This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1996
US Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord writes a letter to Senator Robert F. Bennett in which he states, "The entire Pakistani strategic weapons program should be stamped 'Made in China,'"
—Bill Gertz, "China plays a major role in expanding the nuclear club," Washington Times, 29 May 1998, part A, p. A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 29 May 1998, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

12 March 1996
Taiwanese customs officials announce that a North Korean ship, the Chŏn Sŭng, bound for Pakistan was found carrying 15 tons (200 barrels) of ammonium perchlorate, which is used in manufacturing rocket propellants. The shipment was discovered last week in Kaoshuing Harbor. The shipment was destined for Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), but the ship will return to North Korea.
—"Puk Han, Pakistan's Missile Chaejoyong Hwahagmulchil Such'ul Shido," Chosun Ilbo, 12 March 1996, <http://www.chosun.com/>; "Rocket Chejoyong Kwayŏmsosanyŏm/Puk, Pakistan Such'ul'gido," Hankyoreh Shinmun, 13 March 1996, p. 2, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>.

29 April 1996
Hong Kong customs officials raid and seize a shipment of rocket fuel from China to Pakistan. The raid yields 200 boxes of ammonium perchlorate, which is used as an oxidizer in solid-propellants. The shipment originated in Xian, China and was destined for Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), Karachi.
—Michelle Chin and Glenn Schloss, "Customs raid uncovers huge haul of rocket fuel," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 18 September 1996, p. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 18 September 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

May 1996
A US interagency intelligence report prepared by the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee says the M-11 ballistic missiles supplied to Pakistan by China are operational. The report is based on evidence provided by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The missiles were believed to be in crates at the Sargodha airbase and some US officials believe that China provided experts to assemble the missiles and train Pakistani personnel in operating them. The US officials also believe that Pakistan has developed a nuclear warhead for its M-11 missile based on a design provided by China in 1983. The supplied design was tested by China in 1966.
—Andrew Koch, "Pakistan persists with nuclear procurement," Jane's Intelligence Review (Coulsdon, Surrey), March 1997.

June 1996
US officials say a new US government report unambiguously confirms that Pakistan possesses medium-range ballistic missiles produced by China. The report also states that Pakistan, for the first time, has completed developing nuclear warheads for the missiles. US officials indicate that the report augments the intelligence community's conclusions regarding the presence of complete Chinese M-11 missiles in Pakistan. The report's conclusion puts additional pressure on the Clinton administration to impose sanctions on the two countries.

The intelligence community is, however, divided on the "operational" status of the missiles. Representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) argue that the missiles are operational since a unit of the Pakistani Army has been assigned to operate the missiles and has undergone training by the Chinese experts. Officials from the CIA and the DIA insist that the missiles can be withdrawn from the crates and be deployed within a few days. Officials from the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), however, argue that the missiles are not operational as there is no concrete information on the training practices of the Pakistani Army. The INR insists that the missiles cannot be considered operational until they have been taken out of the crates and used in training, an act that has not occurred so far. A similar dispute exists over the report's conclusion that Pakistani engineers might have completed the difficult task of developing nuclear warheads for the missiles. Several officials reached this conclusion based on an estimate of Pakistan's efforts to develop nuclear warheads. INR analysts, however, insist that unless a warhead has been flight tested, its development cannot be considered successful. The flight-testing of a warhead has not happened so far.

US officials indicate that the final phrasing of the report will be decided by CIA Director John M. Deutch, after further drafting by the Weapons and Space Systems Intelligence Committee, a panel comprising of US intelligence agencies and officials from Australia, Canada and Britain. Australia and Canada agree with the conclusions of the INR that the missiles are not "operational" and that the development of nuclear warheads for the missiles is not complete.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "Report Cites China–Pakistan Missile Links," Washington Post, 13 June 1996, p. A19; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 June 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

14 June 1996
Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Shen Guofang terms the reports on Chinese transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan as unfounded. Guofang says, "We have not in the past, nor shall we in the future, sell similar missiles to Pakistan or other countries."
—"Spokesman Denies Sale of Missiles to Pakistan," WEN WEI PO (Hong Kong), 14 June 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960614000117, 14 June 1996.

July 1996
British officials deport Mohammed Saleem, an employee of Pakistan's High Commission in London, on charges of participating in "proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." US officials say that Saleem is the European purchaser of equipment for A.Q. Khan Research laboratories. In the last five years, three employees of Pakistan's High Commission, including Saleem, have been deported for violation of British export control laws.
—Andrew Koch, "Pakistan persists with nuclear procurement," Jane's Intelligence Review (Coulsdon, Surrey), March 1997.

Last Week of August 1996
US intelligence agencies strongly suspect Chinese assistance to Pakistan in building a factory for short-range ballistic missiles. The factory is being built in a suburb of Rawalpindi, a city near Islamabad. The factory, when completed, is expected to produce most of the major components for the M-11 missile. Some officials believe the factory will turn out precise duplicates of the M-11 missile. The M-11 missile is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and has a range of 200 miles.

US intelligence officials have been aware of the factory's existence for the past year, when its construction began. An intelligence official says they have been noticing "crates of stuff" arrive at the factory and says the crates' contents have been determined with a certain degree of certainty. The factory's use is described in the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which also states that Pakistan has built warheads for the M-11 missile. US officials believe that the factory's completion will give Pakistan an indigenous capacity to build missiles, thereby matching India's missile production capacity. US intelligence agencies indicate that the missile factory is the result of an accord reached between China and Pakistan in the late 1980s, under which China agreed to ship the makings of M-11 missiles to Pakistan as well as three dozen completed M-11 missiles. US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials conclude that China has shipped more than 30 ready-to-launch M-11 missiles and that these missiles are kept in canisters located at the Sargodha Air Force base near Lahore. CIA officials also believe that Pakistan is working on small nuclear warheads to be fitted on top of the missile.

However, differences exist among US analysts as to the exact purpose of the factory. Some analysts believe that the factory is a "turn-key" or "soup to nuts" facility capable of manufacturing complete M-11 missiles, with two missile stages, rocket motors, solid-propellant, and requisite guidance systems. Other analysts believe that the factory can only produce a few components for the missile and Pakistan might still be required to import guidance systems and the specialty steel needed for rocket motor bodies. Spy satellite photographs indicate similarities between the Rawalpindi plant and the M-11 rocket facility in Hubei province in central China. Officials are also debating the extent of the Chinese role in building the factory. Intelligence reports from agents on the ground and telephone intercepts indicate that about a dozen engineers from the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation have visited the factory. The CIA also noticed crates suspected of containing machine tools for rocket motors being shipped by the Chinese corporation. Analysts from CIA and the State Department, however, differ on whether the M-11 missiles in Pakistan's possession are "operational." The issue was settled by not using the term "operational" in the final draft of the US intelligence assessment. Instead, the assessment states that the missile can be launched within 48 hours.

Several US officials say that even though the Clinton administration has not formally accepted that China has sold completed M-11 missiles to Pakistan, the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) confidently states that the missiles are in canisters stored at Pakistan's Sargodha Air Force base, west of Lahore. Washington is seeking further confirmation of Chinese involvement. The United States has twice imposed sanctions on China for its missile deals with Pakistan and removed them after China promised to stop its deliveries. Four US officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that China's assistance in the factory construction is a serious violation of China's pledge to follow the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) stipulations. China has not signed the MTCR.

However, Pakistan flatly denies reports that it is building a missile factory with Chinese assistance, saying that the claim was a lie spread by its archrival India. The Deputy Chief of Mission at the Pakistani Embassy Zamir Akram denies the existence of such a factory. He says that Tarwanah, the suburb mentioned in US reports, has no major military or Air Force facilities. China has also described the allegations as groundless. An official at the Chinese embassy also denies Chinese assistance to Pakistan in building M-11 missiles. The official says, "There never was any such cooperation .This was discussed when we signed the 1994 agreement."
—R. Jeffrey Smith, 'China Linked To Pakistani Missile Plant; Secret Project Could Renew Sanctions issue," Washington Post, 25 August 1996, p. A01; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Tim Weiner, "US Says It Suspects China Is Helping Pakistan With Missiles," New York Times, 26 August 1996, p. 6; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; "Pakistan's Missiles," Pittsburg Post-Gazette (Pittsburg, Pennsylvania), 27 August 1997, p. A-4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Steven Erlanger, "US Wary of Punishing China For Missile Help To Pakistan," New York Times, 27 August 1997, p. 6; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 August 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>; Douglas Waller, "The Secret Missile Deal," Time, 30 June 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/06/23/time/missiles.html>.

25 August 1996
US Vice President Al Gore states that the United States has a "...very active, vigorous program of monitoring all exchanges of technology from China or any other country that might violate the international treaties and laws that are relevant to this. And we are watching very, very carefully, and we have an active, ongoing dialogue with the Chinese on this very point."
—National Public Radio, 27 August 1996.

27 August 1996
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali denies the construction of a short-range missile factory near Islamabad with Chinese assistance. He terms the US news report about the factory as "false and malicious." The Chinese foreign ministry also terms the reports as "groundless" and Pakistani diplomats in Beijing say there is "no defense factory" near Islamabad. However, the US State Department spokesperson rejects the denials and says "we make our decisions based on our own information gathering." He further adds that the United States is going to pursue this issue "very, very actively."
—"Asif Denies Missile Factory Being Built With PRC Help," Agence France Presse, 27 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960827000346, 27 August 1996.

27 August 1996
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Shen Guofang says the United States must "act with prudence" in making allegations of Chinese exports of weapons technology. The spokesperson says, "The US intelligence agency has supplied much inaccurate information and in fact the US side has suffered hard lessons there."
—"Spokesman Urges US Prudence in Intelligence Reports," Agence France Presse, 27 August 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960827000031, 27 August 1996.

27 August 1996
Foreign Report, published by Jane's Information Group, says that Pakistan has built a factory in pre-fabricated sheds in the Kala Chata mountain range near Fatehgunj, 40km west of Islamabad. According to the report, the factory is named National Defence Complex and is being built to produce ballistic missiles with Chinese assistance. The report states that sophisticated equipment such as gyroscopes, accelerometers, and on-board computers have been supplied by the China Precision Machine Import and Export Corporation.
—Pravin Sawhney, "Chinese Missile Technology Transfer Alleged," Asian Age (New Delhi), 27 August 1996; in FBIS Document ID: FTS19960827000380, 27 August 1996.

13 September 1996
Highly placed Indian sources say that China and Pakistan are working on a new long-range missile that will supplement the M-11 missile. The new missile will most likely be able to delivery a 500kg payload over a range of 600km. Sources indicate that work on the new missile began in January 1996 and "It is possible that Chinese experts are building upon some of the know-how which Pakistan has developed earlier."
—Atul Aneja, "'Sources' Report China, Pakistan Working on New Missile," Hindu (Chennai), 13 September 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960913000565, 13 September 1996.

18 September 1996
The report of the Hong Kong customs seizure in April 1996 of an ammonium perchlorate shipment from China to Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) is made public.
—Michelle Chin and Glenn Schloss, "Customs raid uncovers huge haul of rocket fuel," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 18 September 1996, p. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 18 September 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

19 September 1996
Pakistan's Foreign Office spokesperson says the Space Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) is engaged in research activities and has imported a tiny quantity of solid propellants for research and development purposes. The spokesperson denies the confiscation of a huge amount of fuel and terms the news report as "misleading, baseless, and unfounded."
—Tariq Butt, "Pakistan Denies Report on Rocket Fuel Smuggling," The News (Karachi), 20 September 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19960920000529, 20 September 1996.

October 1996
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other US intelligence agencies reach an agreement on a "Statement of Fact" that China is assisting Pakistan to build a missile factory near Rawalpindi that can produce key parts of the rocket within two years. White House officials insist on greater evidence like photos of missiles out of the crates. CIA officials, however, suspect that Pakistan is aware of the timing of US spy satellites and has taken steps to conceal its efforts during those time intervals.
—Douglas Waller, "The Secret Missile Deal," Time, 30 June 1997; <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/06/23/time/missiles.html>.

13 December 1996
Hong Kong custom officials seize a shipment of 10 tons of ammonium perchlorate destined for Pakistan's Space Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), Karachi. However, the Pakistani consulate denies that the shipment was meant for SUPARCO. A spokesperson for the Pakistani Consul-General Tariq I. Puri denies the fuel was destined for SUPARCO. The spokesperson claims that 10 tons of seized fuel was a "sizeable amount" and states that SUPARCO imports only a small quantity of fuel.
—Glenn Schloss, "Cargo linked to Pakistan space agency suspected by West," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 13 December 1996, p. 4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 December 1996, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

13 December 1996
A North Korean military controlled corporation, Lyongaksan, is believed to have shipped the rocket fuel seized in Hong Kong in April. The same corporation was behind the shipment of fuel seized in Taiwan in March this year. Officials say that both shipments were destined for Pakistan's Space Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) and had the same contract number. The Hong Kong shipment is supposed to have originated in the North Korean port of Nampo and then shipped through Xian, China. The shipment is believed to have been routed through China after the earlier shipment in March was confiscated in Taiwan. Officials believe that Lyongaksan or Yongaksan belong to the same state-run corporation. Jane's Intelligence Review reports that both the corporations are part of the External Economic General Bureau that handles North Korea's trade in arms. The United States determined in 1992 that Lyongaksan was selling missiles to Iran and Syria and the company has been on international watch lists since then.
—Glenn Schloss, "DPRK Firm Said Behind Rocket Fuel Bound for Pakistan," South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 13 December 1996; in FBIS Document FTS19961213000119, 13 December 1996.

July-December 1996
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that Pakistan is making "strong efforts to acquire an indigenous capability in missile production technologies," and that "China...was a major supplier to Pakistan's ballistic missile program, providing technology and assistance."
—"The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventions/Munitions, Director of Central Intelligence, July-December 1996, <http://www.fas.org/irp/cia/product/wmd.htm>.

1997
Kang T'ae Yun, a North Korean diplomat in Pakistan, brokers a deal with the All Russian Institute of Light Alloys in Moscow for the delivery of maraging steel to Pakistan and North Korea. North Korea's Changgwang Sinyong Corp acquires special "maraging steel" for Pakistan's missile program. Customs officials in Gatwick Airport seized the maraging steel, addressed to Kang Thae Yun, when it is discovered on a British Airways flight from Moscow to Islamabad. Intelligence sources believe Kang T'ae Yun to be one of North Korea's busiest arms dealers.
—Dexter Filkins, "N. Korea Aid to Pakistan Raises Nuclear Fears," Los Angeles Times, 23 August 1999, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Julian West, "Pakistan Murder Exposes Nuclear Link: The Killing of a Diplomat's Wife has Revealed the Sinister Connection Between the North Koreans and the Pakistanis," Sunday Telegraph (London), 1 November 1998, p. 32, in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/>; Lee Ch'ŏl Min, "Pakistan, Puk'e Haekkisul Chegong," Chosun Ilbo, 25 August 1999, p. 10, in KINDS, <http://www.kinds.or.kr/>; Bill Gertz, "Pakistan gets help with missile; North Korea delivered warhead canisters for Ghauri model," Washington Times, 14 September 1998; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 September 1998, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

March 1997
Jane's Intelligence Review reports that Pakistan's Space Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) tried to buy electron-beam welding equipment from a British-based company, which stopped the shipment. The requested equipment can be used for specialized welding on a missile's airframe. The magazine report also says that Pakistani agents have increased their efforts to acquire equipment that can be used to make sophisticated nuclear weapons designs. The equipment requested by Pakistan could be used for taking precision measurements and for conducting diagnostic examinations. Such activities can help Pakistan design small nuclear warheads that can be fitted atop a missile. The report mentions a previous attempt in which Pakistan's Institute for Industrial Automation attempted to obtain special valves for a vacuum furnace from a French company. The shipment was stopped by British customs authorities as it passed through Britain.
—Andrew Koch, "Pakistan persists with nuclear procurement," Jane's Intelligence Review (Coulsdon, Surrey), March 1997.

27 May 1997
Peter Frisch, president of the Cologne-based Office for the Protection of the Constitution and chief of Germany's counter terrorism, tells the Jerusalem Post that Iran, Libya, and Pakistan have been trying for years to obtain parts for their non-conventional weapons programs through Germany.
—Steve Rodan, "German Terrorism Chief: Iran's Missiles Can Hit US," Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem, Israel), 28 May 1997, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

4 June 1997
Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat says Pakistan will have to proceed with the development of an indigenous missile capability in the absence of reassurances to address India's missile deployment.
—"Army Chief Reacts to Reports of Indian Missile Deployment," PTV Television Network, 4 June 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970604000819, 4 June 1997.

7 June 1997
Indian Army Chief General Shankar Roychowdhury says Pakistan's M-11 short-range ballistic missiles are located close to the border of India and Pakistan. He says the missiles are "not actively deployed," but adds that they can be deployed quickly.
—"Army Chief—Pakistan Missile Sites Located Near Border," Telegraph (Calcutta), 7 June 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970609000644, 7 June 1997.

First week of July 1997
A Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report states that China has provided significant variety of assistance to Pakistan's and Iran's missile programs.
—R. Jeffrey Smith, "CIA Report calls China and Russia Key Suppliers of Most Destructive Arms, Technology," Washington Post, 2 July 1997, A Section, p. A24; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 July 1997, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Early July 1997
Pakistan claims to have carried out a test-firing of the surface-to-surface Hatf-III missile. A Pakistani foreign office spokesperson indicates that the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) conducted the test.
—Amit Baruaj, "Pak test-fires two missiles," Hindu (Chennai), 24 July 1997, News, p. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 July 1997, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

2 July 1997
A leading Pakistani newspaper reports that Pakistan successfully test-fired a short-range missile with a range of up to 800km. The news report quoting reliable sources names the test-fired missile to be the third in the Hatf series with an enhanced range.
—"Delhi Reports Pakistan Test Fired Medium-Range Missile," All India Radio Network, 2 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970702000584, 2 July 1997.

3 July 1997
A Pakistani foreign office spokesperson confirms that Pakistan test-fired a new version of its indigenous Hatf missile. The spokesperson did not provide any details about the range of the tested missile but news reports indicate the range to be 800km. The spokesperson says that the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) carried out the test as part of its routine testing. The spokesperson says that SUPARCO is involved in "peaceful research and development of rocket motor technology" and that none of its activities involves military components. The spokesperson denies a Washington Post report that says that the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in its recent report told Congress that China has provided assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program and says that Pakistan's relationship with China was "totally in the sphere of peaceful uses of technology."
—"Government Confirms Test-Firing of New Missile," Agence France Presse, 3 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970703000413, 3 July 1997.

21 July 1997
Defence sources in India say that "integration of nuclear warheads with its missiles" is high on Pakistan's agenda and that China is "entirely" assisting Pakistan in its missile and nuclear programs. Sources explain that the economics of the missile deal between China and Pakistan clearly involved future production of missiles by Pakistan since one third of the $516 million for technology transfer was used on 64 missiles. According to reported estimates, Pakistan could have 80 M-11 missiles and about 12 to 20 missile launchers.
—"PRC Said Aiding Pakistan Develop Missiles With N-Warheads," Pioneer (New Delhi), 21 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970721000663, 21 July 1997.

24 July 1997
Pakistan announces the successful test-firing of an "indigenously produced" surface-to-air missile, Anza, and an anti-tank guided missile, Baktar Shikan. A statement released by the Pakistani defense ministry says that the test took place at Nowshera, about 100km north-west of Islamabad.
—Amit Baruaj, "Pak test-fires two missiles," Hindu (Chennai), 24 July 1997, News, p. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 July 1997, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

26 July 1997
Former Pakistani Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto confirms Pakistan's development of an 800km-range ballistic missile. Bhutto claims credit for the development of the missile and declares the missile to be her "golden jubilee present" to the people of Pakistan. Ms Bhutto put the onus on the Unites States, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Japan for failing to avert a missile regime in South Asia and insists that Pakistan was forced to acquire an indigenous missile capability to match India's missile strength and to deter Indian adventurism against Pakistan.
—P.S. Suryanarayana, "Sri Lanka Benazir confirms Pak. Missile development," Hindu (Chennai), 26 July 1997, News, p. 12; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 July 1997, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.

Fall 1997
Intelligence sources begin monitoring North Korean flights to Pakistan. There are about three flights a month until January 1998, when the number of flights increased three-fold. The flights mostly involve Il-76 transports; the transports apparently carried technical exports, including telemetry crews in February and March 1998. The increase in the number of flights followed the visit of the North Korean chief of staff and the head of the strategic forces, which leads analysts to believe that Pakistan and North Korea have entered into an agreement for North Korean access to Pakistan's range facilities in exchange for military technology.
—"Pakistan's Missile 'Was a Nodong'," Jane's Missiles & Rockets (Coulsdon, Surrey), vol. 2, no. 5, May 1998, pp. 1-2.

2 October 1997
Reliable sources indicate that Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) has developed a new missile with a range of 1,000-1,500km for research purposes. The missile can also be used for defense purposes.
—"Sources: SUPARCO Prepares Missile With Range of 1,500 Km," Jang (Karachi), 2 October 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19971003000726, 3 October 1997.

20 October 1997
The United States agrees to sell China nuclear technology in exchange for Beijing's cessation of help to Iran and Pakistan on their nuclear and missile programs. The Sino-American agreement, which could be signed 29 October, would also include a promise by President Jiang Zemin that Beijing will stop selling anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran.
—Hugo Gurdon, "US, China in Nuclear Deal: Exchange Means China Must Stop Helping Iran, Pakistan," Gazette (Montreal), 20 October 1997, p. B1, in Lexis-Nexis, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com>.

November 1997
German intelligence services, BND, reported that Iran uses fake companies located in third countries for its missile program purchases. Dubai and Pakistan are considered among these third countries.
—Stern (Hamburg), 9 November 1997, pp. 182-184, in FBIS-TAC-97-254, 9 November 1997; in Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1998, Vol. 5, No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, p. 142.

16 December 1997
During a meeting with Indian Prime Minister Inder Gujaral in New Delhi, the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party's disciplinary commission Wei Jianxing denies that China has supplied M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan. However, an Indian foreign ministry spokesperson explains that "they [China] are sensitized to our [Indian] concerns in this matter."
—"China Denies Arming Pakistan With Long-Range Missiles," Agence France Presse (Hong Kong), 16 December 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19971216000876, 16 December 1997.

December 1997
Gordon Oehler, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Nonproliferation Center, says that Pakistan has recently announced the development of a 1,500km-range missile called Ghauri. Even though Pakistan claims Ghauri to be an indigenously produced missile, US analysts suspect foreign assistance in building the missile. US analysts believe that China and North Korea provided the necessary technical advice.
—Barbara Starr, "Pakistan's new danger weapon is 'confirmed'," Jane's Defence Weekly (Coulsdon, Surrey), 3 December 1997, p. 15.

1997
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that Chinese and North Korean entities are providing assistance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program, and that "such assistance is critical for Islamabad's efforts to achieve independence from foreign sources and to produce long-range ballistic missiles." In response, the United States imposed sanctions on North Korean entities "for their role in transferring ballistic missile-related technology to Pakistan."

The report further states that China has provided extensive assistance to Pakistan's weapons of mass destruction programs, and "China's involvement with Pakistan will be monitored closely."
—"Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997," Director of Central Intelligence, 1997, <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/acq1997.html>.

	Updated November 2003