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Updated September 2009
Nuclear Overview
Introduction
The Soviet nuclear weapons program was initiated during World War II and culminated in its first successful atomic bomb test in 1949. By 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved, Russia inherited approximately 35,000 weapons in its stockpile, down from the Soviet arsenal’s peak of approximately 45,000 warheads in 1986.[1] In addition to this enormous nuclear arsenal, Russia was left with a sophisticated nuclear weapons infrastructure and the largest fissile material stockpile in the world.
Under the provisions of the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT, also known as the Moscow Treaty), the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal had been reduced to approximately 3,909 nuclear warheads as of January 2009.[2] In addition, Russia reportedly has an inventory of as many as 8,150 nuclear warheads awaiting dismantlement and its stockpile size was further uncertain due to lack of an accurate count of tactical nuclear weapons.[3] SORT requires both Moscow and Washington to reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 each by the end of 2012.
As of September 2009, Moscow and Washington were in the process of negotiating a START follow-on agreement. Set to expire on 5 December 2009, START has extensive provisions for reporting and verification of the bilateral nuclear reduction process. SORT, however, lacks comparable transparency and confidence building measures. In an April 2009 statement, U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev "committed … to achieving a nuclear free world" and "agreed to pursue new and verifiable reductions in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing… [START] with a new, legally-binding treaty."[4] Some suggest that the numbers of strategically deployed warheads may be limited to about 1,500 in this new agreement.[5] (For additional information on Arms Control and Treaty Agreements, see section below.)
Russia’s Nuclear Forces
In order to maintain a credible strategic deterrent force, Russian officials have publicly emphasized their intent to continuously modernize all legs of Russia’s nuclear triad—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarines, and bombers. These and other nuclear-weapons related developments have been tracked in the nuclear weapons chronology files since 1993.
This section of the NTI country profiles provides a comprehensive overview of Russia’s nuclear forces. As of 2009, Russia’s strategic rocket forces are slowly deploying the new single-warhead Topol-M ICBM. They are also reportedly set to start fielding the new RS-24 ICBM within the next year. The strategic naval forces have been conducting tests of the new Bulava submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) since 2005. As of 2009, the Borey class nuclear submarine—the platform for Bulava—has yet to start sea trials. Small-scale production of the Tu-160 bomber for the heavy bomber force was restarted in 2004. Modernization of navigation and electronics of the Tu-160 and Tu-95MS long-range bombers is ongoing. During the last few years, the Russian military has increased bomber sorties and submarine patrols.[6] For additional up-to-date information, please, see estimates of deployed and stockpiled warheads, as well as sections on Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, early warning system, and nuclear security.
Russia's president Dmitriy Medvedev is commander-in-chief of the Russian armed forces. The Ministry of Defense oversees military construction projects and defense-oriented research; producing, purchasing, and maintaining military equipment and technology; organizing state orders for nuclear armaments and state monitoring of nuclear and radiation security throughout the entire life cycle of nuclear weapons and military nuclear energy installations. As of mid-2009, Moscow is yet to release an updated version of its military doctrine, which is a document drafted with participation of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and input from other government bodies.[7] Please, see the issue brief by Nikolai Sokov on Russia's Nuclear Doctrine (2004) for additional information.
Comprehensive information on Russia’s nuclear forces is available in archived developments and overview files, compiled from 1993-2004. The archived chronology files and tables include, doctrinal developments, bomber developments, archived ICBM force/SRF general developments, ICBM test launch developments and tables, ICBM deactivation and dismantlement developments, archived SSBN and SLBM developments, SLBM test launches and SSBN exercises and tables, SLBM deactivation and dismantlement chronology, detargeting agreements developments, substrategic (tactical) nuclear weapons status and trends in deployment, developments and tables, strategic C3 and ABM developments, nuclear security developments, and chronology of significant military maneuvers (1999-2004). Access the archives.
Nuclear Arms Control and Treaty Agreements
This section of the Russia country profile provides information on arms control and key nuclear-related treaties and agreements. Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, is a nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The Additional Protocol to Russia's safeguards agreement came into effect in October 2007. As noted above, Moscow and Washington are currently in the process of negotiating a successor agreement to START I. In accordance with the provisions of the SORT agreement, both countries are set to reduce their nuclear forces to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 strategically deployed warheads by 2012.
Moscow has been a signatory to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) since 1996, ratifying the CTBT in 2000. Archived information and detailed chronology developments are also available for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, as well as START II and START III negotiations. The following archived articles are also available on the START process: The Helsinki Summit and U.S.-Russian Arms Control (1997), Current Prospects For START II Ratification and START III Talks (1998), and START II Ratification: There is More Than Meets the Eye (2000).
Additional information on treaty commitments is available in Russia's file (http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/russia.pdf) in NTI’s Inventory.
Russia's Nuclear Complex
Russia has a sprawling nuclear weapons production complex and large stocks of weapons grade fissile material. It is estimated that Russia has between 735 and 1,365 metric tons (t) of weapons grade-equivalent highly enriched uranium (HEU) and between 106 and 156 t of military-use plutonium.[8]
Russia exports nuclear power plants and supplies fuel elements to a range of countries, including China, India, and Iran. In the past decade, Moscow has tightened its nuclear export control system and cracked down on illicit transfers and leakage of technology to these states—a major Western concern. Russia, as the successor of the Soviet Union, is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
Management of facilities in Russia’s nuclear complex is carried out by Rosatom State Corporation (formerly, Minatom). As part of ongoing since 2006 efforts of the Russian government to restructure the nuclear complex, weapons-related infrastructure has been separated from that of the civilian nuclear energy sector. This process is intended to enhance the international competitiveness and transparency of the latter sector.[9] The regulatory agency Rostekhnadzor performs oversight of operation and construction of nuclear-related facilities. Russia’s bicameral legislature and a range of ministries in the Russian government also play roles in various aspects of management and operation of the nuclear complex.
Detailed information on Russia's nuclear facilities is available on the nuclear facilities page. The facilities include nuclear warhead production facilities (research and development facilities, serial warhead production facilities, and testing sites), fissile material production and disposition facilities (civil and military uranium and plutonium production, nuclear fuel fabrication, and disposition of weapons-grade nuclear material ), nuclear research facilities (research reactors, which in some cases use HEU), and nuclear power reactors.
In addition, Russian naval nuclear reactor technology section provides detailed information on naval reactor technology, russian nuclear fleets (Northern and Pacific) and associated R&D and production facilities (map), civilian-Use naval reactors (floating reactors, icebreakers, and service ships), decommissioning and dismantlement, spent fuel and radioactive waste, naval fuel cycle foreign assistance.
Comprehensive information on the nuclear complex is available in the Archives. Access the archives.
Foreign Assistance and Threat Reduction
When the Soviet Union split apart, Russia's vast nuclear complex (its ten closed nuclear cities, especially) was faced with many problems. Under START I, Russia had obligations to destroy many strategic delivery vehicles and securely store or dismantle the resulting surplus nuclear warheads. Further, substantial numbers of nuclear weapons and delivery systems were in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and had to be secured and transported to Russian facilities for dismantlement. In addition, Russia faced the challenge of ensuring the safety and security of weapons and weapons-related materials located at dozens of sites throughout Russia. In the tumultuous political and financial climate of the 1990s, Moscow had difficulties paying salaries at its nuclear facilities, to say nothing of funding security upgrades, scrapping nuclear delivery systems, or undertaking new accounting measures. Thus, foreign assistance was essential to meet Russia’s foreign and domestic commitments.
This section of the database provides detailed information on foreign assistance. The most prominent assistance programs include the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, established by the United States, and the G8 Global Partnership program. This section of the database provides information about foreign assistance to Russia’s nuclear complex, including the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, as well as HEU-LEU agreement and plutonium disposition.
Additional information on foreign assistance and threat reduction is available in Securing the Bomb, commissioned by NTI.
Full Text Documents and Nuclear Legislation
This section is comprised of full descriptions of selected legislation and other documents of relevance to the Russia’s nuclear complex and export control system, as well as the full text of these documents, where available.
Please, also see a comprehensive listing of archived chronologies, articles, and overviews on Russian nuclear issues and policy.
Sources:
[1] For an overview, see Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Global Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-2006," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 62/4, pp. 64-67, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/c4120650912x74k7/fulltext.pdf.
[2] See July 2008 START MoU data, http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/weapons/stockpil.htm.
[3] Robert Norris and Hans Kristensen, "Russian Nuclear Forces, 2009," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May-June 2009, pp. 55-63, http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/h304370t70137734/fulltext.pdf.
[4] Joint Statement by Dmitriy A. Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, and Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms, 1 April 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-Dmitriy-A-Medvedev-and-Barack-Obama.
[5] See discussion in "Next Steps in U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Reductions: The START Follow-On Negotiations and Beyond," Arms Control Association event transcript, 27 April 2009, http://armscontrol.org/node/3632.
[6] U.S. naval intelligence data, as cited in Hans Kristensen, "Russian Strategic Submarine Patrols Rebound," FAS Strategic Security Blog, 17 February 2009, http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2009/02/russia.php.
[7] See Nikolai Sokov, "The Evolving Role of Nuclear Weapons in Russia's Security Policy," in Cristina Hansell and William C. Potter, editors, Engaging China and Russia on Nuclear Disarmament, CNS Occasional Paper 15, April 2009, http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/op15/index.htm; also Russia Nuclear Developments Chronology, Nuclear Threat Initiative, http:/www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Russia/Nuclear/chronology_2006-2008.htm.
[8] International Panel on Fissile Materials, "The Global Fissile Materials Report, 2007," October 2007, http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/gfmr07.pdf.
[9]Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, "Russian Nuclear Industry Reforms: Consolidation and Expansion," CNS research story, 22 May 2007, http://cns.miis.edu/stories/070522.htm.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
