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Updated January 2010
Nuclear Overview
Introduction
South Africa is the first and only country to construct nuclear weapons and subsequently to abandon its weapons program voluntarily. In the 1980s South Africa constructed six gun-type nuclear weapons. Less than a decade after assembling its first nuclear weapon, with diminishing security threats and a need to shed its pariah status South Africa decided to dismantle its nuclear arms. In 1993, South Africa revealed it had pursued a limited nuclear deterrent capability to counter a perceived Soviet threat in Southern Africa and opened its nuclear weapons past to international inspections. South Africa then emerged as a champion of both global nuclear nonproliferation and equal access to the peaceful nuclear energy.
History
In 1948, South Africa established the Atomic Energy Board, the forerunner to the Atomic Energy Corporation, to oversee the development of the nation's uranium mining and trade industry.[1] The country's nuclear experience truly began under the aegis of the "Atoms for Peace" program when in 1957 it signed a bilateral 50-year nuclear collaboration with the United States that resulted in South Africa's acquisition of a nuclear reactor and an assured a supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for it.[2]
In 1965, the U.S. firm Allis Chalmers Corporation delivered the 20MW Safari-1 nuclear reactor and 90% HEU fuel to South Africa. Located in Pelindaba, near Pretoria, Safari-1 was commissioned that same year. By 1967, South Africa had constructed its own reactor, the Safari-2 (also known as Pelinduna or Pelindaba-Zero) also located at Pelindaba. This reactor went critical using 606kg of 2% enriched uranium and 5.4 metric tons of heavy water, both supplied by the United States. Safari-2 was part of a project to develop a reactor moderated by heavy water, fueled by natural uranium, and cooled by sodium. However, only a few years later South Africa abandoned the critical assembly at Pelindaba and the heavy water reactor project because it was draining resources from the uranium enrichment program initiated in 1967.The assembly was dismantled in 1970.[3]
South Africa had sufficient experience with nuclear technology to capitalize on the Ploughshares peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) program when the U.S. government, particularly Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, began promoting it. South African Minister of Mines Carl de Wet approved a research program on PNEs in 1971, with the publicly stated objective of finding utility for PNEs in the mining industry. South Africa had expertise in electronics and metallurgy but no experience in the internal ballistics necessary for an explosive device. South Africa made up this knowledge deficit with open-source information on nuclear weapons construction, including volumes of declassified data from the Manhattan Project.[4]
The date when the PNE program transformed into a weapons program is a matter of some dispute. A 1983 U.S. intelligence report stated that South Africa formally began its weapons program in 1973, with scientists instructed to develop gun-type, implosion, and thermonuclear weapon designs. The report also concluded that research on both a gun-type device using two modified naval guns and on the firing system of an implosion device was conducted at the Somerset West explosives installation near Cape Town.[5]
Other sources provide different initiation dates for the nuclear weapons program. According to F.W. de Klerk, president of South Africa from 1989-1994, the decision to "develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability" was made as early as 1974. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards officials charged with verifying South Africa's past nuclear activities likewise corroborated the 1974 date, citing authorization of the program change by the Prime Minister John Vorster. Dr. Waldo Stumpf, head of the Atomic Energy Commission, stated that the objective of its PNE program did not officially change from peaceful to military purposes until 1977. Alternatively, officials from Armaments Corporation (Armscor), South Africa's state-owned arms manufacturer, maintain that in October 1978 Prime Minister P.W. Botha decided to shift the emphasis of the program to military purposes just one month after taking office.[6] The exact date of the program's transition aside, Pretoria was amassing HEU for weaponization.
South Africa cranked up a uranium enrichment plant at Valindaba, known as the "Y-plant," in 1974, though Stumpf puts the operational date for the full cascade as March 1977. In 1976, the Soviet Union apparently became sufficiently alarmed at the progress of the South African nuclear program to discuss it with the United States. Deiter Gerhardt, a German national living in South Africa who spied for the Soviet Union, recalled that Soviet officials asked for U.S. cooperation in halting the program. The Soviets allegedly considered a preemptive strike on the Y-plant, an option that U.S. officials reportedly rejected.[7]
One year later, in 1977, the Atomic Energy Board completed manufacture of South Africa's first full-scale nuclear explosive device based on a gun-type design. Because the Y-plant had not yet produced sufficient HEU, this maiden device was loaded with a depleted uranium core and slated for a "cold" test in August 1977. A device with an HEU core was to be tested in 1978. As early as 1975, South Africa began preparing two test shafts at the Valstrap military base in the Kalahari Desert. Discovery of the Kalahari test site in August 1977 by Soviet surveillance satellites preempted these tests.[8] After the Soviet Union informed the United States of the situation, South Africa bowed to international pressure, covering the test shafts with concrete slabs and abandoning the site.[9]
On 22 September 1979, a U.S. Vela surveillance satellite detected a distinct light event off of Africa's southern coast. U.S. officials believe that a nuclear test with a yield of 2 to 4 kilotons created this fleeting, intense, double flash of light. South Africa emerged as the prime suspect, but the Pretorian government denied conducting a nuclear test. Stumpf later asserted that South Africa could not have been responsible for the double-flash event since it did not possess a complete nuclear device with HEU until November 1979. Other speculation held that Israel had tested a nuclear device, either alone or with South Africa.[10]
Sometime in the late-1970s, South Africa tested a gun-type device at Building 5000 at the Pelindaba facility. South African nuclear experts considered the test a successful demonstration that the device would operate as projected since the HEU briefly went critical. Afterward, South Africa did not load any nuclear device with HEU.[11]
Drawing on U.S. nuclear safeguards practices, Armscor stored the nuclear and delivery components of South Africa's nuclear weapons separately. Safeguards protocol allowed the mating of the two components only after four approvals, with one of the authorization codes in the hands of the president. Also, unless taken to a certain altitude onboard a delivery aircraft, South Africa's nuclear devices would not arm.[12] South Africa planned delivery system was British Buccaneer bombers, low-level strike aircraft with a general deployment range of about 2,000 miles.[13] The range limitations of the Buccaneers served as incentive for South Africa to develop ballistic missiles.[14]
Depending on the source consulted, the date when South Africa produced its first complete nuclear explosive device is variously given as April or December 1982. The South African nuclear arsenal subsequently increased at the rate of one device approximately every 18 months. By 1989, South Africa possessed six warheads, each containing 55 kilograms of HEU.[15]
After reviewing the nuclear weapons program in September 1985, President Botha decided to limit the program to seven fission devices. The government then halted all work related to the development of plutonium devices, ceased efforts to produce plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons, and began to curtail HEU production.[16]
Several factors explain Pretoria's successful acquisition of nuclear arms. First, South Africa quickly mastered the uranium production and enrichment process, developing a complete nuclear fuel cycle with advanced waste management techniques. The Y-plant, for example, used an aerodynamic enrichment process with a stationary-walled centrifuge as the separating element and a mixture of uranium hexafluoride and hydrogen as the process gas. Second, South Africa had an established, defense industry sufficiently advanced to be able to manufacture the necessary delivery components. Third, the nuclear program benefitted from knowledgeable personnel and a well-established foreign procurement network. Finally, South Africa was not overly ambitious, opting for simple, low-cost weapons designs.[17]
Motivations and Strategy
An October 1977 U.S. Special National Intelligence Estimate attributed South Africa's decision to pursue nuclear weapons to the country's "growing feeling of isolation and helplessness, perceptions of major military threat, and desires for regional prestige" but did not conclude that any country neighboring South Africa posed a serious military threat to Pretoria during the 1970s.[18] With South Africa's acknowledgment of the program came a more nuanced understanding of South Africa's motivations to obtain nuclear weapons and its nuclear doctrine.
By the late 1970s, South Africa's security environment had deteriorated considerably. The introduction of Cuban forces into Angola and the imposition of a United Nations military embargo intensified South African security concerns. Relative border insecurity, strong distrust toward its neighbors and the true intentions of Western powers, and the international community's increasing isolation of South Africa because of Apartheid and its nuclear weapons aspirations heightened South Africa's security dilemma and provided further incentive to develop weapons of mass destruction.[19]
Fearing a direct invasion or an invasion of South African-controlled Namibia by Soviet-backed forces, Pretoria developed a multi-stage nuclear deterrence strategy. The first stage called for South Africa to keep its nuclear capabilities secret or ambiguous in the absence of hostilities. If the invasion threat elevated, Pretoria would initiate a second stage, first confidently indicating its nuclear deterrent capability to one or more of the major powers—such as the United States—in an effort to persuade them to intervene. If this proved unsuccessful, South Africa would publicly declare its nuclear capability. The third stage of the strategy also included, if necessary, a nuclear detonation in an underground or open ocean test to demonstrate the capability. As a last resort, South Africa would threaten the battlefield use of nuclear weapons.[20]
A cease-fire between South Africa, Cuba, and Angola in August 1989 and the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola led to a tripartite agreement between these nations, the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola, and the independence of Namibia. The improved security of South Africa's borders proved pivotal to South Africa's upcoming decision to dismantle the nuclear weapons program.[21]
As these developments were unfolding, South Africa publicly alluded to its nuclear weapons capacity. In August 1988, Roelof Frederik "Pik" Botha, the South African foreign minister, announced that his nation had "the capability to make one [a nuclear weapon]" should it want to do so. When reporters asked if South Africa already possessed such a device, Botha refused to elaborate on his statement.[22]
A month later, in September 1988, South Africa sent a letter to IAEA Director General Hans Blix expressing willingness to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if certain conditions were met, primarily that South Africa be allowed to market its uranium subject to IAEA safeguards. Less than two years later, the de Klerk government terminated the nuclear weapons program. All nuclear devices were dismantled and destroyed. The nuclear materials in Armscor's possession were recast and returned to the Atomic Energy Corporation, where they were stored according to internationally accepted procedures. Armscor's facilities were decontaminated and dedicated to non-nuclear commercial purposes.[23]
In September 1990, Pretoria agreed to sign the NPT but demanded equal commitment from other states in the region in return. U.S. and Soviet diplomatic pressure persuaded Zambia and Tanzania to sign the accord.[24] A date was set for South Africa to accede to the NPT and to submit all of its nuclear materials and facilities to international safeguards. According to Stumpf, by June 1991, South Africa's nuclear weapons program was essentially dismantled.[25]
On 10 July 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The IAEA subsequently began inspections of South Africa's nuclear facilities to verify the scope and history of the program and its dismantlement. U.S. President George W. Bush lifted sanctions imposed by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and some state and local U.S. government restraints were repealed, although an arms embargo and several other measures remained in effect.[26]
In a March 1993 speech before the South African parliament, de Klerk announced that South Africa had a nuclear weapons program from as early as 1974 until 1990, during which time it constructed six of seven planned nuclear weapons. The seventh was dismantled before completion. He cited historical, international, and political reasons such as the Soviet expansionist threat in Southern Africa and Cuban forces in Angola to justify South Africa's decision to obtain nuclear weapons.[27]
Status: South Africa and Nuclear Nonproliferation
In May 1993, the South African Parliament passed the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which committed South Africa to abstain from the development of nuclear weapons.[28]
At the 1995 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in New York, South Africa played a significant role mediating between the nonaligned movement and the nuclear weapon states. International officials credited South African diplomats with building consensus among member states to adopt a set of "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament" and to extend the NPT indefinitely.[29]
On 11 April 1996, South Africa and 42 other African states signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) in Cairo, Egypt. In June of the same year, South Africa was admitted to the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and in September South Africa signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty). South Africa, one of 44 countries that must ratify the treaty for it to take legal force, did so on 30 March 1999. South Africa will host five monitoring stations established to verify the treaty.[30]
Building on its role at the 1995 NPT Review Conference, South Africa has drawn on its unique nuclear history to emerge as the critical bridge between developing and developed countries on nuclear issues. A principal leader in the movement to ensure that all states have the right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, South Africa has also freely challenged nuclear weapon states to adhere to their respective disarmament conditions, for example by criticizing the United Kingdom's 2006 decision to construct a new class of ballistic missile-capable submarines as being in conflict with Britain's commitment to nuclear disarmament.[31]
South Africa is a producer, possessor, and trader of nuclear materials and technologies. The growing energy crisis facing developing countries, a problem likely to worsen as states near capacity constraints in the power sector, is tied to Pretoria's interest in expending its civilian nuclear energy program. Even South Africa has not been able to elude the growing energy crunch, moving from a regular power exporter to a domestic power deficit within the past decade. To relieve its own energy deficit and to better position itself as a major global nuclear supplier, South Africa continues to develop new nuclear technologies and has considered re-activating its nuclear fuel cycle in recent years to relieve its own energy deficits. With its large uranium reserves and advanced peaceful nuclear program, the energy crisis propelling the potential construction of new nuclear plants, and a re-established nuclear fuel cycle, Pretoria's energy export business will likely become increasingly lucrative as countries such as Pakistan, India, China and Russia continue to experience larger energy demands and power shortages.[32]
However, South Africa has a serious blemish on its nuclear trade history, as evidence suggests that certain South African companies and individuals were involving in supplying nuclear-related equipment to Libya through Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear network. In 2004, Asher Karni, a naturalized South African citizen, was arrested for involvement in the nuclear smuggling network attempting to obtain piping and autoclave technology from South Africa.[33]
The international community remains uncomfortable that South Africa might supply nuclear materials and technologies to countries suspected of trying to acquire nuclear weapons, such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea. Arguing that Iran need not forfeit its inherent right to nuclear energy technologies even it Tehran did not comply with IAEA safeguard obligations, Pretoria has been particularly critical of harsh economic sanctions if Iran does not comply with demands to relinquish apparent nuclear weapons aspirations, arguing that such actions will only hinder diplomatic engagement. The possibility that South Africa could share pebble-bed modular reactor technology has sparked calls for increased control and monitoring of the exchange of the technology as well as tighter overall controls on imports and exports.[34] Pretoria has attempted to implement stronger controls and guidelines for its nuclear trade.[35]
Just over half a century after its first such agreement, in September 2009, South Africa signed a bilateral agreement with the United States on cooperation regarding advanced nuclear energy systems and reactor technology, particularly with concerns to improving the cost, safety and proliferation-resistance of next-generation nuclear power systems.[36]
Sources:
[1] More about South Africa's past and present nuclear oversight agencies can be found at: www.fas.org.
[2] "Atomic Energy Corporation — South Africa Special Weapons Agencies." Federation of American Scientists. 5 January 2010, www.fas.org.
[3] Roy E. Horton III, "Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear Weapons Experience," USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 1999. See also "Pelindaba Nuclear Research Center", GlobalSecurity.org, www.globalsecurity.org, and "Atomic Energy Corporation — South Africa Special Weapons Agencies." Federation of American Scientists. 5 January 2010.
[4] Jack Boureston and Jennifer Lacey, "Shoring Up a Crucial Bridge: South Africa's Pressing Nuclear Choices," Arms Control Today, January/February 2007, www.armscontrol.org.
[5] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation," 30 March 1983, secret report partially declassified and released on 27 April 1997, www.foia.ucia.gov.
[6] "De Klerk Tells World South Africa Built and Dismantled Six Nuclear Weapons," Nuclear Fuel, 29 (March 1993): 7; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa," IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, 4, www.iaea.or.at; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 5-8; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel 10 (May 1993): 4; David Albright, "A Curious Conversion," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1993, bullatomsci.org.
[7] David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, www.thebulletin.org.
[8] Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 10. See also J.W. De-Villiers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb," Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 6 (November/December 1993).
[9] Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 10; U.S. Mission U.N., "News Coverage," 29 August 1977, unclassified memorandum released, Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com; U.S. Department of State, "Your Meeting with Gromyko: South African Nuclear Issues," 21 September 1977, secret memorandum partially declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com; U.S. Mission to the U.N., "Non-proliferation Issues at the 32nd UNGA: South Africa Nuclear Issues," 6 October 1977, confidential memorandum partially declassified and released, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.
[10] Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Nonproliferation," Security Dialogue 4 (1993): 458. David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1997, www.thebulletin.org.
[11] David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, 7-8, www.isis-online.org.
[12] J.W. De-Villiers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb," Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 6 (November/December 1993).
[13] Green, William, The Observer's Book of Aircraft (London: Frederick Warne & Co. Ltd., 1968).
[14] David Albright, "South Africa's Nuclear Program" Seminar, MIT Security Studies Program, 14 March 2001, web.mit.edu.
[15] David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, 10, www.isis-online.org; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, 10 May 1993, 5; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 11; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 5; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa." IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, 42. See also David Albright, "South Africa's Nuclear Program" Seminar, MIT Security Studies Program, 14 March 2001, web.mit.edu.
[16] Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 6; David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, 13, www.isis-online.org; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa," IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, 45; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, 10 May 1993, 4; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 16; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 16. See also David Albright, "South Africa's Nuclear Program" Seminar, MIT Security Studies Program , 14 March 2001, web.mit.edu.
[17] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "South African Enrichment Program," August 1977, 458, www.gwu.edu.
[18] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 2 October 1974, classified interagency intelligence memorandum, partially declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.
[19] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 2 October 1974, classified interagency intelligence memorandum, partially declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com. Verne Harris, Sello Hatang, and Peter Liberman, "Unveiling South Africa's Nuclear Past," Journal of Southern African Studies 30, no. 3 (September 2004), 463.
[20] Peter Liberman, "The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb," International Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001). See also #19.
[21] "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: Putting Down the Sword," Nuclear Weapons Archive, 5 January 2010, nuclearweaponarchive.org
[22] "Pretoria Says It Can Build A-Arms," New York Times. 14 August 1988, www.nytimes.com
[23] "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: Putting Down the Sword," Nuclear Weapons Archive, 5 January 2010, nuclearweaponarchive.org
[24] "Nuclear Weapons Program — South Africa", Federation of American Scientists, 5 January 2010, www.fas.org.
[25] Stumpf, W., The Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme, "50 Years After Hiroshima" Conference, Castiglioncello, Italy, 1995. For text, see Federation of American Scientists, www.fas.org.
[26] "Bush ends ban on trade with South Africa Executive order tied to 'profound' moves on apartheid," Baltimore Sun, 11 July 1991, articles.baltimoresun.com.
[27] J.W. De-Villiers, Roger Jardine, and Mitchell Reiss, "Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb," Foreign Affairs, 72, no. 6 (November/December 1993).
[28] "Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993," South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, www.dti.gov.za.
[29] Jeff Erlich and Theresa Hitchens, "S. Africa Shines as Policy Beacon," Defense News, 12-18 June 1995, 1; South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," www.dfa.gov.za.
[30] U.S. Department of State, "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Pelindaba)," 11 April 1996, www.state.gov.
[31] South African Department of Foreign Affairs, "Statement on the Announcement by the UK Regarding the Development of a New Class of Submarines," 5 December 2006.
[32] INTERNATIONAL: Developing countries face power deficit." Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service 26 Mar. 2008: ABI/INFORM Global, ProQuest. Web. 14 October 2009; Carli Lourens, "South
Africa Flirts With Plan to Enrich Own Uranium," Johannesburg Business Daily, 28 August 2006.
[33] "UN: Libya Nuke Suppliers Spanned Globe," Associated Press, May 29, 2004; Douglas Frant and William Rempel, "Complete Nuclear Bomb Plant Earmarked for Libya Found," Los Angeles Times, 29 November 2004; Mark Hibbs, "German Probe Zeroing In on Cascade Piping for Libya," Nucleonics Week, 2 September 2004.
[34] "South African Foreign Minister Dlamini Zuma in Iran, South Africa Review Ties," Fars News Agency, July 18, 2008; 1 Kumalo, Dumisani, Statement following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1803 at the 5848th meeting of the UN Security Council, March 3, 2008 ; "South Africa Guts Big Power Deal on Iran Sanctions," Reuters, March 20, 2007.
[35] "Nuclear Power in South Africa," World Nuclear Association, 5 January 2010, www.world-nuclear.org.
[36] "U.S and South Africa Sign Agreement on Cooperation in Nuclear Energy Research and Development." US Fed News Service, Including US State News 20 Sep. 2009, General Interest Module, ProQuest. Web. 14 Oct. 2009.
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Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
