This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

1993
Kalina Bagrova, a laser expert from Bulgaria, joins South Africa's AEC as a consultant to provide technical assistance to the MLIS project.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Section10; South Africa," Second Tier Nuclear Nations: Laser Isotope Separation Programs Technical Citations and Comments, unpublished paper, January 1996.

1993
The South African Parliament passes the revised Nuclear Energy Act, which prohibits the export of nuclear materials or related equipment or facilities to non-nuclear weapon states unless they have signed a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and to nuclear-weapon states unless the items are used solely for peaceful applications.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 8.

1993
Stumpf reports that when the HEU from the dismantled nuclear weapons became available for non-weapons use in 1991, the enrichment level for the Safari-1 fuel elements was increased to 60 percent. The Safari reactor has also been upgraded to 20MW for commercial purposes. Stumpf says that all HEU that is unsuitable for Safari fuel elements is being diluted to LEU, using an AEC process, for use as PWR fuel.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Non-Proliferation," Security Dialogue 24 (1993): pp. 455-456.

1993
South Africa launches a project to develop a Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR), with a view to constructing a small 100MW high-temperature reactor for commercial use.
—"South Africa Wants to Develop a High-Temperature Reactor," Bulletin ASPEA, 14 September 1998.

March 1993
AEC Chief Executive Waldo Stumpf says that as a result of commercialization, the AEC reduced its dependence on government funds from R685 million in 1991-92 to R300-451 million in 1992-93. AEC reprocesses "low and intermediate level nuclear byproducts from the nuclear industry," but it will not offer this service internationally.
—Saturday Star, 6 March 1993, p. 11; in "Atomic Energy Corporation Official on Nuclear Program," Proliferation Issues.

23 March 1993
As part of the effort to dismantle South Africa's nuclear weapons capability, the AEC and Armscor destroy all documentation regarding design information and associated documentation on the nuclear weapons program. However, they do not destroy accounting and material transfer records.
—"The IAEA Verification in South Africa," GOV/INF/698, April-May 1993, p. 5; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Limited Nuclear Deterrent Programme and the Dismantling thereof Prior to South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," press conference, Washington, DC, 23 July 1993.

24 March 1993
In a speech before the South African parliament, President F.W. de Klerk announces that South Africa had a nuclear weapons program from "as early as 1974" to 1990, during which time it constructed six of seven planned nuclear weapons. The seventh was dismantled before completion. He cites historical, international, and political reasons such as the Soviet expansionist threat in South Africa and Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 to justify South Africa's decision to develop limited nuclear capacity. South Africa's strategy was that "if the situation in southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously," the government would confidentially indicate its deterrent capability to one or more of the major powers—such as the United States—in order to persuade them to intervene. He states that global political changes during 1989, the general world opinion against nuclear weapons, and South Africa's accession to the NPT prompted a complete reversal in South Africa's nuclear policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s. De Klerk hopes that South Africa's "voluntary dismantling of a nuclear deterrent capability, and the voluntary revelation of all relevant information will confirm this Government's effort to assure transparency." De Klerk states the program cost South Africa 800 million rand (about $400 million) and that there was no collaboration with foreign governments on the project.

Armscor reveals that it operated a clandestine nuclear weapons manufacturing site—formerly known as Kentron Circle, now called Advena—just 25km west of Pretoria. Approximately 1,000 experts were involved during the entire life span of the nuclear program. At its zenith, about 400 were employed in the effort. South African officials say the six devices were assembled using HEU from the Y-plant, and equipped with tungsten reflectors. They were estimated to have a yield of 10 to 18 kilotons (KT)—on the order of the 15KT gun-type fission bomb dropped by the United States on Hiroshima. Armscor states that the devices "were identical in principle, but some changes in detail were made to enhance reliability. Armscor officials say that the "feasibility of a ballistic missile was studied...[but] it was rejected on the grounds that the additional deterrence afforded by such a delivery system was limited in terms of South Africa's nuclear strategy." De Klerk stresses that South Africa neither developed thermonuclear bombs nor carried out a nuclear explosive test in the South Atlantic.
—Mark Hibbs, "A Curious Conversion," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, June 1993, p. 8; David Albright, "Foreign Scientist Helped to Develop 'Apartheid Bomb' " Times (London), 26 March 1993, p. 2; "Pretoria Replicated Hiroshima Bomb in Seven Years, then Froze Design." Nucleonics Week, 6 May 1993, p. 16; Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," NuclearFuel, 28 May 1993, p. 4; Brendan Boyle, "S. Africa Says it Has Destroyed its Nuclear Bombs," Executive News Service, 24 March 1993; "De Klerk Tells World South Africa Built and Dismantled Six Nuclear Weapons," NuclearFuel, 29 March 1993, pp. 6-8; Embassy of South Africa, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and South Africa's Nuclear Capability," 22 November 1989, classified document partially declassified and released, <http://nsarchive.chadwyck.com/>.

March 1993
Following President F.W. de Klerk's public acknowledgment of South Africa's nuclear weapons program, Waldo Stumpf, Chief Executive Officer of the AEC, admits that the government did not reveal its nuclear arsenal earlier because it feared that doing so could have led to confrontational inspections similar to those occurring in Iraq. He further claims that the bombs were dismantled starting in February 1992.
—Davis Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1994/a94/a94Albright.html>.

24 March 1993
Officials destroy the last documents on policymaking in the South African nuclear weapons program. South African officials state that they had never sought to develop more advanced devices, or to increase the precision of the yield.
—Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 23. On the destruction of documents by the apartheid regime, see Truth and Reconciliation Commission, "The Destruction of Records," Volume 1 Chapter 8 of Final Report, 29 October 1998, <http://www.woza.co.za/trc/1chap8.htm>; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From PNE to a Deterrent," NuclearFuel, 10 May 1993, pp. 3-4; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: the Dismantling," NuclearFuel, 24 May 1993, p. 10.

25 March 1993
Two members of an IAEA team at Pelindaba, who are conducting follow-up activities regarding the Y-plant, make preliminary visits to key facilities related to the nuclear weapons program. Over the next five months, the IAEA team and nuclear weapons experts carry out inspections at facilities and locations that South Africa declares were involved in the nuclear weapons program.
—Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa." IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 3, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/inforesource/bulletin/bull371/
baeckmann.html>.

26 March 1993
The Times of London reports that an unidentified foreign nuclear scientist aided South Africa in developing nuclear weapons. The report says that 30 South Africans worked on the program under the leadership of a veteran nuclear specialist who was a "fellow Westerner," but that no other foreign advisors were brought to South Africa to assist the effort. [Note: However, subsequent accounts provide no indication that foreign personnel were ever involved directly in the South African nuclear weapons program.]
—David Watts, "Foreign Scientists Helped to Develop 'Apartheid Bomb'," Times (London), 26 March 1993, pp. 1-2.

26 March 1993
The IAEA negotiates with South African officials to detail procedures for special inspections to verify that South Africa no longer possesses nuclear weapons.
—"IAEA Experts Ready Inspection of S. African Sites," Reuters, 26 March 1993.

28 March 1993
The London Sunday Times reports that South Africa contracted with China in the 1980s for access to China's long-range missile technology in order to develop the capacity to launch "ballistic nuclear weapons" and satellites. The South African Consul-General in Hong Kong, Michael Farr, later denies that South Africa received long-range missile technology from China.
—Richard Ellis, "Secret Deal with China Extended Range of Nuclear Firepower," Sunday Times, 28 March 1993; "S. Africa Denies Secret Missile Deal with Peking," Central News Agency, 5 April 1993.

April 1993
Cape Town academic Renfrew Christie says that South Africa "had almost certainly developed" 2 kiloton nuclear shells that could be fired by G-5 and G-6 artillery guns, which have a range greater than 25 miles. Christie was imprisoned by the South African government in 1980 for providing "nuclear secrets" to the African National Congress (ANC). [Note: However, subsequent reports provide no evidence that South Africa developed nuclear artillery munitions.]
—David Beresford, "New Doubts on SA Nuclear Admission," Guardian Weekly, 4 April 1993, p. 10.

18 May 1993
The South African Parliament passes the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which commits South Africa to abstaining from developing nuclear weapons.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Limited Nuclear Deterrent Programme and the Dismantling thereof Prior to South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," press conference, Washington, DC, 23 July 1993.

June 1993
In a paper presented to the International Enrichment Conference of the US Council for Energy Awareness, P.J. Venter, Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) Executive General Manager for Fuel Production, says that due to stagnant domestic electricity demand, South Africa seeks to market its uranium conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication services internationally. Venter estimates that between 1993-97, AEC excess production capacity will be 1,750,000kg uranium hexaflouride (UF6) at its conversion facilities, 250,000 separative work units (SWU) of enrichment, and 200,000-300,000 kgs of fuel fabrication for pressurized water reactors (PWR).
—Wilson Dizard III, "AEC of South Africa Seeks Export Markets for Fuel Cycle Services," NuclearFuel, 21 June 1993, p. 10.

July 1993
In the presence of IAEA inspectors, Armscor renders useless the nuclear test shafts at the Vastrap site in the Kalahari Desert by filling them with concrete.
—Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa." IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, p. 7, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/Periodicals/Bulletin/Bull371/
baeckmann.html>; Photographs online at "Rendering Harmless the Kalahari Test Shafts in South Africa," IAEA, undated, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/inforesource/other/safeguards/
pia38e14.html>.

July 1993
In a briefing at the South African Embassy in Washington, DC, AEC Chief Executive Officer Waldo Stumpf says that South Africa approached both the United Kingdom and the United States in late 1992 regarding the possible sale of South Africa's surplus HEU. According the Stumpf, the United Kingdom was not interested, but the United States said to "come back later," after the November 1992 US presidential elections. Stumpf notes that the Safari-1 research reactor had been upgraded to 20MW, and that all the HEU not suitable for Safari had been blended down to low-enriched uranium (LEU) for use in the Koeberg plant. However, some US firms continue discussing the possibility of purchasing the HEU and sources say that South Africa is still willing to sell "most, if not all, of the stockpile." Sale of its HEU would net South Africa 15 million rand, while conversion is expected to raise 500 million rand.
—Michael Knapik, "South African AEC Head Says Stockpile of HEU Will Be Maintained for Safari," NuclearFuel, 16 August 1993, pp. 5-6; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Limited Nuclear Deterrent Programme and the Dismantling thereof Prior to South Africa's Accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," press conference, Washington, DC, 23 July 1993; "South Africa - Country to Retain High Enriched Uranium Stockpile," Africa Intelligence Report - Business Day (South Africa), 26 July 1993, in Arms Transfer News, Vol. 93, No. 13, Farndon House Information Trust.

August 1993
The IAEA conducts a Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) of South Africa's nuclear facilities.
—Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa." IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/inforesource/bulletin/bull371/
baeckmann.html>.

August 1993
The AEC ceases production at its zirconium tubing plant at Pelindaba. The plant produced zirconium tubing to sheath nuclear reactor fuel rods. However, in 1992 the Electricity Supply Commission (Eskom) changed specifications for fuel used at Koeberg, making the plant unnecessary. The AEC's zirconium tubing plant at Pelindaba was specifically configured to produce fuel assemblies for Koeberg. However, when anti-apartheid sanctions were lifted, South Africa was able to import fuel assemblies at a lower cost than it could produce them. The AEC purchased equipment from West Germany during the 1979-84 period, which was used to construct the plant.
The plant was thus made redundant in 1994 when an AEC agreement with the French firm Cogema precluded export of fuel assemblies from South Africa. During its operation from 1988-93, it produced 75,000 cladding tubes for use in fuel rod assemblies for the Koeberg nuclear power reactors. The plant cost R200 ($42 million) to build, and would later be sold for R20 million ($5 million). A zirconium metal alloy called Zircaloy is extensively used for the canning, or cladding, of nuclear fuel elements for water-cooled reactors.
—SAPA, "SA Sells Pelindaba Nuclear Plant to China," 13 December 1997; "Home Affairs Apologizes to Chinese Technicians," Business Day, December 1997, <http://www.bday.co.za>; The Star, 13 December 1997; in "Nuclear Equipment Sold to China Had Been Redundant for Years, Says AEC," Independent Online <http://www.inc.co.za>; Mark Hibbs, "End-User Statement, Export Permit Still Pending For AEC-China Deal," NuclearFuel, 29 December 1997, p. 3; "Home Affairs Apologizes to Chinese Technicians," Business Day, December 1997, <http://www.bday.co.za>; Robin Friedland, "Meltdown in a Teacup," Financial Mail, 19 December 1997, <http://www.fm.co.za/>.

16 August 1993
South Africa proclaims the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 1993. The legislation creates the South African Council for the Non-Proliferation (NPC) of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is charged with export control authority for all nuclear dual-use items. The act makes any involvement by South African citizens in the development of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or ballistic missile systems to deliver such weapons, a criminal offence.
—Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 8; "Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act," Government Gazette, Act No. 87, 1993. The authors are indebted to Rianne Van Vuuren for providing the text of this legislation; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Non-Proliferation," Security Dialogue, 1993, p. 458; Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Amendment Act, 1995 <http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1995/act95-050.html>; Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Amendment Act, 1996 <#http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1996/act96-059.html>.

September 1993
The IAEA finds it "reasonable to conclude" that the quantity of HEU that could have been produced by the pilot enrichment plant (the Y-plant) in South Africa is consistent with South Africa's initial report to the IAEA. The IAEA General Conference accepts "the completeness of South Africa's inventory of materials and facilities." The General Conference also accepts South Africa's declarations on the dismantlement and destruction of equipment for its nuclear weapons, on transfer of dual-use equipment and facilities to non-nuclear or civilian nuclear uses, and on destruction of the two Vastrap test shafts under IAEA supervision. [Note: With these determinations, most international experts conclude that South Africa has completed its nuclear disarmament. South Africa is the first and to date only country to build nuclear weapons and then entirely dismantle its nuclear weapons program.]
—Hans Blix, "Director General's Statement on the Occasion of the Presentation by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa," 7 April 1994, International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/inforesource/dgspeeches/
dgsp1994n05.html>; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 7.

1 November 1993
According to IAEA Director General Hans Blix, 22 IAEA safeguards missions have visited South Africa since the country concluded its full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA in September 1991.
—Hans Blix, "Statement to the Forty-Eighth Session of the U.N. General Assembly," 1 November 1993, International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/inforesource/dgspeeches/
dgsp1993n13.html>.

1994
South Africa announces that it has decided to construct a MLIS pilot plant, but that MLIS technology would only be developed if the country can find international partners for the project. The MLIS pilot plant is to have a capacity of 10,000 SWU. South Africa has spent $55 million on the MLIS project over the last ten years, and has allocated another $5.5 million in 1994.
—Mark Gorwitz, "Section10; South Africa," Second tier Nuclear Nations: Laser Isotope Separation Programs Technical Citations and Comments, unpublished paper, January 1996.

1994
Armscor officials who comprise South Africa's Defence Industry Working Group draft a document entitled "National Policy for the Defense Industry." The paper outlines Armscor's view of the future of South Africa's defense sector and asserts that the nation should "refrain from trading in weapons of mass destruction, the technology thereof, or any items that run counter to international efforts aimed at controlling the spread of such weapons."
—Martin Navias, "The Future of South Africa's Arms Trade and Defense Industries," Jane's Intelligence Review, November 1994, p. 524.

1994
Independent analysts make different estimates of the quantity of HEU remaining in South Africa. According to Institute for Science and International Security director David Albright, South Africa possesses almost 400kg of HEU taken from its dismantled nuclear weapons. Approximately 85 percent of this material is over 90 percent enriched. South Africa also possesses "a comparable quantity" of 20 to 80 percent enriched HEU. The AEC intends to burn the weapons-grade material in its Safari-1 research reactor. The AEC and the US Department of Energy are evaluating the possibility of replacing the HEU in the Safari-1 reactor with LEU. South Africa would then be able to sell its HEU to be blended down to LEU.

However, Natural Resources Defense Council analyst Thomas B. Cochran estimates that at this time, South Africa possesses 731kg, plus or minus 24kg, of approximately 90 percent HEU. Cochran also estimates that the Y-plant produced about 80 kg of 45 percent HEU fuel for Safari-1, and 4.6 to 5 t of 3.25 percent LEU fuel for the Koeberg reactors. There is also an inventory discrepancy of 88-105kg of U235 , which South African officials say remains in the tailings produced by the Y-plant. Although Cochran cautions that there remains significant uncertainty regarding South African HEU production, he does not believe that the government is in possession of an undeclared stockpile of the material.
—David Albright, "The Nuclear Weapons Legacy and the ANC," ISIS Report, May 1994, pp. 18-19; Thomas B. Cochran, email communication with Michael Barletta, 12 March 1999; Thomas B. Cochran, "High-Enriched Uranium Production for South African Nuclear Weapons," Nuclear Weapons Databook Working Paper NWD 93-3, (Washington, DC, Natural Resources Defense Council), prepared for publication in Security and Global Security 4 (Winter 1993/94).

1994
The African National Congress (ANC) and the AEC reach a "tentative agreement" that South Africa should refuse a US offer to purchase South Africa's stockpile of HEU.
—Mark Hibbs, "Black South Africa Should Retain Nuclear Weapons Option, OTA Says," Nucleonics Week, 3 March 1994, p. 6.

20 February 1994
In an article published in the Johannesburg City Press, Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, a convicted Soviet spy and former commander of the Simonstown naval base near Cape Town, says that the flash recorded by the US Vela satellite on 22 September 1979 was produced by a joint Israeli-South African nuclear test code named "Operation Phenix." Gerhardt says that although he was not involved, he learned of the operation "unofficially."
—David Albright, "The Flash in the Atlantic," ISIS Report, May 1994, p. 18.

March 1994
A group of 16 former Armscor employees involved in South Africa's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs threaten to divulge secret information to the highest international bidder unless they receive $1 million in unemployment benefits. The Transvaal Supreme Court places a gag order on members of the group, barring them from revealing "details about the supply, export, import, manufacture or research of armaments."
—David Albright, "The Nuclear Weapons Legacy," p. 19; Business Day, 30 March 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-008, 1 April 1994, p. 3; Ronelle Rademeyer, "Wetenskaplikes Mag nie Praat oor kerngeheime," Beeld, 30 March 1994, p. 1; Marga Ley, "SA 'het geen buitelandse hulp gehad' met kernbomme," Beeld, 29 March 1994, p. 2.

April 1994
The US General Accounting Office reports that the United States approved 26 of 31 licenses for dual-use items during Fiscal Years 1988-92 for sensitive end-users in South Africa. The items included computers or electronic/digital-related equipment, lasers/optical equipment, measuring/calibrating/testing equipment, photosensitive components, presses and specialized controls/accessories, and electron tubes and specially designed components. Licenses that were approved "generally involved destinations and items of little or no apparent proliferation concern," while the denied licenses "were typically for technically significant items or involved end users associated with nuclear proliferation activities."
—General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation—Export Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Items Need to be Strengthened, GAO/NSIAD-94-119, April 1994, <http://www.access.gpo.gov/index>.

7 April 1994
IAEA Director General Hans Blix comments that IAEA inspections in South Africa have demonstrated how IAEA verification activities can be carried out effectively if there is "a high degree of cooperation and transparency on the part of the inspected country." Blix notes that this was the first time a state that had developed nuclear weapons had chosen to dismantle its nuclear arsenal and terminate its weapons program. He credits the government of South Africa with demonstrating that the purpose of safeguards inspections is to create international confidence that a country's nuclear material and facilities are dedicated solely to peaceful purposes.
—Hans Blix, "Director General's Statement on the Occasion of the Presentation by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Africa," 7 April 1994, International Atomic Energy Agency, <http://www.iaea.or.at/worldatom/inforesource/dgspeeches/
dgsp1994n05.html>.

May 1994
The AEC refuses to sell enrichment technology to China because the Chinese government does not provide assurances that it will not sell the technology to Pakistan.
—David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, p. 19, <htpp://www.isis-online.org/publications/southafrica/ir-594.html>.

25 May 1994
South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki tells the UN Security Council that the South African "government is also keen that a treaty for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone be concluded as soon as possible."
—Anthony Goodman, "South Africa Calls for African Nuclear-Free Zone," Reuters, 25 May, 1994; in Executive News Service, 25 May 1995.

June 1994
In justifying his agency's budget before a parliamentary committee, South African National Intelligence Service Director General Mike Louw testifies that there has been "a huge increase in the number of foreign spies gathering information on South Africa's technological prowess, especially its nuclear weapons know-how."
—Patrick Collings, "Spies Seek South African Technology," UPI, 28 June 1994.

September 1994
South Africa regains a permanent seat on the IAEA Board of Governors, after the IAEA General Conference reinstates it as the country most advanced in nuclear development in Africa.
—Mark Hibbs, "South Africa Reinstatement Ends 18-Year Ban From IAEA Board," Nucleonics Week, 29 September 1994, p. 6.

November 1994
The IAEA conducts a PIV of South Africa's nuclear facilities.

In a book entitled The Mini-Nuke Conspiracy: Mandela's Nuclear Nightmare by Peter Hounam and Steve McQuillan, South African "nuclear weapons specialist" Nick Badenhorst alleges that hundreds of nuclear weapons remain in South Africa. Hounam and McQuillan also allege that South Africa manufactured over 1,000 small tactical nuclear warheads that could be in the hands of an anti-Mandela, right-wing faction. However, Hounam and McQuillan do not present evidence supporting their allegations to the IAEA for examination. President Nelson Mandela says that he has no basis for questioning the completion of nuclear dismantlement under former President de Klerk, and hence will not investigate the "wild and unsubstantiated allegations."

[Note: No evidence emerges subsequently to support Hounam and McQuillan's allegations. The quantity of fissile materials necessary for such an arsenal greatly exceeds South Africa's known production. Their book includes very detailed accounts of efforts in South African to smuggle "red mercury," a material they claim is used in nuclear weapons, but which does not exist except in fraudulent attempts to sell ostensible nuclear material.]
—Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa." IAEA Bulletin, 1(1995), <http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/inforesource/bulletin/bull371/
baeckmann.html>; Peter Hounam and Steve McQuillan, The Mini-Nuke Conspiracy: Mandela's Nuclear Nightmare (New York; Penguin Group, 1995), pp. 50, 267-268; Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program," p. 7; Anton Ferreira, Reuters, 23 October 1995; in " S. Africa Party Says Nuclear Claims May Be True," Executive News Service, 23 October 1995; David Albright, Frans Berkhout, and William Walker, Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 384-391.

January 1995
Former Foreign Minister Pik Botha says that in 1981, US President Ronald Reagan agreed to assist South Africa in acquiring enriched uranium after Botha assured Reagan that South Africa would not conduct a nuclear test without first informing the United States. Botha states that he raised the issue of the Koeberg reactors with Reagan, and asked "that the United States withdraw its pressure on France not to make the fuel elements" for the reactors.
—"S. Africa Says Reagan Helped It Get Nuclear Fuel," Reuters, 10 January 1995.

March 1995
A delegation headed by South Africa's energy minister Pik Botha reportedly meets with Iranian officials to discuss nuclear cooperation.
—James Adams, "US Fears South Africa Will Sell Nuclear Technology to Tehran," The Times (London), 23 April 1995.

March 1995
South Africa closes the Z-plant, which has produced uranium to fuel the Koeberg power reactors since 1987. The plant is closed a year earlier than planned, because South Africa can purchase enriched uranium at a lower cost on the world market. As a result, South Africa will have no domestic enrichment facilities until the AEC's Molecular Laser Isotope Separation (MLIS) program becomes operational. According to AEC executive director Waldo Stumpf, the AEC is currently involved in talks to secure international cooperation on the MLIS project.
—Reuters; in "South Africa to Close Uranium Enrichment Plant," Executive News Service, 25 January 1995; Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa Limited, "Sale of Partially Depleted Uranium," 27 April 1998 <http://www.anc.org.za>; Michael Knapik, Wilson Dizard III, Ann Maclachlan, and Ray Silver, "Uncertainty Bedevils Market; USEC Submits APS Deal for Approval, Talks with PG&E," Nuclear Fuel, 30 January 1995, p. 20.

April 1995
Armscor Chief Executive Tielman de Waal says that a total of approximately 800 people, including scientists and politicians, knew of South Africa's now-defunct nuclear weapons program. De Waal states that dissemination of "the names of our nuclear scientists are limited to avoid foreign governments coming in and recruiting them."
—"S. Africa Keeps Nuclear Scientists under Wraps," Reuters, 6 April 1995.

April 1995
The United States expresses concern that Iran may be seeking assistance from South Africa in developing nuclear weapons.
—James Adams, "US Fears South Africa Will Sell Nuclear Technology to Tehran," The Times (London), 23 April 1995.

April 1995
South Africa joins the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
—Defence in a Democracy: White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa, May 1996, <http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/defencewp.html>.

June 1995
At the 1995 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in New York, South Africa plays a significant role as the "chief mediator" between the nonaligned movement and the nuclear weapon states. South Africa "support[s] the view that the continued existence of the treaty should not be placed in jeopardy and that the review and extension process should strengthen the non-proliferation regime. South Africa played an active role in the discussions resulting in the adoption of a set of 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.' The 'Principles and Objectives' focuses, inter alia, on adherence to the NPT, nuclear disarmament, the conclusion of the CTBT, and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones." International officials credit South African diplomacy with building consensus among member states at the conference to extend the NPT indefinitely. This constitutes a historic contribution by South Africa to strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.
—Jeff Erlich and Theresa Hitchens, "S. Africa Shines as Policy Beacon," Defense News, 12-18 June 1995, p. 1; South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),"
<http://www.dfa.gov.za/for-relations/multilateral/treaties/npt.htm>.

July 1995
In the South African "Energy Policy Discussion Document," the Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs (DMEA) notes that it is unclear how or by whom national nuclear policy was made in the past. The DMEA states that it appears that nuclear policy "was made more on an ad hoc basis and by ad hoc committees, such as was the case with the decision to build nuclear weapons." Furthermore, nuclear policy appears to have been "considered in isolation from any coherent national science and technology policy." DMEA points out that the AEC may have a conflict of interest because it is a commercial entity with nuclear fuel production interests, but is granted a nuclear regulatory role. The Council for Nuclear Safety, currently part of the DMEA, also has a nuclear regulatory role, which includes overseeing the nuclear industry and issuing operating licenses.
—Department of Minerals and Energy Affairs, "South African Energy Policy Discussion Document," July 1995, <http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/Green_papers/energy10.html>.

15 August 1995
The US Department of Energy removes South Africa from a list of countries of proliferation concern, and relaxes restrictions on US firms that seek to export nuclear-related goods and services to the country.
—George Lobsenz, "DOE Lifts Nuclear Restrictions on Four Emerging Markets," Energy Daily, 19 September 1995, p. 3.

25 August 1995
South Africa and the United States sign an Agreement for Cooperation for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. US Department of Energy officials suggest that one of the first projects that South Africa will participate in is the Reduced Enrichment in Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) program, which will allow the United States to help South Africa convert its research facilities from using HEU to LEU fuel.
—"U.S., South Africa Nuclear Cooperation Agreement Hailed as Precedent for Nonproliferation Regime," SpentFUEL, 4 September 1995, <http://www.nuke-energy.com>; Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread Of Nuclear Weapons 1987-88, p. 432; Abdul Minty, "South Africa's Nuclear Capability: The Apartheid Bomb," in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, eds., Destructive Engagement: Southern Africa at War (Harare: Zimbabwe Publishing House, 1986), p. 205. Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb: The Spread of Nuclear Weapons 1987-1988 (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988), p. 303; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: The Dismantling," Nuclear Fuel, 24 May 1993, p. 12.

September 1995
AEC Chief Executive Officer Waldo Stumpf says that a delegation of Iranian oil officials who "didn't seem to understand nuclear matters" had approached him during a trip to Cape Town, which began on 15 September 1995. Stumpf says, "they asked what would be the conditions for nuclear cooperation between our two countries... I told them they would have to negotiate some form of government-to-government agreement first, and then talk to our minister...That's as far as it went." [Note: This meeting is apparently the origin for the September 1997 allegations by Jane's International Defence Review that Iranian officials approached Stumpf with a nuclear "shopping list."]
—"South Africa 'Very Circumspect' about N-Deals," Iran Brief, 9 October 1995, p. 2.

October 1995
A joint US-South African study concludes that conversion of Safari reactor from burning HEU to LEU is "technically feasible," but would nearly double the reactor's running cost and "threaten its commercial viability." US officials disagree, and talks on the subject between the two countries continue.
—Ann MacLachan, "Converting Safari-I to LEU Fuel Would Be Too Costly, Study Finds," NuclearFuel, 9 October 1995, p. 10.

1 March 1996
Stumpf announces that the AEC cannot locate two tons of depleted uranium missing "somewhere in the system." Stumpf says he suspects that the material may be in a nuclear condenser damaged in a 1990 incident, which was contaminated with uranium. The condenser was sealed and buried with other radioactive waste on Thabana Hill (a.k.a. Radiation Hill) at Pelindaba. In April 1995, the AEC began to excavate the site, although it had not obtained the necessary authorization from the CNS. During the excavation, a mechanical digger ruptured many of the waste drums, contaminating the site.
—"Atomic Energy Corporation Missing 2 Tons Treated Uranium," SAPA, 1 March 1996 <http://www.aec.co.za>.

11 March 1996
South Africa and France sign an agreement for joint development of South Africa's MLIS uranium enrichment process, which had been under development since 1983. The AEC projects an annual budget of $13 million. The French firm Cogema will support half of the project's expenditures for a three-year period.
—Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, Annual Report 1998, <http://www.aec.co.za/annual98/page6.htm>; Ann MacLachlan, "Cogema to Help South Africa's AEC Develop MLIS Enrichment Process," NuclearFuel, 11 March 1996, p. 4.

20 March 1996
Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Pik Botha says that the AEC uranium enrichment plants at Pelindaba will be dismantled by the end of March 1999, "with possibly some continuation of decontamination of equipment over the next year or two."
—"Uranium Enrichment Plants Will Be Nearly Dismantled by 1999: Botha," SAPA, 20 March 1996, <http://www.aec.co.za>.

11 April 1996
South Africa and 42 other African states sign the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) in Cairo, Egypt.
—U.S. Department of State, "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Pelindaba)," 11 April 1996,
<http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trty/4699.htm>.

June 1996
South Africa is admitted to the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
—"U.N. Disarmament Conference Admits 23 New Members," AFP, 17 June 1996.

June 1996
South Africa's mineral and energy affairs minister, Pik Botha, discloses that South Africa supplied France with uranium in the forms of yellowcake and uranium hexaflouride between 1977-1994. Botha says that modern nuclear weapons use plutonium, and therefore "it is consequently highly improbable that South African uranium could have been used in the recent French nuclear weapon tests."
—"France Imports Uranium from S. Africa," Xinhua, 26 June 1996.

24 September 1996
South Africa signs the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). South Africa is one of 44 countries that must ratify the CTBT for it to take legal force, and South Africa will host five monitoring stations established to verify the treaty.
—Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization, "State Information: South Africa," undated, <http://www.ctbto.org/>; and "Status of the 44 States Whose Ratification is Required for the Treaty to Enter Into Force (Article XIV)," undated, <http://www.ctbto.org/>.

	Updated November 2003