This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1994
According to the Segye Ilbo, a South Korean daily, North Korea begins to acquire plutonium, uranium, other metals, and equipment from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries. According to the report, North Korea also procures uranium-235, plutonium-239, as well as osmium-187, cesium-137, and strontium, which the report claims are used for reducing the size of nuclear warheads. The Segye Ilbo claims this information is from a four-page Russian document acquired by the South Korean Embassy in Uzbekistan. The report also claims that North Korea later acquire 70-80 documents that contain information regarding nuclear technologies, and that North Korea smuggles 32kg of HEU from Kazakhstan in August 2001. [Note: CNS sources indicate the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade received no such document, and there is no apparent use for osmium-187, cesium-137 and strontium in reducing the size of nuclear weapons; therefore, this report does not seem credible.]
—Segye Ilbo, 7 November 2002, in "Kazakhstani Report: DPRK Purchased Uranium, Plutonium From Kazakhstan," FBIS Document ID: KPP20021108000025; Chŏn Hyŏn Il and Kim Ki Dong, "Puk, K'ajahŭsŏ Uranium Kŭkpibanip," Segye Ilbo, 8 November 2002, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Kim Ki Dong, "Changnyŏn'eman Uranium 32kg Panip," Segye Ilbo, 8 November 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Pak Hye Yun, "Puk, K'ajahŭsŏ Uranium Kŭkpi Kuip," Donga Ilbo, 8 November 2002, <http://www.donga.com>.

1 January 1994
President Kim Il Sung announces that North Korea and the United States have agreed on a "joint statement" which paves the way for the nuclear dispute to be "settled fairly." However, Kim says that any attempts to pressure North Korea into more concessions "may invite catastrophe." In his statements, Kim doesn't mention any details about the agreement, but in an announcement later in the day, the North Korean Foreign Ministry claims that IAEA inspectors will only be allowed to visit North Korea's seven declared nuclear facilities for a one-time inspection.
—David E. Sanger, "Hint of Progress, And Warning, from North Korea," New York Times, 2 January 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 January 1994
US officials announce that North Korea has agreed to permit IAEA inspections of its seven declared nuclear facilities once Pyongyang comes to an agreement with the Agency on "the exact procedures." According to reports, steps involve the resumption of a North Korean dialogue with South Korea in exchange for cancellation of the 1994 Team Spirit military exercise. North Korean United Nations Ambassador Hŏ Jong confirms the agreement and says that IAEA inspections will be permitted in order to "keep continuity" of international safeguards. Ho says that the United States and North Korea have made "some very substantial progress" during negotiations in December 1993 in New York.
—Jeffrey Smith, "North Korean Agrees to Nuclear Inspection; Tentative Pact Covers Only Declared Facilities, Not Other Suspicious Sites, U.S. Officials Say," Washington Post, 4 January 1993, p. A11; John J. Fialka, "North Korea, US Reach Agreement Opening Nuclear Sites to Inspection," Wall Street Journal, 6 January 1994, p. A8; Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Says Deal with North Korea on Atomic Site Inspection Is Near," New York Times, 4 January 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 January 1994
US officials say that they are likely to make the important concession of accepting North Korea's proposal of a complete one-time inspection of its seven declared nuclear facilities, in the hope that additional inspections can be agreed upon in the future. According to the officials, the United States is also considering cancellation of the annual Team Spirit military exercise.
—Jeffrey Smith, "North Korea Agrees to Nuclear Inspection; Tentative Pact Covers Only Declared Facilities, Not Other Suspicious Sites, U.S. Officials Say," Washington Post, 4 January 1993, p. A11; John J. Fialka, "North Korea, US Reach Agreement Opening Nuclear Sites to Inspection," Wall Street Journal, 6 January 1994, p. A8; Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Now Seeks Just One Survey of North Korea," New York Times, 5 January 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 January 1994
IAEA Spokesman David Kyd says that one-time inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities are unacceptable. According to Kyd, "periodic inspections would be necessary" to ensure North Korea's compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
—"IAEA Says Regular Inspections Are Necessary in N. Korea," Agence France Presse, 5 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 January 1994
US State Department Undersecretary Lynn Davis says that the "agreement in principle" reached between North Korea and the United States to allow IAEA inspections is one of the "interim steps" before the United States will agree to a third round of talks with North Korea. Davis denies reports that the United States is prepared to accept one-time inspections of declared nuclear facilities in North Korea. Speaking at a luncheon for newspaper reporters, President Clinton also denies the reports, saying that even if the United States was prepared to make such a concession it would have to be cleared with the IAEA.
—Steven Greenhouse, "North Korea to Open Access to Nuclear Sites, U.S. Says," New York Times, 6 January 1994, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Agrees Access to 7 Nuclear Sites, U.S. Says," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 January 1994
North Korean officials meet with IAEA officials in Vienna, but they make no new offer. After the meeting, IAEA Spokesman David Kyd says that the North Korean officials only came to listen to the agency's position and report back to Pyongyang. According to Kyd, the IAEA informed North Korea that talks on inspection procedures need to be resumed.
—Robert Burns, "Koreans Listen, But Make No Proposals, at Vienna Meeting," Associated Press, 5 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 January 1994
Officials from the South Korean Foreign Ministry and National Unification Board announce that South Korea and North Korea will exchange special envoys to discuss nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula. The officials say that the two sides have yet to agree upon a date but stress that the exchange should take place before the United States reopens high-level talks with Pyongyang.
—"Koreas to Exchange Special Envoys on Nuclear Issue," Associated Press, 7 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 January 1994
North Korea and the IAEA hold "working-level" discussions on the procedures for nuclear inspections.
—"North Korea, Nuclear Agency Resume Talks on Inspections," Associated Press, 7 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 January 1994
US Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar say that Washington will not accept a one-time inspection of North Korea's declared nuclear facilities. Instead, the Senators claim, Washington will demand continued IAEA access to all declared facilities and two suspected nuclear waste sites. Speaking at the US embassy in Tokyo, the two Senators also claim that the United States, Japan, and other countries must begin preparing for the option of imposing economic sanctions against North Korea.
—Reuters (Tokyo), "Regular Inspections Demanded," Los Angeles Times, 9 January 1994, p. A14, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Nunn Urges Preparation for Sanctions Against N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 8 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 January 1994
The IAEA and North Korea hold a second round of "working-level" discussions on the scope and content of inspections. The IAEA submits a "check list" for inspections of North Korea's nuclear facilities. Items on the "check list" include examining the fuel rods at the 5MW gas-graphite reactor, taking samples, and checking seals and surveillance equipment.
—Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 11 January 1994, in "North Korea, IAEA Fail to Make Progress; IAEA Presents Inspection List," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Cha Man Sun, KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 10 January 1994, in "North Korea, IAEA Fail to Make Progress; IAEA Presents Inspection Check List," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea, IAEA Said Still at Odds Over Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 10 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 January 1994
The IAEA sends a report to Pyongyang outlining its demands for unrestricted access to all seven declared nuclear sites.
—"IAEA Bids for Full Inspections of N. Korean Facilities," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 1994
US State Department Spokeswoman Christine Shelly announces that the United States will not consider a third round of high-level talks with North Korea until it resolves the issue of nuclear inspections with the IAEA. Shelly says, "If the North Korean agreement in principle to allow these inspections that they had related to us before does not result in specific arrangements with the IAEA, then there will be no third round of formal US-North Korea talks and we will have to look to alternate means to resolve this dispute." Shelly continues, "The possibility of tougher measures, of sanctions, of going to the Security Council, is still very much out there."
—"United States Calls on North Korea to Allow Inspections," United Press International, 21 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 1994
The IAEA announces that North Korea has rejected its proposed inspection procedures. IAEA Spokesman David Kyd says that the proposed procedures are necessary for IAEA inspectors to verify that North Korea is not developing nuclear weapons. North Korea urges the IAEA to accept its proposal of onetime inspections, but Kyd reiterates IAEA Director General Hans Blix's statement that these inspection procedures are not negotiable and the IAEA will not send an inspection team "unless there is a full agreement."
—David A. Sanger, "North Korea Reportedly to Balk at Inspection Terms," New York Times, 21 January 1994, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Urges IAEA to Accept Its Inspection Proposals," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 January 1994
North Korea's Foreign Ministry claims that the issue of "routine an ad-hoc inspections" of its nuclear facilities should only be addressed in a third round of high-level bilateral talks with the United States.
—"North Korea Justifies Its Snub of Nuclear Checks," Agence France Presse, 22 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 January 1994
North Korea warns the United States that continued pressure on Pyongyang to accept routine IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities could lead to "catastrophe." The warning, printed in the Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, also states that North Korea's March 1993 decision to withdraw from the NPT was not revoked but merely "suspended temporarily."
—"North Korea Justifies Its Snub of Nuclear Checks," Agence France Presse, 22 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Crisis Warning; Japan Has 'All Parts for Bomb,'" South China Morning Post, 31 January 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 January 1994
Thomas Hubbard, chief US negotiator for talks with North Korea, visits Seoul and reiterates the US position that it will improve relations with North Korea only if Pyongyang agrees to nuclear inspections meeting all IAEA requirements.
—Ivan Zakharchenko, "US, South Korea Continue Consultations on Nuclear Problem," ITAR-TASS, 24 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 January 1994
A US official says that Washington will most likely seek sanctions against North Korea if talks with the IAEA fail to make progress soon. According to the official, if at the 22 February meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors Hans Blix reports that the IAEA cannot determine whether or not North Korea's nuclear program is solely for peaceful purposes, the United States will likely move for economic sanctions.
—Rita Beamish, "U.S.: Time Is Running Out for North Korea on Nuclear Inspection," Associated Press, 25 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jacques Charmelot, "N. Korea Has Less Than a Month to Resume Nuclear Checks: US," Agence France Presse, 25 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 January 1994
CIA director James Woolsey tells the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that North Korea would probably resort to its MiG-23 aircraft as a nuclear weapon delivery system, rather than the Nodong-1 missile.
—Kyodo News Service, "CIA Chief Says N. Korea Would Use MiGs for Nuke Attack," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25 January 1994
The IAEA sends a report to Pyongyang explaining its demand for unrestricted access to all seven declared nuclear facilities. According to IAEA Spokesman David Kyd, North Korea still refuses "a significant number" of the agency's inspection requirements.
—"IAEA Bids for Full Inspections of N. Korean Facilities," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 January 1994
US officials announce that preparations are under way to deploy Patriot Missiles in South Korea at the request of General Gary Luck, the senior commander of US forces in South Korea.
—"North Korea Assails US Plan to Put Patriot Missiles in South," Agence France Press, 28 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Pan on 'Patriot' in S. Korea made in," Xinhua News Agency, 29 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January 1994
North Korea condemns the US plan to deploy Patriot Missiles in South Korea as an "unpardonable, grave military challenge." The Korean Central News Agency says the deployment of the missiles "increases the danger of war on the peninsula" and "impedes the progress" of talks aimed at resolving the issue of nuclear inspections. The report also says that the real purpose of the missile deployment is to pressure North Korea into accepting nuclear inspections.
—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 28 January 1994, in "Patriot Missile Deployment in ROK 'Unpardonable'," FBIS-EAS-94-019, 28 January 1994, p. 11; "North Korea Assails US Plan to Put Patriot Missiles in South," Agence France Press, 28 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Pan on 'Patriot' in S. Korea Made in," Xinhua News Agency, 29 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 January 1994
Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian General Staff, denies allegations made by the Japanese weekly Shukan Bunshun regarding an alleged top secret Russian report. The Shukan Bunshun report claims that Russian nuclear and missile scientists have assisted North Korea in the development of nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles. But Kolesnikov says that the report's alleged issuing authority, the Center for Military Strategic Analysis at the Russian General Staff, does not exist, although the General Staff does have a "center for military strategic studies." Kolesnikov lists further discrepancies within the report, including the form used, the index number cited, the incorrect placement and terminology of the security classification, and, finally, the use of a serial number originating with the USSR Council of Ministers (a numbering system not used since 1991) rather than one used by the Ministry of Defense.
—Radio Moscow, 29 January 1994, in "Participation in DPRK Nuclear Program Denied," FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, p. 15; Pavel Felgengauer, "North Korea Has No Nuclear Bomb. The Publication in Shukan Bunshun Is Based on a Hoax. There will be No Official Investigation in the General Staff," Segodnya (Moscow), 29 January 1994, p. 1, in FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, pp. 15-16; Viktor Litovkin, "Russian Chief of General Staff Describes Piece in Japanese Weekly as 'Nonsense'," Izvestiya (Moscow), 29 January 1994, p. 3, in "Army Chief on Missile Document," FBIS-SOV-94-020, 31 January 1994, pp. 16-17; "General Staff Secret Report a Brazen Fake," Official Kremlin International News Broadcast, 28 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alexander Golts, "'General Staff's Secret report' Is Crude Forge," Krasnaya Zvezda, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, Russian Press Digest, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 January 1994
The North Korean Foreign Ministry warns of "catastrophic consequences" if the United States continues to demand that North Korea accept all IAEA conditions on nuclear inspections before it will consider a third round of high-level talks. "If the United States has no intention to hold any further round of talks, North Korea, too, will have no intention to do so," a Foreign Ministry spokesman says, warning that North Korea might once again withdraw from the NPT. He also warns that Pyongyang might reverse its "declared intention to renounce the graphite-moderated reactor system."
—"North Korea Blasts United States for Reversing Nuclear Agreement," United Press International, 31 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "DPRK Issues Statement on Nuclear Issue," Xinhua News Agency, 1 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 January 1994
North Korea warns that it is prepared to renege on all promises regarding nuclear inspections if the United States goes ahead with plans to deploy Patriot Missiles in South Korea.
—"North Korea Warns US Over 'Patriots,'" Press Association, 31 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Warns It May Scrap Promise on Nuclear Inspections," Associated Press, 31 January 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 February 1994
North Korean President Kim Il Sung delivers a message to US President Bill Clinton expressing a desire to improve relations with the United States and vowing that North Korea will never develop nuclear weapons. The message is delivered by US evangelist Billy Graham after a six-day trip to North Korea.
—"Kim Il Sung Says Pyongyang Will Not Develop Nukes," Japan Economic Newswire, 7 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 February 1994
Accusing North Korea of intimidating the United States with its nuclear program, the US Senate calls on the Clinton administration to take a more aggressive stance towards Pyongyang. In two non-binding "sense of Congress" statements amended to the State Department authorization bill, the Senate calls on President Clinton to seek international support for economic sanctions and prepare to reintroduce tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea if North Korea continues to resist IAEA inspections. The Senate also urges President Clinton to move forward with plans to hold the Team Spirit joint military exercises with South Korea.
—Jim Abrams, "Senate Urges Tough Stance toward North Korea," Associated Press, 1 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 February 1994
Addressing the annual meeting of South Korean diplomats, Foreign Minister Han Sŏng Ju says that the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program should be resolved through dialogue in order to prevent its development into a "worst case" scenario.
—"Seoul Urges Talks to Solve North's Nuclear Issue," Japan Economic Newswire, 2 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 1994
In a commentary appearing in the Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, North Korea states that while it wants the dispute over its nuclear program resolved in "a peaceful way," it will not accept any pressure tactics from Washington. If the United States tries to pressure North Korea in allowing IAEA inspections, according to the commentary, Pyongyang's "reaction will be a hundred times stronger and carried into practical action." The statement also says that North Korea has "an expedient to counter any other option of the United States. It is not the United States alone that has the expedient, and the option is not open only for a big power."
—"We Do Not Utter Empty Words," Nodong Sinmun, 3 February 1994, in "'Nodong Sinmun': US 'Ganster-Like Logic' Leads North to 'Reconsider Promises,'" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Warns Against U.S. Pressure for Nuclear Inspections," United Press International, 3 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Terry McCarthy, "North Korea Rattles The Nuclear Saber," The Independent (London), 5 February 1994, p. 9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 1994
French Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Catherine Colonna states that due to the lack of progress in talks between Washington and Pyongyang, it is time for the UN Security Council to consider imposing economic sanctions on North Korea. On 11 February, the North Korean Foreign Ministry condemns the French statement, accusing France of encouraging military conflict in Northeast Asia "so that it may fish in troubled waters through the massive sales of weapons of destruction."
—Andrei Shtorkh, "France for UN Sanctions against North Korea," ITAR-TASS, 3 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "France Says Sanctions against North Korea Should Be Considered," Agence France Presse, 3 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Calls on United States to Act with Discretion," United Press International, 12 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 February 1994
North Korea officially informs the IAEA that it completely rejects the prospect of nuclear safeguards inspections.
—KBS-1 Radio (Seoul), 3 February 1994, in "DPRK Informs IAEA of 'Total Rejection' of Inspections," JPRS-TND-94-005, 25 February 1994, p. 51;

4 February 1994
North Korea's ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho Jin, says that "North Korea cannot accept routine and ad hoc inspections."
—"Talks between IAEA and North Korea Almost 'Moribund'," Agence France Presse, 5 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Puk 'Haeksach'al Chŏlch'ung Ŏryŏpta'/Pin Chujae Ch'amsa'gwan," Donga Ilbo, 5 February 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "Puk 'IAEA Wa Hab'ŭi Nanmang'/Pin Chujaech'amsa'gwan 'Yogusujun Pudam'," Hankook Ilbo, 5 February 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

4 February 1994
The United States, supported by Britain, France and Russia, appeals to China to put added pressure on North Korea to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. Speaking at a UN Security Council meeting, the US Ambassador to the UN Madeline Albright also informs the Chinese representative that the United States, Britain, France and Russia will begin pressing for economic sanctions if North Korea does not open its nuclear facilities to international inspections by 21 February.
—Paul Lewis, "U.S. Urges China to Pressure North Koreans to Open Nuclear Sites," New York Times, 5 February 1994, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 February 1994
South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sŏng Ju meets with senior US officials in Washington to discuss North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. After meetings with US Vice President Al Gore and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Han announces that the United States and South Korea have "decided to exert all available efforts to settle the nuclear question through dialogue until the regular Board of Governors' meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)." Speaking on the possibility of calling for economic sanctions in the UN Security Council, Han says that China may not oppose sanctions but is still reluctant to support such measures, believing that the international community must first give negotiations a chance.
—"S Korean FM Set for Talks on North Korean Nuclear Impasse," Agence France Presse, 11 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Gedda, "U.S., Japanese Leaders Weigh Sanctions against North Korea," Associated Press, 12 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; South Korean News Agency [sic], 11 February 1994, in "South Korean Foreign Minister in USA; UN Security Council to Meet in Vienna," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 February 1994
Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, meeting with President Clinton in Washington, says that Japan is ready to support economic sanctions against North Korea if Pyongyang continues to refuse international inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—Susumu Sono, "North Korea Ready to Punish US More Seriously Than in Korean War," Agence France Presse, 12 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Sue Kendall, "US Consults with Allies Ahead of Crucial Nuclear Meeting," Agence France Presse, 13 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 February 1994
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, carries an article that warns "any US consideration of economic sanctions would be equivalent to a declaration of war."
—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 12 February 1994, in "'Nodong Sinmun': 'Any Kind of Sanctions' to Be Viewed as 'Proclamation of War,'" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Susumu Sono, "North Korea Ready to Punish US More Seriously Than in Korean War," Agence France Presse, 12 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Calls on US to Act with Discretion," United Press International, 12 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 February 1994
Vladimir Kumachev, of Russia's Institute of National Security and Strategic Research, says that North Korea has nuclear warheads. According to Kumachev, the Soviet Union learned in 1985 that North Korea was enriching "more uranium than was necessary for non-military purposes, and that secret underground bases had been set up in the mountains." Kumachev also says that Russia "still retains around 15 experts in North Korea to keep us up to date with and to monitor its nuclear program." He also claims that North Korea has "carried out tests in certain African countries under totalitarian regimes."
—"North Korea Has Nukes: Russian Defence Official," Agence France Presse, 14 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Pukhan Imi Haekshilhŏm'/Russia Anboyŏn'gomun/'Haengmugi Poyu Haekshil'," Kyunghyang Shinmun, 15 February 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "'Pukhan Haekt'andu Itta'/Rŏ Kukpangjŏllyakyŏ'guso Kowigwalli Palghyŏ," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 15 February 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "Rŏ 'Puk Kaekt'andu Poyu'/Kukpang'yŏn Pojwagwan/Africa'sŏ Imi Shilhŏm Wallyo," Segye Ilbo, 15 February 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "Heangmugi-Unbansudan Puk Imi Poyujujang/Rŏ Chŏnmun'ga," Taehan Maeil, 15 February 1994, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

15 February 1994
Following two rounds of talks with the IAEA, North Korea agrees to allow inspections of seven declared nuclear facilities but not two suspected nuclear waste sites. According to IAEA Spokesman David Kyd, the goal of the inspections is "verify that nuclear material in these facilities has not been diverted since earlier inspections." As to the date of the inspections, Kyd says the inspectors will travel to North Korea as soon as the IAEA has made the necessary arrangements.
—"North Korea to Allow Nuclear Inspection," United Press International, 15 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Farhan Haq, "North Korea: Pyongyang And IAEA Agree on Weapons Monitoring," Inter Press Service, 15 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Agrees to International Inspection if Nuclear Sites," Associated Press, 15 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David A. Sanger, "North Koreans Agree to Survey of Atomic Sites," New York Times, 16 February 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Agrees to Open Nuclear Facilities to Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 16 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>

18 February 1994
US and South Korean officials reaffirm their position that the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue on the nuclear situation on the peninsula is a prerequisite for the next round of high-level talks between the United States and North Korea.
—South Korean News Agency [sic], 18 February 1994, in "USA, South Korea Reportedly Confirm Conditions for US Talks with North," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 February 1994
North Korea informs the IAEA that it will issue visas to inspectors once it talks with the United States. The IAEA condemns the North Korean demand as an attempt to "buy time."
—"N. Korea May Grant IAEA Visas after Talks with U.S.," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 February 1994
The North Korean Foreign Ministry announces that the scope of the upcoming IAEA inspections is only to guarantee the continuity of its safeguards agreement. In a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, the Foreign Ministry says that the inspections will be neither routine nor special inspections. The spokesman goes on to say that the "persistent" demand by the United States, Japan and South Korea for special inspections is "tantamount to an attempt to drive (North Korea) out of the (NPT)," and if such demands continue North Korea might rethink its decision to allow IAEA inspections.
—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 21 February 1994, in "Ministry Spokesman on Accord with IAEA; Watching US Attitude," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Defines Scope of IAEA Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 21 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Threatens to Back Away from Inspection Accord," Agence France Presse, 21 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 February 1994
US and North Korean officials hold a working-level meeting to discuss the issuance of visas to IAEA inspectors. North Korea has said that it will issue visas once a third round of high-level talks with the United States is scheduled, but the United States continues to insist that the resumption of high-level talks with North Korea is contingent on Pyongyang first accepting IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—"IAEA Visa Issue Appears Settled in U.S.-N. Korea Meeting," Japan Economic Newswire, 23 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 February 1994
At the IAEA Board of Governors' meeting in Vienna, North Korean officials announce that Pyongyang will allow IAEA inspections by 1 March if the United States officially suspends the annual Team Spirit military exercise and sets a date for the third round of high-level US-North Korean talks.
—"North Korea Sets Condition for Inspections of Nuclear Sites," United Press International, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Urges N. Korea to Set Inspection by Month's End," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles A. Radin, "North Korea Stalls on Inspections; Makes New Demands as Deadline Passes; Material from Wire Service Was Used in This Report," Boston Globe, 24 February 1994, p. 2, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 February 1994
In the summary statement of the Board of Governors' meeting, the IAEA urges North Korea to set a date for IAEA inspections before March.
—"IAEA Urges N. Korea to Set Inspection by Month's End," Japan Economic Newswire, 24 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 February 1994
State Department officials announce that the United States has broken off working-level talks with North Korea. According to the officials, the United States stopped the talks, which have been conducted in New York for the past week, because North Korea announced on 23 February that the United States must meet certain conditions before it would allow IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. US negotiator Thomas Hubbard says that he expects more talks in the near future.
—"U.S. Breaks off Talks with N. Korea on Nuke Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 25 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Negotiator with North Korea Heads Back to Washington with No Accord," Agence France Presse, 25 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 February 1994
The United States and North Korea reach an agreement in which IAEA inspections of North Korean facilities will begin on 1 March. The United States agrees to hold a third round of high-level talks with North Korea starting on 31 March in Geneva. North Korea's representative to the UN, Pak Gil Yon, announces that on 1 March the United States and North Korea will take "four simultaneous steps" to resolve the deadlock on the issue. When asked about the visas for IAEA inspectors, Pak says that they are being granted "as we speak."
—Paul Lewis, "North Korea Agrees to Some U.N. Nuclear Inspections," New York Times, 26 February 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Agrees to Nuclear Inspections form March 1," Japan Economic Newswire, 26 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Lewis, "North Korea Grants Nuclear Inspectors Visas," New York Times, 27 February 1994, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 February 1994
North Korea issues visas to seven IAEA inspectors who will leave for Pyongyang on 27 February.
— Paul Lewis, "North Korea Grants Nuclear Inspectors Visas," New York Times, 27 February 1994, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 February 1994
Seven IAEA inspectors depart Vienna bound for Pyongyang. The seven-member team will conduct inspections of North Korea's seven declared nuclear facilities beginning on 1 March.
—"Inspection Team Leaves Vienna for N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 27 February 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

March 1994
Russia deports five North Koreans from Moscow "for showing too much interest in nuclear components."
—Warren Strobel, "N. Korea Sops for Nuke Technology in Russia," Washington Times, 5 July 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Chŏng Hae Yŏng, "Puk, Rŏ Haekkisul Milsuip Kido/Missile P'oham 3 Kŏn...Taesagwanjig'wŏn 3 Myŏngch'ep'o," Chosun Ilbo, 6 July 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

2 March 1994
General Gary Luck, commander of US forces in South Korea, announces to Congress that the joint US-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises will be cancelled. A few hours later (3 March) the South Korean Foreign Ministry announces the cancellation in Seoul. However, both the United States and South Korea state that the cancellation of the military exercises is contingent on North Korea allowing the completion of IAEA inspections at seven declared nuclear facilities and the resumption of inter-Korea dialogue regarding nuclear issues on the peninsula.
—Michael R. Gordon, "South Korea Offers Terms for Ending War Games," New York Times, 3 March 1994, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 March 1994
The United States announces that it will resume high-level bilateral talks with North Korea on 21 March in Geneva. Undersecretary of State Robert Gallucci will head the US delegation. According to State Department spokesman Michael McCurry, the third round of high-level talks "will aim at a thorough and broad resolution of the nuclear and other issues that separate the DPRK from the US and the rest of the international community."
— Reuters, "U.S. And North Korea to Resume Talks March 21," New York Times, 4 March 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Announces High Level Talks with N. Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 4 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 March 1994
IAEA inspectors begin inspections at one of North Korea's seven declared nuclear facilities. The inspections, to be conducted at all seven declared facilities, are the first such inspections in over one year. The IAEA continues to urge North Korea to allow inspections at two suspected nuclear waste sites, but currently Pyongyang is limiting the inspections to the seven declared facilities.
—"UN Experts Inspect Nuclear Site," Press Association, 3 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, "U.S. And North Korea to Resume Talks March 21," New York Times, 4 March 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 March 1994
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sŏk Chu says that North Korea might halt IAEA inspections if the United States continues to insist on inter-Korean exchange of envoys as a precondition for canceling Team Spirit military exercises. According to Kang, "It is clear that if...the United States gives up halfway the decision to renounce the Team Spirit joint military exercises and delays the opening of the third round DPRK-US talks under an absurd pretext, we cannot satisfactorily ensure the IAEA's inspection that has already begun."
—"N. Korea Says U.S. Action Could End IAEA Inspection," Japan Economic Newswire, 4 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Associated Press (Tokyo), "North Korea Asserts U.S. Endangers Pact on Atom Inspections," New York Times, 5 March 1994, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 March 1994
The United States and South Korea agree that Washington should postpone the third round of high-level talks with Pyongyang scheduled for 21 March in Geneva. Meeting in Seoul, Kim Sam Hun, South Korea's special ambassador in charge of North Korean nuclear issues, and US Undersecretary of State Robert Gallucci agree that the IAEA inspections currently underway in North Korea must be concluded prior to the third round of talks.
—Kate Webb, "Gallucci Flies into Seoul for Talks on Nuclear Impasse," Agence France Presse, 10 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "S. Korea, U.S. Discuss Delay of U.S.-N. Korea Talks," Japan Economic Newswire, 11 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 March 1994
North Korea threatens to boycott the third round of high-level talks with the United States if Washington continues to insist on "unreasonable preconditions." The North Korean Foreign Ministry claims that Pyongyang has fulfilled its commitments by resuming contact with Seoul and allowing IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities. However, the United States insists that IAEA inspectors were not given sufficient access and the exchange of presidential envoys between North and South Korea has yet to be realized.
—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 15 March 1994, in "Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Implementing North Korea-US Agreement," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Threatens to Boycott Talks with U.S.," Agence France Presse, 15 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 March 1994
IAEA inspectors leave North Korea without being able to complete the full scope of their planned inspections. According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, "We were only able to partially fulfill our mission." The inspectors reportedly discovered seals that had been tampered with and were denied access to a site described by North Korean officials as a "Radiochemistry Laboratory" but is suspected of being used for plutonium extraction. According to officials from the United States, Japan and South Korea, inspectors were prevented form taking any samples from within the "glove box" of the suspected reprocessing facility.
—"North Korea Threatens to Halt Nuclear Inspections Again," Associated Press, 15 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea Prevented Full IAEA Inspections," Agence France Presse, 15 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Blocks Key Nuclear Checks," Toronto Star, 16 March 1994, p. A24, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Said to Block Taking of Radioactive Samples from Site," New York Times, 16 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Jahn, "Inspectors Blocked from Learning if Nuclear Fuel Was Diverted," Associated Press, 16 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 March 1994
The United States cancels high-level talks with North Korea scheduled to begin on 21 March and resumes plans to conduct the annual Team Spirit joint military exercise with South Korea. The cancellation of the talks and resumption of the military exercises come in the wake of North Korea's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to take samples at a suspected plutonium reprocessing plant during agreed upon inspections in early March.
—Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Cancels Talks with North Korea over Atom Inspections," New York Times, 17 March 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Stephen Robinson, "US Retaliates after N Korea Blocks Nuclear Inspection," The Daily Telegraph, 17 March 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Gretchen Cook, "US Backs off after North Korea Breaks Nuclear Promise," Agence France Presse, 17 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Burns, "Clinton Says Military Preparations in Korea under Consideration," Associated Press, 18 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 March 1994
Lee Ch'ung Kuk defects to South Korea. Lee, a former analyst and translator for the Ministry of People's Armed Forces Nuclear Chemical Defense Bureau, supplies South Korean officials with information about North Korea's nuclear weapons and chemical weapons programs.
—U Chong Chang, Chugan Chosun, 30 June 1994, pp. 26-28, in "Weekly Assesses DPRK Nuclear War Preparations," FBIS-EAS-94-126, 30 June 1994, p. 38; "Pukhan'gun Chungsa Kwisun," Donga Ilbo, 19 March 1994, p. 31, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

18 March 1994
North Korea claims that recently concluded IAEA inspections of its nuclear facilities were sufficient. Quoting a spokesman for the General Department in Atomic Energy, the Korean Central News Agency reports that North Korea has "permitted all the activities within the scope needed for maintaining the continuity of the safeguards," and that the IAEA was "widening its partiality...in pursuing its ill-disposed political purposes under the United States' manipulation."
—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 18 March 1994, in "North Korean Statement Rejects IAEA View of Recent Inspections," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 19 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Says Nuclear Checks Were Satisfactory," United Press International, 18 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 March 1994
During bilateral talks between the two Koreas, North Korean delegate Pak Yŏng Su says, "Seoul is not very far from here. Seoul can be turned into a sea of fire. We will match dialogue with dialogue, and war with war."
—Cho Min Ho, "'Seoul Pulbada Toel'gŏt' Puk Tanjang Kŭg'ŏn/Nambuk 8 Ch'a Shilmujŏpch'ok P'anmunjŏm P'yojŏng," Segye Ilbo, 20 March 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Backs Maneuvers In S. Korea," Washington Post, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Will Urge U.N. To Plan Sanctions for North Korea," New York Times, 20 March 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Norman Kempster, "U.S. to Urge Sanctions for N. Korea," Los Angeles Times, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Usborne, "North Korea 'Ready for War'," The Independent, 20 March 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 March 1994
The Clinton administration decides to ask the UN to get prepared to impose economic sanctions against North Korea. According to the Washington Post, the United States will ask for a Security Council vote on a resolution calling for complete access to North Korea's nuclear facilities. The administration also decides to reinstate joint military exercises with South Korea. North Korea has said it will consider economic sanctions an act of war.
—Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Will Urge U.N. To Plan Sanctions for North Korea," New York Times, 20 March 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Backs Maneuvers In S. Korea," Washington Post, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Norman Kempster, "U.S. to Urge Sanctions for N. Korea," Los Angeles Times, 20 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Usborne, "North Korea 'Ready for War'," The Independent, 20 March 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US to Reschedule Joint Military Exercises with South Korea," Agence France Presse, 20 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 March 1994
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a six-page statement in which it says that Pyongyang will pull out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if the IAEA refers North Korea's alleged obstruction of inspections to the UN Security Council, and if the United States and South Korea go ahead with the Team Spirit military exercise. According to the statement, "If the United States avoids the talks and...resumes the Team Spirit joint military exercise in 1994, and if the IAEA widens its partiality and resorts to strong-arm politics and pressure...we will have no alternative but to carry into practice the measures declared in March last year in order to defend the sovereignty of the nation and the security of the state."
—"North Korea Threatens Withdrawal from Nuclear Treaty," United Press International, 20 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David A. Sanger, "North Korea Bars A-Plant Survey; Threatens to Quit Nuclear Treaty," New York Times, 21 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 March 1994
President Clinton announces that the United States will send Patriot missiles to South Korea in response to growing tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Speaking to reporters in Florida, Clinton says, "We have agreed that it is our national interest and in the interest of the security if the people of South Korea and the security of our armed forces there to send Patriot missiles at this time." According to a Pentagon spokesman, the missiles will be transported by sea and reach South Korea in about 30 days.
—Jim Abrams, "Clinton Says United States Sending Patriot Missiles to South Korea," Associated Press, 21 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Goes to U.N. to Increase The Pressure on North Korea," New York Times, 22 March 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 March 1994
The United States presents a draft resolution to the UN Security Council calling on North Korea to accept additional IAEA inspections. The resolution stops short of calling for economic sanctions but leaves such an option open if North Korea does not readmit IAEA inspectors within one month.
—South Korean News Agency [sic], 22 March 1994, in "UN Security Council Discusses North Korean Nuclear Issues," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Lewis, "China Shields North Koreans on Atom Issue," New York Times, 30 March 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 March 1994
South Korean President Kim Young Sam places the South Korean military on high alert in response to a North Korean delegate's remark that North Korea could turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." Kim is scheduled to leave for Japan and China tomorrow.
—Terry McCarthy and Teresa Poole, "Seoul Forces Put on Alert as Tension with North Grows, The Independent, 23 March 1994, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Burton and George Graham, "S Korean Forces Go on Alert as N-Plant Row with North Grows," Financial Times, 23 March 1994, p. 24, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; T.R. Reid, "North Korea Warns of 'Brink of War'," Washington Post, 23 March 1994, p. A23, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Steven Greenhouse, "Christopher Says U.S. Stays Firm on Korea, But Pledges Diplomacy," New York Times, 23 March 1994, p. A12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 March 1994
IAEA spokesman David Kyd announces that it appears that North Korea will complete the construction of its 50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun on schedule by the end of 1994. Kyd says it appears that North Korea is constructing a third nuclear reactor in T'aech'ŏn-kun, which is scheduled for completion in early 1996.
—KBS-1 Radio Network (Seoul), 23 March 1994, in "IAEA Spokesman Says North Korea Building Two More Nuclear Reactors," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 25 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 March 1994
According to US and European officials, North Korea may be reprocessing spent fuel through an un-safeguarded second reprocessing line at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. The revelation comes after IAEA inspections of the Yŏngbyŏn reprocessing plant [Radiochemistry Laboratory] during which inspectors were prevented from examining points that may connect the existing reprocessing line to the suspected second line. The existing line was placed under safeguards in 1993. It is believed that the existence of an un-safeguarded second line can allow North Korea to divert "plutonium-laden material in solution from the safeguarded line without detection." US officials say that the second reprocessing line, six months from completion, will double North Korea's plutonium production capacity.
—Mark Hibbs and Naoaki Usui, "Second, Hidden reprocessing Line feared Opened at Yongbyon Plant," Nucleonics Week, 24 March 1994, pp. 1-2; "North Korea Doubling Capacity to Make Plutonium, Report Says," Associated Press, 2 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuter, "N. Korea "Poised" on Nuclear Arms Brink," Toronto Star, 3 April 1994, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael Gordon, "North Korea May Be Expanding Atom Site," New York Times, 3 April 1994, p.6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27-29 March 1994
South Korean President Kim Young Sam travels to China in order to plead with Chinese leaders to place added pressure on North Korea to resolve suspicions about its nuclear program. On 28 March China's President Jiang Zemin tells Kim that the only way to resolve the issue with North Korea is through dialogue.
—Peter Goodspeed, "China's Help Sought in North Korean Nuclear Crisis," Toronto Star, 28 March 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Victoria Graham, "U.S., China at Odds over Security Council Statement on North Korea," Associated Press, 28 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 March 1994
China objects to a US proposed resolution to the UN Security Council calling on North Korea to readmit IAEA inspectors within one month. Objecting to language in the proposal threatening "further Security Council action," China suggests that the Security Council President issue a consensus statement urging North Korea to cooperate with IAEA inspectors. The statement would make no mention of possible actions taken by the Security Council if North Korea does not cooperate.
—Paul Lewis, "China Shields North Korans on Atom Issue," New York Times, 30 March 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 March 1994
The UN Security Council issues a presidential statement proposed by China urging North Korea to allow IAEA inspectors. The statement, read by Security Council President Jean-Bernard Merimee, differs from the US proposed resolution in that there is no mention of a deadline for North Korea to readmit inspectors. The threat of Security Council action is not as overt as in the proposed resolution, but the statement does warn that "further Security Council consideration will take place if necessary in order to achieve full implementation of the IAEA-North Korean safeguards agreement." [Note: China had warned that if the US resolution came to vote, it would use its veto power as one of the permanent five members of the Security Council.]
—J. T. Nguyen, "U.N. Issues Statement on North Korea," United Press International, 31 March 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. to Press North Korea over A-Site," New York Times, 31 March 1994, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Lewis, "U.S. and China Reach Accord at U.N. on Korean Nuclear Issue," New York Times, 1 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Text of U.N. Security Council Statement on North Korea," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 March 1994
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman accuses the United States of making "false promises" and resorting to pressure tactics and condemns the UN Resolution urging North Korea to reinstate IAEA inspectors.
—KCNA (Pyongyang), 31 March 1994, in "Foreign Ministry Spokesman on US Pressure Campaign," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 4 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 April 1994
North Korea's Foreign Ministry states that the nuclear inspection dispute can be settled in direct talks with the United States, and declines a Russian proposal to resolve the matter in a multilateral forum.
—"N. Korea Responds Negatively to Russian Proposal," Japan Economic Newswire, 1 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 April 1994
US Secretary of Defense William Perry, speaking on NBC's Meet the Press, accuses North Korea of lying about its nuclear program. Perry claims that the United States is not considering a preemptive strike on North Korea's nuclear facilities "under these circumstances, at this time," and declares that while the United States has no intention of triggering a war on the Korean Peninsula, direct military action is an option if North Korea continues to refuse international inspections of its nuclear facilities.
—Rupert Cornwell, "U.S. Defence Chief Says North Korea Is Lying about Its Nukes," The Independent, 4 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 April 1994
The North Korean Foreign Ministry condemns the UN Resolution calling for it to reinstate IAEA inspectors as "irrational and senseless." In a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, a Foreign Ministry spokesman states that "since the United States has opted...to put pressure on the DPRK, we cannot but normalize our peaceful nuclear activities." Later in the day, US State Department spokesman Michael McCurry says that Washington is not sure what exactly "normalizing" means.
—Barry Schweid, "U.S. Disturbed by Doubling of North Korea's Capacity to Produce Plutonium," Associated Press, 4 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Braven Smillie, "North Korea Spurns U.N. Request on Nuclear Inspections," Associated Press, 4 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Rejects U.N.'s Call for Full Inspection of A-Plant," New York Times, 5 April 1994, p. 8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kevin Rafferty, "N Korea Says It Will Resume Nuclear Work," The Guardian (London), 5 April 1994, p. 10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 April 1994
North Korea shuts down its 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun in preparation to begin unloading its fuel rods in May.
—David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1994, Vol. 50, No. 5, <http://www.thebulletin.org>.

13 April 1994
Speaking at the annual conference of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that it is critical that the IAEA have complete access to the two undeclared sites in North Korea suspected of being nuclear waste dump-sites in order to determine whether any nuclear materials have been diverted for nuclear weapons production. Blix stresses that gaining access to the radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] and the 5MW gas-graphite reactor is also necessary to learn whether the lab has been used since February 1993. According to Blix, the IAEA is concerned that North Korea possesses more plutonium than it has reported. In the spring of 1993, it was concluded that North Korea had more plutonium than it had declared. Blix disclosed that North Korea is working on constructing a second [reprocessing] production line in the Radiochemistry Laboratory, which is expected to be completed in the near future.
—David E. Sanger, "Nuclear Agency Chief Warns of Need for Access to North Korea," New York Times, 15 April 1994, p. A4; Kyodo News Service, "Blix Urges Completion of N. Korean Inspections," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 April 1994
South Korean Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Unification Lee Yŏng Tŏk announces that South Korea has withdrawn its demand for an exchange of special envoys with North Korea as a condition for the resumption of high-level US-North Korean talks.
—"S. Korea Withdraws Demand for Exchange of Inter-Korean Envoys," Xinhua News Agency, 15 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'T'ŭksa' P'ogi/Puk'e 5 Wŏlch'o'kkaji Ch'ugasach'al Suyong Ch'okku," Kukmin Ilbo, 15 April 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "'Sŏn T'ŭksa'gyohwan' Ch'ŏlhoe/I T'ong'ilbuch'ongni/Haek Ch'oeusŏnhae'gyŏl Ipchang'ŭn Pulbyŏn," Joongang Ilbo, 15 April 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

18 April 1994
In an interview with Prensa Latina News Agency, North Korean President Kim Il Sung says that North Korea has neither the intention nor the capability to develop nuclear weapons. He adds that North Korea will be forced to take self-defensive measures if the United States continued to place pressure on Pyongyang.
—Prensa Latina News Agency (Havana), 18 April 1994, in "North Korean Leader's Comments on Nuclear Capability Reported by Cuban Agency," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 20 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 April 1994
North Korea notifies the IAEA of its intention to refuel its 5 MW(e) graphite-moderated reactor in Yǒngbyǒn-kun "at an early date."
—"IAEA Proposes Sending a Team to Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Discuss Arrangements on Safeguards Measures," Federal News Service, 23 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 April 1994
An official from the North Korean mission to the UN reiterates Pyongyang's claim that no more inspectors will be allowed into North Korea until after the resumption of high-level US-North Korean talks. The official says, "We received all the inspections needed to guarantee the continuity of safeguards that have been agreed with the United States."
—South Korean News Agency, 20 April 1994, in "North Korean Official Says No Inspections before Talks with USA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 April 1994
US Secretary of Defense William Perry announces that the Team Spirit military exercise will be postponed until at least November.
—David E. Sanger, "Defense Chief Says North Korea Could Soon Build 4 A-Bombs," New York Times, 21 April 1994, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1994
US Secretary of Defense William Perry announces that North Korea is "within weeks" of removing enough fuel to make four or five nuclear weapons. Perry does not specify what evidence led the United States to this conclusion.
—David E. Sanger, "Defense Chief Says North Korea Could Soon Build 4 A-Bombs," New York Times, 21 April 1994, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 April 1994
The IAEA announces that it recently received a letter from North Korea stating that it plans to remove fuel rods from its largest reactor [5MW(e) reactor] in Yǒngbyǒn-kun. According to the IAEA, North Korea will allow the agency to monitor the removal but not to take any sample or conduct any tests.
—David E. Sanger, "North Korea Moves to Use Fuel for Bomb," New York Times, 22 April 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 April 1994
US Assistant Secretary of State for political and military affairs, Robert Gallucci, announces that the United States hopes to resume working-level contacts with North Korea by May. Gallucci says, "We hope that this week we'll be able to get back to North Korea—almost certainly using the New York channel."
—South Korean News Agency, 27 April 1994, in "US Hopes to Resume 'Working-Level' Contacts with North Korea 'This Week,'" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis,<http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 April 1994
North Korea announces that it will not accept full IAEA inspections. Although IAEA inspectors will be permitted to witness the removal of the nuclear spent fuel rods from its 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn, they will not be allowed to take samples of the rods or to measure their radioactivity.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "N. Korea Refuses Demand to Inspect Reactor Fuel," Washington Post, 28 April 1994, p. A22.

28 April 1994
North Korean Ambassador to the UN Pak Kil Yŏn accuses the United States of violating the Korean Armistice Agreement by introducing to South Korea "up-to-date military hardware, including over 1,000 nuclear weapons."
—"N. Korea Claims U.S. Breaches Cease-Fire," United Press International, 28 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

28 April 1994
The United States and North Korea hold working-level talks in New York. According to State Department, the United States offers to hold another round of high-level talks and suspend Team Spirit military exercises if North Korea allows additional IAEA inspections.
—Yonhap News Agency, 29 April 1994, in "Yonhap Reports DPRK-US Working Level Contact," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 April 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 April 1994
The IAEA receives a letter from North Korea denying a request to take samples when fuel is removed from the 5MW(e) reactor in Yǒngbyǒn-kun. In the letter, North Korea reiterates that the IAEA's role will be limited solely to monitoring. According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, North Korea's reply is "very firm.... Sampling is not in the cards at all."
—Andrew Pollack, "U.N. Says North Korea Refuses to Allow Nuclear Inspections," New York Times, 1 May 1994, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

May-June 1994
North Korea discharges the spent fuel from its nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—US Department of Defense, "Proliferation: Threat and Response," 11 April 1996, <http://www.defenselink.mil>; Kim Byŏng Ku, et al, Pukhaekkisulch'ongsŏ-I (North Korean Nuclear Issues and the LWR Project), KAERI/AR-552-99, Technology Center for Nuclear Control, November 1999, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr>.

2 May 1994
The US State Department says that Washington will abort all talks with Pyongyang if it removes fuel rods from a reactor without the presence of IAEA inspectors.
—South Korean News Agency [sic], 3 May 1994, in "USA Rejects North's Claim That Armistice Agreement is "Useless", "Invalid," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 3 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 May 1994
The IAEA sends a letter to North Korea reiterating its demand that North Korea allow full inspection of the refueling of its 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. IAEA Director General Hans Blix in a letter to North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong Nam warns that North Korea's failure to agree to IAEA inspections will be seen as evidence of North Korean efforts to develop nuclear capabilities, and will compel the IAEA to take the issue to the UN Security Council.
—KBS Radio (Seoul), 4 May 1994, in "IAEA Head Sends Telegram Urging Pyongyang to Accept Inspection Conditions," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 May 1994
A North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says that the IAEA's demand to set aside and measure spent fuel from the 5MW(e) reactor is "unreasonable," adding that North Korea will allow "the observation of the fuel rod replacement, containment and surveillance over all replaced fuel and other sufficient inspections for the maintenance of the continuity of safeguards." The spokesman adds that "selective" fuel rod sampling "can never be allowed because it means routine and ad hoc inspections that ignore North Korea's unique status" under the NPT following the "temporary suspension" of its withdrawal from the NPT.
—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 3 May 1994, in "Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Inspections and IAEA's 'Unreasonable' Request," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 5 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

9 May 1994
The US and North Korea hold working-level talks in New York. At the talks, the United States asks North Korea to postpone the removal of nuclear fuel rods until IAEA inspectors arrive. Washington threatens to break off all talks if the IAEA is not allowed to monitor the extraction of fuel rods from the 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—Yonhap News Agency, 10 May 1994, in "US-North Korean Working Level Contact in New York: Nuclear Issue Discussed," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 11 May 1994, in "South Reports 'Considerable Progress' in US-North Korean Talks," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 12 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 May 1994
North Korea notifies the IAEA that it has begun removing fuel rods from the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yongbyŏn-kun.
—Mary Curtis, "US Says Korean Fuel Not Diverted," Boston Globe, 21 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Proposes Sending a Team to Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Discuss Arrangements on Safeguards Measures," Federal News Service, 23 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 May 1994
The IAEA announces that it will shortly send an inspection team to North Korea to service cameras and check safeguard seals at the reprocessing plant [Radiochemistry Laboratory] and the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex. North Korea will also conduct working-level talks with the IAEA on the removal of the fuel rods from the 5MW(e) reactor. IAEA inspectors will be allowed to set aside fuel rod samples for future measurement. Inspectors will also complete some steps blocked during the March 1994 inspections, including the measurement of radioactivity and search for radioactive particles at the Radiochemistry Laboratory, but will not be able to sample "liquids from tanks used to dissolve spent fuel." The inspection team will also not be allowed to conduct formal inspections of the removal of spent fuel rods from the 5MW(e) reactor.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "Inspectors Returning to North Korea; Team Scheduled to Resume Tests Halted in March; Access to Some Nuclear Sits Blocked," Washington Post, 14 May 1994; David E. Sanger, "Nuclear Agency to Send a New Inspection Team to North Korea," New York Times, 13 May 1994, p. 7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 14 May 1994, in "North Korea Begins Changing Fuel Rods But Says IAEA Inspections Still on," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Team Leaving Shortly to Inspect Reprocessing Plant in Democratic People's Republic of Korea," Federal News Service, 16 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 May 1994
North Korea starts unloading spent fuel rods from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun before the arrival of the IAEA inspectors.
—Eric Schmitt, "U. S. Delays Taking Steps Over A-Plant," New York Times, 16 May 1994, pp. A1, A3; David E. Sanger, "North Koreans Say Nuclear Fuel Rods Are Being Removed," New York Times, 15 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 May 1994
Clinton Administration officials announce that if North Korea has removed or "emptied" the spent fuel from the rods, the United States will seek sanctions in the UN Security Council.
—Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Delays Taking Steps Over A-Plant," New York Times, 16 May 1994, pp. A1, A3; John Diamond, "Perry Says U.S. Could Be Weeks Away from Crisis with North Korea," Associated Press, 18 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 May 1994
US Secretary of Defense William Perry characterizes the situation in North Korea as a "very substantial near-term crisis." According to Perry, the issue of removing fuel from a 5MW(e) reactor in Yǒngbyǒn could lead to a major confrontation if Pyongyang does not allow verification that spent fuel is not being diverted to a clandestine nuclear weapons program.
—John Diamond, "Perry Says U.S. Could Be Weeks Away from Crisis with North Korea," Associated Press, 18 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-May 1994
IAEA inspectors complete inspections of a plutonium reprocessing plant [Radiochemistry Laboratory] in Yǒngbyǒn-kun and replace the film and batteries on monitoring equipment at a nuclear reactor at the same complex.
—Michael R. Gordon, "Citing Progress, U.S. Plans New Talks with North Korea," New York Times, 21 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 May 1994
IAEA inspectors confirm that North Korea has begun removing spent nuclear fuel from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yǒngbyǒn-kun. While North Korea has not yet taken any measures that would prevent tests from determining the exact amount of nuclear material that has been removed, the IAEA states that immediate implementation of safeguards is necessary in order to verify whether or not spent fuel had been diverted in the past. To this end, the agency proposes sending a team to North Korea to discuss arrangements for implementing the necessary safeguards.
—Michael R. Gordon, "Team Confirms North Koreans Extracted Rods," New York Times, 20 May 1994, p. 9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Proposes Sending a Team to Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Discuss Arrangements on Safeguards Measures," Federal News Service, 23 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 May 1994
The United States decides to resume high-level talks with North Korea. The decision follows an announcement by the IAEA that North Korea has not diverted any of the spent fuel it recently removed from a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yǒngbyǒn-kun.
—Michael R. Gordon, "Citing Progress, U.S. Plans New Talks with North Korea," New York Times, 21 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mary Curtis, "US Says Korean Fuel Not Diverted," Boston Globe, 21 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 May 1994
North Korea sends a message to the IAEA expressing its willingness to receive a team of specialist to discuss the implementation of safeguards on the 5MW(e) reactor currently being refueled. The IAEA team is scheduled to arrive on 24 May.
—"IAEA Consultation Travels to Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Clarify How to Implement Safeguards Measures in Power Reactor," Federal News Service, 24 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 May 1994
An IAEA team of specialists arrive in North Korea to discuss the implementation of safeguards on the 5MW(e) reactor in Yǒngbyǒn-kun.
—"IAEA Consultation Travels to Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Clarify How to Implement Safeguards Measures in Power Reactor," Federal News Service, 24 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

25-27 May 1994
The IAEA and North Korea hold working level talks in Pyongyang. The purpose of the talks is to make arrangements for the implementation of necessary safeguards in order to verify that spent fuel from the 5MW(e) reactor in Yǒngbyǒn-kun has not been diverted. North Korea rejects the IAEA demand that it set aside about 300 fuel rods from the core to be examined at a later date.
—KCNA (Pyongyang), 28 May 1994, in "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Outlines Negotiations with IAEA," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 30 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Late May 1994
Working-level talks between the United States and North Korea break down as North Korea rejects the US demand that it set aside some of the fuel rods currently being removed from the 5MW(e) reactor so that future tests can determine if any of the spent fuel had been diverted in 1989.
—Michael R. Gordon, "Korea Speeds Nuclear Fuel Removal, Impeding Inspection," New York Times, 28 May 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Burns, "U.N. Inspectors Say North Koreans Speeding Removal of Fuel Rods," Associated Press, 28 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 May 1994
IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that North Korea is now removing fuel from its 5MW(e) reactor "at a very fast pace." In a letter to Boutros-Ghali, Blix claims that "almost half of the fuel in the reactor core has been discharged and in a pattern that has precluded the agency's ability to implement the full range of the safeguards measures required."
—Michael R. Gordon, "Korea Speeds Nuclear Fuel Removal, Impeding Inspection," New York Times, 28 May 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Robert Burns, "U.N. Inspectors Say North Koreans Speeding Removal of Fuel Rods," Associated Press, 28 May 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David Albright, "How Much Plutonium Does North Korea Have?" The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September/October 1994, Vol. 50, No. 5, <http://www.thebulletin.org>.

28 May 1994
A team of IAEA officials sent to negotiate the implementation of necessary safeguards on the 5MW(e) reactor leave North Korea. The officials claim that North Korea "rejected all IAEA proposals put forward with the aim of maintaining the IAEA's ability to select, segregate and secure fuel rods for later measurements, so as to be able to verify the history of the reactor core."
—David E. Sanger, "North Korea Foils Efforts to Halt Its Nuclear Plans," New York Times, 29 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

30 May 1994
The UN Security Council issues a statement urging North Korea to set aside spent fuel rods necessary to determine if any plutonium has been diverted to a weapons program. The statement, adopted unanimously, carries less weight than a full resolution and makes no mention of economic sanctions if Pyongyang does not cooperate.
—Eric Schmitt, "U.N. Council Urges North Korea to Preserve Atom-Fuel Evidence," New York Times, 31 May 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

31 May 1994
The IAEA Director General Hans Blix announces that due to continued North Korean non-compliance with IAEA inspections, North Korea is "no longer [officially] in compliance with IAEA safeguards." The IAEA makes a final appeal to North Korea, asking it to stop withdrawing fuel rods from the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor and to allow international inspections to proceed. IAEA inspectors announce that key fuel rods have already been removed from the original 300 rods that are considered "vital to future measurement." In a telex to North Korea, the IAEA reiterates that it will accept two other methods of measuring the rods that remain, but according to Blix, North Korea has not accepted the proposals due to political constraints. North Korea's Ambassador to the IAEA, Yun Ho Jin announces that the refueling will continue. Yun says that 40 rods have been withdrawn under IAEA camera surveillance and placed in a storage site "pending an inspection agreement."
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Plans to Seek North Korea Sanctions; Pyongyang Seen Likely to Continue to Bar Inspections; IAEA Makes Last-Ditch Appeal," Washington Post, 1 June 1994, p. A22; Martin Walker, "North Korea 'Has Crossed Red Line,'" Guardian (London), 1 June 1994, p. 20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

June 1994
The United States establishes a plan to bomb North Korea's nuclear complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.
—Lee Chŏng Hun, "Haek Chaech'orishisŏl Lee Chong Hun'i Pulbut'igo Chang Yŏng Shik'i Mulkkiŏntta," Shindonga, September 2002, <http://www.donga.com/docs/magazine
/new_donga/200209/nd2002090130.html>.

2 June 1994
UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali receives a letter from IAEA inspectors stating that they can no longer verify that North Korea has not diverted plutonium to a clandestine weapons program.
—Terence Hunt, "U.S. to Seek UN Sanctions against North Korea," Associated Press, 2 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mike Trickey, "Yeltsin Warns North Korea Not to Expect Russia's Help," Vancouver Sun, 3 June 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 June 1994
Following the IAEA announcement that they could no longer verify that North Korea has not diverted spent fuel to a weapons program, the United States begins consultations at the UN on imposing economic sanctions. While most members of the Security Council support economic sanctions, China, a permanent member with veto power, is still reluctant to take such measures. In Beijing, Foreign Ministry spokesman, Shen Guofang says, "At this time, we do not favor resorting to means that might sharpen the confrontation."
—Terence Hunt, "U.S. to Seek UN Sanctions against North Korea," Associated Press, 2 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Mike Trickey, "Yeltsin Warns North Korea Not to Expect Russia's Help," Vancouver Sun, 3 June 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "White House Asks Global Sanctions on North Koreans," New York Times, 3 June 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 June 1994
Russian President Boris Yeltsin warns Pyongyang that it cannot expect Russia's protection from economic sanctions or in the event of war over North Korea's suspicious nuclear activities. Yeltsin says that while Moscow would prefer a diplomatic solution to the problem, it does not feel bound by any treaties to support North Korea in the case of conflict.
—Mike Trickey, "Yeltsin Warns North Korea Not to Expect Russia's Help," Vancouver Sun, 3 June 1994, p. A15, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

3 June 1994
The IAEA Director General Hans Blix informs the UN Security Council that the Agency is unable to verify whether North Korea has used the plutonium extracted from its 5MW(e) reactor to make nuclear weapons. According to Blix, North Korea has removed the 300 fuel rods of the "core fuel element" and mixed them up without marking their exact location in the reactor, thus making it impossible to determine the past activities of the reactor. There is no "technical way of knowing whether North Korea secretly removed fuel from the reactor in 1989 when it was shut down for 100 days and ...if plutonium [was extracted] from it." However, US Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci says that although the IAEA's capability to substantiate the extent of North Korea's plutonium diversion has been "seriously eroded," it has not been destroyed.
—Paul Lewis, "U.N. Told North Korea's Nuclear Record Can't Be Retrieved," New York Times, 4 June 1994, p. A3; Thomas Lippman, "Nudging North Korea to Negotiate; International Group Seeks to Avoid Confrontation on Nuclear Issue," Washington Post, 4 June 1994, p. A14.

3 June 1994
North Korea announces that it will view economic sanctions as a declaration of war.
—Korean Central Broadcasting Agency (Pyongyang), 3 June 1994, in "Vice Foreign Minister's Statement on US-Orchestrated Pressure on Nuclear Issue," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 6 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Darnton, "Clinton Says That North Korea Can Still Avoid U.N. Sanctions," New York Times, 5 June 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 June 1994
Delegates from the United States, Japan and South Korea issue a joint statement in Washington calling on the UN Security Council to "urgently" consider economic sanction against North Korea for defying IAEA inspectors.
—"U.S., Japanese, S. Koreans Meet in Washington," United Press International, 4 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Darnton, "Clinton Says That North Korea Can Still Avoid U.N. Sanctions," New York Times, 5 June 1994, p. 16, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 June 1994
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, warns that Pyongyang may withdraw from the NPT if Washington reneges on its agreement to hold a third round of high-level talks. In May the United States agreed to a third round of talks to resolve the nuclear issue in North Korea, but upon learning that IAEA inspectors could no longer verify that plutonium was not being diverted to a weapons program, Washington cancelled plans for the talks.
—"N. Korea Warns It May Withdraw from Nuclear Treaty," Japan Economic Newswire, 5 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 June 1994
US officials announce that by the end of the year North Korea could reprocess the fuel it recently removed from a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor and produce enough plutonium for four to five bombs.
—Michael R. Gordon, "North Korea Said to Have A-Bomb Fuel," New York Times, 8 June 1994, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>

7 June 1994
North Korea's Ambassador to the IAEA Yun Ho Jin declares that the North Korea "will never allow inspections" of two suspected nuclear waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. One of the reasons for not allowing inspections is because the United States discovered the two nuclear sites using spy satellite imagery. IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that inspecting the two sites "is even more important" for determining if North Korea has diverted plutonium, in light of the fact that North Korea has removed spent fuel from the core of its 5MW(e) reactor without allowing the IAEA to monitor the process. According to Blix, in removing the rods without allowing the IAEA to monitor the process, North Korea's "intention must have been to destroy the possibility of the [IAEA] obtaining information about the history of the core through independent measurements and thereby maintain uncertainty about the amount of nuclear material, specifically plutonium that may be present." However, North Korea's Department of Atomic Energy Director Pak Yong Nam says that the IAEA can still determine whether North Korea has diverted material from the nuclear reactor because North Korea is "preserving the technical possibility for later measurements of the fuel rods."
—David B. Ottaway, "N. Korea Forbids Inspections; 2 Nuclear Waste Sites Off-Limits, Says Envoy, Rebuffing U.S.," Washington Post, 8 June 1994, p. A25; "Pyongyang Boycotts Armistice Talks," The Times, 8 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 June 1994
North Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yŏng Nam says North Korea will "guarantee [IAEA] inspections...testing, measuring, and the preservation of nuclear fuel," if the United States agrees to a third round of bilateral talks. The United States declines the offer and instead asks North Korea to comply with IAEA inspections before the United States will consider reopening bilateral talks.
—"U.S. Rejects More Talks in Standoff over Korea," Toronto Star, 9 June 1994, p. A20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Tokyo Reluctant to Levy Sanctions on North Koreans," New York Times, 9 June 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles A. Radin, "South Korea President Says Sanctions Needed to End Nuclear Dispute," Boston Globe, 9 June 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Before Talks with North Korea," New York Times, 10 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 June 1994
The United States announces that at this point it is not considering a third round of high-level talks with North Korea. According to State Department spokeswoman Christine Shelly, North Korea has passed the "point of no return" by removing by removing almost all of the 8,000 fuel rods from its 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, thus destroying vital evidence necessary for the IAEA to determine whether or not spent fuel was diverted to a weapons program when the reactor was shut down for 100 days in 1989. Despite the strong words by Shelly, the State Department says later in the day that the United States "remains interested in a negotiated settlement, but it's up to the North Koreans to reestablish the basis for our dialogue."
—"U.S. Rejects More Talks on Standoff over Korea," Toronto Star, 9 June 1994, p. A20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Charles A. Radin, "South Korea President Says Sanctions Needed to End Nuclear Dispute," Boston Globe, 9 June 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 June 1994
IAEA officials announce that North Korea will have discharged all of the spent fuel rods from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor by 10 June 1994. According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, the fuel removal "has now been 90 percent completed." The fuel unloading has been faster than anticipated due to North Korea's possession of more unloading equipment than was previously indicated by IAEA inspections. IAEA officials claim that North Korea now has the ability to reprocess the spent fuel rods and separate out the weapons-grade plutonium by early August 1994. Kyd says that the IAEA has been unable to accept North Korea's proposal to supply the IAEA with a sample of 40 of the reactor's 8,000 fuel rods, instead of the 300 that are sought by the Agency. The proposal has been rejected because 40 fuel rods are insufficient to trace the 5MW(e) reactor's history.
—Stewart Stogel, "N. Korea Defueling Quickly, Could Make Plutonium Soon," Washington Times, 9 June 1994, p. A13; "China Opposes Sanctions in Korean Nuclear Row," Press Association, 8 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kevin Rafferty, "Seoul Urges China to Back Sanctions," The Guardian (London), 9 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 June 1994
South Korean President Kim Young Sam meets with his National Security Council and decides that economic sanctions should be used to deal with North Korea's defiance of the IAEA. He says that South Koreans must prepare for Pyongyang's response to the sanctions, which could include political turmoil or even military action.
—Charles A. Radin, "South Korea President Says Sanctions Needed to End Nuclear Dispute," Boston Globe, 9 June 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Pukhaek Uri Kyŏnugo Itta'/Kukkaanbohoeŭi Non'ŭi Naeyong," Donga Ilbo, 9 June 1994, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "Puk Haekkaebal Pandŭshi Chŏji," Hankryoreh Shinmun, 9 June 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr.>

9 June 1994
According to IAEA spokesman David Kyd, North Korea has removed 6,500 of the original 8,000 fuel rods from the core of its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor. Two IAEA inspectors are monitoring the fuel rods in the cooling pond. North Korea is not allowing the IAEA inspectors to take samples from the rods. According to a Western diplomat, the ability to reconstruct North Korea's nuclear history "is now lost."
—Mark Hibbs, "Low I-131 Means DPRK Reprocessing Could Begin 'Immediately'," Nucleonics Week, 9 June 1994, pp. 3-4.

9 June 1994
Former US President Jimmy Carter announces that he will travel to North and South Korea in the coming week to discuss "important issues of the day with leaders." Carter claims that he "will have no official status relating to the US government" and thus will not be speaking on behalf of Washington.
—"DPRK Urges U.S. to Help Establish New Peace Mechanism," Xinhua News Agency, 10 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1994
Russia agrees to cooperate with the United States on a UN resolution calling for economic sanctions against North Korea.
—Sue Kendell, "Tension Mounts over North Korea," Agence France Presse, 11 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 June 1994
The IAEA Board of Governors passes a resolution suspending technical aid to North Korea. The aid is worth roughly $250,000 per year.
—Paul Shin, "In Latest War Preparations, Seoul Checking Civil Defense System," Associated Press, 10 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 June 1994
Selig Harrison, a scholar from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, meets with North Korean President Kim Il Sung and reportedly emerges with a North Korean offer to freeze its nuclear activities in return for unspecified concessions.
—David E. Sanger, "North Korea Quits Atom Agency in Wider Rift with U.S. and U.N.," New York Times, 14 June 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 June 1994
North Korea announces its "immediate withdrawal from the IAEA." In a Foreign Ministry statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, Pyongyang announces that it "will not be bound to any rules or resolutions of the agency hereafter." While Pyongyang once again claims a "special status" under the NPT, the statement stops short of announcing a withdrawal from the treaty. The Foreign Ministry announcement comes in the wake of an IAEA resolution suspending technical assistance to North Korea. In the statement, Pyongyang reiterates its position that any UN sanctions will be viewed as a declaration of war.
—"Full Text of N. Korea's Statement on IAEA Withdrawal," Japan Economic Newswire, 13 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jim Abrams, "U.S. Moves Toward Sanctions, Warns North Korea on Inspectors," Associated Press, 13 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; J. T. Nguyen, "N. Korea Sends Pullout Notice," United Press International, 14 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuter, "North Korea Quits Nuclear Watchdog And Warns of War," Toronto Star, 14 June 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "North Korea Quits Atom Agency in Wider Rift with U.S. and U.N.," New York Times, 14 June 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-June 1994
Russian intelligence chief Sergei Stepashin reveals that three North Koreans have been detained in the Russian Far Eastern territory of Primorskoye for seeking nuclear weapons components.
—Daniel Sneider, "The Trail of N. Korea's Nuclear Bid," Christian Science Monitor, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Warren Strobel, "N. Korea Sops for Nuke Technology in Russia," Washington Times, 5 July 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Chŏng Hae Yŏng, "Puk, Rŏ Haekkisul Milsuip Kido/Missile P'oham 3 Kŏn...Taesagwanjig'wŏn 3 Myŏngch'ep'o," Chosun Ilbo, 6 July 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

15 June 1994
Former US President Jimmy Carter arrives in North Korea and begins a four day trip in an attempt to diffuse the escalating tension on the peninsula over North Korea's nuclear program. While Carter is not officially representing the US government, KBS Radio in Seoul, quoting an anonymous US scholar, reports that the former president is carrying "an unofficial package deal" from Washington that offers diplomatic recognition if North Korea opens its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors.
—KBS Radio (Seoul), 15 June 1994, in "Former President Reportedly Has 'Package Deal' for North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 16 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Shin, "Carter to Cross Border to Begin Four-Day Visit to North Korea," Associated Press, 14 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 June 1994
The United States presents the other four permanent members of the Security Council with a draft resolution calling for sanctions on North Korea. The resolution calls for five-phases of increasingly severe sanctions if North Korea continues to refuse IAEA inspections. The first phase would include the immediate halt to all UN technical and scientific projects in North Korea and an embargo on arms sales. Britain and France support the resolution, but China and Russia still seem reluctant to impose sanctions on North Korea. According to Assistant Secretary of Defense Charles Freeman, if the Security Council fails to adopt the resolution, the United States "is prepared to form a coalition outside of the Security Council."
—Rena Slama, "US Proposes UN Sanctions against N. Korea," Agence France Presse, 15 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Paul Lewis, "U.S. Offers A Plan for U.N. Sanctions on North Koreans," New York Times, 16 June 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 1994
Russia refuses to support a US draft resolution calling for phased sanctions against North Korea if it continues to defy the IAEA. Foreign Minister Andrei V. Kozyrev says that the United States failed to consult adequately with Moscow before presenting the resolution to the Security Council.
—Alessandra Stanley, "Moscow is Miffed by U.S. Draft on Sanctions," New York Times, 17 June 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 1994
North Korea reiterates its threat to withdraw from the NPT following the United States's presentation of a draft resolution in the Security Council calling for phased sanctions against North Korea. According to the Korean Central News Agency, a North Korean official says, "Whether our special status following the temporary suspension of the withdrawal from the NPT is removed, or (whether) we completely withdraw from it, fully depends on future developments."
—"North Korea Reiterates Threat to Pull out of NPT," Agence France Presse, 16 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 1994
North Korean President Kim Il-sung, in his talks with former US President Jimmy Carter, reportedly agrees to allow IAEA inspectors to remain at the 5MW(e) gas-graphite nuclear reactor and promises that the IAEA's monitoring equipment will stay in good condition. According to Carter, Kim also expresses an interest in replacing North Korea's gas-graphite reactor with a less proliferation prone light water reactor.
—Frank J. Murray, "Clinton Bolsters Forces But Offers N. Korea an Out," Washington Times, 17 June 1994, pp. A1, A16; "Kim Promises Not to Expel IAEA Inspectors," Agence France Presse, 16 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Carter Optimistic after North Korea Talks," New York Times, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kate Webb, "Carter Goes into Second And Crucial Round of Talks with Kim Il Sung," Agence France Presse, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 June 1994
US safeguards experts propose that the IAEA use alternative techniques to measure the plutonium in the 8,000 fuel rods removed by North Korea from its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor. According to one Western safeguards official, it is still "theoretically possible" to recreate an inventory of North Korea's fissile material "within a 90-95 percent confidence level" with North Korean cooperation.
—Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Might Still Verify DPRK Fissile Inventory, Experts Say," Nucleonics Week, 16 June 1994, pp. 14-15.

16 June 1994
US President Bill Clinton announces that Washington is willing reopen high-level talks with Pyongyang if it freezes its suspected nuclear weapons program in a verifiable manner.
—"Clinton: U.S. May Restore Talks with DPRK," Xinhua News Agency, 16 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Julian Beltrame, "Carter's Intervention Opens Doors to Talks: North Korean Leader Agrees to Allow Inspectors to Stay at Nuclear Facility," Vancouver Sun, p. A13, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Carter Reports Progress on Korea Talks Could Reopen, U.S. Says," Toronto Star, 17 June 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Carter Optimistic after North Korea Talks," New York Times, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 June 1994
Former US President Jimmy Carter informs Kim Il Sung through a videotaped message that "the sanctions process at the UN has been stopped."
—"North Korea: U.S. Moves Forward with Sanctions, Despite Progress," Inter Press Service, 17 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 June 1994
Former US President Jimmy Carter ends his four-day diplomatic trip to North Korea.
—David E. Sanger, "Carter Visit to North Korea: Whose Trip Was It Really?" New York Times, 18 June 1994, p. 6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 June 1994
The Clinton administration sends a letter to North Korea saying that if it agrees to freeze "major elements" of its nuclear program and permits the IAEA to ensure the continuity of safeguards, the US will resume high-level talks and stop pursuing economic sanctions. The message is sent by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci to his North Korean counterpart Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sŏk Chu.
—"U.S. Opens Channel to North Korea," United Press International, 21 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Barry Schweid, "Administration Asks North Korea to Confirm Freeze Offer," Associated Press, 21 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; "US Offers to Suspend Bid for UN Sanctions against North Korea," Agence France Presse, 21 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Michael R. Gordon, "Clinton Offers North Korea A Chance to Resume Talks," New York Times, 22 June 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 June 1994
President Bill Clinton announces that North Korea has agreed to freeze its nuclear program in return for the United States resuming bilateral talks. Clinton says, "...we are informing the North Koreans that we are ready to go forward with a new round of talks in Geneva early next month."
—"North Korea OKs Nuclear Freeze for Talks," St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 23 June 1994, p. 1A, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S.-North Korea: Clinton Announces Accord," Inter Press Service, 22 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 June 1994
North Korea confirms that it will fully comply with the NPT and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, allow IAEA inspectors to remain in North Korea, maintain IAEA monitoring equipment in compliance with the NPT, and halt its nuclear activities.
—"ROK Foreign Minister: DPRK to 'Comply in Full' With NPT," Yonhap News Agency (Seoul), 23 June 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-014, 13 July 1994, p. 10; "DPRK, U.S. to Resume 3rd Round Talks in Geneva," Xinhua News Agency, 23 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 June 1994
US and North Korean officials meet in New York to work out details for the upcoming high-level talks to be held in Geneva beginning 8 July. The two sides reportedly agree on the agenda for the talks.
—Sid Balman Jr., "U.S. Expects Extended Talks with N. Korea," United Press International, 24 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Ron Fournier, "U.S.-North Korean Talks to Begin July 8 in Geneva," Associated Press, 27 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>.

28 June 1994
South Korea announces that President Kim Young Sam will meet with North Korean President Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang on 25 July to discuss reducing the growing tension on the Korean Peninsula.
—Peter Goodspeed, "Presidents of Two Koreas Plan Historic July Summit," Toronto Star, 28 June 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 July 1994
Delegates from the United States, Japan, and South Korea hold a third round of consultations in Washington to discuss North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program. The three countries reaffirm their commitment to solving the problem through cooperation and dialogue.
—"Japan-U.S.-ROK Ties on Nuke Issue Reconfirmed," Jiji Press Ticker Service, 4 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1 July 1994
Diplomats from North and South Korea meet to discuss the details of the upcoming summit between the leaders of the two countries to be held in Pyongyang on 25-27 July. The South Korean delegation will be allowed to bring 100 officials and 80 members of the South Korean press.
—Peter Goodspeed, "Korean Summit Plans Bog Down But Diplomats Do Strike Deals on Some Details of Meeting," Toronto Star, 2 July 1994, p. A13, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 July 1994
Officials in Seoul and Tokyo announce that the United States, Russia, and South Korea are currently working on a plan to supply North Korea with a light water nuclear reactor to replace its graphite-moderated reactor. Under the proposal, Russia would provide North Korea with light water reactor technology, and South Korea would pay the costs by waiving part of the $1.47 billion in loans owed by Moscow to Seoul.
—Kevin Rafferty, "Plan Offers North Korea Safer Nuclear Technology; U.S., South Korea and Russia Working out Details," Ottawa Citizen, 9 July 1994, p. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Plan Discussed to Provide North Korea with Russian Reactor," Associated Press, 6 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 July 1994
Georgi Kunadze, the Russian ambassador to South Korea, says that Russia would help supply a light water reactor to replace North Korea's graphite-moderated rector if North Korea accepts full IAEA safeguards inspections.
—Don Kirk, "U.S., N. Korea Talk," Newsday, 9 July 1994, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

8 July 1994
Kim Il Sung dies of heart failure at the age of 82. Kim's death comes during a period of bilateral negotiations with the United States to freeze the North Korean nuclear program, and shortly before a summit meeting with South Korean President Kim Young Sam that was scheduled to begin on 25 July 1994. His son, Kim Jong Il, later succeeds him as leader of North Korea.
—James Sterngold, "Death Adds a Dangerous Uncertainty to the Warming With U.S.," New York Times, 9 July 1994, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Kim Il Sung, N. Korea's Longtime Leader, Dies," Los Angeles Times, 9 July 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Kim Il Sŏng Chusŏk Samang/Ŏje Saebyŏk Kapchagi/Pukhant'ŭkpyŏlbangsong," Kukmin Ilbo, 9 July 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Hŏ Nam Chin, "Kim Il Sŏng Samang/Nambukchŏngsanghwoedam Musan/P'yŏngyangbangsong 'Ŏje Saebyŏk Shimgŭn'gyŏngsaeg'ŭro'," Joongang Ilbo, 9 July 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Dr. Taeho Kim, "Kim Jong-il—North Korea's New Leader," Jane's Intelligence Review, September 1994, pp. 421-424.

8 July 1994
US and North Korean diplomats begin high-level talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, only hours later, the two sides learn of Kim Il Sung's death. The talks are postponed until 5 August 1994.
—Don Kirk, "U.S., N. Korea Talk," Newsday, 9 July 1994, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "US Fears 'Long Slog' Talks with N Korea," Independent, 8 July 1994, p. 12, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Debra Lau, "U.S., N. Korea Resume High-Level Talks, Daily Yomiuri, 9 July 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Talks Between the U.S. and North Korea to Resume after Kim Funeral," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 July 1994
North Korea indefinitely postpones the North-South summit scheduled for 25-27 July. In a one sentence letter sent to South Korea, Kim Yong Sun, chairman of North Korea's Unification Policy Committee says, "Because of the unusual state of affairs on our side, which has already been made known through urgent reports, I have been instructed to inform you that the scheduled South-North summit meeting will have to be postponed."
—James Sterngold, "Korean Summit Talks Postponed as Northern Military Backs Heir," New York Times, 11 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Postpones Summit, Nuclear Talks with U.S. to Resume," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 July 1994
North Korea's Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Kim Su Man announces that IAEA inspectors can remain at the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, and that the recently removed fuel rods will not be processed. Kim also says that the 5MW(e) reactor will not be refueled.
—"N. Korea Will Honor Promise to Freeze Nuclear Program," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 June 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 July 1994
David Kay, a former IAEA inspector, says that 8,000 fuel rods removed by North Korean technicians from the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor and later placed in a cooling pond must be removed from the pond by September. If the rods are not removed by then, the international community will very likely never know how much if any spent fuel was diverted to a nuclear weapons program. According to Kay, the magnesium oxide cladding that protects the nuclear material reacts with water, and in a matter of a couple of months the cladding will break down leaking the nuclear material into the pond.
—"In Two Months, A Crucial Decision on Korean Nuclear Rods," Deutsch Presse-Agentur, 12 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 July 1994
The US Senate passes an amendment to the 1995 foreign aid bill prohibiting any aid to North Korea unless the president certifies that North Korea is not pursuing nuclear weapons.
—"Senate Votes to Ban Aid to North Korea," Associated Press, 15 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 July 1994
During a rally held in Kim Il Sung Square in central Pyongyang, North Korea's elite pledge allegiance to Kim Jong Il, son of the recently deceased President Kim Il Sung. Meanwhile, North Korea assures the United States that it will continue the freeze on its nuclear facilities and that high-level bilateral talks will resume.
—Reuter, "North Korea Ready to Talk Discussions with U.S. to Resume," Toronto Star, 21 July 1994, p. A20, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 July 1994
Diplomats from the United States and North Korea meet in New York and agree to resume the third round of high-level nuclear talks on 5 August. The United States insists that North Korea must continue to honor a freeze on all nuclear activities for the duration of the talks.
—"U.S. and North Korea to Resume Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Senthil Ratnasabapathy and Victor Ego Ducrot, "North Korea-United States: Talks to Resume on Nuclear Inspections," Inter Press Service, 22 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea to Resume Talks in Geneva August 5," Detsche Presse-Agentur, 22 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

27 July 1994
North Korean defector Kang Myŏng Do claims that North Korea has five nuclear weapons and plans to build an additional five weapons. Kang said that North Korea was using the negotiations to stall while it built missiles to deliver the weapons. Kang, who is allegedly the son-in-law of North Korea's Premier Kang Sŏng San, indicated that he had acquired his information from a "senior official at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex." Kang says he met the official at the wedding of the official's son, and that the official revealed the information after they had been drinking alcohol. Kang also says that North Korea will announce that it has nuclear weapons after it produces about 10 bombs. This announcement comes only one week before North Korea is scheduled to meet with US officials in Geneva to discuss the North Korean nuclear program. [Note: Kang's credibility is very suspect.]
—James Sterngold, "Defector Says North Korea Has 5 A-Bombs and May Make More," New York Times, 28 July 1994, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Terry McCarthy, "Defector Reports N Korea Has Five Nuclear Bombs," Independent (London), 28 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Park Ch'an Ku, "Kwisun kang Myŏng Do-Cho Myŏng Ch'ŏl Ssi Kijahoe'gyŏn Ilmun'iltap," Taehan Maeil, 28 July 1994, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

29 July 1994
Kim Hyŏng Ki, a spokesman for South Korea's Ministry of Unification, states that the claims of North Korean defector Kang Myŏng Do have "not been supported by solid proof." Kang claimed that North Korea has five nuclear bombs and plans to build five more.
—Zeno Park, "S Korean Intelligence Agency Under Fire for Defector's Five-Bomb Claim," Agence France Presse, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Associated Press, "Defector's 'Secrets' Downplayed; Seoul Says Claims N. Korea Has 5 A-Bombs Unproven," The Phoenix Gazette, 29 July 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; John Burton, "Seoul Doubts N-Bomb Claim," Financial Times (London), 29 July 1994, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "No Proof That Pyongyang Has Nuclear Weapons, Seoul Says," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "IAEA Dismisses Defector's North Korea Nuclear Arsenal Claim," Agence France Presse, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 July 1994
The IAEA announces that, based on information currently available to the agency, the claims made by a North Korean defector are "not judged to be plausible." On 27 July, North Korean defector Kang Mŏng Do stated that North Korea has already developed five nuclear weapons and is in the process of developing five more.
—"IAEO Refutes Claims of North Korean Nuclear Bombs," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 July 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 August 1994
North Korea objects to the presence of South Korean envoy Kim Sam Hun at high-level talks in Geneva. According to the Rodong Sinmun, the official daily of the Korean Workers' Party, "South Korean authorities have neither a reason nor a purpose in interfering in North Korea's negotiations with the United States."
—"North Korea Accuses South of 'Interfering' in Geneva Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Pukhaektonggyŏl Shilhyŏn'e Ch'oesŏn'/Clinton Hoegyŏn/Puk, Hyŏpsangipchang Pulbyŏn'gangjo," Chosun Ilbo, 5 August 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Lee Kyŏng Hyŏn, "Kim Il Sung Badge Tan Puktaep'yo 'Hoedam'ŭn Haebwaya...'/4juman'e Chaegae Mibukhoedam'anp'ak," Taehan Maeil, 5August 1994, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "Puk, Ilgwalt'agyŏl Kidae/Han'guk Kansŏp'ŭn Pandae," Kukmin Ilbo, 5 August 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

5 August 1994
US and North Korean officials resume talks in Geneva following a delay due to the death of Kim Il Sung on 8 July. Hŏ Jong, a member of the North Korean delegation and former ambassador to the UN, says North Korea's policy has remained consistent despite Kim's death. North Korea claims it is urgent to reach an agreement because of 8,000 spent fuel rods sitting in a cooling pond in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. The United States has suggested that the spent fuel rods be shipped to another country. During the eight hour meeting, the two sides reportedly discussed the possibility of replacing North Korea's graphite-moderated reactor with a less proliferation-prone light water reactor.
—John Burton, "US and N Korea Climb Back in the Ring: Resumption of Talks Today in Geneva on Nuclear Issue," Financial Times, 5 August 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Frances Williams, "Talks Offer Few Clues to Pyongyang Stance," Financial Times, 6 August 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Debra Lau, "U.S., North Korea Resume Talks," Daily Yomiuri, 6 August 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alan Riding, "No Resolution of Nuclear Issue in Korea Talks," New York Times, 6 August 1994, p. 5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Kyŏng Hyŏn, "Kim Il Sung Badge Tan Puktaep'yo 'Hoedam'ŭn Haebwaya...'/4juman'e Chaegae Mibukhoedam'anp'ak," Taehan Maeil, 5August 1994, p. 5, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

10 August 1994
Delegations from the United States and North Korea try to resolve contentious issues regarding North Korea's nuclear activities, but the two sides have yet to reach an agreement. The two sides have agreed to replace North Korea's graphite-moderated reactor program with more proliferation resistant light water reactors, but the details of the arrangement and prerequisites for the technology transfer are not worked out at this meeting.
—"Seoul May Consider Providing Pyongyang with Light Water Reactors," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Talks Between North Korea And United States Break off," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Gallucci, Kang Hopeful in Talks on Pyongyang's Nuclear Programme," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 August 1994
The third round of high-level talks between the United States and North Korea ends with a joint declaration. In the declaration, the United States agrees to make arrangements to provide North Korea with light water reactors, and "upon receipt of United States assurances for the provision of light water reactors and fro arrangements for interim energy alternatives, the DPRK will freeze construction of the 50MW(e) and 200MW(e) reactors, forgo reprocessing, and seal the Radiochemistry Laboratory, which will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency." The declaration also states that the two states are prepared to improve diplomatic relations, the United States is prepared to provide North Korea with assurances against the threat of nuclear attack, and North Korea will remain a party to the NPT. While the joint declaration is a landmark cooperative effort by the two states to resolve contentious issues relating to North Korea's nuclear program, it makes only passing reference to the time-sensitive problem of the 8,000 spent fuel rods currently corroding in a cooling pond. The delegations agree to meet again on 23 September.
—"Agreed Statement between DPRK And USA," KCNA (Pyongyang), 13 August 1994, in "Agreement Reached in Geneva Talks; KCNA Carries Text of Joint Statement," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea, U.S. Prepare Joint Declaration on Nuclear Row," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "United States, DPRK Reach Landmark Agreement," Xinhua News Agency, 13 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Reuters, "Statement by N. Korea And The U.S.," New York Times, 13 August 1994, p. 4, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alan Riding, "U.S. And N. Korea Say They'll Seek Diplomatic Links," New York Times, 13 August 1994, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N Korean Nuclear Negotiator Hails Geneva Accord," Agence France Presse, 14 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Mid-August 1994
A 34-year-old German man is arrested in Breman, Germany for trying to sale plutonium and enriched uranium. The man, Adolf Jaekle, was in possession of 0.05mg of plutonium but promised 50 times the amount if the buyers were interested. According to a report on Germany's ARD TV, Jaekle was receiving an "operational fund" from Pyongyang. On 24 August, North Korea dismisses the accusation as groundless.
—"Bonn Expects Agreements with Russia on Nuclear Smuggling," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 19 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Blasts German Plutonium Reports," United Press International, 24 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 August 1994
South Korea formally offers to supply North Korea with light water reactor technology if Pyongyang opens all of its nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors. President Kim Young Sam says, "If and when the North guarantees the transparency of its nuclear activities, we are ready to support their development of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, including light water nuclear reactor construction, by providing them with the necessary capital and technology."
—Andrew Pollack, "South Korea Offers Nuclear Aid to North: Gesture Asks for Weaponry Assurances," New York Times, 15 August 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 August 1994
South Korea suggests setting up an international consortium to organize the replacement of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactor technology with the more efficient and more proliferation resistant light water reactor technology.
—"Seoul Wants Consortium to Lead North Korea Nuclear Conversion," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 16 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Han'guk"Yang Sŭng Hyŏn, "Chŏngbu, 'Taebukchiwŏn Taech'aekpan' Kot Kusŏng," Taehan Maeil, 17 August 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; "'Han'gukhyŏng Kyŏngsuro Kwanch'ŏl'/'Kwagŏ Haek Kyumyŏng' Hanwoemu · Migungmu T'onghwa," Kukmin Ilbo, 15 August 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Lee Chae Kŭn, "Han · Mi · Il Consortium Pangshik/Urich'ŭk'i Taebubun Pudam," Kukmin Ilbo, 16 August 1994, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

18 August 1994
White House officials announce that President Bill Clinton is demanding that North Korea open two suspected nuclear waste sites to IAEA inspections before any light water reactor technology is provided.
—Steven Greenhouse, "Clinton Demanding North Korean Inspections," New York Times, 18 August 1994, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 August 1994
North Korea rejects the US demand that it open two suspected nuclear waste sites to IAEA inspectors. In a statement carried by the Korean Central News Agency, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman says, "We will never allow the inspection of military sites at the expense of our sovereignty to receive light water reactors. This is our unshakable will."
—Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 20 August 1994, in "The Nuclear Issue; Spokesman Reaffirms Stance on Rejecting Special Inspections," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 22 August 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Sterngold, "North Korea Turns away from Nuclear Inspection Condition," New York Times, 21 August 1994, p. 25, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

September 1994
Former President Jimmy Carter receives a letter from Kim Jong Il thanking Carter for visiting Kim Il Sung, giving his word that he will carry out all the promises his father had made, and inviting him to mediate the US-North Korean talks to be held in Pyongyang on 10 September.
—KBS-1 Television (Seoul), 10 August 2001, in "ROK's KBS-1 TV Interviews Former US President Carter on Korean Issues," FBIS Document ID: KPP20010811000003; James Sterngold, "North Korea Invites Carter to Mediate," New York Times, 2 September 1994, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early September 1994
The two IAEA inspectors who remain in North Korean conduct inspections at a fuel fabrication plant and a fuel storage facility.
—"IAEA Says North Korea Has Offered to Permit Nuclear Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Delegation Visits North Korea as Two Sides Meet in Berlin," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 September 1994
Pyongyang informs the two IAEA inspectors who remain in North Korea that due to positive development with the United States, it will now consider accepting IAEA inspections.
—"IAEA Says North Korea Has Offered to Permit Nuclear Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Delegation Visits North Korea as Two Sides Meet in Berlin," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

6 September 1994
South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sŏng Ju meets with Robert Gallucci, the head US negotiator in talks with North Korea. Han insists that South Korea play a larger role in resolving the nuclear crisis in North Korea. According to Seoul, North Korea's nuclear program is a North-South issue as well as an international issue and should be dealt with accordingly. Han also conveys to the United States Seoul's concern over the speed at which Washington is normalizing relations with Pyongyang.
—"South Koreans Insist on Role in Nuclear Talks with North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 6 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; George Gedda, "U.S. Says It Remains Committed to South Korea's Security," Associated Press, 6 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 September 1994
US Secretary of State Warren Christopher assures South Korean Foreign Minister Han Sŏng Ju that there will be no deal with Pyongyang unless Seoul is included in the negotiations. Speaking at the State Department, Christopher says, "We can't finally resolve the nuclear issue unless and until North Korea resumes the substantive dialogue with the Republic of Korea."
—"No North Korean Nuclear Deal without North-South Negotiations," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Reassures Seoul on Nuclear Arms Talks with North Korea," New York Times, 8 September 1994, p. A6, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

10 September 1994
The United States and North Korea hold simultaneous talks in Berlin and Pyongyang. The Berlin talks address technical and logistic issues dealing with the proposed replacement of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors. In addition, the delegations in Berlin discuss the status of the 8,000 spent fuel rods currently corroding in a cooling pond. Since no high-level officials are on the US delegation, it is not empowered to negotiate, and its task is solely to exchange information. At the Pyongyang talks, the United States and North Korea discuss logistical concerns of setting up liaison missions in each other's country. Discussions range from exchanging rental prices to whether or not liaisons will be granted diplomatic immunity.
—"U.S., North Korea Hold Technical Talks on Nuclear Issues," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jim Anderson, "Expert Talks Pave the Way for High-Level US-N. Korea Negotiations," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 10 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Delegation Visits North Korea as Two Sides Meet in Berlin," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 September 1994
IAEA Director General Hans Blix announces that North Korea has indicated a willingness to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities. Speaking at the Board of Governors meeting, Blix says that Pyongyang would "permit the agency to perform most of the activities requested in view of recent positive developments in its bilateral talks with the US." Blix also reports that the two inspectors who remain in North Korea have recently conducted inspections at a fuel fabrication plant and a storage facility.
—"IAEA Says North Korea Has Offered to Permit Nuclear Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Delegation Visits North Korea as Two Sides Meet in Berlin," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 September 1994
The IAEA reports that inspections of the reprocessing facility [Radiochemistry Laboratory] in Yŏngbyŏn-kun have yielded no evidence that plutonium has been extracted there since February 1993. The conclusion is reached by analyzing nuclear samples taken from the Radiochemistry Laboratory in Yŏngbyŏn-kun during March and May 1994. There is suspicion, however, that fuel rods were processed at a second facility where inspections were not allowed. The report confirms that North Korea has not permitted inspections of two major nuclear facilities.
—"IAEA Says North Korea Has Offered to Permit Nuclear Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 12 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "'Puk, Haeksach'al Pŏm'ŭihwaktae Hŏyong'/'P'yeyŏllyo Chaech'ŏri Ajik Anhae'," Kukmin Ilbo, 13 September 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Yu Chae Shik, "Puk Yŏngbyŏn Haekyŏllobong/Chaech'ori Hŭnjŏg'ŏpsŏ/IAEA Haeg'anjŏnhyŏpchŏng Ihaeng Ch'okku," Joongang Ilbo, 13 September 1994, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

13 September 1994
The United States and North Korea end talks in Pyongyang. According to a joint statement, the talks, which started on 10 September and dealt with logistics of exchanging liaisons, "proceeded in a serious and cooperative atmosphere."
—"U.S. Talks in Pyongyang 'Cooperative,'" Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 13 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

15 September 1994
The United States and North Korea conclude talks in Berlin. During the five-day talks the two sides discussed issues relating to North Korea's nuclear program including the proposed replacement of North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors with light water reactors. The North Korean representative to the talks, Kim Chong U, says that for Pyongyang to consider such an option the United States must finance the project and North Korea must be allowed to select the type of replacement reactor. With regard to the 8,000 spent fuel rods currently corroding in a cooling pond, North Korea agrees to store the rod in a dry place where they will not be subject to corrosion but refuses to allow the United States or any other country to assist in the process.
—"U.S., North Korea and Nuclear Talks," United Press International, 15 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Sterngold, "Talks Leave North Korea and U.S. Split," New York Times, 15 September 1994, p. A11, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Frank Bajak, "Issues of Who Pays, Who Provides Reactors Linger after Talks," Associated Press, 15 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S. Says No Equipment for North Korea until Full Inspections," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 21 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 September 1994
The United States announces that it along with South Korea, Japan and other countries paying for the replacement reactors, reserves the right to choose which country will supply the reactors. On 15 September, North Korea stated that it should be able to select the reactor type and the supplier.
—Sang Hun Choe, "U.S. Rejects North Korea's Demand to Choose Type of Reactors," Associated Press, 16 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 September 1994
South Korea agrees to participate in an international consortium to replace North Korea's graphite moderated nuclear reactors with more efficient and proliferation resistant light water reactors.
—"South Korea Ups the Stakes on Eve of Korean Nuclear Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 22 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

22 September 1994
The General Conference of the IAEA adopts a resolution sponsored by France that urges North Korea to open up its nuclear facilities to inspections. In the resolution, approved by 76 states, the General Conference "expresses continuing concern over the non-compliance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with its safeguards agreement...urges the DPRK to cooperate immediately with the Agency in the full implementation of the safeguards agreement and to allow the Agency to have access to all safeguards-relevant information and locations." Libya is the only state to vote against the resolution while ten states abstained.
—"IAEA Appeals to N. Korea, Expresses Concern over Nuclear Smuggling," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 23 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

23 September 1994
The United States and North Korea resume high-level talks in Geneva. The talks originally scheduled to begin on 8 July were suspended after the death of Kim Il Sung.
—"Little Progress as U.S., North Korea Continue Nuclear Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 24 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

24 September 1994
North Korea announces that at present it will not allow inspections of two sites suspected by the IAEA of containing nuclear waste. Kang Sŏk Chu, head of the North Korean delegation to the Geneva talks, says, "When the two sides [the United States and North Korea] create the atmosphere of confidence and establish normal relations in the future, we shall be ready to make our nuclear activities transparent."
—Konstantin Pribytkov, "No Progress at US-North Korean Talks in Geneva," ITAR-TASS, 26 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea Continue Nuclear Talks," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 26 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 September 1994
At high-level US-North Korean talks in Geneva, the United States says that North Korea must accept the South Korean light water reactor model or the talks will break down. North Korea concedes that it is up to the United States to decide.
—"U.S. Insists on Its Right to Pick Reactor," United Press International, 26 September 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

29 September 1994
The United States announces that due to a deadlock at high-level talks with North Korea the talks will be briefly suspended. The talks to resolve the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program were resumed on 23 September, but both sides report little progress.
—Alan Riding, "U.S. and North Korea Announce Pause in Talks, but No Progress," New York Times, 30 September 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Getting to Yes with North Korea," New York Times, 1 October 1994, p. 22, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 October 1994
The United States and North Korea resume high-level talks in Geneva.
—Elizabeth Olson, "Negotiators Restart High-level Talks on Nuclear Issues," Associated Press, 5 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "North Korea and the U.S. at an Impasse," New York Times, 6 October 1994, p. A7, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

5 October 1994
In a speech to the UN General Assembly, North Korea's Deputy Foreign Minster Ch'oe Su Hŏn says that talks with the United States to resolve the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program have entered a "new stage." Ch'oe also warns South Korea and the IAEA not to create obstacles to the third round of talks. In a reference to the IAEA's call for North Korea to allow inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites, Ch'oe warns the IAEA not to use "pressure and threats against us, while peddling around arguments about so-called 'special inspections'."
—"N. Korea: Talks with U.S. at 'New Stage,'" United Press International, 5 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Elizabeth Olson, "Negotiators Restart High-level Talks on Nuclear Issues," Associated Press, 5 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Jim Mannion, "North Korea Accuses Seoul of Creating Obstacles in Nuclear Talks," Agence France Presse, 5 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

7 October 1994
South Korean President Kim Young Sam criticizes the US approach to dealing with North Korea's nuclear program as "naive and overly flexible."
—James Sterngold, "South Korean President Lashes Out at U.S.," New York Times, 8 October 1994, p. 3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 10 October 1994, in "Kim Young-Sam Says USA Is Too Ready to Compromise on North Korea," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yu Hye Chu, "'Mi, Pukhaek Tŏ Yangbohal P'ilyoŏpta'/Kim Taet'ongnyŏng," Segye Ilbo, 9 October 1994, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>.

12 October 1994
The United States sends a draft compromise to South Korea on resolving the dispute over North Korea's nuclear program. However, the draft resolution does not contain two keys South Korean demands: (1) North Korea must allow special inspections of two suspected nuclear waste sites before any light water reactor technology is provided; and (2) the light water reactor must be provided by South Korea. While the draft does not include language specifying the use of a South Korean reactor model, the United States assures South Korea that it would be allowed to take the initiative in all technical matters.
—Ivan Zakharchenko, "US Wants South Korea to Approve Compromise with North Korea," ITAR-TASS, 12 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 12 October 1994, in "The Nuclear Issue; US Draft Compromise on Pyongyang's Nuclear Issue Conveyed to Seoul," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

17 October 1994
Robert Gallucci, chief negotiator for the United States in high-level talks with North Korea, announces that the two sides have reached an agreement concerning North Korea's nuclear program. Gallucci does not mention any details of the agreement but says that "it is a broadly acceptable and very positive document."
—"U.S., DPRK Reach Accord on Nuclear Issues," Xinhua News Agency, 17 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. and North Korea Agree to Build on Nuclear Accord," New York Times, 18 October 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "U.S., North Korea Reach Accord on Nuclear Monitoring," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

20 October 1994
IAEA Director General Hans Blix says that the IAEA will need an expanded mandate in order to fulfill its role as spelled out in the bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea. Speaking in Washington, Blix says, "The US-DPRK Geneva agreement foresees a freezing of the present DPRK nuclear program and a subsequent dismantling of installations. This will call for new IAEA verification responsibilities beyond what is required under the Safeguards Agreement."
—"U.N. Needs New Mandate for U.S.-Korea Pact," United Press International, 20 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 October 1994
The United States and North Korea sign the Agreed Framework, an accord that specifies the actions both countries will take to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Under the terms of the agreement, a US-led international consortium will help North Korea replace its graphite-moderated reactors with two 1,000MW light water reactors. The international consortium will compensate North Korea for the freeze on its graphite-moderated reactors by supplying 500,000 tons of heavy-fuel oil annually until the new reactors come online. Second, the United States and North Korea will make efforts to normalize their economic and political relations by reducing investment and trade barriers. Third, both countries will strive towards establishing a nuclear-weapons-free-zone on the Korean Peninsula. Finally, North Korea will help strengthen the nonproliferation regime by remaining a member of the NPT. It will also allow the IAEA to implement the safeguards agreement and monitor the freeze on its nuclear facilities. However, the United States makes a concession in allowing North Korea to retain possession of 8,000 spent fuel rods instead of sending them to a third country for storage, a condition on which the United States had earlier insisted.

In 1999, a source close to US-North Korean negotiations over a suspected nuclear facility in Kŭmch'ang-ri reveals that the 1994 agreement contains a supplementary 10-point memorandum of understanding by which North Korea agrees to forgo any future construction of graphite-moderated reactors, and agrees that once a significant portion of the two light water reactors are completed, it will allow the IAEA access to any facility and information it deems necessary. In addition, according to Flight International, which later cites a "senior US DIA official," the agreement includes a secret clause that suspends the delivery of 150 North Korean Nodong missiles to Iran. [Note: It is later confirmed that the agreement includes no clause on missile deliveries.]
—"Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 21 October 1994, <http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf>; "Chosŏnminjujuŭiinmin'gonghwa'gukkwa Mihapchungguksaiŭi Kibonhab'ŭimun," 21 October 1994, in "Kongshingmun'gŏn – Charyo," <http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-k.htm>; "Iranian Missile Deal with N Korea Falters," Flight International, 23 October 1996, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, "Clinton Approves a Plan to Give Aid to North Koreans," New York Times, 19 October 1994, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Secret Annex to U.S.-North Korea Agreement," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 20 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S.-North Korea Accord Has a 10-Year Timetable," New York Times, 21 October 1994, p. A8, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Alan Riding, "U.S. and North Korea Sign Pact to End Nuclear Dispute," New York Times, 22 October 1994, P. A5, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "N. Korea's Pledge on Graphite-Moderated Reactors Cited," Japan Economic Newswire, 14 January 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Takashi Uemura, "N. Korea's Concession Revealed," Asahi News Service, 10 May 1999, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

21 October 1994
The United States and South Korea announce the suspension of the annual Team Spirit joint military exercise.
—"S Korea-U.S. 'Team Spirit' Joint Military Drill to Be Suspended," Xinhua News Agency, 21 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 October 1994
IAEA Director General Hans Blix states that despite North Korea's recent agreement with the United States, it is still in violation of a UN resolution calling for inspections of two suspected nuclear waste storage facilities. Speaking in London, Blix says that the Agreed Framework is a step in the right direction but it does not supersede the safeguards agreement North Korea reached with the IAEA.
—"IAEA Unhappy with U.S.-North Korea Accord," Associated Press, 26 October 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

November 1994
Specialists from the United States, Japan and South Korea meet to discuss the details of the project to supply North Korea with two light water reactors. South Korea proposes the Ulchin-3 and -4 reactors as reference designs.
—"Getting Down to Business on LWR Supply Details," Nuclear News, January 1995, p. 46.

1 November 1994
A spokesman for North Korea's Foreign Ministry says that North Korea is taking "practical steps" to implement the Agreed Framework with the United States. North Korea's Administration Council has ordered the cessation of construction on the 50MW and 200MW gas-graphite reactors. The Council has also decided to halt operation of the 5MW gas-graphite reactor and to take measures to withdraw fuel rods that were intended for refueling it. In addition, North Korea will continue to cease operations at its radiochemical lab [reprocessing facility] and other nuclear facilities.
—"Ministry Announces Freeze in Nuclear Program," Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 1 November 1994 in FBIS document FBIS-EAS-94-211, 1 November 1994; "North Korea to Stop Making Carbon Nuclear Reactors," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 1 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 November 1994
The UN Security Council endorses the nuclear accord reached between North Korea and the United States in October. Welcoming North Korea's voluntary decision to freeze its current nuclear program and comply with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the Security Council calls on the agency to verify the "accuracy and completeness" of Pyongyang's report of all its nuclear material. The Security Council also asks the IAEA to monitor North Korea's frozen nuclear activities.
—"U.N. Asks IAEA to Verify North Korea's Nuclear Programme," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 5 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

11 November 1994
The IAEA holds a closed-door board meeting and decides to send a small inspection team to North Korea to monitor the nuclear freeze.
—"IAEA to Discuss Nuclear Agreement with North Korea," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 11 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14-18 November 1994
US and North Korean experts discuss safe storage and final disposition of the 8,000 spent fuel rods. While in North Korea, the US experts visit the cooling pond where the fuel rods are being stored. North Korea describes the visit as "useful and constructive."
—"U.S. Experts Fly to Pyongyang to Debate Nuke Fuel Rods," Japan Economic Newswire, 12 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; James Sterngold, "North Korea Reports Fulfilling a Nuclear Promise," New York Times, 21 November 1994, p. A3, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

16 November 1994
North Korean diplomats meet with IAEA officials in Vienna to discuss the implementation of the Agreed Framework. This meeting is the first time the two have met since North Korea withdrew from the agency in June.
—"IAEA and North Korea Confer on Implementation of Nuclear Agreement," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 16 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

18 November 1994
North Korea announces that it has taken steps to "totally freeze" its graphite moderated nuclear reactor program.
—"North Korea Reports Steps to Freeze Nuclear Programme," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 18 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

28 November 1994
The IAEA confirms that North Korea has frozen operations at the 5MW(e) nuclear reactor, the Radiochemistry Laboratory, and its fuel fabrication facility. It also confirms that construction has been stopped at the 50MW(e) nuclear reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun and the 200MW(e) nuclear reactor in T'aech'ŏn-kun. The announcement follows a week-long visit of IAEA experts to North Korea.
—Reuters, "U.N. Says North Korea Halted Nuclear Program," New York Times, 29 November 1994, p. A10, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "North Korea Closes Down Nuclear Plant, IAEA Confirms," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 29 November 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

1-3 December 1994
The United States and North Korea hold expert-level talks in Beijing to work out the details of the light water reactors to be supplied to North Korea. In the talks, described as serious and useful, the two sides discuss the type of reactor and possible construction sites.
—"Getting Down to Business on LWR Supply Details," Nuclear News, January 1995, p. 46.

16 December 1994
The United States, Japan and South Korea agree to form a consortium tasked with financing and constructing two light water nuclear reactors promised to North Korea in the Agreed Framework. The consortium is named the Korean Energy Development Organizations (KEDO) and will be based in New York.
—"US, Japanese, Korean Representatives Meet on Implementing US-N Korean Pact," Agence France Presse, 16 December 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Consortium Formed for North Korean Nuclear Reactor Project," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 17 December 1994, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

	Updated August 2004