On 10 February 2005, the North Korean Foreign Ministry announced that Pyongyang had manufactured nuclear weapons. In April 2003, a multilateral dialogue began in Beijing with the aim of ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Initially trilateral in format (China, North Korea and the United States), the process expanded to a six-party format with the inclusion of Japan, Russia and South Korea. On 19 September 2005, the fourth round of six-party talks concluded and the six parties signed a "Statement of Principles" whereby North Korea would abandon its nuclear programs and return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards at "an early date." The United States agreed that it has no intention of attacking North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons, and Washington affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. The parties also agreed that the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which prohibits uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing, should be observed and implemented.  [Note: on 12 May 2003, North Korea announced that the bilateral Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed with South Korea on 20 January 1992 was no longer valid because of "U.S. actions" even though the United States was not a signatory].

On 10 January 2003, North Korea notified the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the UN Security Council that Pyongyang was withdrawing from the NPT, and that the withdrawal would be effective the next day. The treaty requires 90-day notice before a withdrawal, but North Korea claims this is not necessary since Pyongyang already declared its intention to withdraw in 1993, only to “suspend its intention withdraw” 89 days later. The NPT withdrawal swiftly followed a December 2002 announcement that North Korea was lifting the freeze on its nuclear program, in response to the U.S. decision to suspend heavy fuel oil (HFO) shipments under the Agreed Framework. Pyongyang said it was lifting the freeze to generate electricity to compensate for the loss of HFO supplies, and North Korean technicians were able to remove seals and disable monitoring cameras at nuclear facilities in Yŏngbyŏn-kun within a matter of days. The IAEA’s ability to directly monitor activities at the Yŏngbyŏn nuclear complex was completely lost in late December 2002 when North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors who had been monitoring the freeze.

In the spring of 2003, U.S. intelligence detected activities around the Radiochemisty Laboratory, a reprocessing facility in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, that indicate North Korea was probably reprocessing the 8,000 spent fuel rods that had been in a temporary storage pond. In September 2003, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said that North Korea had completed the reprocessing of this spent fuel, which would give North Korea enough plutonium for about four to six nuclear bombs. In January 2004, a delegation of American private citizens confirmed that the cannisters in the temporary storage pond were empty.

In April 2005, North Korea shut down its 5MW(e) reactor and removed the spent fuel. The reactor had been operating since February 2003, so it should have produced enough plutonium for 1-3 bombs. However, it would take a few months for North Korean engineers to extract the plutonium from the spent fuel rods. In September 2005, satellite imagery indicated that the reactor had begun operations once again.  

There are also concerns about North Korea’s suspected highly enriched uranium (HEU) program, which is a different path to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. In the summer of 2002, U.S. intelligence reportedly discovered new evidence about transfers of HEU technology and/or materials from Pakistan in exchange for ballistic missiles. In October 2002, a delegation led by James Kelly, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, visited Pyongyang and notified North Korean officials that the United States was aware of Pyongyang’s HEU development program. Compared to plutonium-production facilities, the type of HEU production facilities that the DPRK may be developing would be difficult to detect, and therefore, it is difficult to accurately assess the program’s stage of development.

In early 2004, Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. A. Q. Khan revealed that he had sold gas-centrifuge technology to North Korea, Libya and Iran. Libya has since abandoned its nuclear ambitions and is cooperating with the IAEA and the United States, which has revealed much about Khan's network. In April 2003, Egyptian customs officials intercepted 22 tons of aluminum tubing from Germany, which would be enough for about 100-200 centrifuges. In the spring of 2004, it was reported that Khan visited North Korea and was shown three nuclear devices. However, the report lacks details, and its contents have not been confirmed.

History

North Korea first became embroiled with nuclear politics during the Korean War. Although nuclear weapons were never used in Korea, American political leaders and military commanders threatened to use nuclear weapons to end the Korean War on terms favorable to the United States. In 1958, the United States deployed nuclear weapons to South Korea for the first time, and the weapons remained there until President George Bush ordered their withdrawal in 1991. North Korean government statements and media reports often cite a “nuclear threat from the United States,” and continue to claim that the United States has about 1,000 nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea. There is no reason, however, to believe that this allegation is true.

There are different schools of thought on the motivations behind Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. Those who believe North Korea is a revisionist state argue that Pyongyang’s nuclear motivations constitute a serious external threat. This school of thought has ample evidence to support its claims: North Korea’s initiation of the Korean War, acts of terrorism, forward-deployed military forces, a constitution that states that the DPRK is the sole legitimate government for all of Korea, and Korean Workers’ Party bylaws calling for a “completion of the revolution in the south.” Many analysts also argue that Pyongyang’s record of exporting ballistic missiles indicates that North Korea would also be willing to sell nuclear materials, technology, or complete nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, some people believe North Korea is a state satisfied with the status quo and that it seeks peaceful coexistence with South Korea and the international community. Proponents of this school often argue that North Korea’s nuclear motivations are defensive in nature and designed to deter external threats to the DPRK. Evidence to support this argument includes the July 4 North-South Joint Communiqué of 1972; the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between North and South Korea of 1991 (the so-called “Basic Agreement”); the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula of 1991; the summit meeting of 2000; the Agreed Framework with the United States; and reunification proposals that would recognize “two systems” for the north and south. However, critics argue that Pyongyang’s behavior is inconsistent and that this evidence is not credible.

Regardless of North Korean motivations toward South Korea and the United States, Pyongyang’s record of exporting ballistic missiles and missile production technology indicates that North Korea could also be willing to sell nuclear materials, technology, or even complete nuclear weapons.

In the early 1950s, North Korea began establishing the institutional base to train the human resources for its nuclear development program. The Atomic Energy Research Institute was established along with the Academy of Sciences in December 1952, but the nuclear program did not begin its take-off until North Korea established cooperative agreements with the Soviet Union. Pyongyang signed the founding charter of the Soviet Union’s Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in February 1956, and began to send scientists and technicians there for training shortly thereafter. In 1959, North Korea and the USSR signed an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy that included a provision for Soviet help to establishment a nuclear research complex in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, North P’yŏng’an Province.

In the early 1960s, the Soviet Union provided extensive technical assistance while North Korea constructed its Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Center, which included the installation of a Soviet IRT-2000 Nuclear Research Reactor, and other facilities (see Yŏngbyŏn Nuclear Research Center). The small research reactor has been used to produce radioisotopes and to train personnel. The cabinet and the Academy of Sciences were given operational and administrative oversight of the nuclear facilities, but ultimate control of the program and decisions over weapons development belonged to North Korean leader Kim Il Sung. The program appeared to begin as a peaceful one, but whatever Kim’s original intentions, the Cuban Missile Crisis may have prompted initiation of a dedicated nuclear weapons program.

Indigenous Development

Kim Il Sung appreciated Soviet and Chinese support during the Korean War, but he had expected more, particularly from the Soviets, and he was dissatisfied that the war had ended in a stalemate. In 1961, Pyongyang signed “treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance” with both Moscow and Beijing, but events led Kim to question the credibility of these alliances. First, Kim had to question the credibility of Moscow’s alliance commitment after Khrushchev backed down during the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Only two months later, the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee adopted policies to strengthen the military and to implement import-substitution programs to reduce dependency on arms imports. Second, there are reports that Kim Il Sung asked China to share its nuclear weapons technology following China’s first nuclear test in October 1964, but Chairman Mao refused. Shortly thereafter, North Korean relations with China began to deteriorate and they worsened during China’s Cultural Revolution.

In the late 1960s, North Korea continued to expand its educational and research institutions to support a nuclear program for both civilian and military applications. By the early 1970s, North Korean engineers were using indigenous technology to expand the IRT-2000 research reactor and Pyongyang began to acquire plutonium reprocessing technology from the Soviet Union. In July 1977, North Korea signed a trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the USSR that brought the IRT-2000 research reactor and a critical assembly in Yŏngbyŏn-kun under IAEA safeguards. The Soviets were included in the agreement since they supplied the reactor fuel.

The early 1980s was a period of significant indigenous expansion, which included uranium milling facilities, a fuel rod fabrication complex, and a 5MW(e) nuclear reactor, as well as research and development institutions. The early 1980s also marks the beginning of high explosives test that are required for the triggering mechanism in a nuclear bomb. By the mid-1980s, Pyongyang began construction on a 50MW(e) nuclear power reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun, while expanding its uranium processing facilities. Some of technology and equipment acquired during this period had dual-use applications for a uranium enrichment program that was not revealed until the late 1990s.

North Korea’s energy concerns make nuclear energy a legitimate rationale for nuclear power, and Pyongyang explored the acquisition of light water reactor technology in the early to mid-1980s. This period coincided with the expansion of North Korea’s indigenously designed reactor program, which was based on gas-graphite moderated reactors similar in design to the Calder Hall reactors first built in the United Kingdom in the 1950s. In the early 1980s, Pyongyang was also exploring the acquisition of light water power reactors, and agreed to sign the NPT in December 1985 in exchange for Soviet assistance in the construction of four light water reactors.

After signing the NPT, countries have 18 months to complete a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In North Korea’s case, it was later discovered that the agency provided the wrong documents for the safeguards agreement and the IAEA subsequently gave North Korea an additional 18 months to complete the agreement. Nevertheless, North Korea failed to meet the extended deadline, as Pyongyang demanded that the United States withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea, and that Washington and Seoul terminate the joint military exercise “Team Spirit.”

In September 1991, President George Bush announced that the United States would withdraw its nuclear weapons from South Korea, and on 18 December 1991, President Roh Tae Woo declared that South Korea was free of nuclear weapons. North and South Korea then signed the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” whereby both sides promised “not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons.” The agreement also bound the two sides to forgo the possession of “nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.” The agreement also provided for a bilateral inspections regime, but the two sides failed to agree on its implementation.

North Korea finally signed an IAEA safeguards agreement on 30 January 1992, and the Supreme People’s Assembly ratified the agreement on 9 April. Under the terms of the agreement, North Korea provided an “initial declaration” of its nuclear facilities and materials, provided access for IAEA inspectors to verify the completeness and correctness of the initial declaration. Six rounds of inspections began in May 1992 and concluded in February 1993. Pyongyang’s initial declaration included a small plutonium sample (less than 100 grams), which North Korean officials said was reprocessed from damaged spent fuel rods that were removed from the 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. However, IAEA analysis indicated that Korean technicians reprocessed plutonium on three occasions—1989, 1990, and 1991. When the agency requested access to two suspect nuclear waste sites, North Korea declared them to be “military sites” and “off-limits.”

1994 Crisis and the Agreed Framework

After the IAEA was denied access to North Korea’s suspect waste sites in early 1993, the Agency moved to ask the UN Security Council for special ad hoc inspections, but on 12 March 1993, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Under the terms of the treaty, withdrawal is not effective until 90 days after giving notice. However, following intense bilateral negotiations with the United States, North Korea announced it was “suspending its withdrawal from the NPT” one day before the withdrawal was to become effective. Pyongyang agreed to “suspend” its withdrawal while talks continued with Washington, but claimed to have a special status in regard to its nuclear safeguards commitments. Under this “special status,” North Korea agreed to allow the “continuity of safeguards” on its present activities, but refused to allow inspections that could verify past nuclear activities.

As talks with the United States over North Korea’s return to the NPT dragged on, North Korea continued to operate its 5MW(e) reactor in Yŏngbyŏn-kun. By the spring of 1994, the reactor core was burned up, and the spent fuel rods had to be discharged. On 14 May 1994, Korean technicians began removing the spent fuel rods without the supervision of IAEA inspectors. This action worsened the emerging crisis because the random placement of the spent fuel rods in a temporary storage pond compromised the IAEA’s capacity to reconstruct the operational history of the reactor, which could have been used in efforts to account for the discrepancies in Pyongyang’s reported plutonium reprocessing. The Clinton administration announced that it would ask the UN Security Council to impose economic sanctions, but Pyongyang then declared that it would consider economic sanctions “an act of war.”

The crisis was defused in June 1994 when former President Jimmy Carter traveled to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Il Sung. Carter announced from Pyongyang that Kim had accepted the broad outline of a deal that was later finalized as the “Agreed Framework” in October 1994. Under the agreement, North Korea agreed to freeze its gas-graphite moderated reactors and related facilities, and allow the IAEA to monitor that freeze. Pyongyang was also required to “consistently take steps to implement the North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and remain a party to the NPT. In exchange, the United States agreed to lead an international consortium to construct two light water power reactors, and provide 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil per year until the first reactor came online with a target date of 2003. Furthermore, the United States was to provide “formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the US.”

Collapse of the Agreed Framework

While the Agreed Framework froze North Korea’s plutonium program for almost a decade, neither party was completely satisfied with either the compromise reached or its implementation. The United States was dissatisfied with the postponement of safeguards inspections to verify Pyongyang’s past activities, and North Korea was dissatisfied with the delayed construction of the light water power reactors. In fact, Pyongyang had demanded compensation from Washington, but the U.S. position has been that 2003 was only a “target date” and not a strict contractual commitment.

After coming to office in 2001, the new Bush administration initiated a North Korea policy review that was completed in early June. The policy review concluded that the United States should seek “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework, verifiable constraints on North Korea’s missile program, a ban on missile exports, and a less threatening North Korean conventional military posture.” From Washington’s perspective, “improved implementation of the Agreed Framework” meant an acceleration of safeguards inspections, even though the agreement did not require Pyongyang to submit to full safeguards inspections to verify its past activities until a significant portion of the reactor construction was completed but before the delivery of critical reactor components.

In October 2002, bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea finally resumed when U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs James Kelly visited Pyongyang. During the visit, Kelly informed First Vice Foreign Minister Kang Sŏk Chu and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Kye Kwan that Washington was aware of a secret North Korean program to produce highly-enriched uranium (HEU). The U.S. State Department claims that North Korean officials admitted to having such a program during a second day of meetings with Kelly, but North Korea now claims that it has only admitted to having a “plan to produce nuclear weapons,” which Pyongyang claims is part of its right to self-defense.

The United States responded in December 2002 by suspending heavy oil shipments, and North Korea then retaliated by lifting the freeze on its nuclear facilities, expelling IAEA inspectors monitoring that freeze, and announcing its withdrawal from the NPT on 10 January 2003. Initially, North Korea claimed it had no intention of producing nuclear weapons, and that the lifting of the nuclear freeze was necessary to generate needed electricity. On 10 February 2005, the Foreign Ministry announced that North Korea had manufactured nuclear weapons, and in early April 2005 Pyongyang shut down its 5MW(e) nuclear reactor. If the spent fuel in the reactor core is reprocessed, North Korea will be able to obtain enough weapons-grade plutonium for 1-3 nuclear bombs.    

	Updated December 2006