This assessment ranks North Korea among the largest possessors of chemical weaponry in the world. If official reports and testimonies from North Korean defectors are to be believed, the DPRK military possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons. (It is not clear, however, if this amount includes the munitions or only the CW agents themselves.) Reportedly, the CW agents in the DPRK arsenal include all of the major classes, such as phosgene (choking), hydrogen cyanide (blood), mustard (blister) and sarin (nerve agent). However, a 2002 report from the commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, General Thomas A. Schwartz, also suggests that North Korea is self-sufficient only in World War I era CW agents--these would include compounds such as phosgene, Lewisite, and mustard blister agents, but not the more potent nerve agent classes.
During the three decades after the establishment of the DPRK (in 1947), the North Korean CW program had uneven success in obtaining and weaponizing CW agents. However, it would appear that over the last 20 years, the DPRK has increased its capacity not only in CW agent production but also the development and deployment of a variety of chemical delivery systems. According to defector accounts, the DPRK's long-range missiles such as the Nodong, and other ballistic rockets and artillery pieces with calibres larger than 80mm, are capable of delivering CW agents. Despite North Korea's moribund economy and some hints of softening rhetoric from its leadership, the quantity and quality of new artillery placed near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) have actually increased in the last several years. Many of these artillery platforms, including multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) of up to 320mm, are forwardly deployed near the DMZ. This deployment represents a significant threat to heavily populated Seoul, as well as to the entire peninsula in the event of a southward invasion by the Korean People's Army (KPA).
Background
As early as 1947, the KPA manual addressed at least the theory of CW operational doctrine. It noted the utility of forcing the enemy to "suit up" in preparation for real or imagined use of chemical agents, for doing so would degrade the fighting ability of enemy forces. By 1954, the KPA established nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense units, probably along the lines of the Soviet model. According to some accounts, North Korea's offensive CW program also began at this time, relying mostly on Chinese assistance for chemical weapons development. Kim Il Sung's "Declaration for Chemicalization" in 1961 called for the further development of a chemical industry to support chemical weapons production, and the basic organization of the current Nuclear and Chemical Defense Bureau (NCDB) was also established during this time. In 1966, for reasons that are unclear, the DPRK later turned to the Soviets for assistance in CW, mostly in the form of training manuals and small quantities of nerve and mustard agents. Following this period of Soviet-led assistance, North Korea made substantive gains in the area of chemical warfare. Still, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) estimated in May 1979 that North Korea had only a defensive capability in CW, while noting that its development of offensive chemical weapons would have been the next logical step. Finally, by the late 1980s, it was reported that North Korea was able to produce CW agents in large quantity, and deployed large numbers of chemical ordnance. In January 1987, the South Korean defense ministry told the South Korean press that the DPRK possessed up to 250 tons of chemical weapons, including blister (mustard) and nerve agents. Recent estimates of North Korean chemical ordnance by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) have since been raised to the thousands of tons, probably based on recent information provided by North Korean defectors, including former members of DPRK military and NBC defence organizations.
The Suspected North Korean Chemical Weapons Arsenal
The DPRK is believed to maintain 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical agents, primarily mustard, phosgene, sarin, and V-series nerve agents. (Other reports from DPRK defectors--including allegations of a "nitrogen, sulfur, and mercury" chemical weapon that causes "respiratory paralysis"--seem rather farfetched.) Pak Tong Sam at the South Korean Agency for Defense Development has estimated that North Korea's chemical weapons production capability is 4,500 tons annually in peacetime, and this could increase to 12,000 tons in wartime. An unknown portion of CW agents are stored in bulk, but a significant portion is reported to be filled into artillery shells and rocket warheads. Due to challenges posed by a limited source of indigenously produced precursors for CW agents, it is believed that North Korea emphasizes production of phosgene, mustard, sarin, and V-agents. (Previous reports have also alleged a large stock of sarin nerve agent.) In 2001, it was estimated that there are 12 facilities in the DPRK where raw chemicals, precursors, and CW agents are produced and/or stored. CW agents are then moved to either a Sakchu- or Kanggye-based chemical weapons facility for weaponization, i.e., the filling of weapons with agents for deployment. It is also reported that shipments of CW agents are conducted in such a way so as not to attract undue attention, and are camouflaged as ordinary military cargo.
CW Agents
Open-source assessments of North Korean chemical weapons stockpiles have changed significantly over the past decade. Reports by defectors and other accounts in the open literature indicate that North Korea currently possesses blister (e.g., mustard), nerve (e.g., sarin), choking (e.g., phosgene), and blood agents (e.g., hydrogen cyanide). A North Korean defector in 1997 told a U.S. Congressional committee that the DPRK possessed a blister agent called "Lizut," or Lewisite, in its arsenal. VE and VG nerve agents are also mentioned in South Korean assessments of DPRK chemical weapons, although these reports do not appear to be based on hard data but rather on inference. A 1999 report by the U.S. Congress stated the following with regard to how the North Korean military views chemical weaponry:
Reflecting Soviet military doctrine, the DPRK has traditionally viewed chemical weapons as an integral part of any military offensive. There are no indications that this view has altered since the end of the Cold War. The most obvious tactical use of chemical weapons by the DPRK would be to terrorize South Korean civilians. Seoul lies within easy striking distance of North Korea's artillery and rocket systems and, today, the South Korean civilian population has no protection against CW attack.
Delivery Systems
Over half of North Korea's 1.2 million-man army is deployed within 90 miles of the DMZ, as are thousands of artillery systems. Because chemical weapons are best suited for delivery with larger caliber artillery pieces, it is worth noting that over the last two years the North has further increased the number of long-range 240mm multiple rocket launcher systems and 170mm howitzers, all placed in hardened sites near the DMZ.
North Korea's chemical defense force is estimated to be around 13,000 personnel, probably making it the third-largest CW service in the world, with chemical defense units incorporated at the regimental level. The Hamhung Chemical Engineering College is responsible for much of the training of the Korean People's Army in CW defense. Two main factories located in the cities of Kanggye and Sakchu are reportedly tasked with the final preparation, filling, and distribution of CW agents in artillery shells from 80 mm and larger, as well as 240mm caliber artillery rockets. Testing of agents is also reportedly performed at these two locations, possibly in very large underground facilities. In addition to thousands of artillery rounds, hundreds of forward deployed Scud-B, Frog-5 and Frog-7 missiles, plus about 30 Scud-C missiles could be armed with chemical warheads. All of them could easily strike much of South Korea. A South Korean security analyst suggested that DPRK artillery pieces of calibers 170mm and 240mm "could fire 10,000 rounds per minute to Seoul and its environs." Given all of North Korea's artillery along on the DMZ, it has been estimated that the KPA could fire over 5 million artillery shells per hour.
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| Photo from the Republic of Korea 2000 Defense White Paper (Ministry of National Defense) |
Status
In 1994, during heightened tensions over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, the DPRK threatened to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." One of the highest ranking North Korean government officials to defect to the South, Hwang Jang Yop, said in April 1997 that the DPRK military was able to do just that, using a combination of chemical and nuclear weapons delivered by missiles. Rhetoric aside, North Korea faces many obstacles in actually employing CW agents, not to mention their manufacture and storage. To be sure, the wide availability of oil-derived intermediates, especially ethylene oxide, makes the large-scale manufacture of simple CW agents such as mustard well within the capabilities of the DPRK. However, it is not clear how well North Korea would be able to manufacture large quantities of nerve agents, such as sarin, soman, and VX, without putting a great burden on already limited resources.
During the 1990s, the unavailability of precursors required to manufacture some nerve agents may very well have challenged the DPRK logistical supply network. For example, in 1996 an ethnic Korean in Japan was caught exporting 50kg of sodium fluoride to North Korea by way of cargo vessels bringing food aid to the DPRK. Ostensibly, this chemical was intended for use by a North Korean entity for electroplating purposes. But because sodium fluoride is also a precursor for sarin and soman nerve agents, the Japanese authorities arrested the individual (himself a Japanese citizen) for trading in a controlled substance. The relatively small amount (50kg) of this chemical had little consequence in terms of producing militarily significant amounts of nerve agent. But the sodium fluoride episode points to a serious problem faced by North Korea, namely the lack of domestically-manufactured chemical precursors.
Nonetheless, the DPRK has also shown a single-minded emphasis on buttressing its military capabilities despite a poverty-stricken economy and populace. Although the majority of the CW stockpile in the North may not be of the more sophisticated and lethal nerve agent variety, it may contain a large quantity of casualty agents such as mustard, phosgene, and Lewisite, all compounds that are relatively easy to manufacture.
North Korea and the Chemical Weapons Convention
In the early 1990s--according to reports from DPRK defectors--the North Korean Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces debated over whether to join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Although the foreign ministry was apparently in favor of participating in the regime, the military was opposed, and Kim Chong Il apparently sided with the latter.
Since 1997, the South Korean government has insisted that the DPRK join the CWC, to no avail. North Korea has also rebuffed efforts on the part of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), as well as the Japanese government, to persuade it to participate in the chemical disarmament regime. If North Korea wishes to foster a viable chemical industry, a case could be made that its accession to the CWC would make long-term economic sense by giving it access to trade in treaty-controlled chemicals and technology. In the short term, however, a knowledgeable official at the OPCW noted that North Korea would not reap immediate benefits by joining the CWC regime.
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Updated February 2006 |
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Key Sources:
North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, US House of Representatives, November 1999; Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., The Armed Forces of North Korea (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2001) p. 227; Mun Hui-sang, "How North Korea and South Korea Are Heading for Arms Reduction," Sisa Journal (Seoul), online version, 5 July 2000, translated in FBIS Document ID KPP20000710000086; Pak Hon-ok, "DPRK Military Policy in 2000," Pukan, 1 December 2000, pp. 66-75, translated in FBIS, Document ID: KPP20001212000032; Pak Tong-sam (from the ROK Agency for Defense Development), "How Far Has the DPRK's Development of Strategic Weapons Come?" Pukhan, January 1999, pp. 62-71, translated in FBIS Document ID: FTS19990121001655; Katsuhiro Kuroda, "DPRK Manufactures Chemical Weapons," Sankei Shimbun, 10 June 2000, online version, translated in FBIS Document ID: JPP20000610000025; "South Estimates DPRK Has 5,000 Tons of Chemical Weapons, Mostly Sarin," Seoul Sinmun, 15 April 1995, p. 1, in BBC Summary of World Broadcast; Ch'oe Son Yong, "Why the Discrepancy between ROK, DPRK Joint Communique Regarding Military Authorities Talks," Yonhap Internet site, Korean version, 8 April 2002, translated in FBIS Document KPP20020408000065; Statement of General Thomas A. Schwartz, Commander in Chief United Nations Command/Combined Forces Command; and Commander, United States Forces Korea, before the 107th Congress, Senate Armed Forces Committee, 5 March 2002, p. 8.
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