Strategic and Operational Aspects of BW Capabilities

The biological component of South Africa's secret CBW program, Project Coast, was involved in several distinct but interrelated activities: the development and testing of lethal biological agents and their subsequent utilization as assassination weapons, the genetic engineering of certain biological agents, the carrying out of research projects on both African fertility and HIV transmission, and the cultivation and freeze-drying of larger than normal quantities of standard BW agents. Although there was never any large-scale attempt to weaponize such agents for battlefield use, at least two of them were allegedly deployed against segments of the population in neighboring states. All of these activities were undertaken by the apartheid-era regime, and have since been discontinued in conformity with the BTWC.

The most characteristic feature of the South African BW program was undoubtedly the development and utilization of a wide array of toxic agents to assassinate "enemies of the state." There were two key precedents for this. One was the testing of lethal chemical agents on prisoners used as human guinea pigs by the Rhodesian Selous Scouts at their main barracks, and the subsequent use of those agents to contaminate denim clothing sold to nationalist guerrillas by various middlemen. This particular poisoning operation carried out during the Rhodesian civil war resulted in hundreds of deaths. The other was "Operation Dual," a covert program whose purpose was to murder captured guerrillas that were uncooperative and South African military and police personnel that were considered security risks. This operation was initiated in 1979, two years before Project Coast was formally established. Lieutenant-General Fritz Loots, the very first chief of the fledgling Special Forces (SF), is said to have personally authorized the activation of this elimination program, and soon after also supposedly approved of a plan proposed by Johan Theron, a member of the South African Defence Force's (SADF) paramilitary Barnacle unit, whereby the victims would be secretly disposed of by being dropped from aircraft dozens of miles out over the ocean so that their bodies would never be found. After a couple of hair-raising incidents in which Theron had to kill awakening prisoners who were in the process being transported with his bare hands, he asked Basson, then the leader of an elite Special Operations medical unit whose personnel accompanied SF operatives into the field, to provide him with drugs to ensure that the prisoners would not wake up and begin struggling for survival. According to Theron, Basson thereafter supplied him with a "cocktail" consisting of the drugs Tubarine and Scoline, which were normally used to collapse the lungs during surgery but would cause paralysis and death if administered in high doses to living prisoners. Because of the painful nature of such a death, Basson later allegedly provided Theron with the anesthetic Ketamine so that the victims could first be put to sleep. In addition to the widespread use of toxic chemicals, it is likely that particular biological agents were also tested and used to murder certain victims slated for elimination under the auspices of "Dual." For example, former RRL scientist Daan Goosen later testified that in 1983 he had supplied Clostridium perfringens toxin to Basson, who had asked him to provide a biological agent whose effects would be lethal but resemble those of naturally-caused food poisoning.

In the mid-1980s, "Operation Dual" was replaced by a higher-level and more formalized assassination program when the Teen-Rewolusionêre Inligting Taakspan (TREWITS: Counter-Revolutionary Intelligence Task Force) was created. Consisting of representatives from the Security Branch (SB) of the SAP, the Division of Military Intelligence, the SF, and the National Intelligence Service, one of its primary purposes was to "identify human targets for removal" in a series of monthly reports that were forwarded to the State Security Council. During the period it was operating, TREWITS reportedly authorized a total of 82 extra-judicial killings and 7 attempted killings. The primary units responsible for carrying out these "hits" were covert paramilitary units operating under the aegis of either the SF, specifically the Civil Co-Operation Bureau (CCB), the Barnacle unit's successor; or the SB, namely the C[ounterinsurgency]1 unit—later renamed C10—based at Vlakplaas. In popular parlance, such units are known as "death squads."

The biological substances used in these assassination operations were manufactured and tested at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL), the principal South African BW facility. Scientists at RRL, in particular Dr. Mike Odendaal and Dr. James Davies, then prepared freeze-dried stocks of many of these toxic pathogens, including Bacillus anthracis, brucella bacteria, botulinum toxin, Vibrio cholerae, E-coli, HIV-infected blood, and salmonella bacteria. Snake venoms such as mamba toxin were also extracted and stockpiled. There were two types of potential "delivery systems" for these agents. First, Odendaal, Davies, and other RRL laboratory personnel purposely contaminated a considerable variety of foodstuffs and household items with them, such as soft-centered chocolates, lip balm, envelope flaps, deodorant, and cigarettes. According to both testimony and the notorious 1989 "sales list" (TRC document 52), several of these items were later passed on by RRL R&D director André Immelman to members of SADF or SAP covert paramilitary units involved in assassination operations, whose operatives then delivered them to selected targets. After consuming or using them, the targeted individuals typically became very ill or died. Second, beginning in 1987 some of these substances may have also been intended for use with "special applicators," arcane assassination devices designed by bioengineer Jan Lourens and prepared by his assistant Philip Morgan, a former Selous Scout and self-taught armorer, in the QB Lab at Systems Research and Development (SRD). Among these devices were rings, screwdrivers, walking sticks, and umbrellas that had been transformed into weapons by means of the addition of poison compartments and injectors or firing mechanisms for poisoned pellets. Although Basson later claimed that these devices were manufactured so that the SADF could develop defensive measures against them, on more than one occasion assassination plots seem to have been hatched that involved their projected use. The Rhodesians, too, had earlier devised an abortive plan to assassinate nationalist opposition leaders by using a rifle to shoot them with a dum dum bullet into which ricin was inserted.

One of the most worrisome aspects of the South African BW program was the efforts by RRL scientists to genetically engineer various biological agents. Alas, very few details about the specifics of this research have emerged so far, and it is therefore unclear just how many of these agents were actually produced. Such work was apparently carried out primarily by Odendaal, who among other things admitted that he had tried to develop antibiotic-resistant strains of anthrax bacteria. In 1990 certain aspects of this genetic engineering project may have been transferred to another SADF front company, Lifestyle Management, whose directors were three former SAMS Special Operations unit members: Delta G Scientific managing director Philip Mijburgh, clinical psychologist and ex-SRD employee Johnny Koortzen, and Dr. Brian Davey. Ironically, one of the few actual examples of the results of this research did not become evident until long after Project Coast had been terminated. In the summer of 2002 Goosen, who was by then engaged in monitoring BW for South Africa's revamped National Intelligence Agency, was twice asked to provide Coast-related biological materials that had supposedly been destroyed to foreign parties. In the first such instance, he willingly provided a 5ml sample of goat serum used as an anthrax diagnostic agent for livestock and a 2ml sample of freeze-dried E. coli that had been genetically modified with the gene coding for Clostridium perfringens toxin to a shadowy American named Robert A. Zlokie, who was a US intelligence operative. Goosen later admitted that the reason he supplied Zlokie with this latter item was that he wanted to make the Americans, with whom he wished to collaborate, aware of just how sophisticated the genetic engineering potential of Project Coast had been. (After examining these samples, however, officials with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) decided that they were not impressed enough to enter into a collaborative arrangement with Goosen.) It is perhaps worth noting as well that the middleman in this exchange was a right-winger and retired SADF Major-General associated with the CCB named Tai Minnaar, who in 1989 established a private company called Military Technical Services (MTS) that had links with the powerful South African mercenary recruitment agency Executive Outcomes (EO).

Not surprisingly, the covert RRL research projects dealing with fertility and HIV transmission have generated a great deal of controversy since the moment the general public first became aware of their existence. Many outside observers have assumed, as did key RRL scientists such as Goosen and Dr. Schalk van Rensburg, that both of these projects were specifically designed to limit the rapid increase of the black population. Given the existing demographic trends in southern Africa, many Afrikaners feared that if the growth of the native African population could not be curtailed somehow, it would inevitably overwhelm the resources and infrastructure of South Africa, as well as increasingly weaken the control exercised by the beleaguered white minority. In any case, researchers at both RRL and Delta G Scientific worked to develop an anti-fertility vaccine that could be administered orally without the knowledge of the recipient. Although sensationalistic reporters falsely claimed that "race-specific" birth control agents were being developed, in reality this vaccine, which apparently was never produced, would not have been race-specific even though certain parties may have intended to administer it solely to black women.

According to Basson, an AIDS research project had been authorized by Coast's Co-ordinating Management Committee (CMC) as part of a study to determine "whether AIDS alone would allow the SADF to win the war." One of the doctors under his command, Graeme Gibson, was thus instructed to take secret blood samples from members of various guerrilla and military forces in Zimbabwe, Angola, and Mozambique so that their blood could be tested for HIV and the rate of infection could then be extrapolated. Their hope appears to have been that the rapid spread of HIV might seriously erode the numerical strength of hostile African armies and, by extension, slow the growth of the entire black population. In this connection it should be mentioned that American doctor Larry Ford also claimed to have collected blood samples from dead guerrillas in southern Africa. He was also working to develop a vaginal suppository called "Inner Confidence" that he hoped would protect women against HIV infection, a microbicide that he apparently tested on unwitting black prostitutes in southern Africa. Army Surgeon-General Niel Knobel, head of the CMC, seems to have made this possible by helping his friend and contract CBW advisor Ford obtain official approval to use the products made by Ford's company, Biofem, in South Africa. Unfortunately, many central aspects of Coast's AIDS project still remain to be clarified.

In addition, an array of standard biological warfare agents were produced and tested at RRL. These included all of the 45 local strains of anthrax bacteria, Brucella maletensis, all four types of Clostridium botulinum, cholera bacteria, and Yersinia enterocolitica or Y. pestis. Dr. Stiaan Wandrag of RRL later testified that his principal task was to develop CBW antidotes, ostensibly for the protection of VIPs, security force members, and South African agents who might be exposed to CW and BW agents, and that this work was carried out in the basement Compression Lab at RRL. However, in declaring that all research on lethal CBW agents intended for conventional weapons delivery had been concluded by 1986 or 1987, Basson tacitly acknowledged that early on the South Africans may have considered employing biological agents as offensive battlefield or "area denial" weapons. Here too there was a Rhodesian precedent, since members of the Selous Scouts and other special operations units reportedly used cholera bacteria, anthrax bacteria, and other unspecified bacteriological agents to contaminate rivers and reservoirs in rebel-held areas during their civil war. South African intelligence and police personnel were also allegedly given access to secret Selous Scouts bases, and some suspect that they too may have played some role in the development of the Rhodesian CBW program. Given this context, it is perhaps not surprising that the South African security forces were themselves later accused of participating in offensive BW attacks. First, some observers have attributed the so-called "anthrax epizootic" that broke out in various areas of Zimbabwe in 1979 and 1980—prior, it should be noted, to the establishment of Project Coast—to the intentional dissemination of B. anthracis by Rhodesian and/or South African special operations personnel. However, teams of international scientists who subsequently investigated the incident were unable to determine whether this outbreak was natural or man-made. Second, in August of 1989 Basson reportedly instructed Immelman to provide 22 bottles of V. cholerae to Dr. R. F. Botha, at the time a medical coordinator of the CCB. CCB deputy chief Joe Verster then provided four of those bottles to regional commander Pieter Botes, who testified that he directed his subordinates Charlie Krause and Jose Daniels to dump the contents of two of them into the water supply at the Southwest Africa Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) refugee camp outside Windhoek in Namibia. In the end, this operation failed to produce the desired contamination effect because of the high chlorine content of the water. There are no other indications that biological weapons were used by South Africa in offensive actions of this type.

Finally, in addition to producing, researching, and deploying a variety of biological agents, the South Africans made great progress in designing CBW protective equipment and clothing, supposedly for the benefit of VIPs and their own troops. This work was carried out primarily by Jan Lourens and his staff, first at SRD and later at his specialized company Protechnik, where masks, clothing, detectors, and other types of equipment were first tested in the field using actual CBW agents rather than simulants and then, once it was determined that they provided adequate protection, manufactured for both the SADF and certain foreign armies. The quality of this protective equipment ended up being valued so highly that all the parties participating in the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War sought to purchase it for their own forces. In that sense, the specifically defensive aspects of Project Coast and certain other CBW defense-oriented projects can be considered a great success.

In 1990 President F. W. De Klerk prohibited the carrying out of any further work on lethal CBW agents, and in 1993 Project Coast was officially terminated. The stocks of BW agents produced by South Africa were supposedly destroyed in conformity with international agreements, despite the fact that the actual destruction process was never independently verified and there is evidence that some of the substances were removed and retained by Coast scientists. Although several laboratories there continue to produce certain dangerous pathogens for normal industrial, veterinary, and agricultural research, none of these pathogens appear to be intended for deployment as lethal anti-personnel agents. The current government still has access to the type of technical expertise and the sort of sophisticated R&D facilities that would enable it to initiate a new BW program, but there is little reason to suppose that it has any interest in doing so.

Biological Dual-Use: Overview and History

Biotechnology research and development has taken place in South Africa for over 25 years. Since the late 1970s, GM (genetic modification) technology had been worked on in South Africa, although until relatively recently biotechnology remained a tiny focus. South Africa has nonetheless approved four GM crops for commercial release and in 2000 ranked fifth in the world in terms of area planted with transgenic crops (almost 200,000 hectares). Currently, approximately 110 groups from both academic and research institutions are involved in plant biotechnology. The medical/pharmaceutical sector is the most active in biotechnology research, with the majority of R&D activities taking place at educational institutions, as opposed to private research facilities. Current medical projects include the development of treatments for AIDS and tuberculosis. There are also mature industries involved in brewing and food production.

In the past, all sectors of industry were dependent on imported biotechnology; since, as is the case with most developing countries, government resources devoted to indigenous R&D were limited by other exigencies and paled in comparison with those available in First World states. However, the government has recently decided to make biotechnology research and development a priority, a policy outlined in a National Biotechnology Strategy document in August 2001. There are now a variety of funding sources available for biotechnology, including private venture capital firms (such as Chrysalis Biotechnology), along with the recently announced establishment of government-funded Regional Innovation Centers. South Africa's investment in biotechnology companies grew from approximately R100 million in 1995-1997 to an estimated R200 million in 2001. There are also a number of national and international collaborative research programs.

Examples of Technical Prowess

South Africa is the only country in Africa with a P4 (Physical Containment level 4) laboratory, known as the Special Pathogens Unit, at the National Institute for Communicable Diseases[1]. This facility was designed to handle extremely hazardous pathogens. At least one university is planning to build a P3 containment laboratory and the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) runs a specialized containment laboratory for the study of agriculturally relevant organisms as part of its Exotic Diseases Division at the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute, working mainly with Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). South Africa also has the technology to develop and produce vaccines. For example, the Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute has both a vaccine research and production capability and has developed vaccines for the prevention or control of several endemic diseases, including African horsesickness, botulism, anthrax, and FMD. The Institute also maintains an extensive bank of virus strains.

South Africa's research capabilities in the biological sciences include the identification and isolation of commercially important genes, industrial microbe and enzyme improvement strategies, single-cell protein research, as well as biotransformations in the area of materials and chemicals. South Africa also has high-level diagnostic tools available, such as electron microscopy, PCR, RNA sequencing, and monoclonal antibody technology. Kenochem, a South African company, produces anti-caking agents to facilitate the even distribution of fertilizer, a technology that could aid in the production of deliverable BW agents.

In terms of biotechnology equipment, South Africa's large brewing industry ensures experience with fermenters and its research institutes (like most modern biological laboratories) possess such items as lyophilizers, centrifuges[2], and cross-flow microsieve reactors.

Internal Sources of Growth Media and Pathogens

Several dangerous pathogens are endemic to South Africa, and can thus be sourced from the environment with varying degrees of difficulty. Indigenously occurring organisms include Clostridium botulinum, Bacillus anthracis, Yersinia pestis, Congo Crimean Hemorrhagic fever virus, Vibrio cholerae, and Salmonella typhi. South Africa was also the last country to officially destroy its stocks of smallpox virus in December 1983. Since it maintained a biological warfare program at the time, there is at least a slim possibility that not all stocks of the virus were destroyed, although no evidence has ever suggested the continued presence of smallpox in the country.

Unlike the remnants of its chemical weapons program, South Africa's primary biological weapons facility, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, was dismantled when the program came to an end.[3] However, several peripheral Project Coast facilities (mainly educational institutes that were used only partially for BW research) are still operating. Examples are the Pretoria Biomedical Center (formerly the H. A. Grové Laboratory) and the aforementioned Onderstepoort Veterinary Institute (which has divisions such as bacteriology, applied biotechnology and toxicology). While these facilities have only participated in legitimate research since the termination of Project Coast, it can be assumed that they retain the latent capabilities that made them useful for Project Coast's purposes in the first place. Other South African organizations with a strong capability in biotechnology include the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the South African Medical Research Council, the National Institute for Communicable Diseases, and various universities. The CSIR in particular has projects in areas ranging from genomics, proteonomics, and molecular biology to biochemical engineering, biocatalysis, and fermentation technology and also does work (in its Division of Food, Biological and Chemical Technologies) on biotechnology production processes such as brewing, drying and milling.

Significance of Dual-Capable Infrastructure

Although somewhat constrained in the past by a lack of large funding sources and a limited number of scientists, South Africa's small but very active and highly skilled research community, together with years of experience with industrial processes such as fermentation, provide a solid foundation for future growth in the country's biotechnology capability. Recent government and private moves towards increasing support for this sector will enable South Africa to make further advances. The end of Apartheid and the installation of a new political dispensation also enabled more international collaboration. The most important factor in assessing South Africa's dual-use BW capability is the BW R&D precedent set by Project Coast, which succeeded in sophisticated pathogen research and limited production. The above factors all combine to indicate that on a purely technical level, South Africa has the know-how, the equipment, and the raw materials to produce all that would be needed for at least a small-scale BW program. However, under current political conditions there is little or no will to do so—indeed, the present government is vocal and active in its support of nonproliferation efforts.

Key Sources:
[1] Formerly the National Institute for Virology.
[2] One at the University of the Western Cape has a centrifuge, for example, that can handle 6-8 liters per run.
[3] Several former employees of RRL set up a new company called Biocon 2 km from the former RRL location. This company experienced financial troubles and was liquidated in August 2000.

	Updated February 2004