This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

January 1997
South Africa's Department of Art, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) publishes its "Review of the Atomic Energy Corporation." The DACST Review Team finds that "the main raison d'être of the AEC no longer applies," as South Africa does not foresee investment in nuclear power for electricity generation or nuclear weapons. It concludes that the country "has no obvious need for an indigenous capability in nuclear energy."

The review states that the Safari-1 research reactor is currently using 93 percent HEU from the nuclear weapons program, and notes US pressure to convert the reactor to rely instead on 20 percent enriched uranium. However, due to the lack of financial support for reactor conversion and lower efficiencies in production of the medical isotope Molybdenum99 (Mo99), the AEC is committed to using the HEU stockpile to fuel the reactor. Beginning in 1998, the AEC's Hot Cell Complex will be employed for Mo99 production. The Review Team concludes that because the Safari reactor is used primarily for commercial purposes and its future income will not cover the reactor's operational cost, therefore the "available evidence points to its closure."

The review says that it is "highly unlikely" that South Africa will construct any large-scale nuclear power stations "in the foreseeable future." Eskom, in cooperation with German firms, is conducting pre-feasibility studies into construction of a 100MW pebble-bed high-temperature gas-cooled reactor. Eskom invested R9 million in the project in 1997, and has budgeted R35 million for 1998. The Review Team expresses concern "about the high risks of South African involvement in a new and unproven nuclear power technology whose development costs will be enormous."

The Review Team recommends the creation of a public company to be called AEC Technology Ltd. with responsibility for commercialization and industrialization of Pelindaba and Valindaba technology and products, particularly in the area of fluorine chemicals.
—K. Bharath-Ram, et al., Review of the Atomic Energy Corporation, Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology, January 1997, <http://www.dacst.gov.za/science_technology/seti/aecpg1.htm >.

June 1997
Giep du Toit, general manager of the MLIS enrichment technology project, says that South Africa is in the "advanced research phase and early development phase" of the program.
—"SWU's Future: Race of the Lasers," Nukem, June 1997, p. 8.

July 1997
The Z-plant is being dismantled and its component materials are being sold for scrap. The government spent at least R700 million to construct the facility, and the AEC is spending R85 million to decontaminate and disassemble the plant. AEC officials comment that they "would be lucky" if the sale of scrap from the plant raised R6 million. According to AEC senior consulting engineer Johan Niewenhuis, a pilot enrichment plant will be built in the shell of the plant to develop MLIS technology and produce fuel for Koeberg and other nuclear reactors. However, Dr. Gordon Sibiya, Deputy Director General of the Department of Minerals and Energy, says that a new plant is "not in the cards." Mojalefa Murphy, a nuclear scientist and AEC spokesperson, declares that there were not more than "30 internationally competitive scientists working here at the moment out of the 1,000 that used to be here."
—Swapna Prabhakaran, "Pelindaba Bomb Fuel Plant Sold as Scrap," Electronic Mail and Guardian, 11 July 1997 <http://www.mg.co.za>; Freek Robinson, SABC 2 Television Network (Johannesburg), 7 July 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-97-191, 10 July 1997.

18 July 1997
Following an international tendering process—but without public disclosure or coordination with government agencies—the AEC approves the sale of its zirconium tubing plant to China in exchange for $5 million and a titanium processing plant that China will provide to South Africa. The zirconium tubing plant will be sold to Pacific Development Services (PDS) of the Channel Islands, which will arrange for a team of engineers, scientists, and technicians to dismantle the plant. It will then be sold to the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation of Beijing, to be re-erected in China. Other sources indicate that PDS will sell the plant to the China National Nonferrous Industry Corporation at Shaanxi.
—Andrew Koopman, Cape Times, December 1997; in "Tutu Was Broker," Independent Online, 12 December 1997 <http://www.inc.co.za/>; "Nuclear Equipment Sold to China," Independent Online; Mark Hibbs, "End-User Statement, Export Permit Still Pending for AEC-China Deal," NuclearFuel, 29 December 1997, p. 3.

22 July 1997
South Africa releases its draft Nuclear Energy Act for public comment. The act will reduce the commercial independence and materials control function of the AEC, and transfer safeguards functions from the AEC to the CNS. The CNS is currently responsible for licensing nuclear facilities and ensuring safe transportation of nuclear materials. The bill may also further reduce staffing at AEC. During the 1990-1997 period, AEC personnel were cut from 8,000 to 2,000.
—Marion Bidoli, "Atomic Energy Corp in Danger of Being Vaporized," Financial Mail, 15 August 1997, <http://www.fm.co.za>.

August 1997
AEC general manager Mojalefa Murphy comments that South Africa has "already lost hundreds of experienced scientists and engineers to overseas research institutions," and that the AEC has "moved so far down the commercial route that we risk losing all capability to do fundamental nuclear research."
—Marion Bidoli, "Atomic Energy Corp in Danger of Being Vaporized," Financial Mail, 15 August 1997, <http://www.fm.co.za>.

September 1997
Jane's International Defense Review reports that Waldo Stumpf said that Reza Amrollahi, Iran's deputy minister for atomic affairs, visited South Africa in 1996 with "a comprehensive list of requested items essential for the production of weapons of mass destruction," and that South Africa denied the Iranian requests. However, in a letter to the editor of Jane's Information Group, Stumpf writes that he has never met Amrollahi, but said that he had met with Iran's Minister of Petroleum Gholamreza Aghazadeh in March 1995 regarding storage of Iranian oil at Saldanha Bay in South Africa. Former Mineral and Energy Affairs Minister Pik Botha says that Stumpf and Aghazadeh had discussed nuclear issues, including the termination of the South African nuclear weapons program, the country's accession to the NPT, the unfinished Bushehr nuclear power reactor in Iran, and South Africa's uranium export policy. Stumpf denies that he was presented with a list of desired items. Iran had previously approached South Africa about purchasing hundreds of tons of "uranium dioxide concentrate (yellowcake) feedstock" as well as a small quantity of low-enriched uranium. However, Mineral and Energy Minister Penuell Maduna says the AEC has not been involved in "business transactions" with Iran, and that none are presently under consideration.
—Al J. Venter, "Iran's Nuclear Ambition: Innocuous Illusion or Ominous Truth?" Jane's International Defense Review 30 (September 1997): 29-30; Inigo Gilmore, "Iran Sought Pretoria Nuclear Deal," The Times (London), 16 August 1997 <http://www.sunday-times.co.uk>; SAPA, 26 August 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-97-238, 26 August 1997; "AEC Has No Business With Iran: Maduna," SAPA, 11 September 1997, <http://www.aec.co.za>.

September 1997
South Africa closes its nuclear fuel plant at Vaal Reefs. The closure of the plant will cut uranium production in South Africa from 1,600t in 1996 to 1,300t in 1997. Charles Scorer of NUFCOR forecasts that uranium production in South Africa will bottom out at 1,000t per year.
—Stuart Rutherford, "Gold Nukes Thriving Sector: Nuclear Fuels Producer Also Battered by Market Fall-Out," Uranium, 26 September 1997, <http://www.fm.co.za>.

October 1997
Forty Chinese nuclear technicians and engineers begin working in secret at Pelindaba to dismantle the South African zirconium tubing plant for shipment to China.
—"Apology to Nuclear Workers," The Star, December 1997; in Independent Online <http://www.inc.co.za> AFP, "South Africa Sold Nuclear Hardware to China," 14 December 1997.

November 1997
Following Cogema's withdrawal from the project, the AEC announces that it will cease development of the MLIS uranium enrichment process. Stumpf says that the closure of the project will directly affect a staff of 200, many of them among "the world's most advanced laser specialists."
—Ann MacLachlan and Michael Knapik, "South Africa to End MIS SWU Project," NuclearFuel, 29 December 1997, p. 4.

November 1997
According to a senior administrator involved with South Africa's safeguards commitments, personnel from the nuclear program with weapons-related knowledge have either retired or found other employment. However, the administrator is not aware of any formal study to track former personnel from the nuclear program, or of evidence that any of them are involved in the nuclear programs of "threshold" states.
—Rianne van Vuuren, electronic mail communication with Michael Barletta, 28 November 1997.

December 1997
Stumpf says that in early December 1997, the AEC and PDS separately notified South Africa's Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Council (NPC) the country's authority for the export of dual-use nuclear goods—that the AEC's zirconium tubing plant would be exported to China. However, neither the AEC, PDS, nor China has filed an export permit request with the Council. Media reports suggest that the sale of the plant "seems to have been rushed through" before the government's review of scientific and technological institutions is reported to the cabinet in 1998. Rajen Govender, the review's coordinator, says that "we unfortunately do not have the jurisdiction to stop the boards [from] selling assets," and that national nuclear energy legislation grants the AEC "tremendous power."
—Mark Hibbs, "Plant Raises Questions on Controls in China, South Africa," NuclearFuel, 12 January 1998, p. 4; "Is Iran in RSA-China Zirconium Deal?" Jane's Pointer, February 1998, p. 1; "South Africa Sells China Nuclear Plant," Guardian, 14 December 1998.

3 December 1997
Police and immigration officers raid AEC premises at Pelindaba, finding the 40 Chinese nuclear technicians working there in secret to dismantle the South African zirconium tubing plant. The workers possess South African business permits, but the Department of Home Affairs says that instead they need work permits. Albert Mokoena, South African Director General of home affairs, later issues a public apology to the Chinese technicians and to "anybody who might have been inconvenienced" by the raid.
—"Apology to Nuclear Workers," The Star, December 1997; in Independent Online <http://www.inc.co.za>.

12 December 1997
A joint probe by the Sunday Independent and SABC-TV reveals that the AEC is selling its zirconium tubing plant to China for $5 million, reportedly in exchange for a titanium processing plant worth $10 million to be provided to South Africa. The report makes public the immigration raid on Pelindaba of 3 December 1997.

According to Abdul Minty, deputy-director general of the Department of Foreign Affairs and chairman of the Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Council (NPC)—the South African nuclear export control authority—he was previously unaware of the planned sale. Minty said that unless the sale were considered a question of national security, he would not have been personally informed in advance of a regular meeting of the NPC, which take place every four to six weeks.
—Andrew Koopman, "Tutu Was Broker," Cape Times, 12 December 1997; in Independent Online, 12 December 1997, <http://www.inc.co.za>; Mark Hibbs, "Plant Raises Questions On Controls In China, South Africa," NuclearFuel, 12 January 1998, 4-5; Mark Hibbs, "South African Export to China to Be Decided Later This Month," NuclearFuel, 9 March 1998, p. 4.

18 December 1997
South Africa's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) states that China has not provided end-user certification for the zirconium tubing plant that South Africa is to supply to China. The MFA says that the sale includes three pieces of equipment, described as computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools used to make complex molds, which require authorization for export under the Nuclear Suppliers Group dual-use guidelines.

A US State Department spokesperson says that while South Africa has "first rate" nonproliferation credentials, due to the existing China-Iran relationship the United States is seeking assurances that the zirconium tube will not be transferred to Iran. The spokesman acknowledges that in general, "the transfer of zirconium refuel fabrication technology and equipment is not normally a proliferation-sensitive issue," and the equipment is not on the NSG "trigger list."
—Mark Hibbs, "End-User Statement, Export Permit Still Pending For AEC-China Deal," Nuclear Fuel, 29 December 1997, p. 3; Simon Barber, "US Seeks Assurance on Atomic Energy Plant Sale to China," Business Day (Johannesburg), 18 December 1997; in FBIS-TAC-97-352, 18 December 1997.

19 December 1997
According to Waldo Stumpf, the AEC submits to South Africa's Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Council (NPC) a formal application for an export license to ship the zirconium tubing plant to China.
—Simon Barber, "US Seeks Assurance on Atomic Energy Plant Sale to China," Business Day (Johannesburg), 18 December 1997; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-97-352, 18 December 1997.

January 1998
Stumpf states that the first shipments of components from the AEC zirconium tubing plant to China will not "get under way for two to three months."

US officials say that an official note from Beijing declared that Chinese firms had already begun construction of the zirconium tubing plant being exported to Iran and that the South African plant would not be shipped to Iran. Hence, the US officials reportedly concluded that the two sales were unrelated. Other US officials expressed reservations about the ultimate destination of the South African plant.
—Mark Hibbs, "Plant Raises Questions on Controls in China, South Africa," NuclearFuel, 12 January 1998, p. 4.

February 1998
Former AEC scientists charge that the AEC misused R300 million a year of government funding to pay for commercialization activities instead of other approved projects.
—Business Report, February 1998; in "Misuse of Funds Puts AEC in Peril," Independent Online, February 1998 <http://www.inc.co.za>.

March-April 1998
The NPC is to decide whether to authorize the export of the zirconium tubing plant to China.
—Mark Hibbs, "South African Export to China to Be Decided Later this Month," NuclearFuel, 9 March 1998, p. 4.

March 1998
A study by the South African cabinet recommends that the AEC be divided into two divisions, one of which should be privatized. According to the study, a new public company named AEC Technology should be established to develop and market technologies from the Pelindaba and Valindaba facilities. The government, however, would retain responsibility for certain nuclear fuel-related activities, including radioactive waste management.
—"Government May Split AEC," Mail & Guardian Online, 19 March 1998, <http://www.mg.co.za>.

March 1998
The AEC begins work on sealing and capping the intermediate-level radioactive waste (ILW) trench at the Vaalputs facility. The trench is only two-thirds full, but is being closed earlier than planned due to the discovery in 1997 that concrete drums containing ILW from the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station had developed cracks. The low-level radioactive waste (LLW) trench will also be capped once work on the ILW trench at Vaalputs has been completed. In the future, the AEC will excavate smaller trenches to be used for shorter periods. The AEC has also begun a study to determine if Vaalputs can be upgraded to store spent fuel rods from Koeberg. The rods are currently stored on racks in a reactor pool at the Koeberg nuclear power station.
—SAPA, 7 April 1998; in FBIS Document FBIS-TEN-98-097 (7 April 1998); "'Leaky' Vaalputs to Store Uranium Rods," Mail & Guardian Online, 13 April 1998 <http://www.mg.co.za>.

4 March 1998
According to NPC Chair Abdul Minty, the South African media inaccurately reported that Chinese workers packing up the zirconium tubing plant were illegally in the country. In fact, he says that the workers' visas had been approved by the Department of Home Affairs.
—Mark Hibbs, "South African Export to China to Be Decided Later this Month," NuclearFuel, 9 March 1998, p. 5.

13 March 1998
South Africa ratifies the Treaty of Pelindaba. It is the fifth African state to ratify the accord.
—"Signatories to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty," US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; US Department of State, "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Pelindaba)," undated, <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trty/4699.htm>.

27 March 1998
South Africa submits its instrument of ratification of the Treaty of Pelindaba to Organization of African Unity (OAU) Secretary-General Salim Ahmed Salim.
—Panafrican News Agency, 28 March 1998; in FBIS Document FBIS-TAC-98-087, 28 March 1998.

April 1998
The AEC is selling 2,000t of partially depleted uranium in the form of UF6 to Edlow Resources Limited of the United States. The UF6 will be re-enriched in Russia and will then be sold for use in commercial power stations.
—Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa Limited, "Sale of Partially Depleted Uranium," <http://www.anc.org.za>.

April 1998
Minerals and energy deputy director general Gordon Sibiya announces that the South African Parliament will table amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act that would give the Mineral Affairs and Energy Minister more power over the AEC. The amendments would curb AEC autonomy on "sensitive issues," such as uranium transactions, and allow the minister to oversee organizational restructuring of the AEC.
—"Maduna Gets Grip on AEC," Mail & Guardian Online, 29 April 1998 <http://www.mg.co.za>; "Nuclear Energy Bill Will Extend Minister's Powers," African News Service, 29 April 1998.

May 1998
A container holding a radioactive isotope is stolen from the cargo section of Johannesburg International Airport. The isotope, which is en route to Brazil, was produced at the Safari reactor at Pelindaba and cannot be used to produce nuclear weapons. The AEC says that it is "not responsible for nuclear material" once it leaves their facility, and blames the theft on a lapse of "outside safety rules." According to press reports, more than 30 similar containers "have gone missing" since May 1996. [Note: The isotope is described as "extremely hazardous" but is not specified, although the Safari reactor is known to be one of the largest producers of Molybdenum-99, a radioisotope used in the medical industry.]
—"Radioactive Material Stolen from Johannesburg Airport," SAPA, 16 May 1998, <http://www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/1998/news0518>; "NECSA Corporate Profile," Nuclear Technology Products Division, Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa, undated, <http://www.radioisotopes.co.za/>.

May 1998
In response to Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons tests, the Department of Foreign Affairs issue a statement that "as a matter of principle, South Africa opposes all nuclear tests since they do not contribute to promoting world peace and security. South Africa believes that security is provided by nuclear disarmament rather than by nuclear proliferation."
—Department of Foreign Affairs, "South Africa Concerned at Pakistani Nuclear Tests," 28 May 1998; "Foreign Affairs Statement on Indian Nuclear Tests," 12 May 1998; "SA Concern at Subsequent Indian Nuclear Tests," 13 May 1998, <gopher://gopher.anc.org.za>.

1 June 1998
Eskom spokesman Tony Stott says that development of "pocket-sized" nuclear power stations for South Africa looks "promising," although "much work" is still required. The power stations would be small enough to be located on factory sites or in municipal areas. The plant designers state that the new power stations could not melt down, and would be able to store their own waste for 40 years. The stations will use gas-cooled pebble bed molecular reactors (PBMR). Stott said that Eskom still has to finalize the design, finish environmental impact studies, and obtain licenses from the National Electricity Regulator and CNS.
—"Small, Safe Nuclear Power Stations a Promising Idea: Eskom," SAPA, 1 June 1998, <http://www.aec.co.za>; David Shapshak, "Science and Health: New Ways to Create Energy," Africa News, 5 June 1998.

9 June 1998
In a joint declaration with the ministers of foreign affairs of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, and Sweden, South Africa calls on the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the "three nuclear-weapons-capable states" (i.e., India, Israel, and Pakistan) to commit to complete nuclear disarmament and to begin work on the specific steps and negotiations to achieve this goal. The foreign ministers call on the NWS to commit to the adoption of legally-binding no-first-use policies regarding their nuclear weapons, and to provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. They urge that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty begin immediately, and call on the three nuclear-weapon-capable states to adhere to the NPT and ratify the CTBT without attaching conditions to the treaty.
—Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Towards a World Free from Nuclear Weapons: The Need of a New Agenda," 9 June 1998, <http://www.mre.gov.br/sei/decmin.htm>; "South Africa Joins Other in Calling for Nuclear Disarmament," Xinhua, 9 June 1998; AP, "Eight States Demand that Power Disarm within a Few Years," 9 June 1998; Xinhua, "Conference on Disarmament Hears Joint Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament," 11 June 1998.

July 1998
Eskom has sufficient storage space at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station for high-level nuclear waste for only one more annual reloading of its reactors. According to the CNS, the decision regarding storage of additional high-level waste will be made in March 1999. Eskom has proposed re-racking its storage ponds in order to create space for the reactors' high-level waste until 2024. However, CNS has not granted a license for the modification.
—John Yeld, "Nuclear Watch Dog Quells Koeberg 'Crisis' Fears," Cape Argus, 23 July 1998.

17 August 1998
The AEC issues a press release announcing that it is seeking bids for purchase of its "redundant nuclear fuel fabrication equipment." Eskom's pebble-bed reactor program will require a different type of fuel than the Koeberg reactors, and therefore new equipment must be installed. The AEC invites international buyers to submit a tender on equipment that had been used in the manufacture of fuel pellets and fuel assemblies for PWRs. South Africa's conversion facilities are expected to close in mid-1999, and some equipment from the gas-to-powder conversion facility may also be sold. The equipment "in most cases" is only suitable for producing PWR or boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel. The press release notes that the equipment will only be sold to nations that are signatories to the NPT, and that export of the equipment is subject to South African nuclear export controls.
—Atomic Energy Corporation, "Sale of Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Equipment on Tender," 17 August 1998, <http://www.aec.co.za/pr/p980817a.htm>.

August 1998
Eskom is recruiting specialists to manage the environmental study of its PBMR project. The decision to proceed to the next phase of the project—construction of a pilot plant—depends on the outcome of the environmental study and evaluation of the reactor's commercial competitiveness. According to Eskom, South Africa could construct a PBMR in two years with an investment of $88 million.
—"Eskom Pursues Study of High Temperature Reactor," Enerprese, 26 August 1998.

17 September 1998
Both reactors at the Koeberg Nuclear Power Station are temporarily shut down after technical faults are discovered in the turbine units. This is the first time that both units have been shut down simultaneously.
—Cape Argus; in "Koeberg Shut Down Power," Independent Online, 17 September 1998, <http://www.inc.co.za/>.

October 1998
The Western Cape's committee on agriculture, environment affairs, tourism, and gambling conducts a public inquiry into safety at the Koeberg nuclear power plant, the proposal to increase the plant's spent fuel storage capacity, and development of PBMR. Peter Stott, Koeberg public relations officer, testifies before the committee that Eskom has ruled out sending Koeberg's spent fuel abroad for reprocessing due to cost considerations. Instead, Eskom would prefer to double the capacity of Koeberg's existing spent fuel storage rack, which will be filled to capacity in approximately 18 months.
—Sharkey Isaacs, Saturday Argus; in "Koeberg Under a Microscope," Independent Online, 20 October 1998, <http://www.inc.co.za>.

November 1998
Eskom is expected to decide by the end of 1999 whether it will construct a PBMR. A complete plant would consist of 10 modules of 115MW each. Eskom has estimated that the design and construction of a PBMR demonstration unit would cost $200 million, and that subsequent 115MW units would cost $100 million each. After it completed prefeasibility studies for the project, Eskom received government authorization in late 1997 to proceed with concept design. Pending the formation of a joint venture, Eskom "is looking at a construction commitment" in late 1999. Eskom is expected to complete design plans by March of 2001. If the project is on schedule, Eskom could load the fuel in the demonstration unit in 2003, with full operations commencing in mid-2004.
—Ann MacLachlan and Elaine Hirou, "Old Technology May Hold Promise for Future Power," Nucleonics Week, 19 November 1998, pp. 13-15; Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun (Tokyo), 18 November 1998; in FBIS Document FBIS-EAS-98-341, 7 December 1998.

1999
South Africa passes the Nuclear Energy Act to "[t]o provide for the establishment of the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation Limited...for the implementation and application of the Safeguards Agreement and any additional protocols entered into by the Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency in support of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty acceded to by the Republic; to regulate the acquisition and possession of nuclear fuel, certain nuclear and related material and certain related equipment, as well as the importation and exportation of, and certain other acts and activities relating to, that fuel, material and equipment in order to comply with the international obligations of the Republic; to prescribe measures regarding the discarding of radioactive waste and the storage of irradiated nuclear fuel; and to provide for incidental matters."
—Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, "Nuclear Energy Act," 1999, <http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/legislation/1999/act46.pdf>.

30 March 1999
South Africa ratifies the CTBT.
—Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization, "State Information: South Africa," undated, <http://www.ctbto.org/>.

	Updated November 2003