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Nuclear Chronology

1982

First Two Weeks of January 1982
Owing to acute power shortages, Pakistan is likely to invite bids for the construction of a 600 MW nuclear power plant in the next fiscal year that begins in July. Apart from contacting Muslim countries, Pakistan is also requesting the World Bank to finance the nuclear power plant. The Pakistani government is expected to discuss the issue with the new World Bank President A.W. Clausen when he visits Pakistan for a week-long visit beginning on January 15. Western sources indicate that World Bank's involvement in Pakistan's nuclear program will help in strengthening the implementation of stringent safeguards, especially at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP). The World Bank usually does not finance nuclear power projects.
--"There are String Indications that Pakistan, Facing the Worst Power Shortage," Nucleonics Week, 14 January 1982, Vol. 23, No. 2, Pg. 10; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 January 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

14 January 1982
Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi says that Pakistan did not provide any assurance to the United States over its nuclear program in return for the $3.2 billion military and economic aid. Shahi says that Pakistan is aware of the U.S. law that will result in a cut-off of aid to any country that explodes a nuclear device. However, he also states that the Reagan administration might not adopt such a hardline even if Pakistan conducts a nuclear explosion since Pakistan is crucial to U.S. strategic plans in the region. Shahi also elaborates, "we [Pakistan] make a distinction between an explosion and weapons. We do not rule out the possibility of a detonation if it is necessary for our programme."
--Alain Cass, "Pakistan Denies giving Pledge on N-Testing," Financial Times (London), 15 January 1982, Section 1, Overseas News, Pg. 3; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 January 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

18 January 1982
Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq includes a trip to France as part of his European tour. The trip to France is only announced on the eve of his departure. The Pakistani President provides a non-committal answer in response to a question whether Pakistan will discuss the supply of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant with France. A deal between Pakistan and France for the supply of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant was cancelled owing to France's decision to back out of the deal in the late 1970s.
--"Revival of French Nuclear Deal?," Christian Science Monitor, 18 January 1982, The News Briefly, Pg. 2; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 18 January 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

19 January 1982
Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq denies that his trip to France will include discussions for the French supply of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. General Haq further states that Pakistan does not have the intention nor possess the ability to explode a nuclear device. President Haq also states that Pakistan would be "two steps ahead" in implementing international safeguards in its reprocessing plants if other nations also implement the same safeguards mechanisms.
--"Pakistani Denies he will hold Talks in Paris on Atom Plant," New York Times, 20 January 1982, Section A, Pg. 2, Col. 3, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 January 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

23 January 1982
The CIA publishes its report 'Special National Intelligence Estimate 31-81" which mentions that Pakistan will be able to explode a nuclear device within the next three years.
-- Judith Miller, "US Says Pakistan's Nuclear Potential is Growing," New York Times, 24 January 1982, Section 1, part 1, Pg. 6, Col. 1, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 January 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com; Frank J. Prial, "Pakistani Repeats Nuclear Pledge," New York Times, 26 January 1982, Section A, Pg. 3, Col. 1, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 January 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

26 January 1982
Speaking at a news conference after his luncheon meeting with the French President Francois Mitterrand, Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq reiterates that Pakistan does not possess the capacity or the intention to produce nuclear weapons. President Haq also states that his discussions with the French president did not include any references to nuclear issues. President Haq also indicates that he did not attempt to renew the French contract for the supply of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant to Pakistan.
--Frank J. Prial, "Pakistani Repeats Nuclear Pledge," New York Times, 26 January 1982, Section A, Pg. 3, Col. 1, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 January 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com; David Housego, "Pakistan not to build N-Bomb, Zia tells French," Financial Times (London), 26 January 1982, Section 1, Overseas News, Pg. 3; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 26 January 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

30 January 1982
India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi says that India is willing to sign a friendship treaty with Pakistan and also indicates that India will not object to Pakistan's development of a peaceful nuclear program. Gandhi adds that India is willing to accept Pakistan's promises that its nuclear program will be intended only for peaceful purposes. Commenting on the non-aggression pact put forward by Pakistan, Prime Minister Gandhi states that "pact or no pact, we will never attack Pakistan." Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi is in New Delhi to discuss a non-aggression pact with India's Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao. An Indian foreign ministry spokesperson states that "some progress" was made in the first rounds of talks.
--Richard S. Ehrlich, "Gandhi says India willing to sign Friendship Treaty with Pakistan," United Press International, 30 January 1982, International; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 30 January 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

18 February 1982
Hans Blix, the Director General of the IAEA, says that the agency has not made any progress in its six-month efforts to implement increased surveillance at Pakistan's Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) reactor. The IAEA made the request to increase surveillance measures after it detected anomalies and irregularities at the reactor. Blix, however, says that there is no evidence that Pakistan is diverting spent fuel from the reactor. Blix also says that the agency has presented two reports to its Board of Governors indicating that existing surveillance measures are not adequate to provide reliable assurances that Pakistan is not diverting spent fuel from the reactor. IAEA officials privately confirm that Blix will provide a similarly worded report to the Board of Governors during the February 23rd meeting. The Director General also praises the efforts of the Reagan administration to renew economic and military aid to Pakistan.
--Judith Miller, "UN Aide sees Little to Curb Spread of Atom Arms," New York Times, 18 February 1982, Section A, Pg. 4, Col. 3, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 18 February 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

18 - 19 February 1982
IAEA and Pakistani officials hold discussions on increasing the IAEA's monitoring capability at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) reactor. The IAEA has been requesting such increased surveillance measures since summer'81.
--Judith Miller, "US Hails report of Progress on Pakistani Atomic Dispute," New York Times, 3 March 1982, Section A, Pg. 2, Col. 3, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 March 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

26 February 1982
Hans Blix, the Director General of the IAEA, issues a report indicating that the IAEA had "productive discussions" with Pakistani officials on February 18th and 19th over the issue of implementing increasing surveillance measures at the KANUPP reactor in Karachi. Blix says "Some of these proposals for improvements have already been implemented and I hope that the present discussions will lead to the implementation of the remaining proposals."
--Judith Miller, "US Hails report of Progress on Pakistani Atomic Dispute," New York Times, 3 March 1982, Section A, Pg. 2, Col. 3, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 March 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

2 March 1982
U.S. officials welcome the report by the IAEA Director General as a welcome sign. Archelaus R. Turrentine, acting assistant director for nuclear and weapons control at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, describes the report as a "positive development." Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) expresses skepticism and says that "Pakistan remains on the brink of a nuclear test." Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham (D-NY) calls for the safeguards measures to encompass Pakistan's entire nuclear activities.
-- Judith Miller, "US Hails report of Progress on Pakistani Atomic Dispute," New York Times, 3 March 1982, Section A, Pg. 2, Col. 3, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 March 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

12 March 1982
In replying to a question regarding Libya's financing of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, Libya's ruler Colonel Qadhafi says "No, it is not true at all, I heard about this propaganda, one of the bad propaganda to defame us." The Libyan ruler was speaking at an interview broadcast by Vienna television.
--"Qadhafi on the "Pakistan Nuclear Bomb"," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 March 1982, Part 4. The Middle East and Africa, IV(A) - The Middle East, ME/6978/I; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 March 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

March 1982
Speaking at an Arab conference, Munir Ahmad Khan Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), says that oil-producing nations should acquire nuclear technology to conserve petroleum reserves. Mr. Khan says that some industrialized nations are unwilling to share nuclear technology citing the potential proliferation dangers associated with such transfers. Khan says that implementing international safeguards will contain the dangers associated with such technology transfers. Mr. Khan says that tight controls on the sharing of nuclear technologies and reluctance to provide long-term commitment to supply nuclear fuel and equipment will lead to a further increase in the world's energy problems.
--"Arab Oil should be used as a Bargaining Tool to get Nuclear Technology," Nucleonics Week, 8 April 1982, Vol. 23, No. 14, Pg. 9; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 April 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

Late March - Early April
The Spanish firm Sener completes its study on the financial and technical aspects for a 900 MW nuclear power plant at Chashma and submits a report to the Pakistani government. Sener suggests building 6 units of approximately 1,000 MW each for the project.
--Pearl Marshall, "Pakistan hopes LWR Fuel Supply Capability will Stem from 'R&D-Size' Enrichment Plant," Nuclear Fuel, 16 August 1982, Vol. 7, No. 17, Pg. 7; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 August 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com; Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, "Pakistan Issues Plant Tender; Prospective Bidders not Identified," Nucleonics Week, 9 December 1982, Vol. 23, No. 49, Pg. 3; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

March - December 1982
The United States believes that Pakistan is attempting to acquire components that could be used to produce several nuclear bombs. The components sought by Pakistan are identified as finely machined hollow steel spheres measuring approximately 13 inches in diameter, and concave metal plates. Pakistan is believed to have sought these metal spheres from Britain and Argentina. The spheres are important components of an implosion type nuclear device in which uniformly placed explosives compress a sphere of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium to produce a fission reaction. The concave metal plates, known as "driver plates" are attached to the explosive and are used to produce a powerful blast. The shipments of these spheres are stopped using U.S. diplomatic interventions. Pakistan's pursuit of these components forces the U.S. President to send a special envoy, General Vernon Walters, to Pakistan on two occasions. During General Walter's visit to Pakistan in October, Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq rejects the report that Pakistan is pursuing the nuclear weapons option.
--Simon Henderson, "Anxious U.S. could Probe Zia over N-Plans," Financial Times (London), Section 1, Overseas News, Pg. 4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Rogal and William J. Cook, and Jane Whitmore, 'Worries about the Bomb," Newsweek, 20 December 1982, International, Pakistan, Pg. 50; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

11 April 1982
Pakistan's Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan says that the construction of the basic services for a second nuclear power plant has been completed at Chashma. Ishaq Khan does not provide information whether the Pakistani government is already conducting negotiations with various firms for the construction of the plant or whether it plans to invite tender bids for the plant. Khan states that Pakistan needs a number of nuclear power plants to address its energy requirements and mentions that the government is currently formulating a comprehensive strategy to construct the needed plants. He discloses that the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) operated at 61% of its capacity using locally produced parts and fuel. The Finance Minister states that "As the position of local fuel, critical materials and spares continues to improve, the plant will operate at a higher capacity." According to calculations by the magazine Nucleonics Week, the KANUPP facility operated at 19.2% of its original capacity.
--"Approval for a 937 Mw Nuclear Unit at Chashma came Tuesday from Pakistan's," Nucleonics Week, 15 April 1982, Vol. 23, No. 15, Pg. 2; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 April 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

13 April 1982
The Executive Committee of the National Economic Council of Pakistan approves the construction of a 937 MW nuclear power plant at Chashma. The project is expected to be completed in mid-1988 and is believed to cost $1.5 billion. The allocation for the project is expected to be made in the next fiscal year that begins in July. The Spanish firm Sener completed a feasibility study for the plant last year and estimated the cost to be $988 million. The estimate was revised this year and the current estimate is not available.
--"Pakistan to Build Nuclear Power Plant," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 14 April 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 April 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com; "Approval for a 937 Mw Nuclear Unit at Chashma came Tuesday from Pakistan's," Nucleonics Week, 15 April 1982, Vol. 23, No. 15, Pg. 2; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 April 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

10 June 1982
In his address to the UN Disarmament Conference, Pakistan's Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan states that "Pakistan will not develop or acquire nuclear weapons." Yaqub-Khan also states that Pakistan is committed to the creation of a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia.
--John Usher, "Yugoslavia Condemns Soviet-US Rivalry," United press International, 10 June 1982, International; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 June 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

Second Week of June 1982
Addressing a press conference after a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors, Director General of the IAEA Hans Blix says that "talks" with Pakistan will continue over the issue of increasing the safeguards measures at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) facility. Blix hopes that all the required measures will be agreed to by Pakistan by the time he makes his report to the Board of Governors again in September. He also states that the IAEA and Pakistan differed on the "technical arrangements" for the enhanced safeguards at the KANUPP facility. The IAEA inspections at the KANUPP facility are not part of the NPT, which Pakistan has not signed. The inspections are part of the original sales agreement between Canada and Pakistan for the Canadian supply of a CANDU-type reactor.
--"IAEA was not in a Position to Perform Adequate Verification," Nucleonics Week, 17 June 1982, Vol. 23, No. 24, Pg. 2; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 June 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

14 June 1982
The IAEA's annual Safeguards Implementation Report for 1981 states that the agency cannot adequately determine whether there was any diversion of nuclear material for military purposes in two countries. The report does not state the two countries, but U.S. nuclear policy officials identify the two nations to be India and Pakistan. The agency report also states that the nuclear material regulated by the agency was not diverted for military use. The IAEA states that negotiations to improve monitoring measures are proceeding well in one case, which is identified as India by U.S. officials. The IAEA does not provide any comment on the status of negotiations with the other country, i.e., Pakistan. The report mentions that four countries with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities possess the capability to produce weapons grade fissile material. The report does not mention the names of the countries, but they are believed to be India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa.
--"International Atomic Agency says it had Inspection Problems in '81," New York Times, 16 June 1982, Section A, Pg. 4, Col. 3, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 June 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com; Richard Johns, "Atomic Energy Agency Warns on Nuclear Material Safeguards," Financial Times (London), 17 June 1982, Section 1, European News, Pg. 3; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 June 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

17 June 1982
The United States attempts to convince the major suppliers of nuclear power plant technology not to supply such technology to Pakistan until Pakistan accepts full-scope IAEA safeguards on its nuclear facilities. Pakistan has decided to build a 850-900 MW nuclear power plant at Chashma and is expected to issue tenders for the plant's construction in a few weeks. Sources indicate that the United States has somewhat succeeded in convincing the major suppliers of nuclear technology to accept its nonproliferation policy but doubts exist whether small licensees will comply with U.S. requests. The United States indicates to major suppliers that supply of nuclear equipment or material to Pakistan will result in a suspension of U.S. nuclear aid.
--"US Forging United Front to deny Pakistan a Second Nuclear Plant," Nucleonics Week, 17 June 1982, Vol. 23, No. 24, Pg. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 June 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

24 June 1982
Pakistan allocates $72 million for the Pakistan Atomic Energy Agency (PAEC) in its national budget for the year 1982-83. A major portion of the allocated amount is for the proposed 850-900 MW light water reactor (LWR) at Chashma in Mianwali district in Punjab. According to the budget document, for the fiscal year'81 ending on June 30, $47 million was spent on a reprocessing plant and on civil work for the Chashma nuclear power plant. Other completed activities included radioactive minerals survey, uranium exploration in Dera Ghazi Khan, and a nuclear power generation training project.
--"Pakistan's National Budget for 1982-83 Earmarks $72 Million," Nucleonics Week, 24 June 1982, Vol. 23, No. 25, Pg. 8; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 24 June 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

24 June 1982
The U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Security Affairs James W. Culpepper informs the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee that U.S. export control regulations will be tightened following an extensive review of current controls followed by the Departments of State and Energy. The tightening of U.S. export controls follows complaints by Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham (D-NY) that U.S. nuclear exports undermined the U.S. nonproliferation policy. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration Bo Denysyk agrees that the U.S. Commerce Department has allowed the sale of nuclear technology to countries like Pakistan, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and other countries that are suspected of developing nuclear weapons.
--Judith Miller, 'US to Tighten Atomic Export Rules," New York Times, 25 June 1982, Section D, Pg. 1, Col. 3, Financial Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 June 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

1 July 1982
The United States is conducting a review of its export control regulations and revising those export control rules. As part of the efforts, a new list is being prepared by the U.S. special trade representative and the Department of Energy that lists five countries that are ineligible to receive nuclear materials and technology for financial and safeguards reasons. The five countries in the list are Pakistan, India, Israel, Argentina, and Kuwait. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is also updating its nuclear export regulations and is expanding its list of nations that are not allowed to receive non-sensitive equipment and nuclear material under a general license. Pakistan, India, Argentina, Israel, and Kuwait are included in the revised NRC list.
--Sandy Cannon-Brown, "Tightening of US Nuclear Export Controls Looming," Nucleonics Week, 1 July 1982, Vol. 23, No. 26, Pg. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 1 July 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

2 July 1982
The Departments of State and Energy propose to expand the list of nations that would need specific authorization from the Department of Energy and other specific agencies in order to import sensitive technology from U.S. companies. Countries that might be added to the list include Pakistan, India, Brazil, South Africa, Israel, and Argentina.
--'DOE Moves to Expand List of Nations Needing Special OK for Nuclear Deals," Inside Energy/with Federal Lands, 2 July 1982, Pg. 4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 2 July 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

16 August 1982
In an interview, the Director of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Shamim Ahmed Chaudhri hopes that Pakistan will be able to indigenously produce enriched uranium fuel for the proposed 900 MW Chashma nuclear light water reactor (LWR). Chaudhri indicates that it would require Pakistan 20 years to reach that capability. Currently Pakistan is producing nuclear fuel using uranium mined in Bagalchore. Pakistan's actions were necessitated when Canada, the supplier of nuclear fuel for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP), suspended its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan in December 1976. He also says that the fuel is produced at the Kundian plant located at the Chashma site; but that Pakistan's indigenously produced fuel is going through a testing process and the PAEC is "quite happy" with the results. Pakistan's Water & Power Development Authority develops a plan to build two more 900 MW nuclear power plants and hopes to operate them by 1994 and 1997. Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq emphasizes that the Chashma nuclear plant will be placed under stringent international safeguards. Reiterating that Pakistan possesses the right to acquire the latest nuclear technology, President Haq states that "If the advanced countries are a bit stingy then we will acquire it ourselves ... even if we have to beg, borrow or steal ... And stealing is something we have already been labeled with." Some European countries express interest in the Chashma contract. A Western diplomat in Islamabad says that he would make a strong plea for his government's participation in the project based on Pakistan's energy needs."
--Pearl Marshall, "Pakistan hopes LWR Fuel Supply Capability will Stem from 'R&D-Size' Enrichment Plant," Nuclear Fuel, 16 August 1982, Vol. 7, No. 17, Pg. 7; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 August 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

19 August 1982
The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) sets September 15 as the deadline for reactor manufacturers to indicate their willingness to submit bids for a 900 MW LWR nuclear power plant at Chashma. A communiqué from PAEC informs the manufacturers that bid documents must be obtained from Islamabad. The timetable presented in the communiqué sets four months for preparing the bid, five months for bid evaluation, and six years for completing the contract from the date of signature of the letter of intent. Bidders are also allowed to propose a second unit that must be completed within 36 months after the completion of the first unit. The communiqué welcomes a number of options for the bidding including a total turnkey package, or nuclear island, or a nuclear steam supply system. All the cases are expected to include fuel supply. The United States is initiating efforts to prevent the reactor manufacturers in other countries to bid for the contract unless Pakistan accepts full-scope safeguards and abandons its efforts to produce nuclear weapons.
--"Pakistan Solicits Vendor Interest in Proposed LWR," Nucleonics Week, 19 August 1982, Vol. 23, No. 33, Pg. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 August 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

19 August 1982
The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental & Scientific Affairs James Malone indicates that one of the factors obstructing the completion of a bilateral nuclear accord between China and the United States is China's relationship with Pakistan regarding nuclear issues. Malone indicates that China supplied Pakistan with material other than fuel-related items. However, he declines to mention the items specifically. Malone also indicates that the United States is making progress in restricting the supply of nuclear components to Pakistan's nuclear facilities.
--Rob Laufer, "Interview with Malone: Defense Policy and Assessment of 'Hot Spots'," Nucleonics Week, 19 August 1982, Vol. 23, No. 33, Pg. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 August 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

8 September 1982
U.S. Deputy Energy Secretary W. Kenneth Davis informs a House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee that the Reagan administration plans to create a new list of 63 countries that would need specific U.S. approval to receive any American technology for their nuclear program. U.S. administration officials decline to name the countries in the list until the list is finalized, but sources indicate the list to include Pakistan, India, Brazil, South Africa, Israel, Argentina, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Algeria, and Syria. Davis indicates that the criteria for approving the sale has not been changed, a stand that is criticized by Rep. Jonathan B. Bingham (D-NY) as a shortcoming in the new policy. The new measures are announced by the Reagan administration as efforts to strengthen the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. The Assistant Secretary of State James B. Devine indicates at another Subcommittee hearing that a Spanish licensee of Westinghouse Electric Co. would have to obtain a special approval from the Department of Energy to export a reactor to Pakistan. Devine notes that the Spanish firm can provide Pakistan with a Westinghouse Electric Co. reactor without special approval under existing regulations. Some Congressmen expressed concern earlier this year over the sale of a Westinghouse Electric Co. reactor to Pakistan by a Spanish licensee of the U.S. Company.
--Milton R. Benjamin, "Administration will List 63 Countries Subject to Nuclear Export Restrictions," Washington Post, 9 September 1982, First Section, A4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 September 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

8 September 1982
The Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou charges that Turkey is building a nuclear bomb in cooperation with Pakistan.
--"Around the World; Papandreou says Turks Build Nuclear Arms," New York Times, 9 September 1982, Section A, Pg. 6, Col. 3, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 September 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

10 September 1982
A Turkish foreign ministry spokesperson Nazmi Akiman indicates that Turkey does not wish to build nuclear weapons and rules out any cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey over this issue.
--"In Brief: General; Turkish Denial of Nuclear Arms Link with Pakistan," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13 September 1982, Part 4. The Middle East and Africa, C. Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, ME/7129/C/1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 13 September 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

12 September 1982
A Pakistani foreign ministry spokesperson refutes the claims by the Greek prime minister that Turkey and Pakistan are cooperating to produce a nuclear bomb. The spokesperson states that Pakistan's nuclear program is only intended for peaceful purposes and reiterates that Pakistan does not intend to produce nuclear weapons.
--"Other Reports; Pakistan denies Greek Charge over Atomic Bomb," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 September 1982, Part 3. The Far East, A. International Affairs, 4. The Middle East, FE/7133/A4/2; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 September 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

Third Week of September 1982
The Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmad Khan expects that many nuclear reactors manufacturers will participate in the Chashma nuclear power plant project owing to the depressing state of the current nuclear market. Khan states that "there is considerable interest in the Chashma project," and that the United States will find it difficult to prevent firms from participating in the project. One U.S. firm Westinghouse Electric Co. informs Pakistan of its decision to bid for the project, even though doubts exist over the firm's participation since U.S. laws preclude direct participation. In a conference paper delivered at the IAEA, Khan indicates that Pakistan's energy needs necessitate the development of nuclear energy. He also states that Pakistan's nuclear projects needs foreign financing and enhanced personnel development. Khan mentions that the outward flow of skilled personnel from Pakistan to wealthier Middle Eastern nations has adversely affected Pakistan's nuclear power program and outlines a training program developed by the PAEC to build a skilled workforce in all fields of nuclear construction operation and maintenance.
--Rob Laufer, "While Hesitant to Discuss US Policy, a Top Pakistani Official," Nucleonics Week, 16 September 1982, Vol. 23, No. 37, Pg. 4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 16 September 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

18 September 1982
The United States places a hold on bilateral nuclear cooperation with China because of intelligence reports suggesting that China helped Pakistan in its efforts to produce weapons-grade uranium. China is also believed to have provided nuclear aid to South Africa, Argentina, and possibly India. Some U.S. officials believe that China provided assistance to Pakistan in its efforts to enrich uranium.
--Judith Miller, "US is Holding up Peking Atom Talks," New York Times, 19 September 1982, Section 1, Part 1, Pg. 11, Col. 1, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 September 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

18 September 1982
According to a restricted staff report submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors, the IAEA inspections at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) reactor suffer from two deficiencies. The first is the lack of surveillance equipment at an emergency hatch leading out of the containment and the second is the absence of backup monitors attached to the cameras covering various critical areas of the reactor. The existing surveillance cameras monitor the core exit, the canal between the reactor and the fuel storage pond, and the fuel storage pond. The monitors manage the surveillance cameras' operation and record the images. The IAEA wants to have backup monitors in the plant control room since the existing monitors are susceptible to malfunction. The IAEA wants to have an extra camera at the emergency hatch even though it is difficult to remove the fuel rods using this outlet. Pakistan refuses to accept the demand for the backup monitors as well as an extra surveillance camera. However, the IAEA is not extremely worried about the KANUPP reactor since talks are continuing at a slow pace, if not at a rapid and smooth pace, and importantly, assessment by knowledgeable sources indicate that Pakistan is a long way from diverting enough plutonium for a nuclear bomb. Pakistan's indigenous fuel production capacity is believed to be limited and the sporadic operation of the KANUPP reactor will make it difficult for Pakistan to extract sufficient plutonium for a nuclear bomb.
--"The Two Primary Deficiencies in IAEA Safeguards at Pakistan's KANUPP," Nucleonics Week, 23 September 1982, Vol. 23, No. 38, Pg. 2; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 September 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

20 September 1982
The United States bans U.S. companies from selling reactor equipment to Pakistan. However, Westinghouse Electric Co., a U.S. company, plans to build a light water reactor (LWR) for the proposed Chashma nuclear project in Pakistan through its Belgian licensee. A U.S. State Department official indicates that that the government will make efforts to block such a sale. Westinghouse Electric Co. is expected to accept the government's demands.
--Eric Gelman, "No US Nuclear Help for Pakistan," Newsweek, 20 November 1982, Periscope, Pg. 23; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 September 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

September 1982
U.S. Secretary of State George P. Shultz makes a private request to Western European allies to deny permission for the sale of a new reactor to Pakistan until Pakistan accepts international safeguards on all its nuclear facilities. Shultz's request follows private attempts by Pakistan to invite bids for the new nuclear power project at Chashma.
--Judith Miller, "Pakistan Seeking 2D Atom Reactor," New York Times, 3 December 1982, Section A, Pg. 6, Col. 4, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

10 October 1982
Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq says that he will attempt to revive Canada's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan during his trip to Canada in December. President Haq says that he "would not make an issue" of the supply of nuclear fuel for the KANUPP reactor and indicates that "if they agree to help us in our peaceful power program, it would be welcome." Canada suspended its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan in 1976 following Pakistan's refusal to abandon its efforts to obtain a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. Canada insists that it will renew its nuclear cooperation with Pakistan only after Pakistan signs the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. A Canadian delegation of investors and businessmen are visiting Pakistan and the team does not include any member from the nuclear industry.
--"Pakistan is Trying to Revive Nuclear Cooperation with Canada," Nucleonics Week, 14 October 1982, Vol. 23, No. 41, Pg. 4; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 14 October 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

19 October 1982
Speaking at a press conference in Beijing, Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq states that China is not involved in Pakistan's peaceful nuclear energy program. President Haq reiterates that Pakistan's nuclear program is completely indigenous and peaceful in nature.
--"Pakistan President's Peking Press Conference," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 October 1982, part 3. The Far East, A. International Affairs, 3. Far Eastern Relations, FE/7162/A3/1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 October 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

10 November 1982
A joint-communiqué issued at the end of Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq's visit to Malaysia reaffirms Malaysia's support for Pakistan's proposal to create a nuclear weapons-free zone in South Asia.
--"Malaysia and Pakistan Issue Joint Communiqué," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, 10 November 1982; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 November 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

14 November 1982
U.S. military analysts, quoting a recent U.S. intelligence report, state that 31 nations will be able to produce nuclear weapons by 2000. The report, Defense Guidance, includes Pakistan as one of the countries capable of producing nuclear weapons within 20 years.
--Richard Holloran, "Spread of Nuclear Arms by 2000 is Seen," New York Times, 15 November 1982, Section A, Pg. 3, Col. 4, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 15 November 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

Third Week of November 1982
More than 10 nations from the Eastern and Western bloc meet in Vienna to strengthen the export control list relating to gas centrifuge enrichment equipment and materials. The list of items in the expanded list includes centrifuge parts like rotors and scoops, spin-forming, flow-forming, and balancing machines. The list is also expected to include specific materials like ultra-high strength aluminum, maraging steel, and some kinds of carbon fiber. The objective of the current effort is to close the existing loopholes in the Zangger List of 1974 and the London Suppliers Group list of 1978. The gaps in the existing trigger lists were revealed by Pakistan's purchase of centrifuge components in Europe. Sources indicate that Pakistan is still attempting to procure trigger list items almost every week.
--"Centrifuge Suppliers Meeting Privately to Shore up Trigger List," Nucleonics Week, 25 November 1982, Vol. 23, No. 47, Pg. 1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 25 November 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

16 November 1982
Pakistan agrees to implement most of the additional monitoring mechanisms requested by the IAEA. IAEA Director-General Hans Blix states that Pakistan has already agreed to readjust the cameras that were installed by the agency two months ago and has agreed to install a new "bundle counter" next month to facilitate better monitoring of the insertion and extraction of fuel bundles. Dr. Blix also states that Pakistan has agreed to double the frequency of inspections and let inspectors visit the facility once a month to "service our surveillance equipment, develop the films [and] determine the movements [of equipment]." Blix however indicates that the IAEA has to finalize at least one more issue with Pakistan before the IAEA could give assurances that Pakistan is not diverting plutonium for its weapons program. According to U.S. sources, one issue that the IAEA is discussing with Pakistan is the placement of an inspection seal on an access hatch that could be used to covertly remove material from the containment around the reactor. Currently the "port" is not sealed since it was not part of the original plant design. Dr. Blix indicates that the resolution of the remaining issue will allow him to state in the February IAEA board meeting that "we will soon be in a position to give assurance" over the non-diversion of nuclear material in the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) reactor. U.S. sources indicate that by February, Pakistan would have obtained enough fissile material for one or two nuclear bombs because Pakistan has been operating the KANUPP reactor at a reduced power level, which according to these sources, is ideal for producing weapons-grade plutonium. U.S. sources estimate that Pakistan would be able to produce 10 to 20 kg of plutonium by February 1983.
--Milton R. Benjamin, "Handling of Plutonium at Issue; Pakistan backs Atomic Safeguards," Washington Post, 17 November 1982, First Section, World News, General News, A25; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 November 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

19 November 1982
Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq states that Pakistan will be willing to accept tougher nuclear inspections if the United States requests such inspections on all countries. President Haq says "but if the pressure is only on Pakistan, then we will resist." President Haq is visiting Canada and the United States in December.
--Albert E. Kaff, "Zia Criticizes US Nuclear Inspection Demands," United Press International, 20 November 1982, International; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 November 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

Fourth Week of November 1982
The U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Nonproliferation Richard T. Kennedy meets French officials to request them to stop the sale of a nuclear reactor to Pakistan until all nuclear facilities in Pakistan are placed under international safeguards. According to an official source, the French officials respond that they see no reason to halt the sale of a reactor if Pakistan is willing to accept international safeguards on that reactor.
--Judith Miller, "Pakistan Seeking 2D Atom Reactor," New York Times, 3 December 1982, Section A, Pg. 6, Col. 4, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

30 November 1982
In an interview, Pakistan President Zia ul-Haq states that Pakistan's uranium enrichment effort is a "modest, humble program" aimed at using the technology for its nuclear power reactors. President Haq states that Pakistan is forced to acquire nuclear technology since Pakistan has exhausted all other available means of generating energy. President Haq further states that Pakistan does not need to import yellowcake from Niger since it possesses uranium. President Haq firmly also rejects allegations that Pakistan is developing a nuclear weapon capability. He discloses that that the uranium enrichment program is being managed by the military and claims that the enrichment project is "part and parcel of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission." President Haq further states that Pakistan has not accepted international safeguards owing to their discriminatory nature; and that the Kahuta facility will not be placed under safeguards since it was built through "beg, borrow, and steal" and is not "intended to be covered by international safeguards." President Haq states that Pakistan will sign the NPT provided India signs it.
--Mary Anne Weaver, "Zia; Pakistan's Military Ruler, Before US Visit Talks about Drugs, Arms Buildup, India Elections, Afghanistan, and 'the bomb'," Christian Science Monitor, 30 November 1982, Monitor Interview, Pg. 12; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 30 November 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

November 1982
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), comprising the United States and other nuclear exporting countries, secretly submits a new enhanced export control list to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Exporters Committee, also known as the Zangger Committee. The participating countries also decide to hold another Zangger committee meeting in late January 1984 to resolve the legal and technical issues regarding the new list. France and China are not part of the Zangger committee since both the nations are not signatories to the NPT. France, however, is holding bilateral meetings with the United States over the new list and promises to adhere to any new guidelines adopted in the new list. France is part of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
--Milton R. Benjamin, "More Curbs sought on A-Materials; Nations Widening List of Exports Subject to Controls," Washington Post, 3 January 1983, First Section, A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 January 1983, www.lexis-nexis.com.

First Week of December 1982
U.S. and Pakistani officials settle a dispute over the equipment to be included in the F-16 fighter aircraft to be supplied to Pakistan. The U.S. State Department agrees to upgrade the avionics package in the fighter aircraft.
--Jim Anderson, United Press International, 3 December 1982, Washington News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

1 - 9 December 1982
Pakistan invites bids for the proposed 900-1,000 MW nuclear power plant and issues tenders to "over a dozen qualified suppliers." The bidders were selected based on their interest in the project which is estimated to cost about $1.5 billion. The bids have to be submitted in five months and the project is expected to begin in December 1983.
--Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, "Pakistan Issues Plant Tender; Prospective Bidders not Identified," Nucleonics Week, 9 December 1982, Vol. 23, No. 49, Pg. 3; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

1 - 10 December 1982
Major reactor suppliers obtain the technical specifications for the Chashma nuclear power plant project. The suppliers include Kraftwerk Union, Framatome, Westinghouse, and General Electric. The firms that picked up the specifications for the conventional part of the plant are Ansaldo, Hitachi, Toshiba, and Alsthom-Atlantique.
--Ann MacLachlan, "The Final Stages of Work on Evaluation Procedures for Bids on Pakistan's," Nucleonics Week, 10 March 1983, Vol. 24, No. 10, Pg. 11; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 March 1983, www.lexis-nexis.com.

1 December 1982
Pakistan begins to solicit bids for a new reactor for its proposed nuclear power plant at Chashma. The reactor's capacity is mentioned as 900 MW and companies also can bid for a second reactor to be constructed later. The formal invitation to participate in the project is also sent to U.S. companies Westinghouse Electric Co. and General Electric. Spokespersons from both firms, however, state that the firms will not be participating since the U.S. government will not provide the necessary approval. The United States has appealed to European countries to prevent the sale of the nuclear reactor until Pakistan accepts international safeguards for all of its nuclear facilities. Britain, the Netherlands, and other countries that normally require monitoring of nuclear facilities express agreement with the U.S. request. France, West Germany, and Italy do not agree with the U.S. request.
--Judith Miller, "Pakistan Seeking 2D Atom Reactor," New York Times, 3 December 1982, Section A, Pg. 6, Col. 4, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

3 December 1982
The U.S. and Pakistani officials differ over the nature of Pakistan's nuclear program. A senior Pakistani official claims that "The United States and others think we are developing nuclear weapons. We say we are not and we say your evidence is wrong." The Pakistani official says that the pattern of Pakistan's nuclear program and a threat of massive Indian nuclear retaliation make it illogical for Pakistan to pursue nuclear weapons. A U.S. official, however, states that the absence of safeguards at certain facilities raises suspicions over Pakistan's nuclear program.
--Jim Anderson, United Press International, 3 December 1982, Washington News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 3 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

4 December 1982
The Chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmad Khan announces the government's decision to proceed with the 900 MW nuclear power plant project at Chashma. Khan announces that the bidders are welcome to collect the necessary documents before December 15 and says that the project will begin in about 12 months and take six years to complete. According to Khan, the civil work and infrastructure facilities at the Chashma project site have been completed. The project is estimated to cost about 17,000 million Pakistani rupees. He indicates that the final cost of the project will be based on the submitted tenders and that the Chashma nuclear plant, upon completion, will contribute to 10% of the total capacity of Pakistan's power grid which he estimates to be 11,000 MW. Khan also indicates that IAEA safeguards will be implemented at the facility. He further asserts that the location of the nuclear power plant was evaluated using stringent safety standards and states that risk of pollution is non-existent. The rationale for choosing a light water reactor (LWR) was that the technology is available from six to eight sources and hence there are less chances of an embargo like the one imposed by Canada in 1976. Furthermore, Pakistan will insist on certain conditions in the Chashma contract like manufacturing spare parts in Pakistan, mandatory supply of nuclear fuel for five years followed by a 15-year agreement for enrichment supply. Khan expresses confidence that Pakistan will be able to supply its own fuel for the Chashma plant using the fuel fabrication plant. A study by a Swedish company, Asea-Atom, concludes that Pakistan's domestic industry can contribute to the construction of the Chashma nuclear plant. Khan indicates that Pakistan will need between five to eight nuclear power stations before 2000.
--"Energy; Nuclear Power Station," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 8 December 1982, Part 3. The Far East, Weekly Economic Report, A. Economic and Scientific, Pakistan, FE/W1214/A/27; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com; Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, "Pakistan Issues Plant Tender; Prospective Bidders not Identified," Nucleonics Week, 9 December 1982, Vol. 23, No. 49, Pg. 3; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 9 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

6 December 1982
In a briefing to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Reagan administration officials indicate that Pakistan is continuing its nuclear weapons program. Administration officials inform the Foreign Relations Committee that China is assisting Pakistan to build a nuclear bomb and estimate that Pakistan is about a year away from producing fissile material that could be used to make a bomb.
--Bernard Weinraub, "Zia tells Reagan he won't Build Atomic Weapon," New York Times, 8 December 1982, Section A, Pg. 1, Col. 5, Foreign Desk; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 8 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

7 December 1982
According to a senior U.S. administration official, Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq meets U.S. President Ronald Reagan and provides assurances that Pakistan is not interested in developing nuclear weapons.
--Suzanne F. Green, United Press International, 7 December 1982, Washington News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 7 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

Second Week of December 1982
In an interview, Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq denies the existence of the New Labs reprocessing plant and insists that "we have no reprocessing facility whatsoever. Pakistani scientists are experimenting with how to reprocess one ounce of plutonium as scientists." U.S. analysts, however, believe that the New Labs reprocessing facility is not currently reprocessing plutonium but believe the facility to possess greater capacity. U.S. analysts note that Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmad Khan has indicated to European scientists that the New Labs facility can reprocess about 6kg of plutonium. President Haq also says that the enrichment facility in Kahuta is "a humble, modest program." U.S. sources, however, insist that the Kahuta facility is built to house 10,000 ultracentrifuges. U.S. intelligence sources also point out that the reprocessing and enrichment facilities are handled by the PAEC and the procurement of equipment and construction of nuclear plants is supervised by the Pakistani military.
--Milton R. Benjamin, "India said to Eye Raid on Pakistani A-Plants," Washington Post, 20 December 1982, First Section, A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

10 December 1982
Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq is expected to seek resumption of Canada's nuclear fuel shipments for the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) reactor. President Haq will begin his Canadian visit on December 14. Canadian officials indicate that talks between President Haq and the Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau will include a request from the Pakistani president for nuclear fuel. Canadian officials, however, indicate that Canada is unlikely to accept Pakistan's request due to proliferation concerns. Canada insists on implementing full-scope safeguards as a condition for the renewal of nuclear cooperation and Canadian officials indicate that Canada is unlikely to change its nuclear policy, for the fear of nuclear proliferation, even if Pakistan accepts full-scope safeguards.
--Andrew P. Hutton, United Press International, 10 December 1982, Regional News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

17 December 1982
During his meeting with the Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq raises the issue of nuclear cooperation but does not seek any assurances on the resumption of nuclear cooperation between Canada and Pakistan.
--Andrew P. Hutton, "Canada's Aid to Pakistan without "Strings"," United Press International, 17 December 1982, Regional News; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 17 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

18 December 1982
Director-General of the IAEA Hans Blix states that the existing safeguards at the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) reactor are not sufficient to ensure that diversions are not taking place at the facility. Dr. Blix says "we are not satisfied with the arrangements and we cannot ensure that the diversion is not taking place... At the same time we cannot also say for certain that they were diverting material for manufacturing weapons." The IAEA has been requesting to place an inspection seal on an access hatch that would prevent Pakistan from secretly opening the hatch and diverting nuclear material from the reactor. Pakistan has so far refused to accept the measure.
--"IAEA Criticizes Pakistani Nuclear Safety," United Press International, 19 December 1982, International; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 19 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

19 December 1982
In a news conference, Pakistan's President Zia ul-Haq states that he did not ask Canada for the supply of nuclear fuel.
--"President Zia Discusses his Canadian Visit," BC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 December 1982, Part 3. The Far East, A. International Affairs, 1.General and Western Affairs, FE/7214/A1/1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 21 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

23 December 1982
According to a well-informed source, the French government decides to allow Framatome to bid for the supply of the 900 MW Chashma nuclear reactor. The French government authorizes Framatome to accept the invitation to participate in the bidding process. The deadline for the submission of the bid was December 15. The initial French proposal is expected to only cover the reactor without any financial attachments. The French bidding consortium will be headed by Framatome and will consist of Alsthom-Atlantique and Spie-Batignolles. Certain French officials believe that the current reactor bid will serve to resolve the dispute over the reprocessing plant that France cancelled in 1978. It is not clear whether France will insist on full-scope safeguards for Pakistan as requested by the United States as a condition for the supply of a new reactor. A senior French administration official says that the denial of a nuclear reactor by the nuclear suppliers might force Pakistan to turn to Brazil or South Korea. The French official calls this situation a "worst thing." The French official also professes surprise that the United States is denying peaceful nuclear technology to Pakistan while supplying it with advanced F-16 fighter planes.
--'Framatome can Bid on the," Nucleonics Week, 23 December 1982, Vol. 23, No. 51-52, Pg. 9; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 23 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

December 1982
According to U.S. intelligence sources, Indian military planners have prepared a plan to conduct pre-emptive strikes on Pakistani nuclear installations. U.S. sources indicate that the plan was presented to India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who decided not to pursue the option for concerns over a retaliatory strike by Pakistan on India's nuclear facilities. According to U.S. sources, the completion of the New Labs reprocessing facility raised India's concerns over Pakistan's nuclear program. The military plan called for strikes on Pakistan's enrichment facility at Kahuta and the small New Labs reprocessing plant at Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH). India's Ambassador to the United States K.R. Narayanan rejects the report as a "figment of the imagination." The report is also rejected by a spokesperson for India's foreign ministry Mani Shankar Aiyer. Bilateral talks between India and Pakistan are proceeding and certain U.S. sources believe that India will not launch a preemptive during the talks.
--Milton R. Benjamin, "India said to Eye Raid on Pakistani A-Plants," Washington Post, 20 December 1982, First Section, A1; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 20 December 1982, www.lexis-nexis.com.

1982
Pakistan appoints the Geneva-based International Energy Development Corp. as a consultant to the Pakistani government. The company is tasked with preparing a five year energy plan for Pakistan.
--"While the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission has Postponed the Deadline," Nucleonics Week, 10 November 1983, Vol. 24, No. 45, Pg. 8; in Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe, 10 November 1983, www.lexis-nexis.com.

 

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Nuclear Proliferation and South Asia: Recent Trends
WMD411: Background on Relations Between India and Pakistan
Issue Brief: Seven Years After the Nuclear Tests (2005)
Issue Brief: The AQ Khan Revelations and Subsequent Changes to Pakistani Export Controls (2004)
Issue Brief: Nuclear Watch–Pakistan: The Sorry Affairs of the Islamic Republic (2004)
Issue Brief: Indo-Pakistani Military Standoff: Why It Isn’t Over Yet (2002)
Treaties and Organizations
CRS: Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues (2007)
PSRU: Pakistan, Biological Weapons, and the BTWC (2007)
CRS: Indian and Pakistan Nuclear Weapons (2005)
CNS: Safety of Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal and Installations (2001)
FAS: Pakistan Special Weapons Guide
Pakistan's Instrument of Ratification (Chemical Weapons Convention)
Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 19 August 1992 (New Delhi)
CEIP: AQ Khan Nuclear Chronology (2005)
PBS: Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: Pakistan (2005)
CFR: Pakistan: Controls on Nuclear Technology (2004)



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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.