This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1979
The South African government decides to reorganize its weapons program. It assigns Armscor with the tasks of designing and building additional gun-type devices. The AEB is tasked with providing HEU and expertise in theoretical and neutron physics. The principal components of the Armscor nuclear weapons program include: development and production of deliverable gun-type devices; studies of implosion and thermonuclear technology; research and development on production and recovery of plutonium and tritium; and separation of lithium-6 for tritium production, for possible use in nuclear weapons with boosted yield.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 5; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa." IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 5, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull371/
baeckmann.html>.

1979
South Africa is barred from participating in the IAEA General Conference held in India, in accordance with a resolution urging South Africa to sign the NPT and submit its nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 5.

July 1979
An "Action Committee" created by Botha to develop plans for the production of nuclear devices recommends production of a total of seven nuclear weapons.
—Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 9.

August 1979
The Y-plant is shut down "due to a massive catalytic in-process gas reaction between the uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and the hydrogen carrier." When the thermodynamically unstable UF6 and hydrogen gas mixture is contaminated by certain impurities, it reacts to form uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) and hydrofluoric acid. The "catalytic impurities" are later identified and removed from the process. The Y-plant resumes operations eight months later.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 11.

22 September 1979
A US Vela surveillance satellite detects a "brief, intense, double flash of light near the southern tip of Africa." Due to its characteristics, US officials estimate that the flash could have resulted from the test of a nuclear device with a yield of 2 to 4 kilotons. South Africa emerges "as the prime suspect," but the South African government denies that it has conducted a nuclear test. Subsequently, noting that South Africa did not supply a complete nuclear device with HEU until November 1979, AEC head Waldo Stumpf said that "this should put to rest speculations as to whether South Africa was responsible for the 'double flash' over the South Atlantic Ocean on 22 September 1979. There are also rumors that Israel conducted a nuclear test, either alone or in conjunction with South Africa. US President Jimmy Carter assembles a panel of non-governmental scientists to determine whether the flash registered by the Vela was the result of a nuclear explosion.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Nonproliferation," Security Dialogue 4 (1993): 458. David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1997, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1997/nd97/nd97albright.html>.

26 October 1979
J.W.L. De Villiers, president of the Atomic Energy Board (AEB), flatly denies South African involvement in the suspected nuclear event while Foreign Minister Pik Botha refuses to deny South Africa's involvement, simply stating that he knew nothing of the event. The US State Department issues guidance to diplomatic posts worldwide on reaction to press reports of a possible low-yield nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic. The memorandum states that if diplomatic charges d'affaires feel it prudent, they may inform the host government of the incident. The memorandum emphasizes "that evidence remains ambiguous and the US government continues to investigate whether an event has taken place."

As information begins to circulate about the crash, the US State Department issues additional guidance to embassies on answering press questions regarding an alleged cover-up of an intelligence failure, failure to inform congress of the nuclear event in a timely manner, status of efforts to get South Africa to join the NPT, and possible sanctions if South Africa is responsible for the event. US policy is to not respond to any of these questions until conclusive evidence of a South African nuclear test is found.
—US Department of State, "Guidance on Suspected Nuclear Event," 26 October 1979, confidential memorandum declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>; US Embassy in South Africa, "South Africa: Suspected Nuclear Event," 26 October 1979, confidential memorandum declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>; US Department of State, "Guidance on Suspected Nuclear Event," 26 October 1979, unclassified memorandum released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

28-31 October 1979
The South African press speculates that the nuclear event could have been caused by an accident aboard a Soviet Echo II class nuclear submarine, known to have been in the area at the time of the event. South Africa's Sunday Times also speculates that US accusations of a nuclear test could be strong-arm tactics to pressure South Africa into signing the NPT or to derail South Africa's uranium enrichment program in order to maintain a US monopoly on lucrative enrichment contracts.

The US Embassy in Mozambique addresses fears by Mozambican Foreign Minister Chissano of possible radiation effects from the purported nuclear event. The United States assures the foreign minister that no radiation has been measured and that no health hazard exists.
—US Embassy in South Africa, "Suspected Nuclear Event: South African Press Speculation," 28 October 1979, unclassified memorandum released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>; US Embassy in South Africa, "Suspected Nuclear Event: Editorial in South Africa's Sunday Times," 29 October 1979, unclassified memorandum released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>; US Embassy in Mozambique, "Mozambican Reaction to Suspected Nuclear Event," 29 October 1979, confidential memorandum declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

November 1979
The Y-plant produces sufficient HEU to provide 55kg of 80 percent enriched U235 for use with the AEB's second nuclear device, which had been built in 1978. The AEB assembles the device to ensure that "everything fits properly." The AEB device is a "non-deliverable demonstration device," designed for use in an underground nuclear test that would prove South Africa's nuclear weapons capability.
—Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, 10 May 1993, pp. 4-5; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 5; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), pp. 11-12; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa." IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 6, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull371/
baeckmann.html>.

November 1979
A report issued by South Africa's AEB details a monitoring program designed to detect airborne radioactive material. The Board asserts that data analyzed up to 22 October 1979 shows no trace of fresh fission products.
—US Embassy in South Africa, "Suspected Nuclear Event: South Africa Says Local Tests Show No Trace of Fresh Fission Products," 1 November 1979, confidential memorandum declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

December 1979
The CIA issues a report titled "The 22 September 1979 Event." The report assumes that a nuclear explosion of approximately 3 kilotons had taken place on 22 September and attempts to identify which country or countries may have been responsible. The report examines the possibilities of a Soviet, South African, Israeli, or a joint South African/Israeli test. The report concludes that South Africa is the most likely candidate to have performed such a test, citing evidence of security measures imposed during the days leading up to 22 September. Such measures include closure of Simonstown harbor and naval base for the period of 17-23 September for defense exercises (the closure could have been used to mask sensitive loading and unloading operations); placing the naval base at Saldanha Bay on alert for the period of 21-25 September; and the fact that the chief of South Africa's Defense Force was reportedly touring South America, but this could have been a cover story designed to allow his observation of the test.
—US Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "The 22 September 1979 Event," December 1979, classified interagency intelligence memorandum, partially declassified and released 10 July 1990, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

Late 1970s
South Africa conducts a test of a gun-type device at Building 5000 at Pelindaba. "For a brief moment, the HEU (goes) critical, providing confidence that the device would work as predicted by theoretical calculations." After this first test, the device is never again loaded with HEU.
—David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, pp. 7-8, <htpp://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir-594.html>.

January 1980
The CIA issues a classified intelligence memorandum detailing possible South African nuclear policy options, which include maintaining the nuclear weapons program at current levels, scaling back weapons development, or advancing the program. The memorandum concludes that further advancement is in the interest of the South African government, and that the program must remain covert in order to avoid sanctions against its commercial nuclear program. Statements by South African government officials regarding the possible nuclear event of 22 September and the covert nature of the event are consistent with South Africa's purposefully ambiguous policy towards nuclear weapons development.
—US Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence. "South Africa: Defense Strategy in an Increasingly Hostile World," January 1980, classified interagency intelligence memorandum, partially declassified and released 10 July 1990, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

Early 1980s
South Africa begins research on Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (AVLIS) for uranium enrichment. Preliminary work focuses on copper-laser and excimer-pumped dye laser systems.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Section 10; South Africa," Second Tier Nuclear Nations: Laser Isotope Separation Programs Technical Citations and Comments, unpublished paper, January 1996.

1980s
Armscor's nuclear assembly group places strong emphasis on weapons certification and qualification. A unique feature of Armscor's weapon design is the capability to mate air-deliverable warheads to ballistic missiles. South Africa is able to mount its limited nuclear stockpile on either aircraft or ballistic missiles.
—Roy E. Horton III, "Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience," USAF Institute for National Security Studies, Occasional Paper #27, <http://www.usafa.af.mil/inss/ocp27.htm>.

1980
In compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978, the Carter administration formally terminates US nuclear reactor and fuel exports to South Africa. The United States had suspended shipments of nuclear fuel to South Africa in 1975.
—Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1987-1988 (Cambridge: Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 290, 432.

1980
South Africa completes construction of a laboratory designed for handling tritium.
—Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa," IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 6, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull371/
baeckmann.html>.

1980
Two German firms, Neue Technologien GmbH and Physikalisch-Technische Beratung, export an ultrasound device to South Africa that is used in the fuel fabrication process.
—Mark Hibbs, "Germany May Have Approved Exports Alleged by Prosecutor to be Illegal" NuclearFuel, 9 January 1989, p. 2.

1980
Construction begins on Armscor's Kentron Circle facility, which later becomes Advena. The facility is located near Pretoria.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Limited Nuclear Deterrent Programme and the Dismantling thereof Prior to South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," press conference, Washington, DC, 23 July 1993.

February 1980
The US Executive Office of Science and Technology Policy requests that the Naval Research Laboratory undertake a scientific study (the Presidential Panel Review) to determine the source of the light signal detected by the Vela satellite on 22 September 1979.
—John Marcum, 31 January 1980, memorandum from US Executive Office of Science and Technology Policy, declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com>; Alan Berman, 1 February 1980, memorandum from US Naval Research Laboratory, declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

2 February 1980
The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) tells the US Congress that South African naval vessels were conducting military exercises in the South Atlantic at the time of the Vela event on 22 September 1979.
— US Department of State, "Press Report Re: Suspected Nuclear Incident," 2 February 1980, classified cable declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

7 February 1980
The Presidential Panel Review of the South Atlantic Event finds insufficient evidence to support a definite correlation between the light signal of the Vela Event and a nuclear explosion. "There were ambiguities in interpretation of this disturbance, and the information was not persuasive at this time as corroborative evidence for a nuclear event." The Presidential Panel Review hopes to clarify the Vela event with more detailed statistical analyses of previous signals and a thorough investigation of meteorological data.
—US Department of State, "Pres. Panel Review of South Atlantic Event," 7 February 1980, confidential cable declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

11 February 1980
Producers of the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) film "Hot Shells," which reports on the alleged Space Research Corporation (SRC) smuggling of artillery shells to South Africa, testify before the UN Special Committee against Apartheid. They indicate that the US Department of State, Commerce, and Treasury as well as the US CIA and government officials from Antigua, Barbados, Canada, and the United Kingdom were aware of the illegal arms shipments by SRC. One of the producers alleges a US Department of Defense role in "shipping 53,000 rough steel forgings from artillery shells to SRC without an export license." He also alleges that the Vela event may have been a test of nuclear warheads to fit the 155 mm gun system from the SRC.
— US Mission to the U.N., "South Africa Arms Embargo: Space Research Case: Nuclear Matters," 14 February 1980, confidential cable declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

25-29 February 1980
The UN Expert Group on South Africa's Nuclear Capability convenes to discuss South Africa's nuclear plans and capabilities. Two US specialists, Edward Wonder of International Energy Associates, Ltd. and George Questor of Cornell University, speak about South Africa's nuclear facilities and capacity. Questor warns the Expert Group that "the press had been more alarmist than necessary" and concludes that the international community should refrain from premature accusations in regards to South Africa's nuclear weapons capacity.
— US Mission to the U.N., "Expert Group on South Africa's Nuclear Capability Hold Initial Session," 4 March 1980, classified cable declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

27 February 1980
An internal memorandum between scientists at the US Naval Research Laboratory discuss data to confirm whether or not South Africa conducted nuclear weapon tests on 22 September 1979. One scientist suggests that they expand upon the following data: relative position of the solar (earth-sun-moon) systems at the time of the Vela signal, ionosonde records, digital seismic information, and free atmospheric internal gravity waves (AGW) calculations.
— US Department of the Navy, "Progress Report on Project SEARCH," 27 February 1980, unclassified memorandum, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

1 March 1980
J.W.L De Villers, president of the South African Atomic Energy Board, asserts on a national radio program that South Africa is not developing nuclear arms as a by-product of its nuclear energy program. He also adds that "regular inspections would be made of the Koeberg plant to see that none of the nuclear material was diverted for military purposes."
—US Consulate General in Cape Town, "South Africa Nuclear Policy," 1 March 1980, classified cable declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

13 June 1980
The Presidential Panel Review of the Vela event in the South Atlantic concludes that the lack of corroborative evidence that a nuclear explosion caused the light signal on 22 September leads them to consider that a micro-meteorite impact on the satellite could have caused the signal.
—US Department of State, "Press Panel Review of South Atlantic Event," 13 June 1980, secret cable declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

Mid-1980
The US panel of scientists assembled by President Carter releases its public report on the double flash detected by the Vela satellite in 1979. The panel concludes that the "signal was probably not from a nuclear explosion," but it does not "rule out the possibility." The CIA, the Naval Research Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Defense Intelligence Agency contest the panel's conclusions, saying they believe that the data indicates a nuclear explosion.
—David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1997, <http://bullatomsci.org/issues/1997/nd97/nd97albright.html>.

Early 1980s
AEC closes Building 5000, which had been used for conducting the criticality experiment.
—David Albright, "Slow but Steady," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July-August 1993, p. 5.

10 September 1980
The Soviet newspaper Pravda alleges that the United States, United Kingdom, Federal Republic of Germany, and France assisted South Africa's efforts to build an "atomic bomb of the racists."
— US Embassy in the Soviet Union, "Soviet Press Again Attacks South African Nuclear Activities," 10 September 1980, classified cable declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

3 November 1980
The director of research at the US Naval Research Laboratory informs the President's senior policy advisor for Technology and Arms Control that a sample of sheep thyroid collected from Australia between late October and early November 1979 revealed high levels of radioactive materials that also correlates with data from meteorological research on precipitation, making it likely that the Vela event observed in September 1979 is related to a nuclear weapon test.
—US Department of Navy, "Evidence of the Possible Detection of Fission Products Related to Vela Event of 22 September 1979," 3 November 1980, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

5 December 1980
Israel, South Africa, and Taiwan are reported to have reached an agreement to start collaboration on the joint production of strategic cruise missiles and small unmanned jets capable of delivering nuclear warheads. US intelligence sources are aware of the nuclear collaboration and report that South Africa and Taiwan are seeking to keep their cruise missile plans secret. Information on the joint collaboration remains restricted to the national security community.
—"3 Nations to Begin Cruise Missile Project," Washington Post, 5 December 1980, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.

1981
The Elprod fuel fabrication facility comes on-line, and produces sufficient fuel to supply the Safari-1 reactor.
—J. Goldblat, ed., Nonproliferation: The Why and the Wherefore (Philadelphia, PA: Taylor and Francis, 1985), p. 315; in Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1987-1988 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1988), p. 303.

1981
Armscor completes construction of two buildings at the Kentron Circle facility. The main building is for designing, manufacturing, and storing gun-type nuclear weapons, while the other is dedicated to conducting environmental tests. The environmental testing installation involves "testing the reliability of the device under real-world conditions." This testing service is important because the nuclear weapons are expected to be reliable without requiring full-scale nuclear testing.
—David Albright "A Curious Conversion," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1993, <http://bullatomsci.org/issues/1993/j93/j93reports.html>, p. 8; David Albright, "Slow but Steady," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, July-August 1993, p. 5.

1981
South Africa approves a project sited at Gourquia to develop commercial pressurized water reactor (PWR) technology, and for the possible future production of tritium and plutonium.
—Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa." IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 45.

April 1981
One day prior to South African general elections, the Minister of Mines and Energy discloses that the AEB produced 45 percent enriched uranium fuel elements that will allow the Safari-1 research reactor to continue operating at 5MW.
—J.D.L. Moore, "The Development of South Africa's Nuclear Capability," in South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 98-99; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 37.

3 April 1981
The US Department of State issues a set of talking points stating that the United States values resuming nuclear cooperation with South Africa and will provide fuel for the Koeburg reactors if South Africa complies with alternative interim supply arrangements from France, as detailed in Paris on 30 March 1981. The State Department expresses concern regarding South Africa's reluctance to join the NPT and the government's desire to work directly with a French supplier of fuel.
— US State Department, "South Africa – Nuclear Issue," 3 April 1981, secret memorandum declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

May 1981
Armscor's Kentron Circle facility is commissioned, which "essentially duplicate(s), under one roof, most of the development and manufacturing capabilities at Pelindaba." The AEB nuclear device that had been provided with HEU in November 1979 is subsequently transferred from temporary storage in an abandoned coal mine at Witbank to a special vault at the Kentron Circle facility. Armscor later notes that this AEB device is not a "qualified" design, indicating there is "not an adequate degree of assurance that it would detonate as intended or that it would not detonate accidentally." It is later dismantled and turned over to Armscor for safekeeping. Each half of the device is stored in different high-security vaults.
—David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, pp. 9-10. <htpp://www.isis-online.org/publications/
southafrica/ir-594.html>; David Albright "A Curious Conversion," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1993, <http://bullatomsci.org/issues/1993/j93/j93reports.html>; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, 10 May 1993, pp. 4-5; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 5; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 11; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa," IAEA Bulletin, January 1995.

July 1981
The first HEU is withdrawn from the Y-plant since its 1979 shutdown.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 4; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 11.

December 1981
As of 1981, Safari-1 has been operating at approximately 5MW with domestically produced 45 percent HEU. A telegram from the US State Department to the US Embassy in Pretoria reports that the South African government raised the issue of possible US assistance in the conversion of the Safari-1 research reactor to use LEU fuel, in discussions with a US safeguards delegation. The embassy is instructed to express US willingness to invite South African scientists to visit the Oak Ridge and Argonne national laboratories, and to assist South Africa with LEU fuel-fabrication technology for research reactors.
—US Department of State, "Safari Research Reactor Fuel Conversion to Low Enriched Uranium," telegram from the US Secretary of State to the US Embassy in Pretoria, December 1981, declassified and released 12 April 1991.

End of 1981
South Africa obtained 130t of LEU from a Swiss power utility, Kaiseraugst, and an unspecified amount of LEU from the Belgian utility Synatom, to fuel the Koeberg reactors.
—J.D.L. Moore, "The Development of South Africa's Nuclear Capability," in South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), p. 100.

1982
MAN-Energie of the Federal Republic of Germany supplies the Koeberg nuclear power station with a central mast manipulator and other inspection equipment that will be used to conduct pre-service inspections on Koeberg-1 and -2 reactor pressure vessels.
—Engineering News, 6 July 1990, p. 10; cited in "Koeberg Reactor Vessel to be Inspected," Nuclear Developments, 8 August 1990, p. 1.

1982
The first three batches of UF6 for South Africa's Koeberg power plant arrive at the Franco-Belge de Fabrication de Combustibles nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Roman, France. The UF6 comes from Synaton of Belgium and the Kaiseraugst nuclear power firm, a joint venture of France, Switzerland, and West Germany. The material was enriched at the Tricastin gaseous diffusion plant, a Eurodif facility.
—"The First Batches of UF6 for South Africa," Nuclear News, January 1982, pp. 25-26.

1982
South Africa passes the Nuclear Energy Act, making it illegal to divulge information concerning uranium reserves and actual or potential output without government permission.
—David Fischer, "South Africa: As a Nuclear Supplier," in W.C. Potter, ed., International Nuclear Trade and Nonproliferation: The Challenges of the Emerging Suppliers (Toronto: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 275.

1982
UCOR and the AEB are incorporated into the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC).
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 8.

1982
After four years of research and development commissioned by Armscor's Systems Engineering Division, the gun-type device is refined and its hardware qualified and "requalified." In an April 1993 statement, an Armscor spokesperson states that as of 1982 the improved devices exceeded the safety requirements applicable to a gun-type device.
—Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," NuclearFuel, 10 May 1993, p. 5.

1982
The Reagan administration approves the sale of computers to South Africa that could be used in the design and manufacture of nuclear weapons. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in Pretoria receives a "powerful Amdahl 470/V7 computer" from a California firm. The Control Data Corporation also sells a sophisticated Cyber 170/750 computer to the same agency. [Note: CSIR is involved in nuclear- and military-related research, as well as private and scientific studies. Some US officials fear that these large-capacity computers will enhance South Africa's nuclear development. Official US policy is to curtail nuclear ties until Pretoria agrees to complete safeguards for its nuclear facilities and signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.]
—Alan J. Kuperman and Paul L. Leventhal, "Nuclear Proliferation is Everybody's Business," Los Angeles Times, 25 February 1988, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/>; Reed Kramer, "Questions raised over US High-Tech Sales to South Africa," Christian Science Monitor, 28 October 1982, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.

February 1982
South Africa's purchase of enriched uranium from Swiss power utility Kaiseraugst reduces US leverage over South Africa, which had been provided by a long-term South Africa-US Department of Energy uranium enrichment contract.
—"Kaiseraugst Purchase Seen as Freeing South Africa from Contract," Nucleonics Week, 18 February 1982, p. 1.

April 1982
The Koeberg nuclear power plant is scheduled for completion within 78 months, as stipulated by a contract between South Africa and a French consortium led by Framateg. The plant was provided by Framatome. The project features technology from Westinghouse and quality assurance practices from the US firm Gilbert/Commonwealth.
—"French and South African Crew Are Striving to Complete Koeberg-1," Nucleonics Week, 22 April 1982, pp. 3-4.

April 1982
Armscor produces its first nuclear explosive device. The South African nuclear weapons arsenal increases at the rate of one device approximately every 18 months, until it includes six weapons by the late 1980s. During this period, the older devices are upgraded. However, according to Stumpf and IAEA specialists, the "first prototype deliverable device" built at the Armscor facility is not completed until December 1982. Public sources concur, however, that until 1982 South Africa did not possess a deliverable nuclear weapon.
—David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, p. 10, <htpp://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir-594.html>; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," NuclearFuel, 10 May 1993, p. 5; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 11; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 5; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa." IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 42.

April 1982
Advena manufactures its first nuclear device after a long delay caused by a technical fault at the Y-plant. The device is dubbed a "pre-qualification" model. Design refinement is carried out for another two to three years, after which the design is "frozen" for production.
—David Albright "A Curious Conversion," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1993, p. 9.

April 1982
Exploiting increased HEU production at the Y-plant, South Africa completes assembly of a third nuclear weapon. The weapon production rate is planned to coincide with the Y-plant's HEU production.
—Mark Hibbs, "Pretoria Replicated Hiroshima Bomb in Seven Years, then Froze Design," Nucleonics Week, 6 May 1993, p. 16; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, 10 May 1993, p. 5.

April 1982
Before the end of the year, 50 or more modules of UCOR's 300,000 SWUs will be delivered to the Valindaba semi-commercial enrichment plant. UCOR's funding has been reduced by 15 percent. The reduction will delay the plant's output, which otherwise would be at least 3 million SWUs.
—Rob Laufer, "Inside Valindaba: South African Enrichment Plant Steadily Taking Shape," Nucleonics Week, 8 April 1982, p. 2.

14 April 1982
Swuco and Edlow International, US brokers that purchased enriched uranium on behalf of South Africa from Belgium's Synatom in 1981, are asked to apply for an export license before the material can be transferred to South Africa.
—"The EEC Commission is Trying to Persuade Edlow International to Comply," Nucleonics Week, 3 June 1982, p. 5.

12 May 1982
US Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Bridge responds to Senator Charles Percy's queries concerning the export of 95 grams of helium-3 to South Africa's Atomic Energy Board (AEB). He insists that the export of helium-3 to the AEB does not contradict US policy since the export will be used in nuclear safety-related testing, and the administration has a "more flexible policy with respect to approvals of export of dual-use commodities and other materials and equipment which have nuclear-related uses in areas such as health and safety activities."
—US Department of Commerce, "US Department of Commerce Response to Questions on the Proposed Export of 95 Grams of Helium-3 to the Atomic Energy Board of the Republic of South Africa," 12 May 1982, confidential document declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

June 1982
Swuco and Edlow International of the United States broker a deal between the Swiss Power Utility Consortium, Belgium's Synatom, and South Africa's Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom) for transfer of approximately 100 tons of excess enriched uranium to South Africa.
—"US Firms Involved in Koeberg Fuel Deal," Nuclear Engineering International, June 1982, p. 9.

16 July 1982
Chris Von Christierson, South African representative of Nuexco (an international uranium broker), predicts an increase in South Africa's exports of uranium.
—Adam Payne, Rand Daily Mail (S.A. Digest), 16 July 1982, p. 8; cited in "S.A. Set to Become No. 2 in Uranium," South African Digest, 16 July 1982, p. 11.

11 September 1982
During a press conference, the chairman of the board of directors of Armscor states that its G-5 and G-6 SP howitzers are capable of firing 155mm rounds with special nuclear warheads developed in the United States, but that they were not intended for this purpose.
—Kenneth Mokoena, ed., South Africa and the U.S.: The Declassified History (New York: The New Press, 1993), p. 31.

9 December 1982
UN General Assembly Resolution 37/69 condemns the actions of multinational corporations that continue to enhance the military and nuclear capabilities of South Africa through collaboration with the regime, and deplores "the attitude of those States, in particular the US of America and Israel, which have continued and increased their political, economic and other collaboration with South Africa." The resolution also "[r]equests the International Atomic Energy Agency to refrain from extending to South Africa any facilities which may assist it in its nuclear plans and, in particular, to exclude South Africa from all its technical working groups."
—Timothy U. Mozia, "Chronology of Arms Embargoes against South Africa," in Effective Sanctions on South Africa: The Cutting Edge of Economic Intervention, ed. George W. Shepherd, Jr. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 98. U.N. General Assembly, "Policies of the Government of South Africa," A/RES/37/69, 9 December 1982, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r069.htm>.

22 December 1982
The African National Congress (ANC) bombs South Africa's Koeberg-1 reactor in retaliation for a South African Defence Force raid on Maseru, Lesotho, in which 42 ANC members and Lesotho citizens were killed. The damage caused by a series of four explosions to the R1.8 billion complex is reportedly extensive.
—Nucleonics Week, 27 January 1983, p. 1; Abdul Minty, "South Africa's Nuclear Capability: Apartheid Bomb," in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986).