Introduction

Pakistan began pursuing a ballistic missile program in the early 1980s as part of an effort to develop a deliverable nuclear strike capability against India. Although Pakistan's initial efforts appear experimental, the scale of Islamabad's current program clearly reflects a strategic requirement to build a diversified and survivable nuclear deterrent capable of targeting the bulk of the Indian landmass. However unlike India, whose development of missile-based power projection capabilities reflects both regional and extra-regional security concerns, Pakistan's ballistic missile effort is largely Indo-centric.

Islamabad's present nuclear dyad consists of nuclear capable combat aircraft and solid-motor and liquid-engine short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM). The F-16 combat aircraft obtained from the United States during the 1980s were probably the earliest delivery systems in Pakistan's nuclear inventory.[1] Combat aircraft are operationally more reliable than ballistic missiles. In comparison to Pakistan's current inventory of SRBMs, they also offer other advantages such as greater payload and combat radius. However, despite these existing advantages, land-based ballistic missiles are emerging as the mainstay of Pakistan's nuclear strike force. At the same time, Pakistan has increased efforts toward its nuclear-capable cruise missile projects – the Babur (Hatf VII), and the Ra'ad (Hatf VIII).

There are three main reasons for the growing dominance of the missile leg in the emerging Pakistani nuclear dyad. First, Pakistan has been unable to augment its fleet of modern combat aircraft due to the past U.S. policy of military and economic sanctions designed to arrest and slow down Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Although Pakistan is now a U.S. ally in the global war on terrorism and no longer the target of proliferation sanctions, the United States has been hesitant to supply Pakistan with advanced combat aircraft as it would invariably augment the latter's nuclear strike capability. Second, the country's overall poor economic performance has prevented the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) from undertaking major fleet expansion and modernization efforts by making the switch from U.S. to European and Russian suppliers. During the late 1990s, especially after India's and Pakistan's May 1998 tests, U.S. pressure combined with instability concerns in Pakistan prevented external suppliers from selling high-tech nuclear capable combat aircraft to Islamabad.[2] Finally, the unfolding and proposed advances in India's air combat, air-defense, and long-range reconnaissance capabilities are channeling Pakistani investments into a ballistic missile-based capability for which India has no defense at present.

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, Pakistan has invested in both solid-motor and liquid-engine ballistic missile programs with Chinese and North Korean assistance, respectively. Pakistan's reasons for investing in both solid- and liquid-propulsion technologies remain unclear. However, analysts speculate the rival programs could be the result of intra-institutional rivalry and one-upmanship between the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and Khan Research Laboratories (KRL), which have historically feuded over control and credits for Pakistan nuclear weapons-related efforts. This rivalry may have also carried over to the development of nuclear delivery systems. Furthermore, the diversification effort could also be viewed as a proactive attempt on the part of Pakistan's military to factor in possible bottlenecks or failure along one technological front, as well as an attempt to diversify suppliers in the face of U.S. efforts to restrict the international trade in weapons of mass destruction-capable ballistic and cruise missile technologies.

Although Pakistan's current fleet of missiles is restricted to SRBMs, the National Defense Complex (NDC) and KRL are actively pursuing programs to develop medium-range ballistic missiles. Most analysts believe that the Pakistani military has achieved or is close to achieving the capability to mount nuclear warheads on its current ballistic missile fleet. Some reports even go so far as to suggest that Pakistan may be further along than India on the path to achieving nuclear operability.[3]

Pakistan underscored its commitment to strengthening its military capability against India by conducting two ballistic missile tests in quick succession in February and March 2007, even as the two subcontinental rivals continued discussions on nuclear confidence building measures and anti-terrorism initiatives. The Pakistani tests came at a time when India has also sought to strengthen its strategic capabilities vis-à-vis Pakistan, as well as narrow the gap with China through development of more capable nuclear delivery vehicles, including advanced combat aircraft and missile systems.

Since 2005, Islamabad has also carried out several tests of its Babur (Hatf VII) cruise missile, two such tests coming in March and June 2007. This subsonic nuclear capable missile, has a range of 700 km.[48] In addition, in August 2007, Pakistan tested a new cruise missile, the Ra'ad (Arabic for "Thunder"). This missile, which is air-launched, has a range of 350 kilometers.[49] Thus, along with ballistic missiles, cruise missiles are increasingly part of Pakistan's nuclear calculus. [50]

External Dependencies

When Pakistan launched a program to acquire ballistic missiles in the early 1980s, it lacked the technological resources, industrial infrastructure, and human capital to undertake the development of such missiles indigenously. After a brief and unsuccessful attempt in the 1980s to develop solid-fueled short-range ballistic missiles most likely derived from sounding rocket technology obtained from France, Pakistan turned to China and North Korea for assistance.

In the early 1990s, the NDC, a subsidiary of the PAEC, acquired complete though unassembled M-11s and possibly an undisclosed number of M-9 SRBMs from Beijing. Chinese assistance extended to training Pakistani missile crews in the assembly, maintenance, and simulated launches of the missiles. During the mid-1990s, China apparently transferred an entire production line for M-11s and possibly M-9s to the NDC. Chinese assistance most likely encompassed equipment and technology transfers in the areas of solid-fuel propellants, manufacture of airframes, re-entry thermal protection materials, post-boost vehicles, guidance and control, missile computers, integration of warheads, and the manufacture of transporter-erector launchers (TELs) for the missiles. Although China subsequently agreed to abide by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines under U.S. pressure, it has interpreted those guidelines narrowly. Beijing has apparently agreed not to supply Category-I or complete ground-to-ground missiles, which would not cover air-launched cruise missiles. And it does not abide by the MTCR's key technological annex. Indeed, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has alleged that Chinese missile-related assistance to Pakistan increased in the wake of the latter's May 1998 nuclear tests, and that such assistance is critical for the success of Pakistan's medium-range, solid-fueled ballistic missile program.

U.S. intelligence agencies are presently divided over whether Pakistan can produce short-range, solid-fueled ballistic missiles indigenously, or whether it remains dependent on support from Chinese entities. Some analysts believe that the NDC's Fatehjung missile plant, which was built with Chinese assistance in the mid-1990s, is a "soup-to-nuts" facility that can turn out replicas of the M-11s. However, other analysts believe that while the NDC plant can produce most parts and sub-systems of the Chinese SRBMs, Pakistan is still dependent on China for specialty materials, guidance systems, and other critical missile components.[4]

Similarly, Pakistan has relied extensively on North Korea for its liquid-engine ballistic missile program. North Korea is alleged to have supplied Pakistan with 12-25 operational Nodong ballistic missiles and their TEL vehicles.[5] North Korean assistance has also included technical support, including missile launch and telemetry crews. Analysts speculate that North Korea may have also transferred an entire production line of the Nodong ballistic missiles to KRL. After allegations surfaced in U.S. newspapers that KRL had assisted North Korea with its centrifuge-based uranium enrichment program in exchange for Nodong missiles, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf stated that defense cooperation between the two countries had ended.[6] However, analysts believe that it will take Pakistan at least a decade or more to master and produce liquid engines indigenously. Until then, Pakistan will remain dependent on North Korea for importing complete liquid engines, or at least their major component parts, as well as the liquid propellants to fuel its missiles.[7]

Missile Programs
Solid-Motor
Hatf-1, -1A, & -2

Pakistan embarked on an indigenous ballistic missile effort with the launch of the Hatf program in the early or mid-1980s. The Space & Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO), Pakistan's primary civilian space agency, undertook the Hatf program. The existence of the missiles was publicly disclosed by Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff General Mirza Aslam Beg in February 1989.[8]

The Hatf-1 is a single-stage, solid-motor missile capable of delivering a 500kg payload over a maximum range of 60-80km.[9] A subsequent version, the Hatf-1A, was tested in February 2000 and is believed to have an extended range of 100km.[10] The Hatf-2 is a two-stage, solid-motor missile that reportedly has a throw-weight of 500kg over a maximum range of 290-300km. The Hatf-2 is sometimes also referred to as the Shadoz and Abdali, nomenclatures that cause considerable confusion.[11] The Hatf-2 is most likely a modified version of the Hatf-1 composed of the second stage of the Hatf-1 with a new boost motor added to the first stage.[12]

All versions of the Hatf, -1, -1A, and -2, are capable of delivering conventional high-explosive warheads. However, it is unclear if the missiles have been modified for nuclear delivery. Some analysts speculate that the Hatf-1, -1A, and -2 use an inertial guidance system. But U.S. government sources contend that the missiles are essentially inaccurate battlefield rockets.[13] The Hatf is road mobile; missiles have been observed being wheeled on converted World War II-gun carriage trailers as well as modern four-wheel TEL vehicles.

Some analysts believe that the Hatf-1, -1A, and -2 are likely derivatives of the French Dauphin and Dragon sounding rockets. SUPARCO obtained the technology for building sounding rockets from the French company Aerospatiale (formerly Sud Aviation) in the early or mid-1980s. The French transfers most likely included technologies and equipment for solid-fuel casting, curing, and solid-rocket testing facilities.[14]

Although the Hatf-1 was declared operational in 1992 and the -IA and -2 versions operational by the mid-1990s, the missiles do not appear to have been manufactured in large numbers.[15] Neither do they appear to be in operational service with the Pakistan Army.

The Pakistani Army flight-tested a Hatf-1A in February 2000; it also conducted two flight-tests of the Hatf-2 version in May 2002 and March 2003. The Hatf-II (Abdali) was tested again in April 2005, February 2006, and March 2007.[56, 57, 58]

Hatf-III/Ghaznavi/M-11

The Chinese DF-11/M-11 (NATO designation CSS-7), which goes by the dual nomenclatures Hatf-III and Ghaznavi in Pakistan, is a short-range, solid-propellant, road mobile, single-warhead ballistic missile. China began development work on the M-11 in the mid-1980s; the first flight-test of the missile is believed to have occurred in 1990, and it probably entered operational service in 1992.

Analysts believe that the M-11 has a throw-weight of 800kg over a maximum range of 280km. By trading payload weight for increased range, the M-11 could deliver a 500kg payload over a range of 300km. Control during the boost phase is probably exercised through "vanes in the exhaust" or "small vernier motors with an inertial platform for guidance." It is also believed that "the warhead assembly separates during flight" and that "there are four small fins mounted at the rear of the warhead section." However, "it is not known if these four fins move, or are simply stabilizers." Some reports suggest that the missile has a terminal guidance system; the "separating warhead section has a miniature propulsion system to correct the attitude before re-entry, as well as adjusting the terminal trajectory."[16]

Pakistan apparently concluded an agreement with China to procure an undisclosed number of M-11 ballistic missile systems in the late 1980s. Sometime during 1990-1991, U.S. intelligence discovered the presence of an M-11 training missile in Pakistan with an accompanying TEL vehicle, which indicated that operational missile systems were likely to follow.[17] Beginning in 1992, U.S. intelligence agencies tracked shipments of at least 30 M-11 ballistic missiles from China through the Pakistani port city of Karachi. Subsequently, China resorted to transferring components and subsystems so that the missiles could be assembled in Pakistan.[18] Chinese missile technicians are also believed to have trained Pakistani Army personnel in the assembly and simulated launch of the missiles, which entered operational service in 1995 or 1996.[19] Around the mid-1990s, China also built a turnkey missile facility for the NDC at Fatehjung in Punjab. The Fatehjung missile facility is believed to be capable of building either complete missiles or most components and sub-systems of the M-11.

Open source estimates of Pakistan's M-11 inventory range from approximately 30-84 missiles. At least 30 of the missiles are believed to be stored at the Pakistan Air Force base at Sargodha in Central Punjab. Satellite imagery of the base has revealed the existence of shelters for missile crates and their mobile launchers, missile maintenance areas, and missile crew quarters.[20] More missiles may be deployed at other currently undisclosed bases in Pakistan. Although China developed the export versions of the M-11 with high-explosive conventional warheads, the missiles in Pakistan's inventory are believed to be nuclear-capable.[21]

The Pakistan Army conducted a launch of the Hatf-III/Ghaznavi in October 2003 to validate the missile's various design parameters.[22] Subsequent to this test, in February 2004, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf formally inducted the missiles into the Army's Strategic Forces Command.[23] The missile was also tested in December 2006 and another batch was inducted into the Second Missile Group of the Strategic Forces Command in April 2007.[51, 52]

Hatf-IV/Shaheen-I/M-9

Analysts speculate that Pakistan likely acquired an undisclosed number of M-9 ballistic missiles from China in the mid-1990s, although open source reports alleging M-9 transfers from China to Pakistan stretch back to the early 1990s.[24] However, some analysts now believe that China probably also transferred an entire production line for M-9s to the Fatehjung missile facility that it built for Pakistan in the mid-1990s.

China started developing the M-9 in the mid-1980s. The first M-9 flight-test is reported to have occurred in June 1988, and the missile probably entered service in 1990. However, Pakistan first announced the test of an 800km-range ballistic missile in July 1997.[25] This missile was subsequently designated Hatf-IV or Shaheen-I and was publicly displayed for the first time during the National Day parade in March 1999. It was subsequently tested in April 1999, October 2002, and October 2003, respectively. The photographs of the missile displayed during the parade, and those of the tested version, along with its disclosed range and payload closely match the parameters of the Chinese M-9.

The DF-15/M-9 (NATO designation CSS-6) is a single-stage, solid-propellant, road mobile, short-range ballistic missile. It can reportedly deliver a 500kg warhead over a range of 600km; other reports suggest that with a smaller warhead, the missile could have a range of 800km. Pakistani government statements suggest that the missiles in Pakistan's possession have a maximum range of 700-800km, but the missile's payload capacity at that range remains unclear. Like the M-11 missiles, control during boost phase is exercised through "exhaust vanes or small scale vernier motors." The M-9 has a reported 300m circular error probability (CEP) and is believed to employ some form of terminal guidance. Analysts suggest that the missile has a "strapdown inertial guidance system with an onboard digital computer,"....which "enables rapid targeting and eliminates need for wind corrections prior to launch." Unconfirmed reports suggest that the "separating warhead section has a miniature propulsion system to correct the attitude before re-entry, as well as adjusting the terminal trajectory."[26]

Although China originally designed the export versions of the M-9 with a high-explosive conventional warhead, Pakistan is believed to have modified its missiles to make them nuclear capable.[27] The total number of M-9s in Pakistan's inventory remains unknown.

The Hatf-IV/Shaheen-I was formally inducted into the Pakistan Army in March 2003.[28] However, the continuation of flight-tests as late as October 2003[29] raises doubts whether all development concerns have been resolved. The missile was subsequently tested successfully in November 2006.[54]

Hatf-VI/Shaheen-II/M-18?

The NDC is reportedly also developing a 700-2,500km-range missile dubbed as the Shaheen-II, about which little is known.[30] Mock-ups of the missile displayed during the National Day celebrations in March 2003 suggest that it is a two-stage, solid-motor, road mobile system, transported on a 12-wheel TEL vehicle. Analysts speculate that the Shaheen-II is possibly a two-stage version of the M-9, or more likely a copy of the M-18, which was publicly displayed at an exhibition in Beijing in either 1987 or 1988. The M-18 was originally advertised as a two-stage system with a payload capacity of 400-500kg over a range of 1,000km.[31] U.S. intelligence sources suggest that Pakistan remains heavily reliant on external assistance for the Shaheen-II program and that China is actively assisting Pakistan through the supply of missile components, specialty materials, dual-use items, and other miscellaneous forms of technical assistance.[32]

Development flight tests of the Shaheen-II began in March 2004 when a 26-ton missile was launched from Pakistan's Somiani Flight Test Range on the Arabian Sea.[33] According to the Chairman of Pakistan's National Engineering and Scientific Commission (NESCOM) Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, the missile covered a distance of 1,800km during the test. [34]

The missile was tested in March 2005, April 2006, and February 2007.[55] Subsequently, reports in summer 2007 stated that Pakistan had begun the process of deployment of the Shaheen-II.[53]

Liquid Engine
Hatf-V/Ghauri-I/Nodong

Pakistan's liquid-engine ballistic missile program is spearheaded by KRL in collaboration with North Korea. Cooperation in the area of ballistic missiles between the two countries stretches back to the early 1990s. The proposal to procure North Korean Nodong ballistic missiles was probably on Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's agenda during her visit to Pyongyang in December 1993. However, Pakistani missile scientists and engineers are believed to have inspected the Nodong as early as 1992 and were allegedly present during the missile's flight-test from Musudan-ri in May 1993. The Nodong deal was likely finalized during the visit of the former Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission Marshal Ch'oe Gwang to Islamabad in December 1995. Foreign intelligence agencies began monitoring increased frequency of cargo flights between North Korea and Pakistan in the fall of 1997. North Korean telemetry crews reportedly traveled on some of these flights. Ultimately, Pakistan flight-tested a Nodong, which was rechristened the "Ghauri," in April 1998.[35] North Korean crews were present and apparently helped with the launch. Since then, Pakistan has conducted several flight-tests of the Ghauri-I/Nodong: in April 1999, May 2002, May 2004, June, 2004, October 2004, and November 2006.[59, 60, 61, 62] According to Pakistani news reports, the Hatf-V was inducted into the military in January 2003.[63]

The Ghauri-I/Nodong is probably derived from a Soviet-era missile system. Some analysts believe that it is most likely an upscaled version of the Soviet R-17 missile, although there is insufficient data to reach this conclusion definitively. The missile's basic airframe is made from steel, although some sections may be crafted out of aluminum. The propulsion system is a liquid rocket engine that uses a storable combination of inhibited red fuming nitric acid and kerosene. During the boost phase, four jet vanes are used for thrust vector control. It is also believed that the missile uses three body-mounted gyros for attitude and lateral acceleration control. In addition, "a pendulum integration gyro assembly serves for speed control." The Nodong's range and throw weight has been variously estimated between 800-1,500km and 700-1,300kg, respectively.[36] The Nodong is nuclear capable and can also deliver high-explosive conventional warheads. However, it is unclear whether KRL has mastered the capability to mount nuclear warheads on the missiles acquired from North Korea.

U.S. intelligence agencies have identified an assembly and storage facility for the Ghauri close to the KRL's Kahuta plant. Estimates of Pakistan's Ghauri inventory remain unknown, although information available in open sources suggests that Pakistan may have obtained between 12-25 missile systems from North Korea. Speculation also persists that North Korea may have transferred an entire production line for Nodong ballistic missiles to Pakistan.

KRL has also disclosed plans for longer-range versions of the Ghauri: the Ghauri-II and possibly Ghauri-III. A more powerful engine for longer-range versions of the Ghauri is under development.[37] Some statements attributed to Pakistani nuclear scientists and government leaders suggest that the Ghauri-II will have a range of 1,700km; other statements suggest that the Ghauri-III will have a strike-range of 2,000-3,500km.[38] But details of the programs remain unknown and unlike the proposed Shaheen-II, no mock ups have been displayed in public. However, analysts cite the presence of Pakistani missile scientists and engineers during North Korea's August 1998 Taepodong launch and speculate that the Ghauri-II and -III may either be a Taepodong or draw extensively on components and technologies from the latter program.

Former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto admitted in February 2004 that Pakistan obtained missile technology from North Korea in lieu of cash.[39] However, Pakistan's current President Pervez Musharraf vehemently denies that Pakistan obtained ballistic missiles from North Korea; Musharraf insists that Pakistan purchased surface-to-air missiles instead.[40] In March 2003, the United States imposed sanctions on KRL and North Korea's Changgwang Sinyong Corporation for engaging in proliferation activities.[41] A U.S. State Department spokesperson explained that missile proliferation sanctions were imposed on North Korea for "its involvement in the transfer of Missile Technology Control Regime Category 1 items" to a "Category 1 missile program in a non-Missile Technology Control Regime country."[42]

Operational Status

Confusion surrounds the operational status of Pakistan's ballistic missiles. At times, Pakistani government agencies and their spokespersons have deliberately resorted to using a plethora of nomenclatures to describe one or another missile program; at other times, they have made unverifiable and contradictory statements concerning the range, payload, and operational status of different missile systems. Observers speculate that such attempts are probably a ruse to confuse and prevent external intelligence agencies and independent analysts from appraising the precise state of Pakistan's missile-related efforts. Nevertheless, tactics that deliberately promote ambiguity in an attempt to inflate capability should also be viewed as means to enhance nuclear deterrence, especially at a time when Pakistan's nuclear missile force is still in its developmental phase. However, U.S. intelligence agencies believe that the military's control over the missile programs as well as the extent of Chinese and North Korean assistance make it likely that Pakistan is probably further along than India in the path toward nuclear operability.

Even though the Hatf-1, -1A, and -2 were declared operational in the early 1990s, and the Pakistan Army tested the Hatf-1A in February 2000, both programs are likely to have been discontinued. The Hatf-1, -1A, and -2 are short-range systems and most major Indian urban and military targets lie beyond their range. Deployments close to the Indian borders during a crisis or war, coupled with improvements in real-time Indian reconnaissance capabilities, would leave them vulnerable to early detection and destruction. Although the Hatf missile series could conceivably serve as long-range artillery rockets, most observers suspect that they lack an accurate guidance system; others argue that the early Hatf missiles lacked a guidance system altogether. Furthermore, most ballistic missiles are not as cost-effective as combat aircraft in conventional battlefield roles. Therefore, although the Pakistan Army may have acquired a limited number of Hatf-1, -1A, and-2s in the early 1990s, and occasionally tests them for reasons of public consumption, these early missiles are unlikely to play any role in Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Similarly, Pakistan's acquisitions of complete M-11 and possibly M-9 ballistic missiles, as well as a production line to build them from China, indirectly attest to the failure of the Hatf-2 program.

However, the Ghaznavi/M-11 and Shaheen-I/(most likely M-9) ballistic missiles that Pakistan acquired from China in the mid-1990s are now believed to be in operational service. Pakistani missile crews have been observed conducting simulated launches. Other signs of operational capability include observations of procedures for dispersal during exercises and crises alerts, changes in alert status during crises, missile tests to communicate political messages to India during crises, as well as the construction of permanent launch sites along the Indo-Pakistani border.[43] Furthermore, China's alleged transfer of its fourth nuclear warhead design to Pakistan in the 1980s and Pakistan's nuclear tests in May 1998 have led most observers to conclude that Pakistan has achieved or is close to achieving the capability to mount nuclear warheads on its SRBM force. In its latest report to Congress on the acquisition of technology related to weapons of mass destruction, the CIA asserted that "Chinese entities continued to work with Pakistan and Iran on ballistic missile-related projects during the second half of 2003. Chinese entity assistance has helped Pakistan move toward domestic serial production of solid-propellant SRBMs and has supported Pakistan's development of solid-propellant medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). Chinese-entity ballistic missile-related assistance helped Iran move toward its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic missiles."[44]

However, some Indian observers maintain that despite Chinese assistance, Pakistan's ballistic missile tests have not proceeded as well as claimed in public; several technical and operational glitches need ironing out.[45] But such claims cannot be verified in the absence of independent evidence. Similarly, although Pakistani leaders claim that the nuclear-capable Ghauri-I/Nodong has entered operational service with the Pakistan Army, the missile still appears to be undergoing developmental tests. Equally significant, the success or state of Pakistan's efforts to mate nuclear warheads to this North Korean ballistic missile remains unknown.

Like India, Pakistan does not keep its ballistic missile force on operational alert. During peacetime, the missile force and nuclear warheads are stored separately; the warheads themselves are believed to be stored in a disassembled form for security reasons. Plans exist to assemble nuclear warheads during a crisis or emergency, and arm the missiles with warheads at a subsequent stage. Integrated teams of military personnel and nuclear scientists/engineers probably undertake such a task, ensuring organizational checks and balances, as well as ensuring that no rogue commander or scientist could act independently of the national command authority. However, the precise make-up of such teams, as well as the operational procedures for warhead assembly, dispersal, arming of the missile force during a crisis, and delegation of authority for use during a conflict, remain tightly held secrets.

Emerging Trends

Although Pakistan has a small force of nuclear-capable combat aircraft in its nuclear force inventory, land-based ballistic missiles are likely to become the mainstay of its nuclear strike force in the near future. Apart from Pakistan's poor economic performance and its lack of financial resources to modernize its air force in a significant way, external suppliers such as the United States, Russia, and the European Union remain hesitant to supply Islamabad with sophisticated combat aircraft due to instability concerns in Pakistan. Furthermore, the continuing modernization of the Indian Air Force through the acquisition of high-performance combat aircraft as well as substantive improvements in the latter's long-range reconnaissance and air defense capabilities are likely to degrade the deterrence value of the air leg of any Pakistani nuclear force in the future. These factors are likely to encourage Pakistan's continued reliance on a land-based ballistic missile-based nuclear force, for which India has no defense at present.

Given its limited technological and economic resource base, Pakistan appears to have resorted to a strategy of importing complete ballistic missile systems of different range categories and types, standardizing and optimizing their production, and then attempting to manufacture them indigenously through backwards vertical integration with assistance from foreign entities. Analysts believe that the NDC can now probably produce solid-fueled Ghaznavi (M-11) and Shaheen-I (possibly M-9) ballistic missiles in small batches. Over time, Pakistani missile scientists and engineers could improve the performance characteristics of these missiles by making modifications in the solid-propellant motors, achieving weight reduction through the use of lighter materials, and increase their accuracy through the use of either improved inertial navigation or the use of global positioning systems.[46]

However, Pakistan's current fleet of solid-fueled SRBMs suffers from range limitations. In order to strike targets in western India, the missiles need to be deployed close to the Indo-Pakistani border, a condition that leaves them vulnerable to early detection and destruction. More significantly, the SRBMs lack the range to strike targets in eastern, central, and southern India. These shortcomings are expected to be addressed by the medium-range Shaheen-II and Ghauri-II programs, which are under development at the NDC and KRL, respectively. Despite U.S. pressure, China is likely to stick to its commitment to help Pakistan in the development of the Shaheen-II medium-range ballistic missile program. But unlike the past, when China transferred compete missile systems and assembly and production lines to Pakistan, the current pattern of Chinese assistance is apparently restricted to design advice, specialty materials, missile components, guidance systems, and related dual-use machine tools and technologies.

It is also unclear whether KRL has the ability to produce the Ghauri-I/Nodong indigenously. Although North Korea is alleged to have transferred 12-20 operational missiles to Pakistan, it is uncertain whether cooperation extended to the transfer of a production line for the missiles as well. After KRL's alleged assistance to North Korea's centrifuge enrichment efforts came to light, Pakistan insisted that it had ended its defense cooperation program with North Korea. Although continued secret contacts between entities in both countries cannot be ruled out, Pyongyang might find itself less inclined to continue with its program of missile cooperation in the event of any future grand bargain with the United States that is backed by economic and security guarantees from China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. Since the development of longer-range versions of the Ghauri would probably require the development of a new liquid-fuel engine entirely, or multi-staging involving liquid engines and solid motors, termination of North Korean assistance could result in a serious set back for Pakistan's Ghauri-II and -III ballistic missile development efforts.

Although Pakistan tested the Shaheen-II in 2004, the Ghauri-II does not appear to be ready for flight-tests. Independent analysts speculate that Pakistan might be able to flight-test both missiles in the near-term and possibly produce a small number of prototypes for test-demonstration purposes. However, Islamabad is unlikely to be able to build and deploy them in large numbers. This is largely because Pakistan does not have a large and vertically integrated research, development, and manufacturing infrastructure to build long-range rockets. Furthermore, there is poor coordination and integration between government-controlled research and development labs, public sector firms, and private sector companies. Although there is some evidence of private sector participation in the production of the Shaheen-I SRBM, on the whole, Pakistani private sector firms do not have much experience in manufacturing high-technology products. In addition, Pakistan does not as yet produce basic strategic materials, such as aerospace-grade specialty steels, alloys, and composites, for which it is entirely dependent on imports. This deficiency also extends to missile guidance, control and navigation systems, and components such as gyroscopes, missile computers, and accelerometers. Finally, Pakistan lacks the requisite human capital--a large and dedicated pool of aerospace scientists and engineers from which to draw on for a large-scale ballistic or cruise missile program. Thus, Pakistan will most likely remain dependent on external suppliers for its MRBM program in the short- and medium-term.[47]

Although Pakistani leaders have suggested that Islamabad might deploy nuclear-capable missiles at sea in the future, the Pakistan Navy (PN) does not appear to be pursuing either sea-launched cruise or ballistic missile programs. Neither has the PN made the case for the acquisition or development of nuclear submarines. At this point in time, the PN's status as a junior service in comparison to the Army and Air Force, together with resource constraints, both technological and economic, constitutes the principal stumbling blocks to any Pakistani sea-based nuclear capability. Furthermore, it is also unclear whether China, which is in the midst of a gradual course correction in its relations with India, and already under considerable U.S. pressure to terminate missile assistance to Pakistan, would aid Islamabad in any proposed efforts to acquire a sea-based nuclear missile capability.

However, India's efforts to invest in theater ballistic missile defense through the acquisition of either the Israeli Arrow-2 or the U.S. PAC-3 systems could spur significant changes in Pakistan's missile programs. Although an Indian theater missile defense would not create a leak-proof defense umbrella, a limited missile defense coupled with improvements in Indian long-range air and satellite-based reconnaissance capabilities could severely undercut the deterrence value of a Pakistani SRBM force. This latter trend, coupled with Chinese concerns over U.S. attempts to provide Taiwan with a theater missile defense capability, could lead to deepening cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad. In the future, China could conceivably help Pakistan develop intermediate-range ballistic missile systems, land- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic missiles, and missiles with fast burning boosters using high-energy solid-propellants, multiple warheads, maneuverable re-entry vehicles, decoys, and other means to fool ballistic missile defenses.

Nonetheless, it is highly unlikely that Pakistan would seek to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability in the short- and medium-term. The technological difficulties of developing such a capability apart, Pakistan's security concerns are primarily Indo-centric. Since medium- and intermediate-range missiles would suffice to hold most targets in India hostage to the threat of a nuclear strike, Pakistani leaders currently regard an ICBM capability as a strategic irrelevance.

Key Sources:
[1] "Pakistan," Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), pp. 207, 213-214.
[2] However, the Pakistani Air Force is eagerly exploring options to upgrade its ageing fleet of combat aircraft. See, "Pakistan Air Force Weighing Various Aircraft As Procurement Options," The News (Islamabad), 15 May 2004; in FBIS Document: SAP20040515000022, 15 May 2004.
[3] "Pakistan's nukes outstrip India's, officials say," MSNBC News, 6 June 2000, http://www.msnbc.news.
[4] R. Jeffrey Smith, 'China Linked To Pakistani Missile Plant; Secret Project Could Renew Sanctions issue," Washington Post, 25 August 1996, A Section, p. A01; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 August 1996, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/; Tim Weiner, "U.S. Says It Suspects China Is Helping Pakistan With Missiles," New York Times, 26 August 1996, p. 6; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1996, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/; "Pakistan's Missiles," Pittsburg Post-Gazette (Pittsburg, Pennsylvania), 27 August 1997, p. A-4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1996, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/; Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Wary of Punishing China For Missile Help To Pakistan," New York Times, 27 August 1997, p. 6; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 August 1996, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/; Douglas Waller, "The Secret Missile Deal," Time, 30 June 1997; http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/06/23/time/missiles.html.
[5] Joseph S. Bermudez, "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK," Occasional Paper No. 2, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, (Monterey: 1999), http://www.cns/pubs/opapers/op2/index.htm.
[6] "Pakistan denies aiding N. Korea: Pyongyang's nuke plans," Dawn (Karachi), 7 November 2003, http://www.dawn.com.
[7] A. Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," Paper Presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, 26-28 June 2003, p. 22.
[8] Ahmed Rashid, "Pakistan announces first successful test of its own missile," Independent (London), 6 February 1989; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 February 1989, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[9] "Hatf-1 - Pakistan Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems," Federation of American Scientists, November 2003, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/hatf-1.htm.
[10] Amit Baruah, "Pak. test fires Hatf-I missile," Hindu (Chennai), 8 February 2000; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 February 2000, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[11] "Hatf-2/Shadoz-Pakistan Special Weapons Guide: Missiles," Global Security.Org, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/pakistan/hatf-2.htm, (November 2003); "Abdali (Hatf-2) BRBM, PakistaniDefence.com, http://www.pakistanidefence.com/images/AbdaliPictures.htm, (January 2004).
[12] S. Chandrashekar, "An Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Capability," Missile Monitor, Number 3, Spring 1993, pp. 7-8.
[13] "Pakistan derives its first "Hatf" missiles from foreign space rockets," The Risk Report, Volume 1, Number 8, October 1995, http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/pakistan/hatf.html.
[14] Chandrashekar, "An Assessment of Pakistan's Missile Capability," pp. 5-6.
[15] "Hatf Missiles 1/2/3," PakDirectory, November 2003, http://www.pakdirectory.net/hatf_missiles.asp.
[16] "CSS-7 (DF-11/M-11) - People's Republic of China: Offensive Weapons," Duncan Lennox ed., Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems, Issue 25, (Coulsdon: September 1997).
[17] Bill Gertz, "Missile Deception," Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1999), p. 159.
[18] R. Jeffrey Smith, "China said to sell arms to Pakistan; M-11 Missile Shipment may break vow to U.S.," Washington Post, 4 December 1992, p. A10; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 December 1992, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/; Jim Mann, "China said to sell Pakistan dangerous new missiles," Los Angeles Times, 4 December 1992, p. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 December 1992, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[19] Document cited in, Gertz, Betrayal: How the Clinton Administration Undermined American Security, p. 268.
[20] R. Jeffrey Smith and David B. Ottaway, "Spy Photos suggest China Missile Trade; Pressure for Sanctions builds over evidence that Pakistan has M-11s," Washington Post, 3 July 1995, p. A01; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 July 1995, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[21] "Pakistan," Deadly Arsenals, pp. 213-214.
[22]"Pakistan Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile," Agence France Presse, 3 October 2003, International News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 October 2003, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[23]"President Says Pakistan Nuclear Programme "Here to Stay"," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 February 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 February 2004, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/; B. Muralidhar Reddy, "We Will Never Roll Back N-Programme: Musharraf," The Hindu (Chennai), 22 February 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 February 2004, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[24] Bill Gertz, "China can't say no to arms buyers," Washington Times, 28 May 1991, p. A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 28 May 1991, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[25] "Government Confirms Test-Firing of New Missile," Agence France Presse, 3 July 1997; in FBIS Document FTS19970703000413, 3 July 1997.
[26] "CSS-6 (DF-15/M-9) - People's Republic of China: Offensive Weapons," Duncan Lennox, ed., Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems.
[27] "Pakistan," Deadly Arsenals, p. 214.
[28] "Strategic Force gets Shaheen-1 Missile," Japan Economic Newswire, 6 March 2003, International News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 March 2003, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[29] Rana Jawad, "Pakistan Test-fires Nuclear-Capable Missile," Agence France Presse, 8 October 2003, International News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 October 2003, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/; Bronwyn Curran, "Pakistan Test-fires Nuclear-Capable Missile," Agence France Presse, 14 October 2003, International News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 October 2003, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[30]"Pakistan's 'Multi-Stage' 2,500km Range 'Shaheen-II' Missile Ready For Testing," Dawn (Karachi), 17 September 2000; in FBIS Document SAP20000917000011, 17 September 2000.
[31] "Shaheen-II/Hatf-6/Ghaznavi: Pakistan Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems," Federation of American Scientists, December 2003, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/missile/shaheen-2.htm.
[32] David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, "Reports Say China is Aiding Pakistan on Missile Project," New York Times, 2 July 2000, http://www.nytimes.com; "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," Central Intelligence Agency, 1 January-30 June 2001, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/bian/bian_jan-2002.htm.
[33] "Pakistan Test Fires New Missile," Deutsche Presse-Agentur, 9 March 2004, Politics; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 March 2004, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[34]"Pakistan Scientist Says Missile Test Reassures Nation Over Nuclear Programme," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 10 March 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 March 2004, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[35] For a historical overview of missile cooperation between North Korea and Pakistan, see Gaurav Kampani, "Second Tier Proliferation: The Case of Pakistan and North Korea," Nonproliferation Review, Fall/Winter 2002, Volume 9, Number 3, pp. 109-111.
[36] "Nodong: Overview and Technical Assessment," NTI: North Korea Profile- Missile, http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/1363.html, (updated January 2004).
[37] "Pakistan to Test Latest Engine for Ghauri IV Missile - Daily," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 17 December 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 December 2003, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[38] "Ghauri-III Engine Said Successfully Tested," Ausaf (Islamabad), 24 June 1999; in FBIS Document FTS19990624000013, 24 June 1999; "Pakistan Reportedly Begins Preparations For Testing Ghauri-3 Missile," BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 April 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 April 2002, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[39] "Bhutto Says Pak Paid N Korea for Missile Tech," The Economic Times (Mumbai), 11 February 2004; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 February 2004, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[40] "Musharraf-N. Korea," The Press Trust of India, 26 June 2003, Nationwide International News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 June 2003, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[41] "Imposition of Missile Proliferation Sanctions Against a North Korean Entity," Federal Register, 2 April 2003, Vol. 68, No. 63; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 April 2003, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/;
[42] "State Department Regular Briefing," Federal News Service, 31 March 2003; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 April 2003, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[43] Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Center for the Advanced Study of India, Policy Paper Series 2002, http://www.sas.upenn.edu/casi/reports/RiedelPaper051302.htm; Bill Gertz, "Pakistan Builds Missile Sites Near Border With India; Bush Asks Nations to Ease Tensions," Washington Tines, p. A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 January 2002, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/
[44] Attachment A Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 2003, Central Intelligence Agency, 1 July-31 December 2003, http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/july_dec2003.htm#15.
[45] "Chinks in Pak's Missile Armoury," Financial Express (Mumbai), 31 May 2002; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 31 May 2002, http://www.lexis-nexis.com/.
[46] A. Baskaran, "An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia," pp. 16-26.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Bruce Loudon, "New Delhi Suspicious of Test," The Australian, July 27, 2007, http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22139886-2703,00.html.
[49] "Pakistan Military Test-Fires Nuclear Capable Cruise Missile," International Herald Tribune, August 25, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/08/25/asia/AS-GEN-Pakistan-Missile-Test.php.
[50] See "Nuclear Cruise Missiles," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2007, pp. 62-63, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/t673m130k0614h55/fulltext.pdf.
[51] "Pakistan Test-Fires New Version of Nuclear Capable Missile," BBC Monitoring South Asia, December 9, 2006, Lexis-Nexis.
[52] "Army Gets Ghaznavi Missiles," The Nation, April 26, 2007, http://nation.com.pk/daily/apr-2007/27/index4.php.
[53] "Pakistan's Nuclear Forces, 2007," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007, pp. 71-74, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/k4q43h2104032426/fulltext.pdf.
[54] "After Ghauri, Shaheen Shines in Pakistan," The Statesman, November 30, 2006, Lexis-Nexis.
[55] "Pakistan Test-Fires Long-Range Ballistic Missile," BBC Monitoring South Asia, April 29, 2006, Lexis-Nexis.
[56] B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Missile Test-Fired," The Hindu, April 1, 2005, http://www.hindu.com/2005/04/01/stories/2005040109600101.htm.
[57] "Pakistan Test-Fires Surface-to-Surface Missile," BBC Monitoring South Asia, February 19, 2006, Lexis-Nexis.
[58] "Pakistan: Short-Range Missile Tested," The New York Times, March 3, 2007.
[59] "Defence Minister Says India Not Worried Over Pakistan's Nuclear Test," BBC Monitoring South Asia, November 17, 2006, Lexis-Nexis.
[60] B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Hatf-V Test-Fired," The Hindu, October 13, 2004, http://www.hindu.com/2004/10/13/stories/2004101306271200.htm.
[61] B. Muralidhar Reddy, "Missile Test Not Intended to Send Political Signals: Musharraf," The Hindu, June 5, 2004, http://www.hindu.com/2004/06/05/stories/2004060510711400.htm.
[62] "Pakistan's PM praises successful missile test-fire," BBC Monitoring South Asia, May 29, 2004, Lexis-Nexis.
[63] "Ghauri Missiles Delivered to Pakistan Army," BBC Monitoring South Asia, January 8, 2003, Lexis-Nexis.

	Updated December 2007