
In the mid-1970s, Pakistan embarked upon the uranium enrichment route to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. By the mid-1980s, Pakistan had a clandestine uranium enrichment facility; and as early as 1989-1990, the United States concluded that Islamabad had acquired the capability to assemble a first-generation nuclear device. Pakistan is believed to have stockpiled approximately 580-800kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), sufficient amounts to build 30-50 fission bombs. Various estimates put Pakistan's nuclear warheads at between 60-120 weapons.[1] Islamabad conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, shortly after India conducted its own weapon tests and declared itself a nuclear weapon state.
Pakistan is also in the process of expanding its nuclear complex through a new plutonium production reactor and a new chemical separation facility.[1] (In 1998, Pakistan commissioned the Khushab research reactor, which is capable of yielding 10-15kg of weapons-grade plutonium annually.) The construction of its first commercial scale nuclear reprocessing plant will likely increase its weapons-grade plutonium production capability.[3] Thus, Islamabad appears to be expanding and diversifying its nuclear weapons capability through the plutonium route in its quest for secure second-strike capability against India.[4]
Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is centered on a minimum deterrent , and it has repeatedly eschewed a no-first use policy. Its nuclear posture is primarily aimed at deterring a conventional Indian attack.[5] Islamabad has not yet formally issued its nuclear doctrine, althrough there have been attempts in at least one instance by a senior military official to define the threshold of nuclear use.[6]
Islamabad has put in place a command and control system centered around the National Command Authority (NCA), which is the main nuclear decision-making body and the Strategic Plans Division (SPF), which controls the country's nuclear weapons and facilities. The SPD, which acts as the secretariat of the NCA, also oversees the Armed Strategic Force, which consists of the strategic commands of the army, navy, and air force.[7] Reports in 2007 indicated that since 9/11, there has been significant cooperation between Islamabad and Washington on securing Pakistan's nuclear facilities.[8]
According to the United States, China helped Pakistan by providing nuclear-related materials, scientific expertise, and technical assistance. Reports in 2006-2007 stated that China and Pakistan have conducted negotiations on the sale of six nuclear reactors to Islamabad, but as of late 2007, no formal agreement had been announced.[9]
Pakistan is not a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Regarding the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), Pakistan has expressed its opposition because of its insistence that the FMCT cover reduction of existing stocks of fissile materials (to prevent a permanent gap vis-a-vis India), and because of its backing for a verification framework.[10]
Sources: [1] “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2007, pp. 71-74, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/ content/k4q43h2104032426/fulltext.pdf. According to one Pakistani expert, Islamabad now possesses 80-120 warheads, see Thomas E. Ricks, “Calculating the Risks in Pakistan,” The Washington Post, December 2, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article /2007/12/01/AR2007120101618.html. [2] “Pakistan’s Nuclear Forces, 2007.” [3] Shahid-ur-Rehman Khan, “Pakistan Nuclear Reprocessing Plant May Yield Weapons-Grade Plutonium-Kyodo,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, May 7, 2007, Lexis-Nexis. [4] Dean Nelson, “Pakistan Upgrades Nuclear Arsenal,” The Times, July 30, 2006, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ news/world/article1084146.ece. [5] Peter Lavoy, “Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Security and Survivability,” Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, January 2007, pp. 4-5,
http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&
PDFFile=20070121-Lavoy-Pakistan
NuclearPosture&PDFFolder=Essays. [6] See statement by Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, head of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, in “Nuclear Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,” Concise Report of a Visit by Landau Network – Centro Volta, January 2002, pg. 5, http://lxmi.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf. [7] “Pakistan Sets up Tri-Command Nuclear Force: Officials,” Yahoo News Asia, August 9, 2006, http://asia.news.yahoo.com/060809/kyodo/d8jcsvcg0.html. [8] David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, “U.S. Secretly Aids Pakistan in Guarding Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, November 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/washington/
18nuke.html?_r=1&oref=login.
[9] Khaleeq Kiani, “27 pacts signed with China: N-cooperation discussed: Aziz,” Dawn, April 18, 2007, http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/18/top1.htm; “Pak-China technical Level Talks on Nuke Power Sharing Underway,” Press Trust of India, December 21, 2006, Lexis-Nexis; Farhan Bokhari & Jo Johnson, “Chinese Soft-Pedal on Nuclear Aid for Pakistan,” The Financial Times, November 25, 2006. [10] Shireen M. Mazari, “The FMCT Threat,” The News, August 8, 2007, http://thenews.jang.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=67434.
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Updated March 2008 |
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