This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.
Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.
During the Persian Gulf War, the United States urges Israel to limit any retaliation to Iraq's missile attacks to the use of ballistic missiles. According to Israeli sources, Israel rejects the US suggestions because the Jericho II missile is not yet operational. The Jericho II does not become operational until after the Gulf War. [Note: However, Jane's Strategic Weapons reports that the Jericho II entered service in 1989.]
—David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," Institute for Science and International Security, May 1994, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir0594.html>.
The US government asks the South African government whether it intends to accept the export controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). These controls require any recipient of nuclear commodities to accept full-scope safeguards, and also require exporters to adopt new controls on the supply of "dual-use" items.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1993/a93/
a93AlbrightHibbs.html>, p. 8.
A UN Secretary General report asserts that South Africa's experience in developing small tactical missiles has given it the infrastructure, skills, and resources required for the initiation and conduct of a long-range rocket or missile program.
—UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, South Africa's Nuclear Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability (New York: United Nations, 1991), p. 51.
Namibia gains its independence.
—Laurent C.W. Kaela, The Question of Namibia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 125.
Review of the South African defense requirements leads to reduction in defense expenditures.
—William Gutteridge, South Africa's Defence and Security into the 21st Century (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth, 1996), p. 3.
Israel launches the second Shavit satellite launch vehicle (SLV) carrying the Ofeq 2 satellite.
—Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems 33, "Offensive Weapons (Unclassified Projects) - Satellite Launch Vehicles, Israel," 14 February 2000, <http://online.janes.com/>.
Maryanne E. Callaghan, head of LCR Capacitors, a Warwick, Rhode Island computer firm, is convicted by a federal jury of conspiring to ship $50 million worth of gyroscopes to South Africa, which is in violation of the US Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. Two other defendants in the case, Frank J. Randazzo and Symone Morris Behrmann, plead guilty. Defendants Guy Perfezou and George Lester Buckingham Talbor have fled and are believed to be in South Africa.
—"Woman Convicted Under Anti-Apartheid Act," Washington Post, 5 April 1990, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
US authorities allege in a Philadelphia court that James Guerin, a former deputy chairman of Ferranti International, a British defense contractor, illegally exported electronic military equipment to South Africa. The sales were part of $1 billion in phony arms contracts that Guerin and others generated over a 12-year period to defraud shareholders, companies, and lenders.
—"Guerin 'Sold Electronics to Pretoria'," Financial Times (London), 17 May 1990, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
In response to a request of resolution 44/113, the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs issues the report South Africa’s Nuclear Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability.
—UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, South Africa’s Nuclear Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability (New York: United Nations, 1991).
US Customs officials charge a Dutch national and an accomplice with buying sophisticated parts for guided missiles intended for sale to South Africa. Customs alleges that York, Ltd. shipped isolators and circulators from the United States to Telecom Industries in South Africa. The company does not have a license to order some military items and falsely told US manufacturers that the equipment was destined for the Netherlands. Warrants are issued for Reginald Van Rossum, a Dutch citizen living in Ocean Ridge, Florida, and his secretary, Beverly Barratt. The two operate the West Palm Beach, Florida company, which exports computer equipment. Barrat later pleads guilty to one count of attempting to ship missile guidance equipment to South Africa, in violation of the US embargo. She is sentenced to house arrest and three years probation after she agrees in a plea bargain to testify against Van Rossum, should his case reach court. US customs agents suspect the Dutch national is living in South Africa.
—"2 Charged in South Africa Deal," Washington Post, 20 September 1990, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; Richard Cole, "Customs Stops Missile System Shipments to Pretoria," AP, 19 September 1990, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; "Florida Secretary Gets House Arrest in Missile Parts Scheme," AP, 1 October 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
South Africa admits conducting a second missile test-flight from an operational site in the Judean Hills but insists that the missiles are booster rockets for a peaceful space program.
—John Pike, "Overberg Test Range OTB Arniston South Africa," 29 May 2000, Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/missile/index.html>; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous Race for Superweapons in a Fragmented World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 455.
The UN General Assembly condemns military collaboration between Israel and South Africa and urges the Security Council to take appropriate measures against Israel for violating the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa.
—United Nations General Assembly, Policies of Apartheid South Africa (New York: UNGA, 1990) <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>, p. 6.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) learns that South Africa has produced over 200kg of weapons-grade enriched uranium. The high cost of production and the size of the stockpile increase suspicion that South Africa had a bomb program as recently as the mid-to-late 1980s. The IAEA encounters problems in verifying the accuracy of South Africa's nuclear inventory and has found significant discrepancies between the amount of highly enriched material South Africa declared and the IAEAs own estimate. [Note: The IAEA's balance calculations for the Z-plant also reveal an apparent discrepancy. Both discrepancies are due to the material accounting system. In September 1993, The IAEA finds it "reasonable to conclude" that the quantity of HEU that could have been produced by the pilot enrichment plant (the Y-plant) in South Africa are consistent with South Africa's initial report to the IAEA.]
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/
issues/1993/a93/a93AlbrightHibbs.html>; International Atomic Energy Agency, "Report on the Completeness of the Inventory of South Africa’s Nuclear Installations and Material," attachment to Gov/2609, 3 September 1992, pp. 4-5.
The African National Congress (ANC) urges the government to fully disclose the extent of South Africa's nuclear program. US officials believe that the South African government is withholding information because it fears that the ANC will interfere with its efforts to sell off its inventory of weapon-grade uranium to the United States. Furthermore, according to a US official, the ANC is bound to view the sale of the weapon-grade stock as a signal that the governments involved in the transactions do not trust a prospective black majority government.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/
issues/1993/a93/a93AlbrightHibbs.html>, p. 1.
An ABC News-Financial Times investigation alleges that the International Signal and Control Company has exported technology critical for several years to the development of long-range missile development to South Africa. The investigation further alleges that missile technology exported to South Africa was in turn sold to Iraq.
—"Financial Times Sales Report," ABC News Nightline, 23 May 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
A third test-firing of South Africa's intermediate-range missile is expected, but never occurs.
—John Pike, "Overberg Test Range OTB Arniston South Africa," 29 May 2000, Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/missile/index.html>.
Phase III: Increasing US Pressure and the End of the Missile and Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV) Programs, May 1991-1993
The US Senate Intelligence Committee launches an investigation into reports that US ballistic missile technology was illegally shipped to South Africa between 1984 and 1988, with the full knowledge of the CIA.
—"Probe Begins into 'Illegal Shipments to S. Africa'," Financial Times (London), 30 May 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
US intelligence officials report that spy satellites have detected South African preparations for another test-flight of "Israel's Jericho II missile."
—"Probe Begins into 'Illegal Shipments to S Africa'," Financial Times (London), 30 May 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
The last of 50,000 Cuban troops leave Angola as part of implementation of the Angola-Namibia peace accords.
—Kenneth Mokoena, ed., South Africa and the United States: The Declassified History (New York: The New Press, 1993), p. 45; "Troops Home," Independent (London), 27 May 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
Senior Israeli Ministry of Defense officials state that Israel is following US policy with respect to South Africa, and stress that even if economic sanctions are relaxed, Israel will continue to enforce restrictions on military links.
—Gerald M. Steinberg, "Israel: Case Study for International Missile Trade and Nonproliferation," in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jenks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 242.
South Africa signs the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) begins inspections of South Africa's nuclear weapon manufacturing facilities to verify the scope and history of the program and its subsequent dismantlement.
—Seth W. Carus, "Israeli Ballistic Missile Developments," Testimony before the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, 15 July 1998, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/pt2_carus2.htm>; Rita M. Byrnes, ed., South Africa: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1997), p. 355.
US President Bush lifts sanctions imposed by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, although an arms embargo and several other measures remain in effect, along with restraints by some state and local governments in the United States.
—Ann Devroy and Helen Dewar, "Citing S. Africa's 'Transformation,' Bush Ends Most Sanctions," Washington Post, 11 July 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
Israel and South Africa conduct joint tests of the Barak naval anti-missile system off the Natal Coast. The Barak 1 missile has four folding clipped-tip delta wings and four folding, moving clipped-tip control fins at the rear. The missile is 2.17m long, has a body diameter of 0.17m, an unfolded wing span of 0.68m, and weighs 98kg. In addition to the control fins, there are thrust deflectors in the boost motor exhaust nozzle to assist in controlling the missile after its vertical launch. The boost-motor section is ejected after the initial boost phase. Guidance is by radar-controlled Command to Line of Sight (CLOS), using Elta STR coherent pulse-Doppler radar, or using an electro-optic tracker in severe ECM conditions. The STR engagement radar operates in the 8 to 40GHz (I/J/K-bands), has elevation coverage of +85 to -25º, and a range of about 20km. The Barak missile warhead weighs 22kg, and is a fragmentation type with an active laser-fusing system that is supported by an altimeter to intercept very low-level targets. The missile has a range of 12km against aircraft targets, and around 5km against sea-skimming anti-ship missiles. A minimum range of 500m is reported. The lightweight system, including radar, fire-control system, and eight missiles in launch canisters, weighs a total of 3,000kg. The fire-control radar can command two separate missiles towards each target, and it is reported that the Barak system can be fully and automatically controlled by the threat evaluation system.
—Gerald M. Steinberg, "Israel: Case Study for International Missile Trade and Nonproliferation," in William C. Potter and Harlan W. Jenks, eds., The International Missile Bazaar: The New Suppliers Network (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), p. 242; Jane's Strategic Weapon Systems 35, "Defensive Weapons, Israel, Barak," 19 January 2001, <http://online.janes.com/>.
A US Federal Register notice announces sanctions against South Africa for importing ballistic missile technology from Israel. Under US law, the president is required to prohibit US exports of aerospace technology to any foreign entity exporting or importing missile technology in contravention of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). President Bush, who is unaware of the impending sanctions, receives a personal call from President de Klerk protesting the sanctions. The Bush administration initially settles on a compromise that would allow US sanctions to be lifted if South Africa limited its rocket activities to development of "peaceful space launch vehicles [SLVs]." However, some US officials oppose this idea because of the technical similarities between a SLV and a ballistic missile. A series of high-level meetings between US and South African officials follows in which US officials argue that South Africa's rocket program is not cost effective and will eventually harm the already shrinking economy. South African officials receive a briefing on the economics of SLVs and other private economic market analyses, which is based on a RAND study. Subsequently, the South African government announces that it will stop subsidizing the project and direct those in charge of the project to determine ways to make it profitable. [Note: After a year of attempting to make the program profitable, in 1993 South Africa announces the abandonment of its SLV program.]
—Henry Sokolski, "Ending South Africa’s Rocket Program: A Nonproliferation Success," Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, Fall 1993, <http://www.wizard.net/~npec/papers/southafrica.htm>; Brian G. Chow, Calvin L. Shipbagh, and Richard H. Buenneke, Jr., "A Comparison of Spin-Offs from Space Launch and Satellite Programs in the Third World Countries," RAND, February 1997.
The Bush administration pressures Israel to impose controls on its export of missile technology. Israel concedes in response to US threats to curtail US Department of Defense contracts with Israeli defense contractors. In return, the United States does not impose sanctions against Israel for violating the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). [Note: The United States is also eager to avoid a confrontation with Israel on the eve of the Middle East peace conference in Madrid.]
—Jackson Diehl, "Israel, Pressed by U.S., Puts Limits on Its Export of Missile Technology," Washington Post, 4 October 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; Simon Tisdall, "US Plays Down Illegal Israeli Missile Sales," Guardian (London), 28 October 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; Stepen Labaton, "Baker Defends Waiver of Sanctions Against Israel on Missiles," New York Times, 28 October 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
Following admission by an ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) spokesman that the state-run corporation had developed a wide range of ground-to-ground, ground-to-air, air-to-ground, and air-to-air missiles, two South African experts, professors Mike Hough of the University of Pretoria and Garth Mine of Stellenbosch University, claim that South Africa also tested two booster rockets.
—"Experts Say South Africa Has Ballistic Missile Capability," AP, 17 October 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
The United States imposes two-year sanctions against ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) after the US State Department determines that it has been engaging in "missile proliferation activities." The sanctions mandate a two-year ban on dealings with the corporation, which is to remain in effect even if general sanctions are lifted. The terms of the sanctions stipulate that licenses for the export of "controlled" items to Armscor are to be denied; no US government contracts may be entered into with the corporation; and no ARMSCOR products may be imported. South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha expresses "regret" over the US decision.
—David Beresford, "US Ban Deals Big Blow to South African Arms Maker: Unspecified Sales of Missiles Cited in Punitive Embargo by Washington," Guardian (London), 17 October 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; "South Africa Regrets New U.S. Arms Sanctions," Xinhua News Agency, 12 October 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; David Hoffman and R. Jeffrey Smith, "President Waives Sanctions for Israel; S. African Firm Cited in Missile Parts Deal," Washington Post, 27 October 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
US intelligence agencies determine that Israel has exported key ballistic missile components to South Africa; however, President Bush decides against applying any punitive measures toward Israel. His decision is motivated by a concern that sanctions against Israel could undermine its position at the forthcoming Middle East peace conference and further aggravate US-Israeli relations.
—"Bush Waived Retaliation Over Israeli Arms Sales," Daily Telegraph, 28 October 1991, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
Israel publicly announces that it will abide by Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines and will no longer cooperate with South Africa on ballistic missile development.
—"CIA Threat," Arms Sales Monitor, 2 January 1992, p. 3.
South Africa appears on a British Department of Trade list of 33 countries considered as sensitive destinations, due to concern over evidence that exports are used in its ballistic missile and nuclear programs.
—"Arms Sanctions for Six African States," Africa Confidential, 10 January 1992, p. 8, cited in Proliferation Issues, 14 February 1992, p. 1.
South African security sources complain that the United States is pressuring South Africa to abandon its satellite launch program because it could be converted to a missile program. The sources further state that the United States extended its embargo against South Africa, which began in 1990 in order to force Israel to halt arms cooperation with South Africa.
—"Security Sources Cited on U.S. Plans," Cape Times, 14 February 1992, cited in FBIS-AFR-92-032, 18 February 1992.
US Ambassador to South Africa William Swing meets with South African Ambassador to the United States Harry Schwartz and ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) representatives to pressure South Africa to scale down its missile manufacturing capacity.
—"Regime, Armscor, U.S. Discuss Arms Sales," Saturday Star (Johannesburg), 15 February 1992, cited in Proliferation Issues, 3 March 1993, p. 1; Gary Mulhollin and Gerard White, "Why Are U.S. Firms Still Able to Aid the Mideast Missile Race?" Washington Post, 16 August 1992, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
In an interview, (Reserve) Major General Yehoshu’a Sagi, chairman of the Subcommitee on Arms Sales of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, denies that Israel illegally transferred Arrow technology to South Africa or Patriot technology to China.
—"Arms Sales Subcommittee Chairman," IDF Radio (Tel Aviv), 15 March 1992, cited in Proliferation Issues, 26 March 1993, pp. 35-37.
The South African cabinet decides to commercialize ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) and establish the Denel group of defense companies. Advena becomes a division of Denel, and subsequently focuses on electronic design and manufacture for medical equipment, powder metallurgy for components and military programs, and pyrotechnical engineering. In total, Denel takes over 23 of 26 ARMSCOR subsidiaries.
—Mark Hibbs, "South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling," Nuclear Fuel, 24 May 1993, p. 12; David Albright, "A Curious Conversion," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1993, <http://bullatomsci.org/issues/1993/j93/j93reports.html>.
US State Department Inspector General Sherman M. Funk charges in a report that Israel has engaged in a "systematic and growing pattern" of reselling sensitive US technology to other countries in violation of US law, and attempted to conceal the illegal exports. The report also notes that the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs failed to notify Congress or senior department officials despite "significant" evidence of illegal violations. The report said the practice began in 1983 and was curbed only after the investigation began.
—David Hoffman, "U.S. Says Israel Resells Technology; State Department Inspector General Reports on Alleged Violations," Washington Post, 2 April 1992, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
A report by the US State Department's Office of Inspector General recommends that export of military technology to Israel be subject to end-use restrictions. In response, Israel indicates that it will try to find non-US substitutes for components of Israeli weapons and technology with export potential. The report further cites a "major recipient of US weapons and technology" for illegal re-exportation of US anti-tank missile military technology to South Africa. [Note: This formulation is used to imply that Israel is the country supplying South Africa with the weapons technology.]
—"Israel Snubs USA in Weapons Export Row," Flight International, 22 April 1992, p. 5.
The US Bureau of Export Administration announces a list of destinations that require a validated export license when an exporter knows that the items will be used in the "design, development, or production of missiles." Twenty-one countries are on the list, including every country in the Middle East and South Africa. The list specifically mentions South Africa’s surface-to-surface missile project and space launch vehicle (SLV). [Note: In an early draft, the list also explicitly mentioned Israel’s Jericho II missile, but lobbying on the part of Israel leads to the removal of the specific reference from the 1992 list.]
—Federal Register, Vol. 57, 16 June 1992, p. 26773; Gary Milhollin and Gerard White, "Why Are U.S. Firms Still Able to Aid the Mideast Missile Race?," Washington Post, 16 August 1992, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
The South African press corps is invited by Somchem to observe the firing of a rocket motor at the controversial Hangklip test range off False Bay scheduled to take place on 10 October 1992. The test is expected to last 50 seconds and forms part of a continuing viability study of opening South Africa to the international commercial space industry.
—"Press to View Rocket Motor Test at Hangklip," SAPA (Johannesburg), October 1992, cited in Proliferation Issues, p. 3.
The US Commerce Department's Bureau of Export Administration and the US State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs announce the resolution of a controversy between the two offices over export licensing requirements to overseas entities under which the State Department has imposed sanctions for missile proliferation. The State Department is given the authority to impose sanctions on missile proliferations under the National Defense Authorization Act of 1990 against non-Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) countries that export goods and technology. The US State Department exercises this authority to level sanctions on five separate occasions against 11 entities in South Africa, as well as China, India, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Syria, and India.
—"BXA Negotiates Missile Controls With State," Export Control News, 27 August 1992, pp. 17-18.
South Africa's newly privatized arms and aerospace corporation expresses its interest in targeting Asian markets for exports of its military equipment. However, Denel's marketing director Ferdi Stark states that Denel would not sell any equipment prohibited by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
—"South Africa Industry Targets Asia," Defense News, 29 September 1992, pp. 1, 34.
An unnamed official in the Taiwan Defense Ministry alleges that China is interested in purchasing missile guidance technology from South Africa. The source reports that South Africa has already sold China parts for long-range artillery.
—"S. Africa Said to Sell China Arms Technology," Washington Times, 27 October 1992, p. A2.
South Africa marks the beginning of "Space Week" with a successful test-firing of a solid-fuel launch system manufactured by Somchem. South African Public Enterprises Minister Dawie de Villiers remarks that there is international interest in cooperation with South Africa’s space program although he does not mention specific firms or countries. The divisional general manager for Somchem, Jakob Dekker, reports that the motor has a 50-ton static thrust and a "500kg payload."
—"Somchem's Rocket Launcher, Test Described," Star (Johannesburg), 16 October 1992, p. 11, cited in Proliferation Issues, 18 December 1992, p. 1; "Foreign Interest in South African Space Project," Reuters, 12 October 1992, cited in Executive News Service, 13 October 1992.
The South African government announces that it intends to promulgate a bill prohibiting development of weapons of mass destruction in South Africa. An inter-departmental level committee is appointed to draft the bill, which is expected to be deliberated in parliament in 1993.
—"Restricting Weapons of Mass Destruction Planned," Engineering News (Johannesburg), 24 October 1992, cited in Proliferation Issues, 24 November 1992, p. 3.
The Russian Scientific and Technological Center reportedly offers to launch nine South African satellites into space, using a redundant SS-20 missile. The deal is made public by South Africa's Foundation representative and the chief Russian designer of the SS-20 missile.
—Brian Pottinger and C. Perkins, "Russian Offers To Launch Satellites Considered," Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 27 December 1992.
A classified US General Accounting Office (GAO) report concludes that the United States should "heighten" its concern over the possible misuse of Arrow anti-ballistic missile technology by Israel. The Arrow project is largely funded by the United States. The GAO study cites recent US government reports that conclude that Israel may still be selling weapons technology to unidentified third countries. [Note: The unnamed countries are most likely China and South Africa.] The report also cites US concerns about possible diversion of Arrow technology to Israel’s ballistic missile programs. When questioned about the concerns raised in the report, Israeli officials in Tel Aviv and Washington say that in the past year they have given US authorities "appropriate guarantees" that sensitive US technology would not be misused. Former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Arens, a strong advocate of the Arrow program, states that the concerns raised in the GAO report were baseless and that the allegations are being made "to muddy the waters of the US-Israel relationship."
—Edward T. Pound and David Makovsky, "A Missile Under Fire," U.S. News & World Report, 28 July 1993, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
An article in the Russian newspaper Rossiisskya Gazetta denies Western press reports alleging that Russia would like to sell South Africa SS-20 missiles, which are due for destruction under the Soviet-American Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. The African National Congress (ANC) is critical of the offer and alleges that attempts are being made to arrange formal talks between Denel and the Russian space agency on the agreement for the delivery of Russian SS-20 intermediate-range missiles. The proposal allegedly includes the possible launch from the area of Murmansk or temporary launch facilities in South Africa.
—Seri Demidov, "SS-20 and SS-25 Missiles Will Not Fly to South Africa But Moscow is Prepared to Cooperate with Various Nations on the Space Market," Russian Press Digest, 11 February 1993, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
The US State Department expresses concern regarding the South African missile program, and urges South African officials to reconsider their commercial space industry program and the sale of South African missile technology to countries that have nuclear weapons but lack missile technology.
—Greg Myers, "South Africa's Rockets Now Come Under Scrutiny," AP, 26 March 1993, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; SABC TV 1 Network (Johannesburg), "Waldo Stumpf, Pik Botha Interviewed," cited in Nonproliferation Issues, 29 March 1993, pp. 5-8.
In a speech before the South African parliament, President F.W. de Klerk announces that South Africa had a nuclear weapons program from "as early as 1974" until 1990, during which time it constructed six of seven planned nuclear devices. According to De Klerk, the devices constituted a deterrent and South Africa never intended to use them offensively. South Africa's strategy was that "if the situation in southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously," the government would confidentially indicate its deterrent capability to one or more of the major powers—such as the United States—in order to persuade them to intervene. De Klerk states that all of South Africa's fissile nuclear material has been accounted for, and all hardware and design information has been destroyed. De Klerk declares that South Africa has never conducted "a clandestine nuclear test," nor has it obtained nuclear weapons materials or technology from another country. He further notes that in the late 1980s, South Africa was ready to test a medium-range missile capable of launching satellites. [Note: However, President de Klerk does not admit to any link between the nuclear and missile programs.]
—"Speech by President de Klerk to Joint Session of Parliament on 24 March 1993 Regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and South Africa's Nuclear Capability," in Kenneth Mokoena, ed., South Africa and the United States: The Declassified History (New York: The New Press, 1993), pp. 170-176; F.W. de Klerk, The Last Trek--A New Beginning (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), pp. 66, 273.
Following President F.W. de Klerk's public acknowledgment of South Africa's nuclear weapons program, Waldo Stumpf, Chief Executive Officer of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), admits that the government did not reveal its nuclear arsenal earlier because it feared that doing so could have led to confrontational inspections similar to those occurring in Iraq. He further claims that the bombs were dismantled starting in February 1992.
—Davis Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, <http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/1994/ja94/ja94Albright.html>.
The Sunday Times (London) reports that South Africa reached a $2 billion secret deal with China in the 1980s for access to China’s long-range missile technology, allowing it "to develop the capability of launching ballistic nuclear weapons." According to South African military sources involved in negotiating the accord, the purpose was to have the ability to hit targets more than 2,000km from Pretoria, such as Luanda, the Angolan capital. South Africa also sought its own satellite to monitor movement of Cuban and other hostile forces in southern Africa. The accord was scrapped in 1989 after President de Klerk came to power. South African Consul-General in Hong Kong, Michael Farr, denies the report saying, "At no time did South Africa acquire nuclear weapons technology or materials from another country, nor has it provided any to any other country or cooperated with another country in this regard."
—Richard Ellis, "Secret Deal with China Extended Range of Nuclear Firepower," Sunday Times, 28 March 1993, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; "S. Africa Denies Secret Missile Deal With Peking," Central News Agency (Taiwan), 5 April 1993, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
A report published in Jane's Defense Weekly details the pressure that South Africa was under from the United States and Israel to ensure that its nuclear capacity and its space program did not fall into the hands of an African National Congress (ANC) government. [Note: The pressure stems from fear that the ANC would share technology with countries such as Libya, Cuba, and various Islamic revolutionary and fundamentalist Middle East states, which were traditionally supporters of the ANC.]
—Heitman Romer, "South Africa Built 6 Nuclear Weapons," Jane’s Defense Weekly, 10 April 1993, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>, p. 14.
Phase IV: Legacies of SLV and Missile Programs, 1993-present
Under US pressure, South Africa agrees to refrain from manufacturing long-range missiles and to dismantle its capability to produce large space rockets. In return, South Africa is given access to military and high-tech markets of the industrialized nations. The RSA-3 and RSA-4 space launch vehicle (SLV) programs are cancelled. Prime contractor Houwteq dismantles its existing RSA rocket components and retrieves and sequesters technical data from its subcontractors. Propellant manufacturer Somchem eliminates RSA solid propellants and rocket casings that remain in stock. Denel fills in its large engine casting pits at Somerset West and demolishes its large-scale X-ray inspection equipment. The Hangklip static motor test facility at Rooi Els is converted into a nature reserve.
South African President F.W. de Klerk issues a statement announcing South Africa's termination of its SLV program, the result of an investigation into the commercial viability of the South African commercial space industry by Denel. Foreign Minister Roelof Botha refuses to divulge the total amount spent on the project and claims that Denel's missile test site at Hangklip could be offered to foreign weapons manufacturers. Foreign Minister Pik Botha states that the decision has been made for commercial reasons. However, "Western diplomats" say heavy pressure from the United States was the deciding factor. Washington does not want the technology to fall under the control of a future African National Congress (ANC) government. A Western diplomatic source says, "The bottom line is that the ANC has historically maintained close friendships with countries such as Libya, Cuba, and various Islamic revolutionary and fundamentalist Middle East states…[t]hese are regarded by Washington as unstable sponsors of terrorism who must not get access to South African missile technology." The envoys says South Africa was only about 12 months away from perfecting a rocket capable of propelling nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads more than 1,200 miles.
—Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, "Space Industry in South Africa," 30 June 1993; "South Africa abandons Independent Program," Reuters, 30 June 1993; "South Africa to abandon missile launching programme," Agence France Presse, 30 June 1993, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; Encyclopedia Astronautica, "Overberg," [undated], <http://www.astronautix.com/sites/overberg.htm>; "Pretoria Gives Up Nukes and Missiles," Risk Report, January 1996, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; Fred Bridgland, "S Africa Scraps Missile Plan After US Pressure," Daily Telegraph, 1 July 1993, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
South Africa proclaims the Act on the Control of Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The legislation creates the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation (NPC) of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is charged with export control authority for all nuclear dual-use items. The Act makes any involvement by South African citizens in the development of nuclear, biological, chemical weapons, or ballistic missile systems to deliver such weapons, a criminal offense.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Non-Proliferation," Security Dialogue, 1993, 24(4), p. 458.
A spokesman representing 16 South African scientists claims that between 1989 and 1992, 200 South Africans secretly visited Israel and worked on a missile program.
—"Nuclear Scientists Threaten to Reveal Secret Arms Program: Blackmail Admitted," Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 27 March 1994, <http://lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
The US State Department provides financial support to the government of South Africa for the destruction of two critical components of their Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I ballistic missile delivery systems. This involves the destruction of rocket motor casting pits at the Somchen production facility by cutting out steel components and sealing the pits with concrete.
—US Department of State, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, "Destruction of Rooi-Els Rocket Motor Test Facility," 1 January 1994, <http://www.ndf.org/html/projects/002.html>.
The South African Supreme Court grants an injunction preventing scientists from making disclosures about their involvement with South Africa's nuclear and missile programs. The order is granted to ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) after 16 South African nuclear scientists threaten to go public with weapons secrets in an attempt to win a $1 million in unemployment benefits. The court acts after ARMSCOR testifies that revelations from the scientists could jeopardize negotiations with the US for South Africa's admission to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). [Note: This interdiction could also indicate that South Africa seeks to cover up its nuclear- and missile-related activities, and that allowing the scientists to go public would reveal the full extent of foreign cooperation with these programs.]
—David Beresford, "Nuclear Cover-Up Confirmed," Guardian (London), 30 March 1994, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; Roy E. Horton III, "Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience," USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper #27, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp27.htm>.
South African Government Notice No. R88, issued by the Department of Defence, introduces licensing requirements for all items that fall within the limits of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
—Peter Batchelor and Susan Willett, Disarmament and Defence: Industrial Adjustment in South Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 126.
South Africa and the United States sign a bilateral agreement by which South Africa terminates its missile development program and pledges to adhere to the export guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The agreement includes provisions that allow South Africa to import temporary space-launch vehicles for satellite launches, when it is agreed that such activities will not contribute to missile proliferation.
—US State Department, "U.S., South Africa Sign Missile Non-Proliferation Pact," 4 October 1994, Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/news/safrica/74459525-74463291.htm>.
The US Department of State commits $500,000 to assist the government of South Africa in the destruction of the buildings at the Rooi-Els rocket motor static facility. The funds are to be used for the complete removal of structures.
—US Department of State, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund, "Destruction of Rooi-Els Rocket Motor Test Facility," 16 November 1994, <http://www.ndf.org/html/projects/002.html>.
The South African government signals its intentions to adhere to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) export guidelines and to terminate South Africa's space launch program.
—Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "South Africa Becomes a Member of the MTCR," 14 September 1995, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
According to Overberg test range division general manager Jan Malan, the test facility is now focusing on the support of aircraft and tactical missile test programs, with a particular concentration on "longer range systems."
—"Secret Range Conducts Stealth, Foreign Tests," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 July 1995, pp. 5.
South Africa is accepted as a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
—SA Communication Service, "South Africa Becomes a Member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)," 14 September 1995, <http://www.polity.org.za/>.
A South African government white paper declares "South Africa does not now, and will not in the future, have aggressive intentions towards any state. It is not confronted by an immediate conventional military threat, and does not anticipate external military aggression in the short- to medium-term (+/- 5 years)."
—Government of South Africa, "Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa," May 1996, <http://www.gov.za/whitepaper/1996/defencwp.htm>.
South Africa signs the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). South Africa is one of 44 countries that must ratify the CTBT for it to take legal force, and South Africa will host five monitoring stations established to verify the treaty.
—Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization, [undated], "State Information: South Africa," <http://www.ctbto.org/>; "Status of the 44 States Whose Ratification Is Required for the Treaty to Enter Into Force (Article XIV)," <http://www.ctbto.org/>.
Denel, ARMSCOR's (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) engineering arm, negotiates to revive the curtailed space program by courting international partners. Denel officials report that they are in the closing stage of a joint venture deal with a major international satellite group that wants to use Denel's aerospace facility.
—"South Africa-New Life for Local Space Programme," Cape Business News, September 1997, <http://www.cbn.co.za/archive/97-sep/cbnro.htm>.
ARMSCOR (Armaments Corporation of South Africa) pleads "no contest" in US District Court in Philadelphia, PA, to charges of violating the US arms embargo against South Africa during the apartheid era. The firm is charged with working with the Philadelphia firm ISC to smuggle restricted commodities and technology made in the United States to South Africa between 1978 and 1989. Armscor and a subsidiary are fined $1 million and $500,000, respectively.
—"South African Firms Fined for 1980s Arms Smuggling," Washington Post, 28 February 1997, <http://www.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.
South Africa ratifies the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
—Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization, "State Information: South Africa," [undated], <http://www.ctbto.org/>.
Denel Group (Pty) seeks a joint venture partner to develop an air-launched stand off cruise missile, designated Torgos. The weapon allegedly evolved from the Raptor series of glide bombs. The technology and conceptual framework is based on MUPSOW (Multi-Purpose Stand off weapon) advanced technology program. [Note: Glide bombs can be used for attacks on conventional buildings, air-defense weapons, aircraft, or radar sites. Over the past 40 years, glide bombs have undergone numerous modifications and one of the most recent models, the GBU-15, was operational during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War.]
—"South Africa Seeks a Partner to Develop Cruise Missile," Jane’s Missiles & Rockets, Air-to-Surface Section, Vol. 3, No. 12, 1 December 1999; "Glide Bombs Modified to Hit Through Clouds," [undated], <http://www.aeronautics.ru/nws001/awst003.htm>.
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Updated April 2005 |
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