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Missile Imports


Year/Date Exporter Item(s) Remarks
1992 China Training M-11 ballistic missile and its accompanying transporter-erector-launcher vehicle The transfer of a training missile suggests that operational missiles will follow. See entry for 1992.
31 January 1992 China Guidance systems for M-11 ballistic missiles Allegations concerning the transfer are refuted by China. See entries for 31 January 1992 and 5 February 1992.
1992 China 24 M-11 ballistic missiles US intelligence agencies suggest that China might have transferred short-range missiles or modified the M-11 missiles to make them incapable of delivering nuclear warheads. See entries for 4 December 1992 and 6 May 1993.
March-May 1995 China Components for missile systems China denies reports of such transfers. See entries for June 1995 and 22 June 1995.
First week of March 1996 North Korea 15 tons (200 barrels) of ammonium perchlorate Taiwanese officials discover the shipment at Kaohsiung harbor. The shipment is destined for Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO). See entry for 12 March 1996.
Spring 1996 North Korea (Changgwang Sinyong Corporation) Key components of either Nodong or Taepodong missiles, 12 to 25 Nodong missiles, and at least one transporter-erector-launch vehicle The items are supplied to the Khan Research Laboratories. See entry for Spring 1996.
29 April 1996 North Korea 200 boxes of ammonium perchlorate Hong Kong officials say the shipment's destination is SUPARCO. The shipment is sent by Lyongaksan, a North Korean firm controlled by the military. The shipment originated in North Korea and was shipped through China. See entries for 29 April 1996 and 13 December 1996.
1996 China (China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation) Materials for building a missile factory, including crates suspected of containing machine tools for rocket motors, sophisticated equipment such as gyroscopes, accelerometers and on-board computers; technical assistance from engineers from the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation The missile factory is built at the Kala Chata mountain range near Fatehjung, 40km west of Islamabad. The missile factory is designed as a "turn-key" facility to produce complete M-11 missiles. The agreement to build the factory was most likely reached between China and Pakistan in the late 1980s. See entries for last week of August 1996 and 27 August 1996.
13 December 1996 Unknown 10 tons of ammonium perchlorate The shipment is destined for SUPARCO. Pakistan denies that the shipment's destination is SUPARCO. See the entry for 13 December 1996.
1997 North Korea Maraging steel A North Korean diplomat in Pakistan brokers a deal with a Russian firm to deliver maraging steel to Pakistan. The shipment is intercepted at Gatwick airport, London. See entry for 1997.
February-March 1998 North Korea, Changowang Sinyong Corporation Nodong ballistic missiles See entry for Fall 1997.
Mid-June 1998 North Korea Missile warhead canisters and missile production components See entry for Mid-June 1998.
Fall 1998 North Korea Weapons-grade Russian steel The shipment is made by North Korea's Changowang Sinyong Corporation. See entry for 20 September 1998.
March 1999 China Metal-working presses and a special furnace China's Poly Ventures Co. transferred the US-manufactured equipment to a missile production facility in Pakistan's National Development Complex. See entry for March 1999.
25 June 1999 North Korea Ten sets of "rolled steel metal frustum" for reinforcing missile nose cones, "plate bending machines" that can be used to roll plates needed for making rocket motor casings, a heavy-duty press along with sophisticated lathes, torroidal air bottles that can be used to produce maneuverable warheads, two sets of theodolites, a digital micron soldering device, water refining and filtration machinery that can be used for making nuclear weapons and also washing missile cones, equipment needed for precision welding, and 1.5mm forged steel bars The North Korean ship, Ku Wŏl San, carrying the equipment is seized by Indian authorities at Kandla port in Gujarat, India. Indian authorities allege that the shipment is destined fro Pakistan. See entries for 25 June 1999, 4 July 1999, 6 July 1999, 7 July 1999 and 10 July 1999.
2000 China Missile command system (CT-101) and fuel improvement ventilation system The equipment will be useful for ensuring better control and guidance for Ghauri-II and Shaheen-II missiles. See entry for 2000.
January 1999-June 2000 China Specialty steel, guidance systems, and technical expertise US officials claim that Chinese assistance continues despite China's assurances of stopping its missile related assistance to Pakistan. See entry for Last Week of June 2000.
July 2001 North Korea Ballistic missile parts The missile parts are shipped using a Pakistani C-130 aircraft. US officials are not sure whether the aircraft brought nuclear materials from Pakistan. See entry for July 2001.
January-June 2001 China Missile parts for Shaheen I and Shaheen-II missiles China sends a dozen shipments of missile parts. See entry for 6 August 2001.
January 2002 China Military hardware including missiles See entry for 8 January 2002.
2002 China Guidance and control systems, solid fuel, and M-4X missile variants See entry for 12 January 2002.

Key Sources: Bill Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1999); Los Angeles Times; Xinhua General Overseas News Service; Washington Post; New York Times; Xinhua, Financial Times (London); Chosun Ilbo; Hankyoreh Shinmun; China Morning Post (Hong Kong); Pittsburg Post-Gazette (Pittsburg, Pennsylvania); Time; Asian Age (New Delhi); Sunday Telegraph (London); Chosun Ilbo; Jane's Missiles and Rockets (Coulsdon, Surrey); Washington Times.



 

Updated December 2003


Import Table by Date
 


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