Back to Country Index COUNTRY PROFILE
Nuclear Biological Chemical Missile
Access Newswire
Country Information
 
Nuclear Imports


Key Sources:
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; Nuclear Fuel; J.D.L. Moore; Engineering News; Nuclear Developments; Alan J. Kuperman and Paul L. Leventhal; Los Angeles Times; Christian Science Monitor; Nucleonics Week; Leonard S. Spector; David Albright; CQ Weekly Report; Worldwide Report; John Felton; Nuclear Engineering International; Reed Kramer; New York Times; Newsbrief; Mark Gorwitz; Xinhua; Andrew Koopman; Mark Hibbs; The Star; Digital National Security Archive; Independent Online.



South Africa Profile: Nuclear Imports
Year/Date  Exporter  Item(s)  Remarks 
1965  U.S. firm "Allis Chalmers Corporation"  20MW Safari-1 nuclear reactor and 90% highly enriched uranium (HEU)  Under the auspices of the "Atoms for Peace" program, South Africa and the U.S. sign a bilateral 50-year agreement for nuclear collaboration in 1959. Under the agreement, South Africa acquires the Safari-1 reactor and assured supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for the reactor. 
1977  Israel  30g of tritium  South Africa trades 50t of yellowcake for 30g of Israeli tritium. 
1980  German firms "Neue Technologien GmbH and Physikalisch-Technische Beratung"  An ultrasound device that is used in the fuel fabrication process.   
end of 1981  Swiss power utility "Kaiseraugst"  130t of LEU  South Africa acquires these materials in order to fuel the Koeberg reactors. 
end of 1981  Belgian power utility "Synatom"  unspecified amount of LEU  South Africa acquires these materials in order to fuel the Koeberg reactors. 
1982  MAN-Energie of the Federal Republic of Germany  a central mast manipulator and other inspection equipment  These materials acquired by South Africa in order to be used in conducting pre-service inspections on Koeberg-1 and -2 reactor pressure vessels. 
1982  French nuclear fuel fabrication plant "Franco-Belge de Fabrication de Combustibles"  the first three batches of UF6  The UF6 comes from Synaton of Belgium and the Kaiseraugst nuclear power firm--a joint venture of France, Switzerland, and West Germany. South Africa acquires UF6 for its Koeberg power plant. 
1982  unidentified U.S. firm  a powerful Amdahl 470/V7 computer  The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) in Pretoria receives the item. 
1983  Framatome, a state-owned French company  a repaired set of 18 control rod drive mechanisms  Items were specifically sent for the Koeberg plant. 
1983-1984  United States  technical expertise  South Africa secretly hires 25 U.S. reactor operators and technicians to work at the Koeberg nuclear power plant. It is reported that The specialists are contracted without proper authorization from the U.S. government. 
1985  China  nuclear technology and LEU  unconfirmed; China denies the allegations 
1986  Framatome, a state-owned French company  nuclear fuel   
1989  Israel  technical expertise (75 Israeli engineers) and technology to develop nuclear missile capability  unconfirmed; Israel denied the allegations 
1989  United States  Information on detonators, explosives, and firing sets  The U.S. Senate investigates reports that South Africa has obtained information on detonators, explosives, and firing sets from the U.S. Department of Energy. The information is not classified, but may be used in making and testing nuclear weapons. 
December 1990  Framatome, a state-owned French company  New control rod guide tube split pins  Framatome supplies the Koeberg power station with new control rod guide tube split pins and assists South Africa's Eskom (Africa's largest electric company) in replacing the rods.  
August 1991  Framatome, a state-owned French company  114 control rod guide tube split pins  Framatome replaces all 114 control rod guide tube split pins at South Africa's Koeberg-2. 
1993  Bulgaria  technical expertise  A laser expert from Bulgaria joins South Africa's Atomic Energy Corporation(AEC) as a consultant to provide technical assistance. 
December 1997  China  nuclear expertise  South African police and immigration officials reports on December 3, 1997 that 40 Chinese nuclear technicians are working in the South African zirconium tubing plant. It is not confirmed when the technicians exactly started working  
December 1997  China  Titanium processing plant worth $10 million  The Sunday Independent and SABC-TV reveals that China is selling titanium processing plant to the Atomic Energy Cooperation (AEC) of South Africa for $10 million, reportedly in exchange for a zirconium tubing plant worth $5 million to be provided to China. Allegations were denied by the S. African nuclear export authority. 

 

Updated April 2004


Import Table by Date
 
Export Table by Date


The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
Treaties and Organizations
PBS Interviews with South African Officials on CBW Program
South Africa Special Weapons Guide
Resources on South African Nuclear Weapons Program
South Africa Country Assessment
Putting Down the Sword
NPR: Nuclear Weapons Not Appealing to All Countries
Nuclear Power in South Africa (2006)
GlobalSecurity: Nuclear Weapons Program



Search for:


Enter query terms separated by spaces.
Match:
Search in: Select any one of the following databases and archives or search any combination.
Click here for more details.
Entire Web Site
Global Security Newswire
Country Profiles
WMD 411
Issue Briefs & Analysis
Securing the Bomb
NTI Press Room
Source Documents
HEU Reduction and Elimination Database
Submarine Proliferation Database
Russian Language Resources
NIS Nuclear and Missile Database
NIS Nuclear Trafficking Database

Country Information
Argentina
Belarus
Brazil
China
Cuba
Egypt
France
India
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Japan
Kazakhstan
Libya
North Korea
Pakistan
Russia
South Africa
South Korea
Syria
United Kingdom
United States
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Yugoslavia
Other


Research Library
Country Information Glossary
Issues & Analysis Source Documents
Databases Warheads & Materials
 

CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

HOME   | CONTACT US   | GET INVOLVED   | SITE MAP