This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
KEDO delivers 559,613 metric tons of heavy fuel oil to North Korea.
—KEDO 2001 Annual Report, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, <http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2002.pdf>.
The EU pledges to contribute €150 million ($130 million) for the construction of the two light water reactors in North Korea under the Agreed Framework. The EU will provide 30 million euro per year for five years.
—Yonhap News Agency, 19 November 2000, in “ROK’s Yonhap: EU to Provide $130 Mil for KEDO’s Reactor Construction in N. Korea,” FBIS Document ID KPP20001119000019; “EU ‘5 Nyŏngan KEDO 1500 Ŏk Chiwŏn’,” Kukmin Ilbo, 20 September 2000, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
The Chosun Ilbo reports that at the two Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meetings held on 30 March and 26 June 2000 respectively, the US delegation reportedly proposed to build six standard power plants instead of one of two light water nuclear reactors, under the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. According to the documents produced from the TCOG meeting, the US delegation suggested that the said proposal will help ease North Korean power shortage in a shorter time frame and at a much less cost. However, according to the Chosun Ilbo, the South Korean government disagreed with the proposal saying that even though electricity supply to North Korea is a key issue of ongoing North-South dialogue, it cannot be mixed with the conditions of the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework. The United States stated its dissatisfaction with South Korea’s attempt to support North Korea’s electricity generating capacity on its own, disregarding the 1994 Agreed Framework. The US contention is that such a move will aggravate the US position at the negotiation table with North Korea.
—Chosun Ilbo, 5 January 2000, in “ROK Daily Notes US Aim to Build 6 Power Plants in DPRK, ROKG’s Objections,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010105000068; Lee Ha Wŏn, “Mi ‘Pug’e Hwajŏn’gŏnsŏl’ Chean,” Chosun Ilbo, 6 January 2001, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
ASouth Korean official announces that construction of two nuclear power plants under the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework is likely to be further delayed due to contractual and funding problems. The first reactor is to be built by 2003 and the second by 2004. The US company General Electric Co. backed out of a deal to supply turbine generators for the project because the supply contract did not contain financial liabilities and compensation guarantees in case of plant accidents. KEDO has now decided to award the contract to a Japan’s Hitachi-Toshiba consortium for supply of power turbines. According to the official, the contract worth $100million will be signed within six months. The official also says that work on site preparation has almost been completed and reactor construction work is expected to begin in the later half of the year 2001. The contract with Japanese consortium would increase the pace of planning and constructing the nuclear power plants. However, according to the official, some South Korean lawmakers have opposed the Japanese firms’ participation, saying it will only benefit Japan’s economy, while turning the North Korean power stations into a Japanese model instead of Korean. Other South Korean lawmakers refute the contention, stressing that Japanese earnings from the contract will only be $250 million as compared to $1 billion contribution to the project by Japan.
—Jae Sook Yoo, “Further Delay Expected in Nuclear Reactors for North Korea,” Associated Press, 10 January 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 9 January 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: 2 Japanese Firms May Supply Generators to KEDO Reactor Project,” FBIS Document KPP20010109000067; “Japanese Firms to Assume Reactor Project in N.K. instead of GE,” Korea Herald, 10 January 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Associated Press, “Further Delay over Reactors Expected,” South China Morning Post, 10 January 2001, <http://www.scmp.com/>.
KEDO officials say that North Koreans have been demanding an almost six-fold pay rise since February 2000, with some 100 workers taking leave everyday to pressure KEDO. According to the officials, bargaining talks have been continuing off and on without any early conclusion in sight. The officials also say that the consortium is considering employing construction workers from Uzbekistan for the light water nuclear reactor project in North Korea.
—Kyodo News Service, 13 January 2001, in “KEDO Mulls Employment of Non-Koreans for Nuke Plant Project,” FBIS Document ID JPP20010113000064.
Song Min Sun, director general of North American Affairs Bureau in South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, says the idea of replacing a nuclear power plant, currently under construction in North Korea, with a thermal plant is unworkable “politically, economically and technologically.” Song says, “Once, we reviewed the idea, but reached the conclusion that it is unworkable because of underlying problems regarding the replacement.” Noting that Seoul is set to provide 70 percent of the total construction cost reaching $4.6 billion, Song said that it should have the key voice in any possible change in the agreement.
—Korea Times, 14 January 2000, in “ROK Official Says Seoul Rules out Revision of Nuclear Deal with DPRK,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010114000027; Son Key Young, “Seoul Rules Out Revision of LWR Deal,” Korea Times, 14 January 2001, <http://www.hankooki.com/times.htm>.
US Secretary of State-designate Colin Powell tells the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Bush administration will adhere to the Agreed Framework, “provided North Korea does the same.”
—“Bush Administration to Review N. Korean Policy: Powell,” Japan Economic Newswire, 17 January 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Matthew Lee, “Powell Outlines New Foreign Policy to Adoring Lawmakers, China, Russia,” Agence France Presse, 17 January 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
KEDO issues an Authorization to Proceed, allowing KEPCO to commence negotiations with Doosan to begin preliminary work on the turbine generators for the KEDO light water reactor project. [Note: General Electric (GE) was to be the supplier of the turbine generators, but after failing to receive liability guarantees from the US Congress, GE pulled out of the KEDO project.]
—KEDO 2001 Annual Report, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, <http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2002.pdf>.
Desaix Anderson, Director General of KEDO, says that construction of the two light water nuclear reactors in North Korea would be continued even though the Bush administration has pursued the replacement of the light water reactors with conventional power plants. He dismisses media reports of replacing one LWR with a thermal plant.
—Shin Joong Dong, Joongang Ilbo, 4 February 2001, in “KEDO Denies Report of Substituting Thermal Plant for Reactor in DPRK,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010204000047; Shin Chung Ton, “Taebuk Kyŏngsuro Hwaryŏkpaljŏnso Taech’e Koryŏanhae,” Joongang Ilbo, 5 February 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
According to the Wolgan Chosun, Kim Jong Il is shot in the side by one of his bodyguards. According to the report, Pak Song Pong, first vice director of the Munitions Industry Department under the Korean Workers’ Party, was also shot and died on 20 February. [Note: Pak’s sudden death on 20 February has been confirmed, but he shooting has not.]
—U Chong Chang, “Kim Jong Il, Yopkurie Han Pang Maja?” Wolgan Chosun (Seoul), 1 June 2001, <http://monthly.chosun.com>; U Chong Chang, Wolgan Chosun (Seoul), 1 June 2001, in “Rumor of Attack on Kim Chong Il,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010524000099.
KEPCO and the government of Uzbekistan sign a contract by which 250 Uzbeks will be employed to work on the KEDO light water reactor project beginning in March 2001.
-—“250 Uzbek Workers to Toll on KEDO Project in N. Korea,” Japan Economic Newswire, 16 February 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Uzbek Workers to Be Deployed to KEDO Construction Site,” Korea Times, 17 February 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
Charles Kartman, US special envoy for Korean affairs, meets with South Korean officials in Seoul to discuss various issues. While in Seoul, Kartman meets with Chan Sun Sup, head of South Korea’s Office of Planning for the Light Water Reactor Project. The two reportedly discuss recent developments in the KEDO project, including the employment of 250 Uzbeks to work on the project beginning in March.
—“U.S. Envoy to Meet Officials in N.K. Reactor Project,” Korea Herald, 20 February 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement criticizing the hard-line policies of the Bush administration. The spokesman says that the United States and North Korea agreed to improve bilateral relations and remove distrust in the Agreed Framework, but that US calls for “conditional reciprocity” mean the United States wants North Korea to “disarm itself.” The spokesman says that the United States has not sincerely implemented its commitments under the Agreed Framework, which has “caused huge losses to North Korea.” Furthermore, the spokesman says the KEDO light water reactors (LWR) are unlikely to be completed by 2003, and that the United States “is obliged to compensate for North Korea’s loss of electricity caused by the delayed LWR project.”
—“Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on New U.S. Administration’s Policy Towards DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency, 22 February 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Migukŭi Kŭ Ŏddŏn Taejosŏnjŏngch’aeg’edo Chunbidoeyŏ Itta/Oemusŏngdaebyŏnin,” Korean Central News Agency, 21 February 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Yonhap News Agency, 22 February 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: DPRK FM Warns of Breaking Geneva Accord If US ‘Turns Hard Line Against DPRK,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010222000004.
US government sources state that the Bush administration plans to emphasize a reduction in North Korean conventional forces, including a withdrawal of forward-deployed North Korean troops. Other US officials state that reaching an agreement with North Korea on conventional forces will be relatively easy compared to nuclear and missile issues. The Bush administration is also considering the replacement of one or both light water reactors under the Agreed Framework with conventional power plants as part of its ongoing policy review.
—“Bush to Seek Cut in N. Korea’s Conventional Forces,” Japan Economic Newswire, 22 February 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
Senior lawmakers, including Henry Hyde (R-Illinois) chairman of the House International Relations Committee; Christopher Cox (R-California), chairman of the Republican Policy Committee, and Edward Markey, (D-Massachusetts), deliver a letter to the Bush administration urging the United States to reconsider its commitments under the Agreed Framework to provide North Korea with light water reactors.
—John Diamond, “Bush Is Asked To Reassess North Korea Reactor Deal,” Chicago Tribune, 3 March 2001, p. 1.
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher says that the Bush administration plans to fulfill its Agreed Framework commitments “completely and fully.”
—John Diamond, “Bush Is Asked To Reassess North Korea Reactor Deal,” Chicago Tribune, 3 March 2001, p. 1.
President George Bush states that he is not certain North Korea can be trusted to adhere to its commitments under the Agreed Framework. Speaking in Washington at a joint press conference with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, Bush says, “I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea. We’re not certain as to whether or not they’re keeping all terms of all agreements.”
—Doug Struck, “U.S.-Led Plant Beset by Delays; Atomic Power Project Key to Korean Accord,” Washington Post, 25 March 2001, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; David E. Sanger, “Bush Tells Seoul Talks with North Won’t Resume Now,” New York Times, 8 March 2001, p.A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell announces that the United States may modify the Agreed Framework. Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Powell says, “For the moment we are in accord with the 1994 agreement, but that doesn’t prevent us from looking at aspects of it that we might wish to revisit or change.” Powell says the 1994 Agreed Framework had many promising elements, but “what was not there was a monitoring and verification regime of the kind that we would need to have in order to move forward in negotiations with such a regime.”
—Kenji Urakami, “U.S. May Modify 1994 Accord with N. Korea, Powell Says,” Japan Economic Newswire, 8 March 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Ben Barber, “Powell Wants a Reduction on Size of N. Korea’s Million-Man Army,” Washington Times, 9 March 2001, p. A1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, sends a letter to George W. Bush urging him to renegotiate the Agreed Framework with North Korea and substitute conventional power plants for the two light water reactors. Helms accuses North Korea of not upholding its commitments under the agreement.
—Jason Sherman and Amy Svitak, “Helms Pushes Harder Stance on Reactors for North Korea,” Defense News, 12 March 2001, p. 8.
KEPCO, the main contractor for the KEDO light water reactor project, announce that Donga Construction will no longer participate in the project, thus leaving its 20 percent share of the construction project to be divided amongst the other three companies subcontracted for the project.
—Yonhap News Agency, 9 March 2001, in “South Firm’s Share in North’s Reactor Project to be Taken on by Partners,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 March 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
A KEDO delegation travels to Pyongyang “to participate in high-level negotiations” with North Korea officials regarding the light water reactor project.
—“KEDO Delegation Arrives,” Korean Central News Agency, 10 March 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Chosŏnbando’e’nerŭgigaebalgigu (KEDO) Tae’p’yodan Toch’ak,” Korean Central News Agency, 10 March 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “KEDO Delegation Leaves,” Korean Central News Agency, 13 March 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “KEDO Tae’p’yodan’i Ddŏnakatta,” Korean Central News Agency, 13 March 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 13 March 2001, in “DPRK Radio reports Departure of KEDO Delegation,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010313000113.
North Korean radio says, “The people of the earth all know that there are approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons still in existence in South Korea.” The report quotes a publication of the “National Democratic Front,” which North Korea claims is an underground resistance organization operating in South Korea.
—Yonhap News Agency, 13 March 2001, in “DPRK Alleges US Has ‘1,000 Nuclear Weapons Deployed’ in ROK,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010313000040.
The head of the North Korean delegation for inter-ministerial talks, which are scheduled to begin today in Seoul, calls his counterpart in Seoul to inform him that North Korea will have to postpone the talks. Chŏn Kŭm Chin, the North Korean representative gives no reason for the sudden postponement, but some speculate the reason may be health problems for Chŏn, the recent summit between Kim Dae Jung and George W. Bush, or the perceived US hard-line policy towards North Korea.
—“5th Inter-Korea Ministerial Talks Postponed,” Chosun Ilbo, 13 March 2001, <http://www.chosun.com>; Lee Young-jong and Lee Soo-jeong, “North Abruptly Calls Off Meeting,” Joongang Ilbo, 14 March 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Associated Press, in “North Korea Cancels Talks With South Korea,” New York Times, 12 March 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com>; Kim In Ku, “Changgwankŭp Hoedam Puk, Tolyŏn’yŏngi,” Chosun Ilbo, 14 March 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
The Education Center of Unification, a South Korean think tank, issues a report stating that over 3,000 nuclear scientists are currently working in North Korea.
—“North Korea Believed to Have 3,000 Nuclear Experts, Report Says,” Associated Press, 23 March 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
The Washington Post reports that the North Korean nuclear project under the Agreed Framework is unlikely to be completed until 2010. According to the report, the Bush administration is looking skeptically at the project, and some key Republican senators are demanding changes. North Korea has been threatening war if the project is not carried forward. Yet, the report quotes officials involved with the project as saying that they are confident that the project will not be abandoned. Chang Sŏn Sŏp, head of South Korea’s Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, has said that there is no alternative to the project.
—Doug Struck, “US-Led Plant Beset by Delays; Atomic Power Project Key to Korean Accord,” Washington Post, 25 March 2001, p. A1.
Chang Sŏn Sŏp, head of South Korea’s Office of Planning for the Light-Water Reactor Project, says that replacing the light-water nuclear reactors with thermoelectric power plants would be impractical. He says, “There would be difficulties in revising the Agreed Framework and the replacement would not be of help in reducing the construction period or curtailing of costs.”
— Yonhap News Agency, 28 March 2001, in “Thermoelectric Power Plant Construction in DPRK ‘Impractical’,” FBIS Document ID KPP200010328000030; Pak Yong Hyŏn, “Puk Kyŏnsuro Hwajŏndaech’e Hyŏnshilsŏng Opsŏ/Chang Sŏn Sŏp Kihoekdanjang,” Hankyoreh Shinmun, 29 March 2001, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
The US State Department announces that the United States has earmarked $95 million for fiscal year 2002 to be used on the KEDO light water reactor project. This amount marks a 73 percent increase in US contributions to KEDO from fiscal year 2001.
—Yonhap News Agency, 10 April 2001, in “North Korea: USA to Increase Funds for Nuclear Reactor Projects in 2002,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 10 April 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
The US National Security Council decides to permit a renewed authorization of certain nuclear technology transfers to North Korea under the Agreed Framework. [Note: Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham signed the authorization on 3 May 2001.]
—Michael Knapik, “Westinghouse gets Reauthorization to Send Technology to North Korea,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 42, No. 23, 7 June 2001, <http://www.mhenergy.com>.
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun reports that the United States is planning to urge North Korea to accept a nuclear inspection team to “confirm the existence of a storage place for plutonium.” The report also says the new US administration is seeking to replace one of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework with a conventional power plant. [Note: The reference to “the storage place” is likely referring to the two suspect waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun.]
—“U.S. to Dispatch New Nuclear Inspection Team to North,”Joongang Ilbo, 19 April 2001, <http://www.english.joins.com>.
Speaking in Washington, D.C., John McLaughlin, deputy director of the CIA, says that North Korea “probably has one or two nuclear bombs—and it may also have biological ones alongside its chemical ones.”
—“News Review: North Korea Extends Missile Test Moratorium, Holds Firm on Exports,” Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 57, May 2001, <http://www.acronym.org.uk>.
Charles Kartman, a former US State Department official, is appointed new director of KEDO. Kartman will replace Desaix Anderson on 1 May 2001.
—Kyodo News Service, 26 April 2001, in “Charles Kartman Appointed to Head KEDO” FBIS Document ID JPP20010426000232.
The United States renews for five years an authorization for the transfer of certain nuclear technology to North Korea. The authorization is issued under the Department of Energy’s regulations in 10 CFR Part 810, and it allows limited technology transfers only to what is “necessary for the licensing and safe operation of the reactors and not technology enabling the design or manufacture of nuclear reactor components or fuel.” [Note: According to Department of Energy documents released in March 2003, Westinghouse Co. transfers approximately 300 nuclear related documents to North Korea from May 2001 to March 2003. The 300 documents, including safety analysis reports, training documents, quality assurance documents, and construction documents, are among 3,100 nuclear related documents from Westinghouse Co. that have been approved by the Department of Energy. 100 Westinhouse documents have been blocked by the Department's export control office.]
—Michael Knapik, “New Part 810 Authorization Needed for North Korean LWRs,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 41, No. 45, 9 November 2000, <http://www.mhenergy.com>; Mark Hibbs and Michael Knapik, “Decisions on KEDO Project Fate Now in Hands of Bush Officials,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 42, No. 1, 4 January 2001, <http://www.mhenergy.com>; Wayne Washington, “US Lets N. Korea Get Nuclear Data Transfer Pact Stays in Effect,” Boston Globe, 7 March 2003, p. A9, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; H. Josef Hebert, "U.S. Still Providing North Korea with Nuclear Information during Confrontation," Associated Press, 7 March 2003, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
KEDO’s Executive Board names Charles Kartman as the new executive director of KEDO.
—KEDO 2001 Annual Report, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, <http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2002.pdf>.
A KEDO delegation visits Pyongyang to participate in “high-level expert negotiation” with North Korea. The talks are in regard to the provision of two LWRs under the Agreed Framework. It is later revealed that quality guarantee protocols are covered in the talks, and that North Korea agrees it will be the responsible party for operating the reactors, and that it will accept responsibility for any accidents at the site.
—“KEDO Delegation Here,” Korean Central News Agency, 2 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “KEDO Delegation Leaves,” Korean Central News Agency, 2 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Yonhap News Agency, 2 May 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: KEDO Mission Flies to DPRK to Hold High-Level Talks,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010502000141; Korean Central News Agency, 2 May 2001, in “DPRK Radio Reports on KEDO Delegation’s 1 May Arrival,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010502000051; Korean Central News Agency, 5 May 2001, in “KEDO Experts End Round of Negotiations in Pyongyang,” FBIS Document ID JPP20010505000044; “North Responsible in Reactor Mishaps,” Joongang Ilbo, 28 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.
In a US Senate conformation hearing, James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, says he does not expect the Bush administration to scrap the Agreed Framework after the policy review on North Korea is completed.
—Shin Yong Bae, “N.K. Nuclear Reactor Controversy Reviving,” Korea Herald, 8 May 2001, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.
Moscow TV 6 says there have been reports in the Moscow press that 20 Russian have gone to North Korea and assumed aliases. The scientists are said to be working on the North Korean nuclear program.
—Moscow TV 6, 2 May 2001, in “Russia: Plans to Sell Military Hardware to North Korea Noted,” FBIS Document ID CEP20010503000276.
US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham signs a new authorization for Westinghouse to transfer certain nuclear technology to North Korea. The new five-year authorization replaces one that was issued in 1996 and was due to expire on 6 May 2001. The earlier authorization was for Combustion Engineering, which has now merged with Westinghouse. Only technology that is necessary for the implementation of the Agreed Framework can be transferred to North Korea under this authorization. Technology for “the design or manufacture of nuclear reactor components or fuel” is still banned.
—Michael Knapik, “Westinghouse gets Reathorization to Send Technology to North Korea,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 42, No. 23, 7 June 2001, <http://www.mhenergy.com>.
South Korean media report that the United States has decided to replace the two light-water nuclear reactors being constructed in North Korea by KEDO with thermal power stations. According to reports, President Bush has instructed Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to inform South Korea and Japan of the decision during his upcoming diplomatic trip to South Korea and Japan. However, a spokesman for the South Korean government says that the United States does not have the final decision over the replacement of the light-water reactors with conventional power plants.
—Kyodo News Service, 7 May 2001, in “South Korea Denies Reports on Change in North Korea Nuclear Energy Plans,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 7 May 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Lee Ch’ŏl Hui, “Mi, Pukhan Kyŏnsuro ‘Hwaryŏkpaljŏnso’ Ro Taech’e Pangch’im,” Joongang Ilbo, 7 May 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>; Ryu Chae Hu, “Puk Kyŏngsuro Hwajŏn Taech’e Nollan Kyesok,” Hankyoreh Shinmun, 8 May 2001, p. 4, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers’ Party, condemns CIA Deputy Director John McLaughlin for suggesting that North Korea might have one or two nuclear weapons. According to the report, Pyongyang is shocked that the “CIA dared find fault with us groundlessly on an official occasion.” The report continues, “It is a known fact that we do not have nuclear problems. The transparency of our peaceful nuclear energy program has already been confirmed.”
—“ U.S. Loudmouthed ‘Threat’ from DPRK Rebuffed,” Korean Central News Agency, 8 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Bush Haengjŏngbu’ga Ddŏ’dŭ’nŭ <Pukchosŏn’wihyŏp>Sŏl’ŭl Kyut’an/Rodongshinmun,” Korean Central News Agency, 8 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 8 May 2001, in “North Korean Paper Rejects US Official’s Remark on Possession of Nuclear Bombs,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 8 May 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
The Rodong Sinmun criticizes IAEA Director ElBaradei for trying “to shift responsibility for the delayed construction of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework onto North Korea.” The commentary says that the United States is “chiefly responsible for the noncompliance with the Agreed Framework,” and that North Korea has an urgent need to be compensated for the loss of electricity “due to the intentional delaying tactics of the US.” However, the Rodong Sinmun also says, “There is no change in North Korea’s stand to sincerely implement the Agreed Framework.”
—“United States to Blame for Delayed LWR Construction,” Korean Central News Agency, 15 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Kyŏgsurodaesanggŏnsŏlchiyŏnch’aeg’im’ŭn Mi’gug’e Itta/Rodongshinmun,” Korean Central News Agency, 15 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “North Korea Criticizes IAEA Director-General,” Joongang Ilbo, 15 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.
The Korean Central News Agency releases a report on the Agreed Framework that says the light water reactors (LWR) may not be completed until 2010. The report says North Korea should be compensated for the shortfall in electricity, and that the 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil (HFO) delivered per year under the Agreed Framework will not be sufficient. The HFO is supposed to compensate for the closure of North Korea’s two graphite-moderated nuclear plants of 50MW(e) and 200MW(e), while each of the LWRs is to generate 1,000MW(e). North Korea says other countries may contribute to this shortfall besides the United States, but that North Korea may pull out of the Agreed Framework and reopen the graphite-moderated reactors if it does not receive compensation.
—“Report on Delay in Construction of Light-Water Reactor Project Issued,” Korean Central News Agency, 16 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.kr>; “Chomi’gibonhab’ŭimun’e Ddarŭn Kyŏngsurogŏnsŏl Chiyŏn’e Taehan Sangbo,” Korean Central News Agency, 16 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.kr>; Korean Central News Agency, 16 May 2001, in “DPRK’s KCNA: Detailed Report on LWR Construction Delays Issued,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010516000110; Yonhap News Agency, 16 May 2001, in “DPRK Report on LWR Construction Delays Viewed as ‘Tactic’ to Resume DPRK-US Dialogue,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010517000002; Yonhap News Agency, 16 May 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: DPRK Hints at Reopening Graphite-Moderated Reactor,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010516000107; AFP (Hong Kong), 16 May 2001, in “DPRK Report: LWR Delays May Lead To ‘Abandoning’ 1994 Agreed Framework,” FBIS Document ID KPP2001051600018; “N. Korean Nuclear Deal Warning,” Washington Post, 17 May 2001, p. 20; Ha T’ae Wŏn, “Pukhan ‘Mibosangŏpsŭmyŏn Haektonggyŏl Haeje,” Donga Ilbo, 17 May 2001, <http://www.donga.com>; Yun Chŏng Ho, “Puk, Haektonggyŏl Haeje Kyŏnggo,” Chosun Ilbo, 16 May 2001, <http://www.chosun.com>; Ahn Sung Kyoo, “Pay for Delays, North Warns, or It Will Walk Away From Pact With U.S.,” Joongang Ilbo, 18 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.
The Korean Central News Agency publishes another report stating that the United States is responsible for the delay in the KEDO light water reactor project, and must compensate North Korea for the electricity loss. The report also complains about “cock-and-bull stories about the ‘revision’ of the AF [Agreed Framework] and the ‘provision of thermal power plants’ [that] are heard from among officials of the Bush administration.”
—“KCNA on U.S. Non-Compliance with Agreed Framework,” Korean Central News Agency, 21 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Mi’gukchŏnggwŏn’i Kyoch’edoeyŏttago Ŭimu’ga Talla Chi’nŭn’ga/Chosŏnjung’angt’ongshin,” Korean Central News Agency, 21 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Korean Central News Agency (Pyongyang), 21 May 2001, in “DPRK’s KCNA: KCNA on U.S. Non-Compliance with Agreed Framework,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010521000062.
An IAEA delegation travels to North Korea. The delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang on 23 to 25 May for the 16th round of negotiations on the implementation of the Agreed Framework. Olli Heinonen, director of safeguards for the IAEA in Asia, asks North Korea for a detailed program guaranteeing scrutiny of the two suspect waste sites in Yŏngbyŏn-kun and other facilities. The negotiations end with no agreement to resume inspections, but another meeting is scheduled for October.
— “IAEA Delegation Here,” Korean Central News Agency, 22 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/>; Don Kirk, “North Korean Bomb: Do They Have It?” International Herald Tribune, 25 May 2001, <http://www.iht.com>; Ahn Sung-Kyoo, “Three Sites in North Selected For Nuclear Control Check,” Joongang Ilbo, 31 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; “IAEA Delegation Leaves,” KCNA, 29 May 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Pyongyang Rebuffs Nuclear Inspectors,” Joongang Ilbo, 1 June 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; “Pyongyang Already Notified of Early Inspection: Interview with the IAEA Spokesman,” Joongang Ilbo, 7 June 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.
Yonhap News Agency reports that the United States will try to accelerate safeguards inspections in North Korea so that they may begin no later than next year. The Joongang Ilbo quotes a diplomatic source in Seoul as saying, “It seems like the US Bush administration has made up its mind to resolve the North’s nuclear suspicion first among all the other matters and launch early verification process (sic).” The administration is likely taking this stand because of the delay in the LWR construction that was originally targeted for completion by 2003.
—Hwang Chae Hon, “US Accelerates Early Inquiry Into DPRK Nuclear History,” Yonhap News Agency, 23 May 2001, in “US Plans to Accelerate Investigation of Suspected DPRK Nuclear History Noted,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010522000174; Kim Hee Sung, “U.S. to Launch Early Nuclear Verification Process to N.K.,” Joongang Ilbo, 23 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Pak Ch’an Ku, “Mi, Puk Haekŭihok Shisŏl Naenyŏn Sach’al Ch’ujin,” Taehan Maeil, 24 May 2001, <http://www.kdaily.com>; Lee Ha Wŏn, “Mi, Pukhaek Chogisach’al Yoguhal Tŭt,” Chosun Ilbo, 23 May 2001, <http://www.chosun.com>.
James Kelly, US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, tells South Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Im Sŏng Jun that talks between the United States and North Korea are likely to resume in June. Kelly makes the remarks in Honolulu during the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting. Kelly says the North Korean missile program will likely be the first item on the agenda.
—Kyodo News Service, 26 May 2001, in “U.S.-North Korea Talks May Resume in June: Yonhap,” FBIS Document ID JPP20010526000055; Ch’oe Ch’ŏl Ho, “Kelly Miat’aedamdang Ch’agwanbo ‘Taebuk Missile Hoedam Kot Chaegae’,” Taehan Maeil, 24 May 2001, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
James Kelly, US representative to the Trilateral Consultation and Oversight Group (TCOG), briefs his South Korean and Japanese counterparts on the US policy review of North Korea. He says, “We are in the final stage in the comprehensive review of US policy toward North Korea.” All three delegations agree that consultation and coordinated policy is needed towards several issues regarding North Korea, including missiles, WMD, and humanitarian issues. The delegations reaffirm their commitment to the Agreed Framework, and express strong support for South Korea’s engagement policy towards North Korea.
—“Brief Comments from Three Delegations after TCOG Talks,” Joongang Ilbo, 29 May 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; “TCOG Issues Joint-Statement on North Korea,” Chosun Ilbo, 30 May 2001, <http://www.chosun.com>; Ch’oe Hyŏn Su, “Han · Mi ·Il Taebuk Chojŏnghoeŭi/‘Puk · Mi Taehwa Wŏnchŏmsŏ Chae’gae’,” Kukmin Ilbo, 28 May 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
After the Trilateral consultation and Oversight Group (TCOG) meeting in Honolulu, senior officials from South Korea, the United States and Japan hold an unofficial meeting to discuss North Korea policy. During the meeting, South Korean Unification Minister Im Tong Wŏn, former US Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry William Perry, and Ryozo Kato, who is later named the new Deputy Vice Foreign Minister of Japan, review the Bush administration’s policy toward North Korea.
—“Unification Minister in Honolulu Unification Minister Lim Dong-Won Left for Hawaii Yesterday to Attend an Informal Yet Significant Meeting with U.S. and Japanese Experts on North Korea Policy,” Korea Times, 28 May 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; “Han · Mi · Il O’nŭl Pi’gongshik Taebukchŏngch’aekhoeŭi/Kelly Ch’a’gwanbodŭng Shilmuch’aegimja Ch’amsŏk Chumok,” Hankyoreh Shinmun, 30 May 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun tells Selig Harrison, an American scholar, that Pyongyang is reconsidering its missile flight-test moratorium. Harrison quotes Foreign Minister Paek as saying, “As to whether we will maintain the moratorium until 2003, that is yet to be decided. It depends entirely on the policy of the new administration.” During his five-day visit to Pyongyang, Harrison also meets with Colonel General Lee Ch’an Pok, the North Korean representative at Panmunjom. Harrison quotes Colonel General Lee as saying, “Right now our government has not decided that we need nuclear weapons, but everybody is thinking in that direction in view of the hostile attitude of the Bush administration.” Harrison concludes that the Bush administration’s stance is playing into the hands of hard-liners in Pyongyang.
—John Pomfret, “North Korea Said to Warn of New Missile Tests,” Washington Post, 4 June 2001, p. A15; John Pomfret, “A North Korean Warning on Missiles: U.S. Scholar Sees Negative Mood in Pyongyang as Bush Hardens Line,” The International Herald Tribune, 4 June 2001, p. 9; Elisabeth Rosenthal, “North Korea Threatens to Pull Out of Missile Pacts,” The New York Times, 5 June 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com>; Joe McDonald, “N. Korea Warns of Actions on Missiles,” AP Online, 6 June 2001, <http://www.ap.org>.
Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer says that Australia will invite North Korean officials to a nuclear safeguards training course to be held in Australia later this year. Downer says the invitation is being extended so that North Korean officials can “join regional counterparts in developing their expertise in the management and accounting of nuclear materials, to assist North Korea to meet its NPT and IAEA obligations.” Downer also says that Australia “supports efforts to achieve comprehensive and verifiable cuts in the DPRK missile program.”
—Yonhap News Agency, 31 May 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: Australia to Invite N.K. Officials to Its Nuclear Training Program,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010531000059, 31 May 2001; “NK Officials to Attend Nuclear Safeguards Training in Australia,” Korea Times, 1 June 2001.
The United States and South Korea begin a joint study on confidence-building measures (CBMs) with North Korea to address Pyongyang’s ballistic missiles, WMD programs and conventional forces. The joint study team reportedly completes the first part of the study in late February 2002, with 32 items to be proposed for CBMs with North Korea.
—Jong-Heon Lee, “U.S. Moves to Tackle Conventional Weapons,” United Press International, 28 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; C.W. Lim, “US and South Korea Study Ways to Ease Tensions with North,” Agence France Presse, 28 February 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Kim Min-Seok, “U.S. to Join Effort to Limit North’s Arms,” Joongang Ilbo, 28 March 2002, <http://english.joins.com>; Yu Yong Wŏn, “[Han-Mi] Taebuk Kunsashilloejoch’i Maryŏn...Hotline Tŭng Hyŏpsang,” Chosun Ilbo, 27 February 2002, <http://www.chosun.com>; Kim Kwi Kŭn, “[Han-Mi, CBM Kongdong’yŏn’gusŏnggwawa Chŏnmang],” Chosun Ilbo, 27 February 2002, <http://www.chosun.com>; Kim Kwi Kŭn, “Hanmi, Kunsashilloejoch’i Kongcongdaeŭng Hab’ŭi,” Chosun Ilbo, 27 February 2002, <http://www.chosun.com>.
The Financial Times reports that US officials are concerned about contacts between North Korean officials and senior figures in the Pakistani nuclear program. There is also evidence that North Koreans have visited a nuclear weapons site in Pakistan. Some speculate that North Korea might obtain nuclear weapons technology in exchange for ballistic missile technology.
—Stephen Fidler and Edward Luce, “US Fears North Korea Could Gain Nuclear Capability Through Pakistan,” Financial Times, 1 June 2001, p. 1.
Charles Kartman, executive director of KEDO, says the United States will not provide any compensation for delays in the construction of two light water reactors in North Korea. However, Kartman denies reports that the reactors will be replaced with conventional power plants.
—Charles Lee, “N. Korea’s Demand for Compensation Rejected,” United Press International, 4 June 2001.
Pakistani Foreign Minster Abdul Satter categorically denies that Pakistan has ever exported nuclear technology to North Korea. Speaking at a press conference, Satter stresses that Pakistan has never and will never export nuclear technology or material to any country.
—“Pakistan Denies Export of Nuclear Technology,” Japan Economic Newswire, 5 June 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
The Bush administration announces that its North Korea policy review is complete. The administration says it wants to restart talks with Pyongyang to seek “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile program, a ban on missile exports, and a less threatening North Korean conventional military posture.” The administration offers incentives, such as “greater humanitarian aid, easing of economic sanctions, and unspecified political steps.”
—Alex Wagner, “Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2001, pp. 23, 25; Michael Knapik, “U.S. to Pursue Better Execution of U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework,” Nucleonics Week, Vol. 42, No 24, 14 June 2001, <http://www.mhenergy.com>; Kyodo News Service, 6 June 2001, in “Bush Wants ‘Serious’ Talks with N. Korea on Missiles,” FBIS Document ID JPP20010606000167.
North Korea criticizes the United States for suggesting in the TCOG meeting on 27 May that North Korea should submit to early IAEA safeguards inspections. Instead, North Korea feels it should be compensated for the loss in electricity due to the delay in the light water reactor (LWR) construction under the Agreed Framework. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang says, “The inspection is unthinkable before a great deal of the LWR project has been carried out.” Furthermore, KCNA says, “It is the deserved right and option for the DPRK to restart the construction of graphite-moderated reactors for its right to existence unless compensation is made for the electricity loss resulting from the heavy delay in the LWR project...”
—“U.S. Urged to Compensate for DPRK’s Loss of Electricity,” Korean Central News Agency, 6 June 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Korean Central News Agency, 6 June 2001, in “DPRK’s KCNA: US Urged To Compensate for DPRK’s ‘Loss of Electricity’ Due to Delay in LWR Project,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010606000016; C.W. Lim, “North Korea Warns Nuclear Accord Close to Collapse,” Agence France Presse, 6 June 2001.
US Secretary of State Colin Powell states that the United States is placing no preconditions on the proposed talks with North Korea. However, Powell adds that the Bush administration wants to expand the dialogue with North Korea by “putting conventional forces on the agenda and by making it clear to the North Koreans that we want to talk about missiles and missile technology and missile sales and nuclear weapons programs, but we also want to talk about humanitarian issues.”
—Alex Wagner, “Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2001, pp. 23, 25; “Powell: U.S. ‘Ready to Move Forward’ with North Korea,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 7 June 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Stephen Collinson, “No Preconditions on North Korea Talks: US,” Agence France Presse, 8 June 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Han Sŭng Su says he is confident that the Bush administration will abide by the Agreed Framework. Han met with White House and State Department officials last week in Washington. Han quotes officials as saying that the new target date for transferring the two light water reactors is 2008.
—Jim Mann, “U.S. Is Seen As Ready To Fulfill 1994 North Korea Reactor Deal,” Los Angeles Times, 10 June 2001, p. 4.
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei urges North Korea to comply with IAEA requests for safeguards inspections. ElBaradei makes the request during the opening statement of the IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna.
—“ROK’s Yonhap: IAEA Urges North Korea to Cooperate with Inspection,” 11 June 2001, in FBIS Document ID KPP20010611000100.
Jack Pritchard, US special envoy for Korean peace talks, meets with Lee Hyŏng Ch’ŏl, North Korean ambassador to the UN, in New York. Pritchard explains the outline of the Bush administration’s policy towards North Korea, and requests a meeting with Kim Kye Kwan, North Korean vice foreign minister. Lee responds that he will reply in one or two weeks after delivering the message to Pyongyang.
—“‘A Useful Start’, Comments Washington on U.S.-DPRK Talks,” English Joongang Ilbo, 14 June 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; “Not Much Enthusiasm from N.K. in Resuming Next Dialogue with U.S.,” English Joongang Ilbo, 15 June 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Kuk Ki Yon, “Mi, Kim Kye Kwan Kwa Hoedam Kongshikcheŭi,” Segye Ilbo, 14 June 2001, <http://www.segyetimes.co.kr>; Steve Mufsaon, “North Korea, U.S. to Hold Talks Today on Missiles,” Washington Post, 13 June 2001, p. A21; Alex Wagner, “Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2001, pp. 23, 25.
South Korean Unification Minister Im Dong Wŏn says that South Korea has no intention of linking the supply of electricity to North Korea with the issues of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile proliferation.
—Lee Chul Hee, “No Linkage Seen in Aid to North, Nuclear Issue,” Joongang Ilbo, 15 June 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; “Seoul Opposes Proposal to Link N.K. Energy Aid with Missiles,” Korea Herald, 15 June 2001, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in response to the Bush administration’s announcement on 6 June 2001 of its intention to resume dialogue with North Korea. A ministry spokesman says that the United States is attempting to “disarm North Korea through negotiations” because the administration has proposed the topics of discussion to include North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, missile program and conventional military forces. North Korea claims there should be no preconditions for resuming the dialogue that has been suspended for four months. Furthermore, the spokesman says North Korea will never discuss its conventional forces as long as US military forces remain in South Korea, and that the first item on the agenda should be “compensation for the loss in electricity due to the delay in construction of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.”
—“Spokesman of DPRK Foreign Ministry on Bush’s Statement on Resuming Negotiations with DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency, 18 June 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Chosŏn’oemusŏngdaebyŏn’in Mihaengjŏngbuŭi <Taehwajaegaejean>e Taehan Konghwa’gug’ŭi Ripchang Ch’ŏnmyŏng,” Korean Central News Agency, 18 June 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Charles Lee, “N. Korea Rejects ‘Unfair’ Talks with US,” United Press International, 21 June 2001; “Pyongyang Sets Agenda for US Talks,” South China Morning Post, 19 June 2001, <http://www.scmp.com>; “U.S. Expects North Korea Talks to Continue,” South China Morning Post, 19 June 2001, <http://www.scmp.com>; Alex Wagner, “Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2001, pp. 23, 25; John Burton, “N Korea Frosty about US Talks Plan,” Financial Times, 19 June 2001, p. 12; Kim Yŏng Shik, “Puk Chŏllyŏkposang’yogu Anp’akk / KEDO Sŏ Chŏllyŏkchiwŏn Mi Pandaemara,” Donga Ilbo, 19 June 2001, p. 3, <http://www.donga.com>; Kim Yong-sik, Donga Ilbo, 18 June 2001, in “Background of DPRK Demand for US Compensation for Power Losses Viewed,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010618000122.
The IAEA issues a statement that says North Korea remains in non-compliance with its
safeguards agreement.
—“Nuclear Watchdog Unhappy with North Korean Safeguards,” South China Morning Post, 19 June 2001,
<http://www.scmp.com>; "IAEA Unclear If Iraq, N. Korea Respect Non-Proliferation Treaty," Agence France Presse, 18 June 2001; Christopher S. Wren, “World Briefing United Nations: Nuclear Questions for North Korea and Iraq,” New York Times, 20 June 2001, p. A10.
NBC News, quoting anonymous US intelligence sources, reports that the United States believes North Korea has built one or two nuclear bombs, but “there is no evidence it has built missile warheads.”
—Robert Windrem, “How Real Is the Rogue Threat?” NBC News, 19 June 2001, <http://www.msnbc.com>.
Glyn Ford, a member of the European Parliament, says that the EU will contribute $87.5 million to the KEDO light water reactor project. Thus far the EU has contributed $75 million to the KEDO project.
—“EU to Offer More Financial Aid to KEDO,” Korean Information Service, 19 June 2001, <http://www.korea.net>; Hwang Jang Jin, “EU to Increase KEDO Contribution to $87.5 Million,” Korea Herald, 20 June 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
North Korean television and radio criticize the United States for unilaterally setting the agenda for bilateral talks. The Bush administration announced on 6 June 2001 bilateral talks should resume, but the administration proposed that conventional weapons should be included on the agenda. The broadcast accuses the United States of not implementing the Agreed Framework, and reiterates the North Korean demand for compensation due to the delay in the construction of the two light water reactors.
—Korean Central Television (Pyongyang), 20 June 2001, in “DPRK TV Commentary Reiterates Need To Compensate for Electricity Loss,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010620000115; Korean Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 20 June 2001, in “DPRK Daily Decries US ‘Preconditions’ for DPRK-US Dialogue,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010620000090; Xinhua News Agency (Beijing), 21 June 2001, in “DPRK Urges IAEA to be Impartial in Nuclear Inspection,” FBIS Document ID CPP20010621000194. .
At a luncheon hosted by the Korea Society in New York, Charles Kartman, executive director of KEDO, says that there will be no more delays in the construction of the two light water reactors in North Korea.
—Yonhap News Agency, 21 June 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: No More Delays in Reactor Project: Kartman,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010621000049.
The Korean Central News Agency carries a commentary that criticizes the IAEA for joining the “hostile forces in the US attempting to suffocate North Korea to death” by calling for special inspections of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The commentary emphasizes that the completeness and correctness of North Korea’s initial declaration must wait until a considerable portion of the light water reactors (LWRs) is completed, and before any critical nuclear components are delivered, as stipulated under the Agreed Framework. KCNA says that IAEA Director now admits the LWR project will be delayed until 2008, and that inspections will take 3-4 years. The commentary also says that North Korea has faithfully guaranteed the IAEA’s ability to “observe” (maintain the continuity of safeguards) the nuclear freeze, and that North Korea will faithfully carry out its obligations under the Agreed Framework.
—“Kukchewŏnjaryŏkkiguŭi Ch’ogibogosŏkŏmjŭng Ununŭn Chomigibonhapŭimune Paech’i/Chosŏnchungangt’ongshin Ronp’yŏng,” Korean Central News Agency, 20 June 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “KCNA Urges IAEA to Abide by Its Principle of Neutrality and Impartiality,” Korean Central News Agency, 21 June 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Korean Central News Agency, 21 June 2001, in “DPRK’s KCNA Decries IAEA for ‘Joining Hostile Forces’, Urges ‘Impartiality’,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010621000071.
South Korean Defense Minister Kim Dong Shin meets with US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Washington, D.C. The two agree on a number of issues, including: the United States should maintain a long-term military presence in Korea to ensure regional stability; the United States and South Korea should strengthen military readiness against North Korea and develop an allied defense posture for the 21st century; and North Korea poses a threat with its nuclear and missile programs, and must submit to IAEA inspections. Secretary Rumsfeld also expresses US support for Kim Dae Jung’s engagement policy towards North Korea. The two sides also agree that South Korea should take the lead in negotiating conventional arms control issues with North Korea, which seems contradictory to the results of the Bush review of policy towards North Korea announced on 6 June 2001.
—Jefferson Morris, “Rumsfeld, S. Korean Minister Agree On North Korea Policies,” Aerospace Daily, 22 June 2001; Kyodo News Service, 22 June 2001, in “U.S., S. Korea Reaffirm Threats from N. Korea,” FBIS Document ID JPP20010622000001; Yonhap News Agency, 22 June 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: S.K. to Take Initiative in Conventional Forces talks with N.K.,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010622000004; Kim Kwang-tae, “Seoul Set To Take Up Conventional Weapons Issue After Kim’s return,” Korean Times, 25 June 2001, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>; US Reaffirms Security Commitment to Korea,” Korea Times, 23 June 2001, <http://www.koreatimes.co.kr>; “[Sasŏl] Han-Mi Kukpangjanggwanhoedam Ihu,” Taehan Mail, 23 June 2001, p. 5, <http://www.kdaily.com>; Taehan Mail, 23 June 2001, in “ROK Daily Views Result of ROK-US Defense Ministerial Talks,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010622000108; Chin Kyŏng Ho and Pak Ch’an Ku, “Nambuk Chaeraemugihyŏpsang ‘Sonswiun Ŭijebut’ŏ Chŏpkŭn’,” Taehan Maeil, 23 June 2001, p. 5, <http://www.kdaily.com>; Chin Kyong-ho, Taehan Maeil, 23 June 2001, in “Prospects for N-S Korea Negotiations on Conventional Weapons Reductions Viewed,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010622000110, Yu Yong Wŏn, “Hanmikukpang Anbogongjoman Chaehwagin,” Chosun Ilbo, 23 June 2001, p. 4, <http://www.chosun.com>; Yu Yong-won, Chosun Ilbo, 23 June 2001, in “ROK Daily Suspects Opinion Difference in ROK-US Defense Ministers’ Talks,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010622000101.
Korean Central Television in Pyongyang repeats North Korean news reports from yesterday saying compensation for the delay in the construction of the two light water reactors under the Agreed Framework should top the agenda of bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea.
—Yonhap News Agency, 21 June 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: N.K. Reiterates Call for Compensation Issue for Talks with U.S.,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010621000009.
North Korea’s Minju Joson carries a commentary criticizing the Bush administration’s agenda for renewing dialogue with North Korea, saying that North Korea can never accept the US demands. The piece claims that the “top priority in the bilateral relations for the present is for the United States to deal with the issue of the delayed delivery of the light water reactors in a responsible manner.”
—“Minju Joson on DPRK’s Stand on Negotiations with U.S.,” Korean Central News Agency, 23 June 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Migug’ŭi Hyŏpsangŭijenŭn PiHyŏnshilchŏgida/Minjuchosŏn,” Korean Central News Agency, 23 June 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Korean Central News Agency, 23 June 2001, in “DPRK’s KCNA: Minju Joson on DPRK’s Stand on Negotiations with U.S.,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010623000044.
NuclearFuel says that reports in early June 2001 about possible cooperation in the nuclear field between North Korea and Pakistan are erroneous. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage was cited as the source of the earlier reports, but a “US nonproliferation official” said a week earlier that the evidence points to cooperation in the area of solid-fuel missiles. Apparently, there is no indication of Pakistan assisting North Korea with uranium enrichment.
—Mark Hibbs, “North Korean-Pakistan Collusion Said Limited to KRL and Missiles,” NuclearFuel, Vol. 26, No. 13, 25 June 2001, <http://www.mhenergy.com>.
KEDO officials say that 21 North Korean policymakers will be invited to a briefing on 28 June at the light water reactor construction site in [Kŭmho-chigu], Shinp’o, North Korea. North Korean officials requested the briefing so that they could inform their superiors on the progress of the project. Cho Kyu Hyŏng, deputy executive director of KEDO, will give the briefing.
—Yonhap News Agency, 26 June 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: KEDO to Brief N.K. Officials at Reactor Construction Site,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010626000003.
A US State Department official states that substituting conventional power plants for the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework is “not something that we are looking at right now.”
—Alex Wagner, “Bush Outlines Resuming Talks with North Korea,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2001, pp. 23, 25.
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld tells the US House Armed Services Committee that North Korea is very close to developing an ICBM, and has nuclear material needed to develop nuclear weapons.
—Chosun Ilbo, 29 June 2001, in “Announcement of US Missile Defense Test Reported by ROK Daily,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20010629000105; Chu Yong Chung, “‘Alaska’e MD Ch’ŏt Paech’I’ Mi Kukpang ‘Puk ICBM Kaebal Kŭnjŏp’,” Chosun Ilbo, 30 June 2001, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
In a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, President Bush says that Kim Jong Il is not trustworthy because “he makes his own people go hungry.”
—Kyodo News Service, 1 July 2001, in “Bush Tells Koizumi N. Korea’s Kim Is Untrustworthy,” FBIS Document ID JPP20010701000021.
In an issue of Han’guksa, a South Korean Defense Ministry magazine published by the Han’gukkunsamunjeyŏn’guso twice a year, General Thomas Schwartz, commander of the United Nations Command in South Korea, calls North Korea “the major security threat in Northeast Asia.” Schwartz also says “their dogged adherence to a ‘military first’ policy when viewed against the backdrop of a nation on the brink of complete economic and social collapse is problematic.” Schwartz says, “North Korea also possesses weapons of mass destruction and continues to develop asymmetric threats.”
—Tim Witcher, “North Korea Threat Grows Despite Near Collapse, Says US Commander,” Agence France Presse, 12 July 2001; Kim Min Sŏk, “Schwartz ‘Pukhan, Sŏn’gunjŏngch’it’as Kyŏngje-Sahoe Wanjŏnbunggoe,” Joongang Ilbo, <http://www.joins.com>.
According to the CIA, North Korea “continues its attempts to procure technology worldwide that could have applications in its nuclear program.”
—Central Intelligence Agency, “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Weapons, 1 January Through 30 June 2001,” 30 January 2002, <http://www.cia.gov/>.
North and South Korea hold the first direct meetings on export control issues regarding the supply of the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework. The meeting is held in Hyangsan, North Korea, and it addresses the export controls of the United States, South Korea and Japan.
—Kim Jong Suk, “The First South-North Direct Consultation on Export Control Related to KEDO Project,” TCNC Newsletter, July/August 2001, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr/Newsletter/Tcncnews.htm>.
President Bush authorizes the release of $20 million for heavy fuel oil deliveries to North Korea under the Agreed Framework.
—“North Korea: Bush OKs $20 Million to Deliver Fuel to Nation,” Dallas Morning News, 6 July 2001.
During a State Department briefing session, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage says that North Korea is abiding by the Agreed Framework. Armitage also urges North Korea to resume bilateral talks with the United States.
—Yonhap News Agency, 6 July 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: Armitage Urges DPRK to Resume Talks with US,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010707000042.
The Rodong Sinmun, official daily of the Korean Workers’ Party, states, “The DPRK has never allowed ‘verification’ and ‘inspection’ as its national defense industry and military forces are vital to it [sic]. It will neither permit ‘verification’ and ‘inspection’ nor accept the demand for the reduction of armed forces in the future, too, but further strengthen them.”
—“U.S. Urged to Properly Understand DPRK’s Principled Stand Towards U.S. Proposal,” Korean Central News Agency, 9 July 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Migug’ŭn Uriŭi Wŏnch’ikchŏngnipchangŭl Ddokparo Alaya Handa,” KCNA, 9 July 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Korea Central News Agency, 9 July 2001, in “DPRK’s KCNA: U.S. Urged to Properly Understand DPRK’s Principled Stand Towards U.S. Proposal,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010709000070; “North Korea Not to Resume Talks with US under Bush’s Conditions,” Agence France Presse, 9 July 2001; Ch’oi Sŏn Yŏng, “Puk, ‘Kŏmjŭg-Sach’al-Muryŏkkamch’uk Suyong Mothae,” Joongang Ilbo, 9 July 2001, <http://www.joins.com>.
Joe Bermudez, in an interview with USA Today, claims that North Korea may have mastered a new “electro-magnetic isotope separation” technique to enrich uranium, and may already have enough fissile material for 12 nuclear bombs. The report also says North Korea intends to acquire enough fissile material for 30 bombs by 2015. The speculation is from a new book edited by Henry Sokoloski, Planning for a Peaceful Korea. However, Bermudez admits, “It’s not that I firmly believe what I wrote. I was just trying to think outside the box.”
—Barbara Slavin, “Heat Is on to Check N. Korea’s Nuclear Program,” USA Today, 10 July 2001, <http://www.usatoday.com>; “USA Today ‘Puk Haekp’okt’an 12 Kae Chejonŭngnyŏk’,” Joongang Ilbo, 12 July 2001, <http://www.joins.com/>.
Korean Central Television in Pyongyang denounces the Bush administration’s proposal for renewing bilateral dialogue. The broadcast says that if the United States truly intends to reopen dialogue, “the agenda items should be practical issues about implementing the articles in the DPRK-US Framework Agreement [sic] and the DPRK-US Joint Communiqué as agreed upon.”
—Korean Central Television (Pyongyang), 11 July 2001, in “US ‘Arrogant’ Attitude Toward Dialogue With DPRK Denounced,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010711000103; Vladimir Kutakhov, “DPRK Does Not Intend to resume Dialogue on US Terms—Media,” ITAR-TASS, 11 July 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
The Chosun Ilbo reports that between 1 January 2001 and 20 June 2001, the South Korean government borrowed W172.5 billion with an interest of W17.1 billion in order to finance its share of the LWR project in North Korea. The National Assembly has delayed legislation to levy a 3.0 percent tax on South Korean utility costs to finance the South Korean share of the project.
—Chosun Ilbo, 15 July 2001, in “Interest on LWR for DPRK Reaches 36.1 Billion Won,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010715000002. Kim In Ku, “Pukkyŏngsuro Hangukpun’dan’gŭm,” Chosun Ilbo, 16 July 2001, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.co.kr>.
In response to a June 2001 report from the IAEA board of governors report, the Korean Central News Agency says the report is “once again a partial behavior and criminal attempt of the IAEA to shift the responsibility for the non-compliance with the DPRK-US Agreed Framework onto the DPRK at any cost as their remarks were timed to coincide with Bush’s announcement of the US unilateral and conditional ‘policy toward the DPRK’.” The IAEA report suggested North Korea’s refusal to allow full safeguards inspections would adversely affect the provision of light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.
—“KCNA Slams IAEA’s Attempt to Shift Responsibility onto DPRK,” Korean Central News Agency, 16 July 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Korean Central News Agency, 16 July 2001, in “DPRK’s KCNA: KCNA Denounces IAEA’s ‘Criminal’ Attempt to Shift Responsibility onto DPRK,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010716000026.
South Korean President Kim Dae Jung issues an amended presidential decree to implement and enforce the South Korean Atomic Energy Act. The changes will include the establishment of a review committee for export controls, which could affect the delivery of nuclear components and technology for the light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.
—Kim Jong Suk, “Amendment of Presidential Decree of the Act for Reinforced Nuclear Control Framework,” TCNC Newsletter, July/August 2001, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr/Newsletter/NL010708/Newsletter-010708.htm>.
Vice Marshall Cho Myŏng Rok, First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission, enters Hospital 301 in Beijing with kidney disease, and receives a kidney transplant. Cho is later reported to be in critical condition.
—“North Korean Number Two in Critical Condition in Beijing,” Agence France Presse, 11 August 2001, in “AFP Cites ROK Newspaper on DPRK Cho Myong-nok Reportedly in ‘Critical Condition’,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20010811000018; Choi Chae Yong, “Puk Kim Jong Il Ch’ŭkkŭn Cho Myŏng Rok Widok,” Kyunghyang Shinmun, 11 August 2001, <http://www.khan.co.kr>; Shim Kyu Sŏk, “Cho Myŏng Rok Che 1 Puwiwŏnjang, 16 Il Pyongyang Kwihwan,” Yonhap News Agency, 17 August 2001, <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr>; Ch’oe Wŏn Ki, “Widoksŏl Pukhan 2 Inja Cho Myŏng Rok P’arisŏ Susul,” Joongang Ilbo, 15 October 2001, <http://www.joins.com>.
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement in response to the 14 July 2001 missile interceptor test by the United States stating that North Korea must take counter-measures for self-defense, and that North Korea “will have nothing to lose even if all the points agreed upon between the DPRK and the US are scrapped.”
—“U.S. Interceptor Missile Test Under Fire,” Korean Central News Agency, 20 July 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Migukŭi Missile Yokyŏkshihŏme Chawijŏktaeŭngjoch’i / Chosŏnoemysŏng Taebyŏnin,” Korean Central News Agency, 20 July 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Korean Central News Agency, 20 July 2001, in “DPRK FM on US Interceptor Missile Test, Says DPRK ‘Compelled’ To Take Action,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010720000067; Korean Central Broadcasting Station, 20 July 2001, in “DPRK Radio Reports on DPRK Foreign Minister’s Answers to KCNA Reporter on US Missile Interceptor Test,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010720000113; “Pyongyang Criticizes Missile-Defense Test,” Washington Times, 21 July 2001, <http://www.washtimes.com>; “North Korea Vows Countermeasures in Reply to U.S. Test,” South China Morning Post, 20 July 2001, <http://www.scmp.com>.
According to an official at South Korea’s Unification Ministry, North Korea and KEDO initial a quality assurance and warranties protocol in New York following a fifth round of negotiations held 16-24 July. The protocol is the eighth between KEDO and North Korea, and the document took four years to negotiate. The official says the formal signing of the protocol will take place in about one month.
—Yonhap News Agency, 25 July 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: KEDO, N.K. Agree on Reactor Quality Assurance Protocol,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010725000059; Chu Yong Sŏng, “Puk-KEDO P’umjilbojangŭijŏngsŏ Kasŏmyŏng,” Yonhap News Agency, 25 July 2001, <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr>; “KEDO, North Korea Initial Protocol on Reactors,” Korean Information Service, 26 July 2001, <http://www.korea.net>.
Charles Pritchard, US special envoy for Korean peace talks, says that lack of cooperation from Pyongyang is responsible for the delays in the KEDO light water reactor project. Speaking at a hearing of the Asia and Pacific subcommittee of the House International Relations Committee, Pritchard says that North Korea “must begin active cooperation soon to avoid serious delays in the KEDO project.”
—“U.S. Envoy Raps N. Korea for Delay in KEDO Project,” Japan Economic Newswire, 26 July 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
Diplomatic sources tell NuclearFuel that Russia has offered to provide enriched uranium and fabricated fuel assemblies for the light water reactors being constructed by KEDO in North Korea. However, KEDO and US officials say they have not been informed of any Russian plans to renew nuclear cooperation with North Korea.
—Mark Hibbs, “Russia Offered to Supply Fuel for PWR Project in North Korea,” NuclearFuel, Vol. 26, No. 16, 6 August 2001, <http://wwwmhenergy.com>.
According to the Segye Ilbo, a South Korean daily, North Korea smuggles 32kg of HEU from Kazakhstan. According to the 8 November 2002 report, North Korea has been acquiring plutonium, uranium, other metals and equipment from Kazakhstan and other central Asian countries since 1994. North Korea has reportedly been procuring uranium-235, plutonium-239, as well as osmium-187, cesium-137, and strontium, which the report claims are used for reducing the size of nuclear warheads. The Segye Ilbo claims the information comes from a four-page Russian document later acquired by the South Korean Embassy in Uzbekistan. [Note: CNS sources indicate the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade received no such document, and there is no apparent use for osmium-187, cesium-137, and strontium in reducing the size of nuclear weapons; therefore, this report does not seem credible.]
—Segye Ilbo, 7 November 2002, in “Kazakhstani Report: DPRK Purchased Uranium, Plutonium From Kazakhstan,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20021108000025; Chŏn Hyŏn Il and Kim Ki Dong, “Puk, K’ajahŭsŏ Uranium Kŭkpibanip,” Segye Ilbo, 8 November 2002, p. 1, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Kim Ki Dong, “Changnyŏn’eman Uranium 32kg Panip,” Segye Ilbo, 8 November 2002, p. 3, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr>; Pak Hye Yun, “Puk, K’ajahŭsŏ Uranium Kŭkpi Kuip,” Donga Ilbo, 8 November 2002, <http://www.donga.com>.
A broadcast in Pyongyang says that North Korea will not resume dialogue with the United States unless the United States drops its stance that “the verification of North Korea’s missile and nuclear programs” be included on the agenda. Furthermore, the broadcast says that the US proposal to include conventional weapons in bilateral talks is part of a US effort to “completely disarm” North Korea.
—Kim In Ku, “Puk ‘Missile Kŏmjŭng P’ogihaeya Mi-Puk Taehwa Chaegae’,” Chosun Ilbo, 1 August 2001, <http://www.chosun.com>.
According to an interview with the Joongang Ilbo, Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, meets with President George Bush, and Bush recognizes the problems he created with his remarks during President Kim Dae Jung’s visit to Washington in March 2001. Biden says Bush’s remarks are unintentional, and that Bush “displayed enthusiasm for reopening talks with Pyongyang.” [Note: On 7 March, President Bush, speaking in Washington at a joint press conference with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, says, “I do have some skepticism about the leader of North Korea. We’re not certain as to whether or not they’re keeping all terms of all agreements.”]
—Brent Choi, “Mr. Bush Recognizes His Mistake—Special Interview with Senator Biden,” Joongang Ilbo, 13 August 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; “North Korea Refuses to Talk to U.S.,” Arms Control Today, September 2001, p. 40.
A senior Russian official confirms the NuclearFuel report of late July that Russia is prepared to supply enriched uranium and fuel for the KEDO light water reactor project.
—Mark Hibbs, “Russia Offered to Supply Fuel for PWR Project in North Korea,” NuclearFuel, Vol. 26, No. 16, 6 August 2001, <http://wwwmhenergy.com>.
According to ITAR-TASS, an official from Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry says that Russia is interested in building nuclear reactor for North Korea, and that the issue will be discussed in summit talks between President Putin and National Defense Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il on 4 August 2001. The official says Russia will suggest that the reactor be financed with funds from KEDO.
—“Russia Wants to Build Nuclear Reactor for N. Korea on Border,” Agence France Presse, 2 August 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
Interfax reports that Yevgeniy Reshetnikov, deputy atomic energy minister, has said Russia is not planning to increase cooperation with North Korea in the area of power generation. According to Reshetnikov, the United States pressured Russia to abandon its plan to join KEDO. The deputy minister says that North Korea had a debt of $5 million with the ministry, but that it had been reduced to $1.5 million, and that he expects North Korea to pay of the debt by the end of this year.
—Interfax News Agency (Moscow), 3 August 2001, in “Russia Has No Plans to Expand Ties with North Korea in Power Engineering,” FBIS Document ID CEP20010803000033; “Russian Atomic Energy Ministry Does Not Plan to Cooperate with North Korea,” Interfax News Agency, 3 August 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
Kim Jong Il holds a summit meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, where they discuss the planned construction of two light water reactors (LWRs) under the Agreed Framework. The details of the discussion are unknown, but there is speculation that Russia possibly proposes the sale of Russian-made LWRs to North Korea. North Korea is believed to have expressed its dissatisfaction with the project’s delay, as well as its desire for compensation from the loss in electricity.
—Kyodo News Service, 4 August 2001, in “Putin, Kim Call for Adherence to ABM Pact, Sign Accord,” FBIS Document ID JPP20010804000057; ITAR-TASS, 2 August 2001, in “Russia: DPRK’s Kim Jong-il to Arrive in Moscow 3 Aug; Agenda Outlined,” FBIS Document ID CEP20010802000321.
The North Korean Foreign Ministry issues a statement saying that North Korea “can never accept the agenda items of the talks raised unilaterally by the United States out of its intention to disarm the DPRK and stifle it and will not respond to the talks with the United States before it withdraws the items.” The statement is similar to several responses that have followed the 6 June 2001 proposal to resume talks with North Korea.
—“Answers Given by Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry,” Korean Central News Agency, 8 August 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Mi’gug’i Nae’noh’ŭn Hoedam’ŭije’rŭl Ch’ŏlhoehagi Chŏn’e’nŭn Maju Anj’ŭlsu Ŏbta / Oemusŏng Taebyŏn’in,” Korean Central News Agency, 8 August 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; Kim Ji-ho, “N.K. Again Turns Down U.S.-Proposed Agenda,” Korea Herald, 10 August 2001, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>.
At a press conference in Moscow, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld says, “By the year 2003, North Korea will have completed the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and currently possesses enough plutonium to develop five nuclear warheads.” Rumsfeld also says, “I have already presented the view in 1998 that North Korea would establish its ICBM capability within five years. Considering the fact that North Korea has already tested a three-stage long-range missile, the completion of its ICBM development by 2003 is certain.”
—“US Department of Defense Says ‘North Korea Will Complete Its ICBM Development Within Two Years’,” Hankook Ilbo, 15 August 2001, p. 2, in “ROK Daily Reports US SecDef’s Remarks to Russian Media on NK Nuclear Capability,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20010820000109; Yun Sŭng Yong, “Migukpang ‘Puk 2 Nyŏnnae ICBM Kaebal Kkŭtnaelgŏs’,” Hankook Ilbo, 14 August 2001, <http://www.korealink.co.kr/hankook.htm>.
Six North Korean nuclear specialists participate in a 12-day “Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material” in Canberra and Sydney, Australia. The program also includes participants from Australia, China, South Korea, and New Zealand.
—Kim Ji Ho, “N.K. Officials Receiving Nuclear Safety Training in Australia: Amb. Heseltine,” Korea Herald, 23 August 2001, <http://www.koreaherald.co.kr>; Kyodo News Service, 23 August 2001, in “N. Korean Officials Get Nuke Safety Training in Australia,” FBIS Document ID JPP20010823000092; Park Sung Ki, “SSAC Training Course Held in Australia,” TCNC Newsletter, 1 October 2001, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr/Newsletter/tcncnews.htm>.
First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission Marshall Cho Myŏng Rok returns from China after having received a kidney transplant at the 301 Hospital in Beijing.
—Shim Kyu Sŏk, “Cho Myŏng Rok Che 1 Puwiwŏnjang, 16 Il Pyongyang Kwihwan,” Yonhap News Agency, 17 August 2001, <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr>.
A high-level KEDO delegation meets with North Korean officials in Pyongyang to discuss the supply of the two light water reactors under the Agreed Framework.
—“KEDO High-Level Experts Negotiation Delegation Here,” Korean Central News Agency, 21 August 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “KEDO Kowigŭpchŏnmun’gahyŏpsangdae’p’yodan Toch’ak,” Korean Central News Agency, 21 August 2001, <http://www.kcna.co.jp>; “Delegates in Pyongyang for Talks over Nuclear Deal,” Agence France Presse, 21 August 2001; Central Broadcasting Station (Pyongyang), 25 August 2001, in “Korean Energy Organization Delegation Leaves North,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, 26 August 2001, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.
KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman reveals that excavation work will begin in September 2001 to prepare the foundations for the light water reactors to be constructed in North Korea under the Agreed Framework.
—David R. Sands, “Construction Set for N. Korea Nuclear Plant,” Washington Times, 30 August 2001, <http://www.washtimes.com>; “KEDO to Launch LWR Excavation Work in September,” Joongang Ilbo, 31 August 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; “KEDO, Puk Kyŏngsuro Kulch’akkongsa Naedal Ch’akkong,” Segye Ilbo, 31 August 2001, <http://www.segyetimes.co.kr>.
Government officials from the United States, South Korea and Japan meet in New York for a KEDO meeting to discuss nuclear exports. The meeting is held to coordinate policy on the transfer of nuclear facilities, equipment material and technology to North Korea under the Agreed Framework.
—Kim Jong Suk, “KEDO Export Control Consultation Meeting in New York,” TCNC Newsletter, September/October 2001, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr/Newsletter/Tcncnews.htm>.
Site preparation work for the KEDO light water reactor project is completed in [Kŭmho-chigu], Shinp’o, North Korea.
—KEDO 2001 Annual Report, p. 10, Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, <http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/KEDO_AR_2002.pdf>
North Korea’s State Nuclear Safety Regulatory Commission issues the construction permit for the light water reactors to be built under the Agreed Framework. The permit is issued after the review of a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report and an Environmental Report submitted by the Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) earlier this year.
—Kim Jong Suk, “DPRK SNSRC Issued CP for KEDO 2 LWRs,” TCNC Newsletter, September/October 2001, <http://www.tcnc.kaeri.re.kr/Newsletter/Tcncnews.htm>.
First Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission Marshall Cho Myŏng Rok greets Chinese President Jiang Zemin during his arrival at Sunan Airport for an official state visit to North Korea. Cho was hospitalized in mid July 2001 at the 301 Hospital in Beijing to receive a kidney transplant.
—“Puk Cho Myŏng Rok P’yŏngyang Kwihwan Hwagin,” Segye Ilbo, 3 September 2001, <http://www.segyetimes.co.kr>.
During talks with visiting Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Kim Jong Il reaffirms that North Korea will maintain its flight-test moratorium for its ballistic missiles until at least 2003. The newly appointed Chinese ambassador to South Korea later reveals that Kim Jong Il says “both sides (North and South Korea) must strive to create the conditions for his trip to Seoul by the end of the year.”
—“N. Korea Pledges to Continue Missile Test ban,” Middle East Newsline, Vol. 3, No. 349, 5 September 2001; ITAR-TASS, 4 September 2001, in “North Korean, Chinese Leaders Discuss Missiles-Related Subjects” FBIS Document ID CEP20010904000127; Yu Sang Ch’ŏl and Oh Yŏng Hwan, “Puk Missile Palsayuye Chaehwagin,” Joongang Ilbo, 4 September 2001, <http://www.joins.com>; “NK Reaffirms Halt to Missile Tests Until 2003,” Joongang Ilbo, 7 September 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; “Kim Jong-Il Renews Pledge to Postpone Missile Testing: Reports,” Agence France Presse, 5 September 2001; “N. Korea Pledges to Continue Missile test Ban,” World Tribune.com, 6 September 2001, <http://www.worldtribune.com>; “Kim Jong Il ‘Han’guktappang Yŏ’kŏn Chosŏnghaeya’,” Donga Ilbo, 12 September 2001, <http://www.donga.com>; “N.K. Chairman Wants ‘Right Conditions’ for Return Visit,” Joongang Ilbo, 13 September 2001, <http://english.joins.com>.
In hearings before the South Korean National Assembly’s Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee, the Ministry of Unification says that $638 million was spent on the KEDO light water reactor project between February 2000 and 31 August 2001. South Korea provided $447 million (70 percent) and Japan provided $191 million (30 percent) of the total. South Korea’s expenditures on the project have resulted in a national debt of W150 billion in 1999, W255 billion in 2000, and W262.5 billion for the period between January 2001 and 31 August 2001. The total deficit from the project over this period is W667.5 billion. The operating expenses for KEDO during 2001 are $18.36 million, with the United States, South Korea and Japan each contributing $4.56 million. US expenses for heavy fuel oil for the year are $70.32 million, and the United States has supplied North Korea with 308,000 tons of heavy fuel oil from January 2001 to 31 August 2001. The Ministry of Unification also reveals that KEDO plans to begin training North Korean technicians to operate the light water reactors under construction in North Korea. According to the Ministry, the training is to begin in February 2002, and will be divided into two steps for 529 personnel in all.
—Chu Yong Sŏk, “Kyŏngsuro Kongbi 6ŏk3ch’ŏnman Dollar Chiphaeng,” Yonhap News Agency, 10 September 2001, <http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr>; “South Korea Extends $638 Million for LWR Project So Far,” Joongang Ilbo, 10 September 2001, <http://english.joins.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 10 September 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: KEDO Pays KEPCO $638 Million on Reactor Building Contract,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010910000094; “Naenyŏn 2 Wŏl Pukch’ŭk Kyŏngsuroyowŏn Kyoyuk,” Chosun Ilbo, 10 September 2001, <http://www.chosun.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 10 September 2001, in “ROK’s Yonhap: KEDO to Give Training to North Koreans on Reactor Operation,” FBIS Document ID KPP20010910000063.
Jack Pritchard, US special envoy for Korean peace talks, says that bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea should resume soon. While visiting Seoul for meetings with South Korean officials, Pritchard says that we should expect talks to begin soon now that Kim Jong Il has had recent summit meetings with Vladimir Putin and Jiang Zemin. Pritchard is in Seoul after participating in the TCOG meeting in Tokyo on 6 September.
—Hŏ Yŏng Pŏm, “Mi-Puk Taehwa Kot Shijak,” Chosun Ilbo, 10 September 2001, <http://www.chosun.com>.
KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman postpones his trip to North Korea because of a typhoon. Kartman plans to depart for North Korea on the 13th to attend a groundbreaking ceremony for the two light water reactors in [Kŭmho-chigu], Shinp’o on 14 September, but cancels his travel plans after terrorists hijack four aircraft and crash two into New York’s World Trade Center and another into the Pentagon.
—Kwŏn Kyŏng Pok, “KEDO Ch’ongjang 13 Il Pangbuk,” Joongang Ilbo, 10 September 2001, <http://www.joins.com>; “Kartman KEDO Samuch’ongjang Pangbuk Ch’wiso,” Chosun Ilbo, 12 September 2001, <http://www.chosun.com>; Yonhap News Agency, 12 September 2001, in “KEDO Head Cancels DPRK Visit for LWR Ground-
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