6 February 1975
US President Ford indicates to Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that his administration will give ‘active consideration’ to the lifting of the 10-year arms embargo against Pakistan. In response, Prime Minister Bhutto states that he will place Pakistan’s nuclear reactors under international safeguards if the United States provides sufficient conventional arms that meet Pakistan’s requirements.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 6 February 1975; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 February 1975, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

15 February 1975
Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan, Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) has a meeting with Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Khan seeks the government’s approval for a $450 million nuclear weapons program that involves (a) the building of a centrifuge plant for the enrichment of uranium; (b) the development of a uranium mine at Baghalchor in Dera Ghazi Khan (BC-1); and (c) the inception of a nuclear weapons design program led by Dr. Riazuddin of the PAEC. Khan obtains the government’s approval and the uranium enrichment program is formally launched under the name ‘Directorate of Industrial Liaison’ in a barrack at Chaklala airport under the leadership of Dr. Bashiruddin Mahmood.
—Shahid-ur-Rehman, “Dr. A.Q. Khan: Nothing Succeeds Like Success,” Long Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), p. 50.

9 April 1975
The Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Fred C. Ikle, warns that several countries are pursuing efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Ikle warns that such countries are acquiring the means to produce nuclear weapons under the guise of obtaining nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Although Ikle does not reveal the names of countries believed to be pursuing nuclear weapons, the New York Times claims that it has has learned from “authoritative” sources that the list includes Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Libya, Israel, Taiwan, and South Korea.
—“Ikle Warns Against Nuclear Spread,” Facts on File World News Digest, 12 April 1975; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 February 1975, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

July 1975
Pakistani nuclear scientist S.A. Butt is appointed to the Pakistani embassy in the Netherlands. Later Butt is shifted to Paris where he becomes the Pakistani government’s chief purchasing agent in Europe for uranium and plutonium enrichment technologies. Butt was one of the scientists who attended the January 1972 meeting that Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called to discuss the possibility of Pakistan developing a nuclear bomb.
—Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, “The Kindly Dr. Khan,” The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, (New York: 1981, Times Books), p. 182.

August 1975
Pakistan begins exploring the uranium enrichment route through the centrifuge process in its pursuit of fissile material. One early indication of this comes when the Pakistani embassy in Brussels queries a Dutch company about the possible purchase of high-frequency transformers or inverters.
—Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, “The Kindly Dr. Khan,” The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, (New York: 1981, Times Books), p. 181.

October 1975
Dr. A.Q. Khan asks one of his colleagues at FDO to photograph drawings of ultracentrifuges that he had at home. The suspicious colleague declines and reports the incident. In response, the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs asks FDO to shift Khan to a less sensitive position where he would not have access to documents related to the ultracentrifuge project.
—Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, “The Kindly Dr. Khan,” The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, (New York: 1981, Times Books), p. 180.

Fall 1975
Dr. A. Q. Khan is tasked to translate sensitive documents concerning a German technical breakthrough in the ultracentrifuge uranium enrichment process from German into Dutch. For this purpose Khan spends 16 days at URENCO’s facility in the town of Almelo. Security arrangements at the facility are lax and a colleague later reports as having seen Khan making notes at his desk in a foreign script. Khan also uses the opportunity to repeatedly tour the Almelo plant.
—Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, “The Kindly Dr. Khan,” The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, (New York: 1981, Times Books), pp. 179-80.

Fall 1975
Dr. A. Q. Khan uses S. A. Butt at the Pakistani embassy in Netherlands as a conduit for supplying centrifuge-related technical literature, blueprints, plans for plant design, and lists of equipment and material suppliers to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).
—Shahid-ur-Rehman, “Dr. A.Q. Khan: Nothing Succeeds Like Success,” Long Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), p. 51.

15 December 1975
Dr. A.Q. Khan returns to Pakistan with his wife Henny and their two daughters. He subsequently informs FDO of his intention to stay on in Pakistan and resigns his position at FDO. The resignation takes effect on 1 March 1976.
—Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, “The Kindly Dr. Khan,” The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, (New York: 1981, Times Books), p. 180.

Late 1975
Pakistan secretly launches Project 706 (according to another source – Project 726) to produce enriched uranium using the centrifuge enrichment process. The project involves the construction of a pilot facility at Sihala, to be followed by the construction of an industrial-scale plant housing 10,000 centrifuges at the village of Kahuta. Dr. A.Q. Khan takes charge of the new Engineering Research Laboratory (ERL), which is tasked with designing the centrifuges for the proposed facilities. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) led by Dr. Munir Ahmed Khan is given overall charge of the project, while the military’s Special Works Commission is asked to help with purchases from abroad and construction of the top-secret facilities.
—Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, “The Kindly Dr. Khan,” The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, (New York: 1981, Times Books), p. 182; Shahid-ur-Rehman, “Dr. A.Q. Khan: Nothing Succeeds Like Success,” Long Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), p. 56.

1976
The Pakistani government approves a plan to build a reprocessing plant and eight nuclear power plants at the Chashma site on the Indus River in Mianwali district. According to plan projections the first nuclear power plant will be commissioned by 1982.
—“Pakistan Plans to Spend $56 million during the Current Fiscal Year,” Nucleonics Week, 2 July 1981, Vol. 22, No. 26, Pg. 5; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 July 1981, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

23 February 1976
In a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director Fred C. Ikle reveals that the United States and six major industrialized nations have agreed to develop new safeguards and place restrictions on the export of nuclear facilities. Ikle does not provide the names of the countries that have agreed to such controls; but the countries are believed to be the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, Canada, West Germany, and Japan. He also mentions that the United States is making efforts to persuade Pakistan to abandon its efforts to purchase a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France. According to Ikle, Pakistan’s intentions for purchasing the reprocessing plant is to produce nuclear weapons.
— Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 24 February 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 February 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 February 1976
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto meets with Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and refuses to accept Canada’s directions on the use of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant that Pakistan is planning to buy from France. Canada insists on implementing stringent safeguards on the Karachi power reactor, but Bhutto refuses to accept Canada’s proposals. Canadian officials are concerned that the spent nuclear fuel from the Canadian built nuclear reactor in Karachi will be used to run the reprocessing plant and produce Plutonium for nuclear weapons. Bhutto contends that Pakistan is not interested in acquiring nuclear explosives. Bhutto further contends that the deal between France and Pakistan to buy a reprocessing plant has been approved by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 26 February 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 February 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; “Canadian Nuclear Talks Suspended,” Facts on File World News Digest, New York Times, 6 March 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 March 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

27 February 1976
Canadian officials state that Pakistan has promised not to divert spent fuel from the Canadian supplied power reactor in Karachi. The officials also indicate that either side can withdraw from the agreement on six months notice. Canadian officials have expressed skepticism over Pakistan’s desire to purchase a spent fuel reprocessing plant from France and suspect that Pakistan will attempt to divert spent fuel from the Canadian supplied power reactor at Karachi.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 27 February 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 February 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

19 April 1976
Dr. A.Q. Khan addresses a letter to the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Dr. Munir Ahmad Khan expressing his impatience with the slow pace of the centrifuge-based uranium enrichment project. A few days letter he writes a similar letter to Prime Minister Bhutto threatening to resign his position.
—Shahid-ur-Rehman, “Dr. A.Q. Khan: Nothing Succeeds Like Success,” Long Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), pp. 51-52.

April 1976
During a private meeting with Prime Minister Bhutto, Dr. A.Q. Khan threatens to quit if he is not given formal charge of the uranium enrichment project. In response, Bhutto appoints a committee comprising of A.G.N. Kazi (Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission), Ghulam Ishaq (Defense Secretary), and Agha Shahi (Foreign Secretary) to resolve the matter. The committee rules in favor of giving Dr. A.Q. Khan formal charge of the uranium enrichment project. However, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) is allowed to continue with the plutonium fuel project independently.
—Shahid-ur-Rehman, “Dr. A.Q. Khan: Nothing Succeeds Like Success,” Long Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), p. 52.

2 March 1976
Canada’s External Affairs Minister Allan Maceachen announces the suspension of weeklong talks with Pakistan on the supply of fuel for the Canadian supplied power reactor in Karachi. The talks were initiated during the visit to Canada by Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.
— “Canadian Nuclear Talks Suspended,” Facts on File World News Digest, 6 March 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 6 March 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

March 1976
Pakistan signs a contract with France for the sale of a nuclear fuel-reprocessing plant.
—Don Oberdorfer, Michael Gatier, and Maralee Schwartz, “Pakistan: The Quest for Atomic Bomb; Problem Discussed by West, Moscow, Peking,” Washington Post, 27 August 1979, First Section, A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 27 August 1979, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 July 1976
Dr. A.Q. Khan takes formal charge from Dr. Bashiruddin Mahmood of the Engineering Research Laboratory (ERL), the entity instituted to develop centrifuge technology for enriching uranium. ERL is instituted as an independent organization with a three member board comprising of A.G.N. Kazi, Ghulam Ishaq, and Agha Shahi.
—Shahid-ur-Rehman, “Dr. A.Q. Khan: Nothing Succeeds Like Success,” Long Road To Chagai, (Islamabad: 1999, Print Wise Publication), 53.

8-9 August 1976
The United States offers to sell 110 Vought A-7 attack aircraft to Pakistan if it agrees to abandon its efforts to purchase a nuclear reactor from France. The first batch of the attack aircraft is expected to be delivered in 1978-1979.
—Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 August 1976, Industry Observer, Pg. 11; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 30 August 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 August 1976
The French foreign minister informs US charge d’affaires Sam Gammon of France’s displeasure over US efforts to hinder the sale of a fuel reprocessing plant to Pakistan. The French foreign minister also indicates that France will proceed with the sale of the reprocessing plant. French foreign ministry officials reveal that the sale of the reprocessing plant was approved on 18 March under an agreement reached between France, Pakistan, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The French government releases a statement indicating that it is in compliance with all international agreements regarding the sale, including an agreement with the IAEA to ensure that the plant is only used for peaceful activities.
— Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 10 August 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 August 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; “U.S., Pakistan Discuss French A-Plant,” Facts on File World News Digest, 14 August 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14  August 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

9 August 1976
Addressing a news conference in Lahore, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announces a compromise formula that seeks to avoid confrontation between the United States and Pakistan over Pakistan’s attempts to obtain a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant from France. According to the compromise formula, Pakistan would not be able to divert nuclear material for building nuclear weapons. Mr. Kissinger suggests that an agreement between France and Pakistan that would give France power to veto any plans by Pakistan to divert the nuclear fuel for atomic explosives. Mr. Kissinger also says that the United States will block the sale of 100 A-7 Corsair jet-fighter bombers until Pakistan reaches an agreement with France over the fuel reprocessing plant.
—Bernard Gwertzman, Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 10 August 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 August 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; “U.S., Pakistan Discuss French A-Plant,” Facts on File World News Digest, 14 August 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14  August 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com

11 August 1976
US Charge d’Affaires in Paris Sam Gammon meets US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. After the meeting, Mr. Gammon informs the French Foreign Office Secretary General Francois de Laboulaye that the United States wishes to work out a safeguards agreement for the reprocessing plant that France is planning to supply to Pakistan.
— Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 11 August 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 August 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

11 August 1976
In an interview with Radio Luxemburg, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto says that Pakistan will proceed with the purchase of the French nuclear equipment despite objections from the United States.
— Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 11 August 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 11 August 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

12 August 1976
French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac rejects proposals for talks between France, Pakistan, and the United States over the sale of a French fuel reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Mr. Chirac states that only France and Pakistan must be involved in the issue.  US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger states that the United States is only interested in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 12 August 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 August 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

26 August 1976
The French cabinet indicates its intention to proceed with the sale of the nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan despite objections raised by the United States.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 26 August 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 August 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

13 October 1976
France reaffirms its decision to supply Pakistan with the nuclear reprocessing plant despite its recent assertions to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
— Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 13 October 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 October 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

November 1976
France is unlikely to proceed with the supply of the nuclear reprocessing plant to Pakistan. The change in position is caused by US opposition to the deal and the recent announcement by the Canadian Secretary Donald C. Jamieson that Canada will not supply Pakistan with fuel for its power reactor if France supplies Pakistan with the reprocessing plant. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed and the French Foreign Minister Louis de Guiringauld meet in Paris to discuss the issue. France also sends an envoy to Pakistan to discuss the sale of the reprocessing plant.
— Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 12 November 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 12 November 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

November 1976
Albrecht Migule, owner of the West German firm Ces Kalthof, signs a $2 million deal with a Pakistani textile firm to supply a fluoride plant.
—“German Firm Cited in Case Involving Sale of Fluoride Conversion Plant to Pakistan,” Nuclear Fuel, 20 July 1981, Vol. 6, No. 15, Pg. 3; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 July 1981, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

17 November 1976
The US Defense Department agrees to the sale of 110 A7 attack planes to Pakistan. The deal is worth $700 million and includes training for Pakistani pilots and supply of spare parts. The deal must be approved by Congress and the State Department. The State Department’s approval is contingent on Pakistan’s abandonment of it’s plans to acquire a nuclear-fuel reprocessing plant from France.
— Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 17 November 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 November 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

16 December 1976
The French Nuclear Export Council, chaired by President Giscard d’Estaing, states that France will not supply any fuel reprocessing plants in the future. The decision is taken to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. According to the French Nuclear Export Council, the sale of the reprocessing plant to Pakistan will be completed as planned. French officials, however, indicate their willingness to cancel the deal, but refrain from doing so owing to domestic political pressure. French officials indicate that France would be happy if Pakistan decides to cancel the contract. The French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing is hopeful that Pakistan will cancel the agreement.
—Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 17 December 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 December 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; Information Bank Abstracts, New York Times, 31 December 1976; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 31 December 1976, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.

23 December 1976
Canada suspends its nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan and indicates that it will not supply uranium for the reactor at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP).
—“Pakistan Sticks to French Nuclear Deal,” Washington Post, 4 January 1977, First Section, A9; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 4 January 1977, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; Milton R. Benjamin, “Pakistan Says France Killing Controversial Nuclear Deal; Pakistan Says France Killing Nuclear Deal,” Washington Post, 24 August 1978, First Section, A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 August 1978, http://web.lexis-nexis.com. 

1976
Pakistan begins a major purchasing drive in Western Europe for its uranium enrichment project. During 1976, government agents place orders with Swiss and Dutch firms. Specific purchases include highly specialized valves for centrifuges (VAT-Switzerland), a gasification and solidification unit to feed uranium hexafluoride gas into centrifuges (CORA Engineering, Switzerland), and hardened steel tubes (Van Doorne – Netherlands). Exports of these items are not covered under the London Group’s ‘Nuclear Suppliers List’ and the Pakistani government is able to obtain them legally. Although the Swiss and Dutch governments learn that the purchases are related to Pakistan’s planned centrifuge facility, they stick with a narrow interpretation of nuclear export control regulations and do little to interfere the sales.
—Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, “The Kindly Dr. Khan,” The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, (New York: 1981, Times Books), pp. 182-184.

1976
Pakistan attempts to purchase 10-15 tons of uranium hexafluoride gas from the West German company Rohstoff-Einfuhr; but the attempt is unsuccessful.
—Steve Weissman & Herbert Krosney, “More Bang for the Buck,” The Islamic Bomb: The Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle East, (New York: 1981, Times Books), p. 218.

	Updated February 2006