This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1989
South Africa possesses six devices in its nuclear arsenal each containing 55kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), and enough HEU for a seventh device. The devices are stored unassembled with the front and rear portions of the weapons stored in separate vaults. In order to prevent premature detonation, the weapons are designed to arm only when they reach a certain altitude while on board delivery aircraft.
—David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir0594.html>.

1989
SIPRI researcher Signe Landgren concludes that South Africa is developing "long-range missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads." The study states that in November 1989, the CIA confirmed that a joint South African-Israeli test of the "Arniston" missile, which could carry a nuclear warhead over 1,200 miles, had taken place.
—Eddie Koch, "South Africa: Capable of Becoming World's Sixth Nuclear Nation," Inter Press Service, 28 December 1989.

Late 1980s
Armscor prepares to upgrade the seven gun-type weapons. Armscor plans to "replace the seven cannon-type devices with seven upgraded devices, when they reach the end of their estimated life by the year 2000."
—David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, p. 14, <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/
ir-594.html>.

January 1989
Argentina's Comisión Nacional de Energia Atomica (CNEA) is reported to have shared design information on nuclear fuel cycle technology with South Africa.
—Richard Kessler, "Menem Reported Ready to Name Castro Madero CNEA Boss Again," Nucleonics Week, 12 January 1989, pp. 4-5.

June 1989
The Washington Times reports that with assistance from Israel, South Africa plans to test launch a new intermediate-range ballistic missile. In response, an Armscor spokesman confirms that the company has over the last six years built a missile test range at Overberg and that missiles are being fired to test their performance. At the same time, US Intelligence sources report that South Africa is close to launching a modified version of the Israeli Jericho II Intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). Reconnaissance satellite images show that the test launch is likely to be carried out from a facility near Cape Town. The facility is reportedly identical to an Israeli launch site in the Negev Dessert. Officials say the new missile has been under development since at least 1987, and will also be used as a booster for launching photo-reconnaissance satellites. A CIA assessment reportedly also suggests that a second test of the more advanced Israeli Shavit (Comet) SLV, which might be converted to a 3,200km-range missile, is also being prepared at the site.
—"South Africa to Test-launch IRBM," Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 July 1989, p. 1354; Martin Walker, "S Africa 'About to Test Medium-Range Missile,'" Guardian (London), 21 June 1989, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; Bill Gertz, "S. Africa on the Brink of Ballistic Missile Test," Washington Times, 24 June 1989, pp. A1, A10.

5 July 1989
Armscor announces that it has successfully tested a booster rocket from the Overberg test range outside Cape Town. Although South African sources describe the launch as a booster rocket, outside analysts suggest that it may have been a test-flight of an IRBM. A US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Special Assessment calls the missile a "probable SRBM." US intelligence sources report that the rocket plume of the missile bears a striking resemblance to that of Israel's Jericho missile. The DIA report notes that if Israel and South Africa are collaborating, a high-level if not senior-level Israeli delegation was probably present for the test. The missile flies 1,620km southeast toward Prince Edward Island.
—"South African Missile Test," Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 July 1989, p. 59; Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Sees Israeli Help in Pretoria's Missile Work," New York Times, 27 October 1989, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; US Defense Intelligence Agency, "Special Assessment, South Africa: Missile Activity," 5 July 1989, declassified and partially released, in South Africa and the U.S.: The Declassified History, ed. Kenneth Mokoena (New York: New Press, 1993), pp. 167-168; William E. Burrows and Robert Windrem, Critical Mass: The Dangerous for Superpowers in a Fragmented World, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), pp. 446-448; John Pike, "Overberg Test Range OTB Arniston South Africa," Federation of Atomic Scientists, 29 May 2000, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rasa/facility/overberg.htm>.

June 1989
South Africa and the IAEA resume talks on opening fuel cycle facilities to inspection.
—"Republic of South Africa's Pressure to Sign NPT," Nuclear Engineering International, June 1989, p. 28.

14 September1989
F. W. de Klerk is elected President of South Africa.

September 1989
At a meeting of his senior political aides and advisors, President de Klerk declares that in order to end South Africa's isolation from the international community, both the political system of apartheid and the nuclear weapons program must be dismantled. He summons AEC Executive Chairman Wynand de Villiers and Waldo Stumpf to inform them of his intention to terminate the nuclear weapons program and accede to the NPT. De Klerk asks them to draw up a schedule to implement his directive.
—Adrian Hadland, "SA's Nuclear Delusions Lie in Ruins, But They Still Cost a Fortune," Independent Online, 26 January 1998, <http://www.inc.co.za>; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Limited Nuclear Deterrent Programme and the Dismantling thereof Prior to South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," press conference, Washington, DC, 23 July 1993.

12 October 1989
Derek Smith, a British citizen living in Greece, is arrested in Athens and charged with illegally possessing 12.1kg of pure uranium, says that it is a sample from 1210kg stored in a secret location in South Africa. The material was offered by a South African friend for $180,000/kg.
—Athens News, October 12, 1989, 3; in "Uranium Destined For Libya," Nuclear Developments, 26 October 1989, p. 3.

25 October 1989
NBC News reports that Israel has "secretly given South Africa access" to the "nuclear club." Quoting anonymous intelligence sources, the network says that Israel is in a partnership with Pretoria to produce a missile with a nuclear warhead for South Africa, in exchange for enriched uranium and access to a long-range test site. The report identifies Armscor as builder of the missile and Urdan, an Israeli firm located outside of Tel Aviv, as the front company responsible for transferring missile technology. Israeli General Hagai Ravev, a former senior adviser to Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, allegedly oversees the project from Jerusalem.
In a follow-up report, NBC claims that Israel is also sharing aviation technology with Pretoria and that at least 75 Israeli engineers have gone to South Africa to work on aviation projects. The report also alleges that South Africa is developing a site to construct a long-range missile with Israel, which the CIA designates as IRAH-3.
—Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. Sees Israeli Help in Pretoria's Missile Work," New York Times, 27 October 1989, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>; NBC Nightly News, 25 October 1989, transcript of broadcast 25 October 1989, pp. 1-2.

26 October 1989
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir further denies reports that Israel provided missile technology to South Africa. Shamir tells Israel Radio that there is "no truth" to the NBC News report alleging a partnership between Israel and South Africa to develop nuclear missile capability.
—"S. Africa Nuclear Link Denied," Los Angeles Times, 26 October 1989, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.

28 October 1989
US President George Bush warns that any cooperation on nuclear missiles between Israel and South Africa would complicate US-Israeli relations. Israeli Prime Minister Shamir responds by saying those responsible for leaking information to NBC News sought to sabotage US-Israeli relations.
—Wolf Blitzer, David Makovsky, and Dan Petreanu, "It Would 'Complicate' Jerusalem-Washington Ties. Bush Warns Israel on N-Deal with S. Africa," Jerusalem Post, 29 October 1989, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.

October 1989
The US Senate investigates reports that South Africa has obtained information on detonators, explosives, and firing sets from the US Department of Energy. The information is not classified, but may be used in making and testing nuclear weapons.
—U.S. General Accounting Office Report GAO/RCED-89-116, "Weapons Related Information and Technology Controls," June 1989; in "Developments of Concern for Horizontal Proliferation", PPNN Newsbrief, October 1989, p. 8.

November 1989
An "Experts Committee" formed by de Klerk and composed of senior AEC, Armscor, and South African Defense Force (SADF) officials formally recommends the dismantlement of South Africa's nuclear weapons, and outlines dismantlement procedures. De Klerk and the South African cabinet approve the plan. The Y-plant subsequently stops producing HEU.
—Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), pp. 11, 17; David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 380; International Atomic Energy Agency, Report on the Completeness of the Inventory of South Africa's Nuclear Installations and Material, attachment to Gov/2609, 3 September 1992, pp. 4-5.

15 November 1989
Two Americans and three South Africans are charged with trying to export US-origin missile technology illegally to South Africa, using the government-owned Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) as the mediator, thereby violating such US laws as the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act and the Arms Export Control Act.
—US Department of State, "Israel Aircraft Industries Indictment for Illegal Exports to South Africa," 22 November 1989, confidential cable declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

Late 1989
The nuclear test site in the Kalahari Desert is completely abandoned.
—Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 14.

15 December 1989
UN General Assembly Resolution 44/113 notes "with great concern" that "collaboration between Israel and South Africa has resulted in the development by South Africa of a nuclear-tipped missile." The resolution also requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its 45th session on the military assistance that South Africa is receiving from Israel, and any other sources in advanced missile technology, and supporting technical facilities.
—UN General Assembly, "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa," A/RES/44/113, 15 December 1989, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/44/a44r113.htm>.

1990
The de Klerk government implements its decision to terminate South Africa's nuclear weapons program. All nuclear devices are dismantled and destroyed. Nuclear materials in Armscor's possession are recast and returned to the AEC, where they are stored according to internationally accepted procedures. Armscor's facilities are decontaminated and dedicated to non-nuclear commercial purposes. A date is set for South Africa to accede to the NPT and submit all of its nuclear materials and facilities to international safeguards.
—"De Klerk Tells World South Africa Built and Dismantled Six Nuclear Weapons," Nuclear Fuel, 29 March 1993, p. 7.

1990
The AEC decides to substantially diversify its activities, shifting from strategic to commercially oriented production.
—Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, "AEC Corporate Profile," <http:www.aec.co.za/profile/profile.htm>.

11 February 1990
The de Klerk government lifts the ban on the African National Congress (ANC), and ANC leader Nelson Mandela is released from prison.

1 February 1990
The Y-plant officially ceases operations. [Note: Reiss reports that the Y-plant, which had an annual output of 100kg, stopped enriching uranium in 1989. Albright, Berkhout, and Walker state that the Y-plant stopped producing HEU in November 1989, but was officially closed on 1 February 1990. The IAEA reports that HEU production at the Y-plant began in January 1978 and ended in November 1989.]
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 6; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 11; David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 380; International Atomic Energy Agency, Report on the Completeness of the Inventory of South Africa's Nuclear Installations and Material, attachment to Gov/2609, 3 September 1992, pp. 4-5.

Late-February 1990
De Klerk requests a planning and feasibility study to ascertain the best procedures to dismantle South Africa's nuclear weapons.
—Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 17.

26 February 1990
President de Klerk issues written instructions directing all relevant agencies to begin dismantling the nuclear weapons program. According to Stumpf, this "should stand as the official date of implementation of the termination of South Africa's weapons program."
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 6; David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, p. 16, <htpp://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir-594.html>.

30 April 1990
A Norwegian newspaper reports that Norway exported approximately 450 tons of heavy water between the 1930s and 1988, when the Brundtland government banned further exports. The newspaper reports that South Africa received 6-7kg of Norwegian heavy water "figured to be for research purposes."
—"450 Tonnes Sold Abroad," Stavanger Aftenblad, 30 April 1990; in JPRS-TND-90-11, 28 June 1990, p. 39.

4 May-10 May 1990
AEC Chief Executive Waldo Stumpf announces that South Africa is considering exporting enriched uranium from its Valindaba plant.
—The Weekly Mail, 4-10 May, 1990, p. 13; in "Environmentalists Challenge Nuclear Fuel Export Plan," Nuclear Developments, 28 June 1990, pp. 1-2.

July 1990
The dismantlement study commissioned by de Klerk is completed. De Klerk opts to order the dismantlement of one complete nuclear device at a time. An alternative, more rapid disarmament option would have been to destroy one-half of each device before destroying the second half. The slower option allows South Africa to maintain a nuclear deterrent until the last weapon is dismantled. Furthermore, Wynand Mouton, a retired nuclear physicist and university professor whom de Klerk appoints as independent auditor of the dismantlement project, believes the slower option will "help acclimate the dismantlement team to the reality" of de Klerk's decision to eliminate South Africa's nuclear arsenal.
—Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 18.

September 1990
The South African Air Force (SAAF) plans to retire the six Buccaneer aircraft stationed at Waterkloof Air Force Base near Pretoria. SAAF had planned to upgrade the aircraft and extend their service life, but an overhaul of the first plane revealed that the program would be too expensive. The Buccaneers entered service in October 1965 and are "believed to have been the SAAF's nuclear weapons strike unit."
—"South Africa to Retire Buccaneers," Flight International, 5 September 1990.

September 1990
The West German firm MAN-Energie is scheduled to perform an in-service safety inspection on South Africa's Koeberg nuclear station.
—Engineering News (Johannesburg), 6 July 1990, p. 10 in "Koeberg Reactor Vessel to be Inspected," Nuclear Developments, 8 August 1990, p. 1.

10 September 1990
In response to a request of resolution 44/113, the U.N. Department of Disarmament Affairs issues the report South Africa's Nuclear Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability.
—UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, South Africa's Nuclear Tipped Ballistic Missile Capability (New York: UN, 1991).

December 1990
Framatome supplies the Koeberg power station with new control rod guide tube split pins and assists South Africa's Eskom in replacing the rods.
—"South Africa: New Split At Koeberg", Nucleonics Week, 13 December 1990, p. 16.

1991
The ANC urges the government to fully disclose the extent of South Africa's nuclear program. US officials believe that the South African government is withholding information because it fears that the ANC will interfere with its efforts to sell off its inventory of weapon-grade uranium to the United States. Furthermore, according to a US official, the ANC is bound to view the sale of the weapons-grade stock as a signal that the governments involved in the transactions do not trust a prospective black majority government.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 1993, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1993/a93/a93AlbrightHibbs.html>, p. 1.

1991
According to a member of an IAEA inspection team, the IAEA discovers nuclear design documents and nonnuclear components of nuclear weapons that have not been destroyed.
—Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 40.

1991
South Africa terminates all work on the AVLIS project.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Section10; South Africa," Second tier Nuclear Nations: Laser Isotope Separation Programs Technical Citations and Comments, unpublished paper, January 1996.

June 1991
According to Stumpf, by this time the dismantling of South Africa's nuclear weapons program is "essentially complete."
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996), p. 6.

July 1991
The AEC completes dismantling the six Armscor-built nuclear bombs. The de Klerk government shreds all blueprints and minutes of meetings at which the weapons program was discussed.
—"S. Africa Says It Has Destroyed Its Nuclear Bombs," Reuters, 24 March 1993; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Limited Nuclear Deterrent Programme and the Dismantling thereof Prior to South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," press conference, Washington, DC, 23 July 1993.

10 July 1991
South Africa accedes to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The IAEA begins inspections of South Africa's nuclear weapon manufacturing facilities to verify the scope and history of the program and its subsequent dismantlement. US President Bush lifts sanctions imposed by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, although an arms embargo and several other measures remain in effect, along with restraints by some state and local governments in the United States.
—US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, "Signatories and Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 3 December 1998, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/npt3.htm>; Seth W. Carus, "Israeli Ballistic Missile Developments," Testimony before the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the U.S., 15 July 1998, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumfeld/pt2_carus2.htm>; Rita M. Byrnes ed., South Africa: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 1997), 355; Ann Devroy and Helen Dewar, "Citing S. Africa's 'Transformation,' Bush Ends Most Sanctions," Washington Post, 11 July 1991, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe>.

August 1991
South Africa terminates its gas-centrifuge enrichment program due to financial reasons.
—David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies, (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 379.

August 1991
Framatome replaces all 114 control rod guide tube split pins at South Africa's Koeberg-2 and says biological shielding of equipment at Koeberg-1 should be improved.
—"South Africa: Split Pin Replacement," Nucleonics Week, 1 August 1991, pp. 15-16.

August 1991
The US firm Edlow International asks the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a license to import 1 million kg U3O8 from South Africa for processing in the United States.
—"Edlow Asks for License to Import South African Uranium," NuclearFuel, 2 September 1991, p. 14.

13 August 1991
The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission announces that it will lift the ban on South African uranium imports.
—"South African Uranium Can Again Be Imported to the US," Nuclear News, September 1991, p. 28.

August 1991
General Magnus Malan, South Africa's minister of defense, bans the "development, manufacture, marketing, import and export of nuclear weapons or explosives." In a notice in the Government Gazette, Malan says that any attempt to produce these devices would be illegal.
—South African Broadcasting Corporation, 30 August 1991; in JPRS-TND-91-014, 12 September 1991, p. 1.

5-6 September 1991
The HEU from the last dismantled nuclear weapon is returned to the AEC.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today, 25 (December 1995/January 1996), p. 6.

16 September 1991
South Africa signs full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, which is effective immediately. Under the terms of the agreement, South Africa is to compile an "inventory of all materials and facilities to be safeguarded," and allow inspections at all of its nuclear sites, including the enrichment facilities.
—Capital Radio (Umtata), 16 September 1991 in "Nuclear Sites Open to International Inspection," Nuclear Fuel, 29 March 1993, p. 8; Proliferation Issues, 27 September 1991, p. 1; "South Africa Has Signed a Safeguards Pact With the IAEA," Nuclear News, October 1991, p. 26; "De Klerk Tells World South Africa Built and Dismantled Six Nuclear Weapons," NuclearFuel, 29 March 1993, p. 8.

September 1991
South Africa says that it will provide production records for its two unsafeguarded fuel enrichment plants to the IAEA by mid-October 1991.
—Mark Hibbs and Ann MacLachlan, "South Africa Will Provide IAEA Operations Data from SWU Plants," NuclearFuel, 30 September 1991, p. 6.

September 1991
South Africa takes its seat at the IAEA General Conference for the first time in 12 years.
—Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), p. 19.

October 1991
AEC Chief Executive Waldo Stumpf declares that South Africa has "abandoned its nuclear weapons program and is seeking instead to become competitive on the world nuclear fuel market within a few years." Stumpf says that the new commercial orientation of the AEC is "absolutely the right direction to go in." Stumpf notes that a "strategic emphasis" had been the catalyst to develop nuclear technology, but that it had become "counterproductive" to South Africa's efforts to revitalize the country's slowed economy. Furthermore, Stumpf says that the "strategic emphasis" of South Africa's nuclear program was "possibly far too narrow for the new South Africa," referring to the country's future black-majority government.
—David B. Ottaway, "South Africa Said to Abandon Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons," Washington Post, 18 October 1991, pp. A23, A26; The Guardian, 19 October 1991 in "South Africa's Nuclear Arms Programme," Peace News Bulletin, p. 15.

10 October 1991
South Africa presents its initial inventory of nuclear materials and facilities to the IAEA.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996), pp. 6-7.

29 October 1991
Information supplied to the IAEA indicates that South Africa possesses weapons-grade uranium. The Y-plant has enriched uranium "far in excess'' of the 45 percent level needed for the Safari research reactor.
—Mark Hibbs, "Documents Indicate South Africa Enriched Uranium to Weapons-Grade," NuclearFuel, 23 December 1991, pp. 1, 6-7.

15 November 1991
The IAEA begins verifying South Africa's declared inventory.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Limited Nuclear Deterrent Programme and the Dismantling thereof Prior to South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," press conference, Washington, DC, 23 July 1993.

December 1991
The IAEA meets with the AEC to discuss the inventory. [Note: Stumpf explains the "completeness exercise" is an instruction given to Hans Blix, Director General of the IAEA, by the IAEA General Conference and the UN General Assembly to report back on the completeness of South Africa's declaration of nuclear materials and facilities.]
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Limited Nuclear Deterrent Programme and the Dismantling thereof Prior to South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," press conference, Washington, DC, 23 July 1993.

1992
According to a paper presented at the 1992 International Symposium on Isotope Separation and Chemical Exchange Uranium Enrichment, South Africa's MLIS project is in the pilot plant stage, and work continues on "eliminating part of the laser energy by using chemical energy or reactions (CRISLA process)."
—D.M. Kemp, "Uranium Enrichment Technologies in South Africa," paper presented at the International Symposium on Isotope Separation and Chemical Exchange Uranium Enrichment," 1992 in Mark Gorwitz, "Section10; South Africa," Second Tier Nuclear Nations: Laser Isotope Separation Programs Technical Citations and Comments, unpublished paper, January 1996.

February 1992
The AEC considers the commercial packaging of uranium, conversion, enrichment, fabricating and spent fuel storage services. Under one plan, AEC would "rent" fabricated fuel to utilities overseas, and would take it back to South Africa for storage after the fuel had been burned.
—Michael Knapik, "Spot Uranium Price Circles $8/lb Level," NuclearFuel, 17 February 1992, pp. 1-3.

March 1992
AEC Chief Executive Waldo Stumpf announces that South Africa is planning to test a prototype molecular laser isotope separation (MLIS) uranium enrichment unit around 1994. Currently South Africa relies on the indigenous "helikon" jet-nozzle separation process to enrich uranium.
—Ann Maclachlan, "South Africa's AEC Plans to Test Prototype MLIS Enrichment Unit in 1994," NuclearFuel, 2 March 1992, pp. 7-8.

April 1992
The South African cabinet decides to commercialize Armscor and establish the Denel group of defense companies. Advena becomes a division of Denel, and subsequently focuses on electronic design and manufacture for medical equipment, powder metallurgy for components and military programs, and pyrotechnical engineering. In total, Denel takes over 23 of 26 Armscor subsidiaries.
—Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling," p. 12; David Albright, "A Curious Conversion," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1993, <http://bullatomsci.org/issues/1993/j93/j93reports.html>.

9 April 1992
Kenya announces that it will propose that South Africa join the African Energy Agency (AFRA) at the organization's annual meeting (25 April 1992-1 May 1992). South Africa and Kenya are to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement that would include exchange of nuclear technology and information for medicine and agriculture.
—"Power: Kenya, S.A. Hold Talks," Pretoria News, 9 April 1992.

September 1992
South Africa starts blending down some of its over 20 percent enriched HEU to under 5 percent LEU.
—David Albright and Mark Hibbs, "South Africa: The ANC and the Atom Bomb," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, April 1993, p. 33.

3 September 1992
The IAEA reports that the high-enriched separation units of the Y-plant have been dismantled and removed, and that the remainder of the plant has been decommissioned and partially dismantled. South Africa is preparing the facility for use as a demonstration module in the laser enrichment project to be commissioned in 1993-94. Using accounting data provided by the AEC, the IAEA estimated the U235 balance of the Y-plant. The calculations "showed an apparent discrepancy in this balance" that could be the result of the material accounting system. The IAEA's balance calculations for the Z-plant also reveal an apparent discrepancy, which may likewise be due to the material accounting system. According to the AEC, blending operations to convert a certain amount of HEU to LEU will begin in September 1992. The IAEA reports that it visited facilities involved in South Africa's abandoned centrifuge enrichment program, including the site of a proposed 48-centrifuge cascade, and reports that the centrifuge program had been halted at all locations visited. The AEC supplied information to the IAEA regarding an unspecified quantity of unsafeguarded LEU imported to fuel the Koeberg reactors. South Africa also imported natural uranium as feedstock for the Y-plant until 1979.
—International Atomic Energy Agency, Report on the Completeness of the Inventory of South Africa's Nuclear Installations and Material, attachment to Gov/2609, 3 September 1992, pp. 4-7.

16 September 1992
The AEC and Kenya's National Council for Science and Technology sign an agreement to cooperate on nuclear energy programs. The two countries will collaborate in training, research, and energy supply. The collaboration may lead to a joint energy protocol.
—"S.A. and Kenya in Atomic Power Deal," The Star, 16 September 1992.

12 September 1992
The IAEA determines that South Africa's Y-plant likely produced more than 400kg of weapons-grade uranium during the 1970s and 1980s.
—Mark Hibbs, "Iaea Believes South Africa Produced More Than 200 Kg of High-Enriched Uranium," NuclearFuel, 28 September 1992, p. 1.

October 1992
The IAEA successfully implements a "near-simultaneous" physical inventory verification (PIV) of all of South Africa's declared nuclear facilities.
—Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa," IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 7, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull371/
baeckmann.html>.

October 1992
According to unidentified officials, at the September 1992 IAEA general conference in Vienna, South Africa offered to sell its supply of HEU to the United States and the United Kingdom. However, Timothy Walker, undersecretary for atomic energy at the UK Department of Energy, says that South Africa had not made such an offer to the United Kingdom during the conference.
—Mark Hibbs, "Washington Wants to Purchase South African HEU Inventory," NuclearFuel, 12 October 1992, pp. 3-4.

8 October 1992
IAEA inspectors discover "evidence of critical assemblies, testing gear, and equipment for metallurgical research and processing" at Building 5000, an abandoned site southwest of the enrichment complex at Pelindaba. Unnamed sources say that South African technicians used the equipment to work on "the shape of spherical fissile cores for a [more sophisticated] nuclear explosive device."
—Mark Hibbs, "IAEA Found Evidence of Nuclear Weapons Work in South Africa," Nucleonics Week, 8 October 1992, p. 2.

22 December 1992
The African National Congress (ANC) expresses concern regarding reports emanating from Europe and the United States disclosing South Africa's nuclear activities and ambitions. The reports indicate that the IAEA confirmed that South Africa produced several hundred kilograms of highly enriched uranium, a quantity large enough to support an active nuclear program. The IAEA has corroborating evidence from visits to an abandoned facility near the Pelindaba uranium enrichment complex where it found equipment to develop nuclear explosive devices. The US CIA reveals Atomic Energy Council (AEC) chairman, Jacob de Villiers' involvement in designing nuclear weapons at the Pelindaba center up to 1979. The ANC asks that the de Klerk government and the AEC disseminate past and present nuclear program information to the South African people and the international community.
—"ANC Deeply Concerned about Nuclear Program," SAPA, 22 December 1996, <http://www.aec.co.za>; in FBIS Document FBIS-AFR-92-246, 33 December 1992.

	Updated November 2003