kyd, "the overall degree of access granted is still insufficient for the agency to discharge its responsibilities." He also says that the IAEA has made no progress in gaining access to two suspected nuclear waste sites located in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—Michael Lindman, "IAEA No Nearer to Getting Access to Top-Secret N. Korean Sites," United Press International, 13 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 August 1993
The United States and South Korea commence the joint military exercise "Ulchi Focus Lens." The exercise will last ten days and involve approximately 12,000 US and South Korean troops. North Korea condemns the exercise as "nuclear war games."
—"S Korea, U.S. Start Computer War Games Despite N Koreas Opposition," Agence France Presse, 17 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 August 1993
The IAEA sends a letter to Pyongyang in response to North Korea's acceptance of an offer to begin negotiations over the reinstitution of nuclear safeguards inspections in Korea. The IAEA proposes that it send a five-member delegation, headed by the deputy director of the agency's Nuclear Safety Management Bureau, to Pyongyang for talks.
—"IAEA to Send Mission for Nuclear Talks in Pyongyang," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 August 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Puk Haekhyŏpsang Bbarŭmyŏn Saedalch'o Chaegae," Taehan Maeil, 21 August 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "Pukhan Haeksach'al Hyŏb'ŭi/Taep'yodan P'a'gyŏn'k'iro/IAEA, Puk'e T'ongbo," Joongang Ilbo, 21 August 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

1-3 September 1993
The IAEA and North Korea hold consultations on nuclear safeguards as part of an agreement reached earlier between the United States and North Korea in Geneva. North Korea says they will address the issue of inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites once the question of IAEA neutrality is resolved. —"Atomic Energy Spokesman on Talks With IAEA," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 8 September 1993 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-93-172, 8 September 1993; "IAEA, North Korea Resume Nuclear Talks in Pyongyang," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; KBS Radio (Seoul), 2 September 1993, in "IAEA and DPRK Begin Negotiations on Vienna on Inspection of Nuclear Facilities," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 September 1993
David Kyd, a spokesman for the IAEA, says that the Agency has finished its internal discussions of the North Korean nuclear problem, and has decided to draft a report for submission to the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council in case North Korea refuses to allow inspections.
—"Pukhaeksach'al Hyŏpsanggyŏlgwa/Anbori'e Pogobangch'im/IAEA," Segye Ilbo, 11 September 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

15 September 1993
North Korea is currently building facilities for six SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) near its Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. There are already 47 SAM positions within a 6km radius of the complex.
—"Pukhan Yŏngbyŏn Iltae E Missile Kiji Kŏnsŏl—Haeksisŏlboho Taebi," Joongang Ilbo, 15 September 1993, <http://www.joins.com>.

15 September 1993
At a counselor-level meeting in Beijing, the United States informs North Korea that high-level bilateral talks will not resume until North Korea resumes dialogue with South Korea and cooperates with the IAEA.
—KBS Television (Seoul), 21 September 1993, in "North Reportedly to Quit NPT if Nuclear Issue Referred to UN," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 September 1993
At secret working-level talks in New York, the United States strongly urges North Korea to resume negotiations with the IAEA.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 27 September 1993, in "'Secret' Talks Held 'on Several Occasions Last Week' in New York," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 29 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 September 1993
The State Department announces that North Korea has not met the conditions necessary to resume bilateral talks. The United States had previously set the conditions that North Korea must reopen dialogue with South Korea and cooperate with the IAEA.
—"North Koreans Balk at U.S. Conditions for Renewed Talks," Associated Press, 17 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 September 1993
The South Korean media report that a Russian nuclear specialist believes North Korea is incapable of producing a nuclear weapon within "one or two years." According to reports, Mikhail Ryzhov, chairman of Russia's Committee for International Relations of the Ministry of Atomic Energy, delivered this information to the South Korean Embassy in Moscow. Ryzhov said, "North Korea, having no capability of producing nuclear weapons, pretends to the outside world that the North Korean development of nuclear weapons is pending. The Russian nuclear specialists are of the general opinion that North Korea is trying to use this as a bargaining chip for negotiations with the United States." [Note: The FBIS translation says within "a few years" while the Korean press reports say within "one or two years."]
—Joongang Ilbo, 22 September 1993, p. 2, in "Russia Says DPRK 'Incapable' of Developing Nuclear Weapons," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, pp. 38-39; "'Pukhan Myŏtnyŏnnae Haekkaebalmothae'/Russia Wŏnjaryŏkpu/Uri Taesagwan'e T'ongbo," Joongang Ilbo, 22 September 1993, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "Pukhanhaek Kisullyŏk Han'gye/1~2 Nyŏnnae Kaebal Mothae/Russia P'yŏngga," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 23 September 1993, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Kyodo News Service, "N. Korea Can't Make Nuclear Weapons, Russian Expert Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 September 1993
North Korea warns that it might once again decide to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Describing the preconditions set by the United States for the resumption of bilateral talk as "unilateral" and "self-opinionated," North Korea says that if the preconditions remain, "we will have no alternative but to reconsider all the measures we have taken, presupposing negotiations with the United States."
—"North Koreans Balk at U.S. Conditions for Renewed Talks," Associated Press, 17 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Renews Threat to Leave NPT," Agence France Presse, 22 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 September 1993
North Korea's Atomic Energy Minister Ch'oe Hak Kŭn informs IAEA Director General Hans Blix that North Korea is rejecting the IAEA's offer to restart consultations in October 1993 due to efforts to put North Korea's nuclear program on the agenda of the IAEA's General Conference. —Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, "IAEA General Conference May Face North Korean Controversy Friday," Nucleonics Week, 30 September 1993, pp. 1-2.

25 September 1993
South Korean President Kim Young Sam, speaking in Japan, says that sanctions against North Korea will be "unavoidable" if Pyongyang fails to resolve suspicions about its nuclear activities.
—"South Korean President Warns of Sanctions Against North Korea," United Press International, 25 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Won't Budge on Nuclear Stance," New York Times, 27 September 1993, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 September 1993
Addressing the opening session of the IAEA general assembly, IAEA Director General Hans Blix puts North Korea's refusal to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities at the top of the agenda. He says that "as long as our suspicions are not met with credible findings and additional inspections of sites, the IAEA cannot rule out that some nuclear material has been diverted."
—"U.S. General Warns North Korea Amid Report of Secret Talks," Agence France Press, 28 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 September 1993
North Korea accuses the IAEA of being impartial with regard to its inspections and of trying "to open up our military instillations under the manipulation of a superpower." North Korea continues, "We reject any attempt to make inspections on the basis of fabricated intelligence information provided by a third country."
—"N. Korea Expresses Resentment at IAEA 'Partiality,'" Agence France Presse, 30 September 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 October 1993
The IAEA General Assembly passes a resolution that calls on North Korea to "cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement." The resolution notes the IAEA's "grave concern that North Korea has failed to discharge its safeguards obligations and has recently widened the area of non-compliance by not accepting scheduled Agency ad hoc and routine inspections as required by the safeguards agreement." The resolution receives 72 votes in favor, 11 abstentions, and negative votes by Libya and North Korea. —Mark Hibbs, "Pyongyang May End IAEA Access to Monitored Sits, Envoy Says," Nucleonics Week, 7 October 1993, pp. 1, 10-11; "IAEA Adopts Resolution on N. Korea Nuke Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 October 1993
North Korean Prime Minister Kang Sŏng San sends a letter to his South Korean counterpart proposing working-level talks at the border village of Panmunjom. [Note: This sudden proposal is possibly a reaction to the preconditions set forth by the United States before it will reengage Pyongyang in bilateral talks.]
—"Pyongyang Proposes Talks with Seoul, Dialogue with Washington: Analysts," Agence France Presse, 3 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 October 1993
The North Korean Foreign Ministry rejects the resolution passed by the IAEA general assembly on 1 October calling on North Korea to resolve all suspicions about its nuclear program. The Foreign Ministry says that North Korea "decidedly rejects the 'resolution' ... as wanton encroachment on the sovereignty of the DPRK." North Korea reiterates that it believes the only way to resolve the nuclear problem is through bilateral talks with the United States.
—"North Korea Rejects IAEA Resolution, Calls for Talks with U.S.," Agence France Presse, 4 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 October 1993
In a closed-door meeting held in New York, senior officials from the United States, South Korea, and Japan discuss the option of using economic sanctions against North Korea in order to persuade North Korea to clear up suspicions about its nuclear weapons program.
—"U.S. Allies Mull Sanctions Against N. Korea," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 8 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 October 1993
KBS-1 Radio in Seoul reports that France believes North Korea has developed nuclear weapons. According to the report, the South Korean Embassy has revealed that France has analyzed satellite imagery of North Korea's nuclear facilities, and concluded that North Korea has developed nuclear weapons because the nuclear facilities do not have electrical transmission lines. The ROK Embassy reportedly received the information from the Foreign Security General Bureau, a French military intelligence agency.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 10 October 1993, in "French Satellite Confirms DPRK Nuclear Development," JPRS-TND-93-032, 12 October 1993, p. 39.

11 October 1993
US Congressman Gary Ackerman meets with North Korean President Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang to discuss North Korea's refusal to allow international inspections of its nuclear facilities. Upon arriving in Seoul the following day, Ackerman says that Kim listened "very strongly and clearly" when he conveyed the US position. Ackerman also says that the North Korean leader condemned the IAEA for pressuring it to accept ad hoc inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—"U.S. Solon Says Pyongyang Raps IAEA Inspection Demand," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Congressman Crosses DMZ after Talks with Kim Il-Sung," Agence France Presse, 12 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 October 1993
North Korea's Atomic Energy Minister accuses the IAEA of forging a letter from the UN Secretariat calling for international pressure to be placed on North Korea to open its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspections. The minister claims that UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had no knowledge of the letter which was, as he described, a conspiracy by some officials in the IAEA and UN Secretariat "for the purpose of doing harm to the DPRK." According to the minister, this action destroys the credibility of the IAEA, and thus shows that the "nuclear problem" can only be resolved through bilateral talks with the United States.
—"N. Korea Charges IAEA Forged Letter on Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., S Korea Discussing Patriot Deployment Amid N Korean Nuke Fears," Agence France Presse, 14 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 October 1993
IAEA Spokesman David Kyd announces that the monitoring equipment set up in North Korea's declared nuclear facilities will run out of film in November and the IAEA has not been allowed to service all of the equipment. Kyd states, "We are coming up on something of a technical deadline, and North Korea has not been responsive at all. At this point, we have no access to the sites at all."
—David A. Sanger, "U.S. Warns North Koreans of U.N. Action on Nuclear Inspections," New York Times, 15 October 1993, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 October 1993
IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that since North Korea has continued to delay IAEA access to check monitoring equipment, any assurance that North Korea is not diverting nuclear materials to weapons purposes has been diminishing. In the spring of 1993, the IAEA's main concern was the presence of undeclared plutonium and North Korea's non-acceptance of special inspections. The concern now is that the declared facilities and materials could also be diverted from peaceful purposes.
—"Pyongyang Ready to Resume Nuclear Inspections; U.S. Reports New Talks," Agence France Presse, 22 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-October 1993
Peter Hayes, an Australian nuclear expert, conducts a 15-day visit to North Korea, during which he meets with several high ranking officials about North Korea's nuclear program. After the visit, Hayes says that "North Korea's main aim in challenging the International Atomic Energy Agency is to normalize or at least upgrade its political and economic relations with the United States."
—Paul Shin, "North Korea Tells Nuclear Expert It Will OK Routine IAEA Inspections," Associated Press, 26 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 October 1993
North Korea and the United States allegedly hold secret talks to discuss the resumption of IAEA's ad hoc inspections. The ongoing talks are reportedly held between North Korea's Deputy Ambassador to the UN Hŏ Jong and Kenneth Quinones, the State Department's North Korea Desk Officer. North Korea agrees to negotiate on the nuclear issue in exchange for US diplomatic recognition. The United States hints that it may consider suspending Team Spirit military exercises with South Korea if North Korea "shows a positive attitude" and accepts IAEA inspections before the end of October 1993.
—"N Korea Holding Secret Talks with U.S. on IAEA Checks," Japan Economic Newswire, 22 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pyongyang Ready to Resume Nuclear Inspections; U.S. Reports New Talks," Agence France Presse, 22 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Tim Weiner, "U.S. in Quiet Talks with North Korea," New York Times, 27 October 1993, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Chŏng Yŏn Ju, "Pung'mi 'Haeksach'al' Kŭkpijŏpch'ok/New York'sŏ/Pukhan, Sach'aldan Ipkuk T'ahyŏb'an Cheshi," Hankryoreh Shinmun, 22 October 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Chŏng Hae Yŏng, "Mibuk Makhuhaekhyŏpsang Chinhaeng/Wŏlmalshihan Ap'tugo Ch'aenŏl Ch'ongdong'wŏn," Chosun Ilbo, 22 October 1993, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

20 October 1993
According to North Korean defector Lee Ch'ung Kuk, North Korea tests a nuclear warhead triggering device. Approximately 50 personnel from the Nuclear Defense Bureau observe the test explosion in Yŏmso-gol, Sŏg'am-ri, P'yong'wŏn-kun, South P'yong'an Province.
—Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure-Part One," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1999, p. 41; U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38.

24 October 1993
The United States and North Korea reportedly reach an agreement in which North Korea will allow full inspections of its nuclear facilities in exchange for diplomatic recognition from the United States. Reportedly, the agreement was reached through secret working level talks in New York between Hŏ Jong and Kenneth Quinones. As a first step, North Korea is expected to allow IAEA inspectors to service monitoring equipment by 1 November. However, disagreements remain as to whether all of North Korea's suspected nuclear facilities will be open to inspection or just those which have been declared.
—Kelley Smith Tunney, "Reports: U.S.-North Korea Agree to Resolve Nuclear Disputes," Associated Press, 24 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ruth Sinai, "North Korea Offers Limited Inspections in Return for Recognition," Associated Press, 27 October 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.