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Updated May 2007
Nuclear Overview
Introduction
South Africa is the first and only country to construct nuclear weapons and subsequently voluntarily abandon its weapons program. In 1993, then-South African president F.W. de Klerk revealed in a speech to parliament that South Africa had pursued a "limited nuclear deterrent capability," to counter a perceived Soviet threat in Southern Africa. In the 1970s and 1980s South Africa constructed six gun-type nuclear weapons. Less than a decade after completion of its first nuclear weapon, South Africa dismantled its weapons program—facing diminishing security threats and in an effort to shed its pariah status. Since that decision in the early 1990s, South Africa has been instrumental in promoting nonproliferation globally.
History
South Africa's nuclear experience began under the aegis of the "Atoms for Peace" program when in 1957 it signed a bilateral 50-year agreement for nuclear collaboration with the United States. Under the agreement, South Africa would eventually acquire the Safari-1 nuclear reactor and was assured supply of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel for the reactor. The South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB)—forerunner to the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC)—had already been established in 1948.
In 1965, the U.S. firm Allis Chalmers Corporation delivered to South Africa the 20MW Safari-1 nuclear reactor and 90% HEU to fuel it. The Safari-1 reactor is located in Pelindaba, near Pretoria. The facility was commissioned the same year. By 1967, South Africa had constructed its own reactor, the Safari-2 (also known as Pelinduna or Pelindaba-Zero) also located at Pelindaba. It went critical using 606kg of 2% enriched uranium and 5.4 metric tons of heavy water, both supplied by the United States. Safari-2 was part of a project to develop a reactor moderated by heavy water, fueled by natural uranium, and cooled by sodium. However, only a few years later South Africa abandoned the critical assembly at Pelindaba and heavy water reactor project because it was draining resources from its uranium enrichment program which was initiated in 1967.The assembly was dismantled in 1970.
In 1971, inspired by the Plowshares peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) Program promoted by the U.S. government and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the South African Minister of Mines Carl de Wet approved research on PNEs, which were hoped to be useful in the mining industry. The AEC was put in charge of the research because its expertise in electronics and metallurgy through the uranium enrichment program though it had no experience in the internal ballistics necessary for an explosive device. The AEC acquired information on nuclear weapons construction from open sources, including volumes of declassified data from the Manhattan Project.
There is some dispute on when exactly the PNE program was transformed into a weapons program. According to a 1983 U.S. intelligence report, "[deleted passage] indicates that South Africa formally launch[ed] a weapons program in 1973," and scientists were instructed to develop gun-type, implosion, and thermonuclear weapon designs. The report also concluded that research on both a gun-type device, using two modified naval guns, and on the firing system of an implosion device was conducted at the Somerset West explosives installation near Cape Town.[1]
However, South African and other international sources provide different estimates on the initiation of the nuclear weapons program. According to F.W. de Klerk, president of South Africa from 1989-1994, the decision to "develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability" was made "as early as 1974."
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards officials charged with verifying South Africa's past nuclear activities likewise reported that the prime minister approved a "limited program for development of nuclear weapons as a deterrent" in 1974. But, according to Waldo Stumpf, head of the Atomic Energy Corporation, the government officially did not change the objective of its nuclear explosive program from peaceful purposes to developing a nuclear deterrent capability until 1977. Alternatively, Armaments Corporation (Armscor) officials maintain that in October 1978, Prime Minister P.W. Botha decided to shift the emphasis of the nuclear program from peaceful nuclear explosives to developing nuclear weapons, just one month after taking office.[2]
In 1974, a pilot uranium enrichment plant, referred to as the "Y-plant" by the South African government, began operation. According to Waldo Stumpf, the full cascade became operational in March 1977. In October of the same year, the director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency issued a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) in which the prospective capabilities and motivations for a number of countries seeking nuclear weapons were addressed. The SNIE stated that South Africa's decision to pursue nuclear weapons would be based on its "growing feeling of isolation and helplessness, perceptions of major military threat, and desires for regional prestige" although the estimate did not foresee a serious military threat from any of its African neighbors during the 1970s.[3]
In 1976, the Soviet Union apparently became sufficiently alarmed at the progress of the South African nuclear program to discuss it with the United States. According to Deiter Gerhardt, a German national living in South Africa who spied for the Soviet Union, Soviet officials asked for U.S. cooperation in halting the program. One of the options allegedly considered by the Soviets was a preemptive strike on the Y-Plant. U.S. officials reportedly rejected this option.[4]
One year later, in 1977, the AEB completed manufacture of South Africa's first full-scale nuclear explosive device based on a gun-type design. The device did not contain a highly enriched uranium core, however, because the Y-plant had not yet produced a sufficient quantity of HEU. The device was loaded with a depleted uranium core in preparation for a "cold" test planned for August 1977 at a test site in the Kalahari Desert. The AEB planned to conduct an actual test using a HEU core in 1978. However, before any tests could be conducted, a Soviet surveillance satellite discovered the Kalahari test site.[5] After a second Soviet satellite completed several passes over the test site, the Soviet Union informed the United States that South Africa was making preparations for a nuclear test. Under international pressure, South Africa subsequently covered the test shafts with concrete slabs and abandoned the site.[6]
On 22 September 1979, a U.S. Vela surveillance satellite detected a "brief, intense, double flash of light near the southern tip of Africa." Due to its characteristics, U.S. officials estimated that the flash could have resulted from the test of a nuclear device with a yield of 2 to 4 kilotons. South Africa emerged as the prime suspect, but the South African government denied that it had conducted a nuclear test. Subsequently, noting that South Africa did not supply a complete nuclear device with HEU until November 1979, AEC head Waldo Stumpf said that "this should put to rest speculations as to whether South Africa was responsible for the 'double flash' over the South Atlantic Ocean." Other speculation alleged that Israel had conducted a nuclear test, either alone or in conjunction with South Africa.[7]
Sometime in the late-1970s though, South Africa conducted a test of a gun-type device at Building 5000 at the Pelindaba facility. "For a brief moment, the HEU [went] critical, providing confidence that the device would work as predicted by theoretical calculations". After this first test, the device was never again loaded with HEU.[8]
Finally, in April 1982 Armscor produced its first complete nuclear explosive device. However, according to Stumpf and IAEA specialists, the first prototype deliverable device built at the Armscor facility was not completed until December 1982. The South African nuclear weapons arsenal would subsequently increase at the rate of one device approximately every 18 months, until six weapons had been produced by the late 1980s.[9]
After reviewing the nuclear weapons program, in September 1985, President P.W. Botha decided that the program would be limited to seven fission devices. The government then halted all work related to development of plutonium devices and ceased efforts to produce plutonium and tritium for nuclear weapons.[10]
Motivations and Strategy
Fearing a direct invasion or an invasion of South African-controlled Namibia by Soviet-backed forces, the South African government developed a multi-stage deterrence strategy. In the absence of hostilities, its nuclear option would remain secret or ambiguous — the first stage. However, if an invasion were threatened, the government would begin a move to a second stage process. The government would confidentially indicate its deterrent capability to one or more of the major powers — such as the United States — in an effort to persuade them to intervene. If this proved unsuccessful, the third stage would involve demonstrating South Africa's nuclear weapons status by first publicly declaring its nuclear capability and if necessary detonating a nuclear explosive in an underground test or one over the ocean. As a last resort, it would threaten the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield.[11]
However, by 1988 the diminishing threat of the Soviet Union and the resolution of regional conflicts during the latter half 1988 led to an increased feeling of security by the South African government. A cease-fire between South Africa, Cuba, and Angola in August and the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola eventually lead to a tripartite agreement between these nations. The UN agreement was signed on 22 December and provided for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola. The improvement of South Africa's security situation proved to be a pivotal factor in the future decision to dismantle its nuclear weapons program.
Around this time, South Africa also gave its clearest public statement alluding to its nuclear weapons capacity. In August 1988, Pik Botha, the South African foreign minister, publicly announced "We have the capability to make one [a nuclear weapon]. We have the capability to do so should we want to." When asked by reporters if South Africa already possessed such a device, Botha stated "I'm not going to enlarge on that statement."
But only one month later, in September 1988, South Africa sent a letter to then-IAEA Director General Hans Blix expressing willingness to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if certain conditions were met, primarily that South Africa be allowed to market its uranium subject to IAEA safeguards. Less than two years later, the de Klerk government implemented its decision to terminate South Africa's nuclear weapons program. All nuclear devices were dismantled and destroyed. The nuclear materials in Armscor's possession were recast and returned to the AEC, where they were stored according to internationally accepted procedures. Armscor's facilities were decontaminated and dedicated to non-nuclear commercial purposes. A date was set for South Africa to accede to the NPT and to submit all of its nuclear materials and facilities to international safeguards. According to Waldo Stumpf, by June 1991, the dismantling of South Africa's nuclear weapons program was "essentially complete."
On 10 July 1991, South Africa acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The IAEA subsequently began inspections of South Africa's nuclear weapon manufacturing facilities to verify the scope and history of the program and its dismantlement. Then-President Bush lifted sanctions imposed by the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, although an arms embargo and several other measures remained in effect, along with restraints by some state and local governments in the United States.
In March 1993, in a speech before the South African parliament, President F.W. de Klerk announced that South Africa had a nuclear weapons program from as early as 1974 until 1990, during which time it constructed six of seven planned nuclear weapons. The seventh was dismantled before completion. He cited historical, international, and political reasons such as the Soviet expansionist threat in South Africa and Cuban forces in Angola from 1975, to justify South Africa's decision to develop limited nuclear capacity.
Status: South Africa and Nonproliferation
In May of the same year, the South African Parliament passed the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which committed South Africa to abstaining from the development of nuclear weapons.
At the 1995 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review and Extension Conference in New York, South Africa played a significant role as the "chief mediator" between the nonaligned movement and the nuclear weapon states. It was instrumental in the discussions resulting in the adoption of a set of 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament'. International officials credited South African diplomacy with building consensus among member states at the conference to extend the NPT indefinitely.[12]
On 11 April 1996, South Africa and 42 other African states signed the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (the Treaty of Pelindaba) in Cairo, Egypt. In June of the same year, South Africa was admitted to the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and in September South Africa signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). South Africa is one of 44 countries that must ratify the CTBT for it to take legal force, and South Africa will host five monitoring stations established to verify the treaty.[13]
Key Sources:
[1] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "New Information on South Africa's Nuclear Program and South African-Israeli Nuclear and Military Cooperation," 30 March 1983, secret report partially declassified and released on 27 April 1997, www.foia.ucia.gov.
[2] "De Klerk Tells World South Africa Built and Dismantled Six Nuclear Weapons," NuclearFuel, 29 (March 1993): 7; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa," IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, 4, www.iaea.or.at/ worldatom/ Periodicals/ Bulletin/ Bull371/ baeckmann.html; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 5-8; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel 10 (May 1993): 4; David Albright, "A Curious Conversion," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, June 1993, bullatomsci.org/ issues/ 1993/ j93/ j93reports.html.
[3] U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," 2 October 1974, classified interagency intelligence memorandum, partially declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.
[4] David Albright, "South Africa and the Affordable Bomb," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1994, www.thebulletin.org/ article.php? art_ofn= ja94albright.
[5] Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 10.
[6] Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 10; U.S. Mission U.N., "News Coverage," 29 August 1977, unclassified memorandum released, Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com; U.S. Department of State, "Your Meeting with Gromyko: South African Nuclear Issues," 21 September 1977, secret memorandum partially declassified and released, Digital National Security Archive, nsarchive.chadwyck.com; U.S. Mission to the U.N., "Non-proliferation Issues at the 32nd UNGA: South Africa Nuclear Issues," 6 October 1977, confidential memorandum partially declassified and released, nsarchive.chadwyck.com.
[7] Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa: Nuclear Technology and Nonproliferation," Security Dialogue 4 (1993): 458. David Albright and Corey Gay, "A Flash from the Past," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 1997, www.thebulletin.org/ article.php? art_ofn= nd97albright.
[8] David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, 7-8, www.isis-online.org/ publications/ southafrica/ ir-594.html.
[9] David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, 10, www.isis-online.org/ publications/ southafrica/ ir-594.html; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to Deterrent," NuclearFuel, 10 May 1993, 5; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 11; Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 5; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa." IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, 42.
[10] Waldo Stumpf, "South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Program: From Deterrence to Dismantlement," Arms Control Today 25 (December 1995/January 1996): 6; David Albright, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons," ISIS Report, May 1994, 13, www.isis-online.org/ publications/ southafrica/ ir-594.html; Adolf Von Baeckmann, Gary Dillon, and Demetrius Perricos, "Nuclear Verification in South Africa," IAEA Bulletin, January 1995, 45; Mark Hibbs, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Program: From a PNE to a Deterrent," Nuclear Fuel, 10 May 1993, 4; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 16; Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), 16.
[11] Peter Liberman, "The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001).
[12] Jeff Erlich and Theresa Hitchens, "S. Africa Shines as Policy Beacon," Defense News, 12-18 June 1995, 1; South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," www.dfa.gov.za/ for-relations/ multilateral/ treaties/ npt.htm.
[13] U.S. Department of State, "African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Pelindaba)," 11 April 1996, www.state.gov/ t/ ac/ trty/ 4699.htm.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently
verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2009 by MIIS.
