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Updated January 2010
Common Elements of Project Coast
Project Coast was a bifurcated program, with chemical warfare activities operating side-by- side with the biological warfare components of the program. Project Coast had the same historical influences, not to mention common objectives and command and budgetary structures. Moreover, the covert assassination program of South Africa's apartheid-era government used both CW and BW agents. Project Coast's chemical and biological weapons infrastructure was simultaneously dismantled, and similar proliferation concerns linger over both sides of Project Coast. Information about these aspects of Project Coast can be found in the following narrative. Details about the biological warfare activities that preceded Project Coast, the biological warfare facilities involved, South Africa's battlefield use of biological weapons, and South Africa's current status within the international biological weapons nonproliferation regime are at the following links: Overview of South Africa's Chemical Warfare Program and overview of South Africa's Biological Warfare Program.
The Rhodesian CBW Program and its Influence on South Africa
The Rhodesian Civil War was not the first African conflict to see the use of poisons as weapons of war. As early as the 1960s the Portuguese army reportedly poisoned wells and waterholes, drugged prisoners and threw them out of airplanes, and deployed defoliants like napalm in their efforts to counter Angolan (and possibly also Mozambican) guerrillas.[1] For their part, Rhodesian security forces used chemical and biological agents in some novel ways that influenced the thinking of their South African counterparts.
Faced with a deteriorating security situation in the 1970s, Rhodesian authorities resorted to increasingly extreme counterinsurgency measures including "pseudo-operations," psychological warfare, covert executions, and the deployment of ingenious booby traps and toxic substances.[2] According to former Rhodesian and South African soldiers, the Rhodesians employed: 1) poisonous chemicals in clothing, canned food, drinks, and aspirin; and, 2) lethal biological agents such as cholera and anthrax to contaminate water supplies and farmland.[3] One former member of the Special Branch of the Rhodesian police claimed insider awareness of the work with poisons as early as 1973, but the first clear evidence of activity dates from 1975 or 1976, when the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) apparently asked doctors and chemists from the University of Rhodesia to identify and test a range of chemical and biological agents that could be used to frighten nationalist guerrillas.[4] Professor Robert Symington, head of the clinical program in the university's Anatomy Department, recruited several colleagues and students to carry out this research.[5]
The Selous Scouts was the primary Rhodesian special operations unit that was tasked with posing as insurgents to infiltrate guerrilla-held areas and conduct various unsavory operations to defeat the insurgents. Former Commanding Officer for Counter Terrorist Operations M. J. McGuinness oversaw the CW program and other covert operations for the CIO that were launched from the Selous Scouts fort at Bindura. According to McGuinness, in 1977, 25-gallon drums of foul-smelling chemicals were delivered to the fort a dozen or so times, dried in the sun, and then ground into a powder. The noxious powder was later brushed onto the denim clothing favored by the guerrillas, mixed into processed meat such as bully beef before being repacked in new cans, or injected into bottles of alcohol with a micro-needle.[6] In addition, several prisoners were forcibly brought to the fort, allegedly used in human testing to determine the effects of the poisons, and their corpses were disposed of secretly. Other accounts indicate that Selous Scouts at the André Rabie barracks soaked denim clothing in vats of odorless and colorless liquid chemicals.[7] While Selous Scouts dispersed some bottles of poisoned alcohol, the Projects Section of the Special Branch organized the distribution of the contaminated items via uniformed policemen to agents and intermediaries willing to sell them to the guerrillas.[8] Secret Special Branch documents confirm the distribution of various poisoned items, and reveal that at least 800 people died after absorbing poison through their soft body tissues. Indeed, Police Commissioner Peter Allum terminated the CW program after unscrupulous local agents, recruited with a 1,000 Zimbabwean dollar bonus for each confirmed guerrilla death, instead sold poisoned clothes to unsuspecting rural villagers, who then died.[9]
The Rhodesians also made several attempts to disseminate lethal BW agents, in particular Vibrio cholerae and Bacillus anthracis. McGuinness claimed that Selous Scouts twice unsuccessfully tried to contaminate the Ruhenya River in northeastern Rhodesia with cholera. A former Rhodesian intelligence officer stated that the many attempts of Rhodesian security forces to pollute water sources close to guerrilla camps inside neighboring Mozambique were of very limited utility because the cholera bacteria was dispersed so quickly. This intelligence officer also recalled that Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) regiment dropping anthrax spores from an aircraft near Plumtree on the Botswana border in experiments to try to kill cattle in the Gutu, Chilimanzi, Masvingo, and Mberengwa areas. McGuinness claimed surprise to learn that anthrax was released, but Rhodesian Army psychological operations officers to the attacks to infiltrating guerrillas.[10] Even today, anthrax is endemic only to Matabeleland, where Plumtree is located. Dr. Meryl Nass has argued that the Zimbabwean anthrax epizootic of 1979 and 1980 might be attributable to intentional human dissemination.[11]
Finally, in 1979 the CIO allegedly recruited an expatriate former British SAS member nicknamed "Taffy" to assassinate either Zimbabwe African National Union leader Robert Mugabe or Zimbabwe African Peoples Union leader Joshua Nkomo in London. After performing successful tests on dogs, Taffy planned to shoot Mugabe with a ricin-laced bullet, but aborted the operation at the last minute.[12]
South Africa security forces later emulated many of the Rhodesian CW and BW tactics. The SADF, the Bureau of State Security and its National Intelligence Service successor, and especially the South African Police (SAP) sent operatives to Rhodesia to acquire firsthand counterinsurgency experience, where some received direct training from the Selous Scouts, SAS, and other special operations units, possibly in exchange for training the Rhodesians in mine-laying and intelligence work.[13] At the very least, scuttlebutt about some of the covert Rhodesian CW and BW operations probably reached South African ears. Worse, South African scientists, soldiers, and policemen evidently participated directly in such operations. According to former African National Congress (ANC) guerrilla Jeremy Brickhill, South African forensic experts and intelligence personnel had access to the most secret Rhodesian bases and likely played some role in developing that country's CBW agents, including organophosphates, thallium, the anticoagulant warfarin, anthrax bacteria, and other unspecified bacteriological agents.[14] A Dutch anti-apartheid activist named Klaas de Jonge claimed that various "dirty tricks" poisoning operations were carried out in Rhodesia in the mid- to late 1970s under "Operation Alcora," a joint Portuguese, Rhodesian, and South African effort. The SAP Forensic Sciences Laboratory on Visagie Street, headed by Major-General Lothar Neethling, allegedly developed "sophisticated" chemical weapons deployed under Operation Alcora.[15] Also, Rhodesian Army Colonel Lionel Dyck insisted that South African military intelligence officials were directly involved in the contamination of rivers with cholera bacteria during the Rhodesian civil war.[16] Substantiation for these specific statements, it should be noted, is not yet available.
On the eve of Zimbabwe's independence, many frustrated and soon-to-be-unemployed Rhodesian special operations personnel left their homeland to continue to fight "terrorists" in South Africa. Indeed, "Operation Winter" may have involved the en masse covert transfer of Rhodesian special force assets, including Selous Scouts, the SAS, the CIO, their black collaborators, and "the poisoners and their poisons" across the border. British government ministers in Rhodesia may have consented to this transfer, possibly effectuated in part by British and American transport planes.[17] Whether or not such a mass covert transfer of assets took place, many former Rhodesian special operators or scientists, including Fritz Loots, Philip Morgan, and perhaps even Robert Symington were subsequently incorporated into South African units or institutions.[18] Though the precise role that Rhodesians may have played in the scientific or operational orientation of Project Coast remains unclear, linkage between the Rhodesian and South African CBW programs is evident.
The Origins and Purposes of Project Coast
While the SADF had various covert projects that focused exclusively on defensive CBW procurement and preparation (e.g., Project Academic, Project Galvanise, Project Fargo), as the 1970s wore on, a few South African officials expressed increasing interest in a different type of CBW program. Few, if any, SADF documents prior to the establishment of Project Coast provided a clear CBW threat analysis. The looming collapse of Rhodesia and the escalation of the Angolan conflict between 1978 and 1980 probably altered SADF threat perceptions. Moreover, the apartheid-era South African government viewed itself as the possible target of a total onslaught by Soviet-backed Marxist guerrillas in neighboring states and black nationalists at home, and to defend against this all-encompassing "red-black danger" South Africa's leaders were apparently willing to use almost any means at its disposal.[19] This highly-charged political and military context precipitated a "bunker" mentality that led in turn to the secret initiation of Project Coast in 1981 within the SADF Special Forces.
According to the official line, Project Coast was entirely defensive. Captured Soviet-made vehicles that Cuban forces used in Angola were outfitted with the customary chemical air filters, CW antidotes, and gas masks, but abundant rumors about the supposed use of CW agents by Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola against South Africa's allies, the soldiers of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, were never confirmed. Nevertheless, this standard issue equipment provided a rationale to establish Project Coast. After this program's initiation, Dr. Wouter Basson and his associates prepared CBW threat analyses that retroactively justified the program, referring to the presence of chemical warfare equipment in Angola and possible enemy plans to use chemical agents against the SADF, if forces in Angola had not already done so.[20]
Were the defensive-only parameters of Project Coast true, the program's primary focus should have been on the purchase or manufacture of protective clothing and on training troops to defend against CBW attacks. According to Dr. Brian Davey, the scientist responsible for developing defensive measures, defensive work began only in 1986 and not until 1988 did actual chemical defensive training of SADF troops commence. Among several soldiers who confirmed this timeline, Willem Steenkamp attended lectures and tried on protective suits at an SADF camp but was then told the training was a propaganda exercise to convince their Angolan enemies of the SADF's defensive preparedness. Danie Du Toit recalled that only select groups of soldiers received the CW protection courses. In Angola in 1987, he said regular SADF troops had no protective gear and were instead told to dig foxholes, crawl in, and cover themselves with their ponchos in the event of a CW attack. SADF medical units had only10 to 20 protective suits at their disposal[21] The failure to equip SADF troops properly is astonishing since by then South African companies, owned by bioengineer Jan Lourens, had already successfully designed, field tested against actual CBW agents, and manufactured some of the world's best protective CBW equipment and clothing, stocks of which were in great demand overseas.[22] This lackluster approach to troop protection, argue Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, suggests the SADF did not take the purported communist CBW threat that seriously.
In line with the siege mentality of South Africa's leadership, Basson explicitly acknowledged the offensive dimensions of the program in a top secret November 1989 military report. Among other things, Project Coast was to conduct basic offensive CBW research, including on conventional and covert delivery systems, to create an indigenous industrial capacity to make offensive and defensive CBW equipment, and to provide offensive and defensive operational and technical CBW support to the SADF.[23] Basson's top secret mission statement directly contradicts his testimony before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and at his trial, during which he repeatedly denied that Project Coast sponsored any offensive CBW activity. His 1989 mission statement also corroborates the testimony of many scientists who were engaged in research, testing, and production activities for Project Coast. Often recruited with the understanding that Project Coast was a defensive endeavor, these scientists soon recognized that it was largely offensive.[24]
In early 1981 Defence Minister Constand Viljoen, who was reportedly very concerned about the threat posed by potential Cuban use of CW, ordered Basson to collect information covertly about Western CBW programs that might be used as a model for South Africa's own program. Also instructed to make contact with people who could provide information on East Bloc programs, Basson embarked on an international fact-finding mission. In May 1981, Basson attended an international CBW conference in San Antonio, Texas, and visited the Army Chemical School in Taiwan. After Basson's report to the Defence Command Council, Viljoen allocated funds in August 1981 to complete a feasibility study on the establishment of a South African CBW program. Toward the end of 1981, Defence Minister Magnus Malan authorized funding for such a program.[25] Thus was born Project Coast, with Basson promptly appointed its Project Officer.
Basson's rise to the helm of Project Coast was meteoric. A brilliant young SADF internist at 1 Military Hospital in Pretoria before Viljoen sent him abroad to gather CBW data, in March 1981 he was appointed special advisor at SADF headquarters and as Project Officer for Special Projects of the Surgeon-General, also seconded to Special Forces headquarters. The Commanding Officer of the SF thereafter oversaw all of his activities. Among other appointed tasks, Basson led the Special Operations (SO) unit of the South African Medical Services (SAMS), an elite medical team that provided health-related logistical support and medical care to Special Forces, Parabat, SAP, and National Intelligence Service elements operating clandestinely in the field.[26] The SO unit received specialized military training (e.g., parachute, scuba diving, survival training) of the type generally reserved for special operations personnel. In January 1985 this SO unit was renamed 7 Medical Battalion Group. Not coincidentally, most of the individuals who later held senior managerial and scientific positions in Project Coast's front companies and in affiliated private companies working under SADF contracts started out as trusted members of this SO unit of SAMS. Likewise, the covert operatives with whom Basson collaborated were almost all ex-members of the Special Forces or other South African and Rhodesian counterinsurgency and special operations units. As Gould and Folb point out, the foundation of Project Coast was "personal relationships and informal networks."[27]
The Organization and Command Structure of Project Coast
The SADF originally asked ARMSCOR to assist in developing a CBW program, but ARMSCOR, which had exclusive control over the South Africa's nuclear program, refused to do so without full control. Authorities therefore placed the program solely under SADF control. Although Basson's claim to the Defence Command Council that foreign CBW programs utilized ostensibly civilian front companies to conduct all offensive research and development up to the point of actual weaponization was not entirely accurate, the SADF created new front companies for Project Coast rather than use its own components or the existing structures.[28]
Unlike CBW programs elsewhere, the SADF did not completely separate the CW and BW components of Project Coast. Both components shared the same chain of command, the same Project Officer, and integrated secret funding mechanisms. Just as the principal BW facility, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories (RRL), sometimes conducted tests of chemical agents, the primary CW facility, Delta G Scientific (Delta G), sometimes provided assistance with RRL's biochemistry projects.[29] The SADF established one separate principal production facility for CW and for BW, as well as other facilities that, for administrative, security, or technical reasons, carried out specialized research, testing, or production tasks.
In theory, South African President P.W. Botha constituted the apex of the official chain of command for Project Coast. Under the militarized National Security Management System of August 1979, Botha exercised his authority primarily through the State Security Council rather than the Cabinet. Within this elaborate security-oriented and largely covert power structure, the SADF coordinated the activities of the Army, Air Force, Navy, SAMS, and the Special Forces through the Defence Command Council.[30] Administratively subordinate to this council, the Co-ordinating Management Committee (CMC), which typically met two to four times per year, managed Project Coast. The Army Surgeon-General, who was also the head of SAMS, was the CMC's titular chair. Other members included the SADF chief, the chiefs of staff for intelligence and for finance, ARMSCOR representatives, personnel from the Auditor-General's office, and Project Officer Basson, who served as committee secretary. Basson led the CMC's Technical Work Group, which included a rotating group of directors and leading scientists from the front companies and was tasked with research planning for each company. The CMC"S Financial Work Group, which included the Surgeon-General and the finance chief of staff, was responsible for budgetary planning and controlled the movement of money through front companies to hide the SADF's role. The Security Work Group, which consisted of the chief of staff for intelligence and other members of the intelligence community, handled security arrangements to assure the secrecy of Project Coast.[31] Several senior scientists and officials testified to the TRC that they were unaware that these working groups existed, so activities may have been managed in a more ad hoc manner.
When called to account, Basson modestly claimed that he operated under the control and direction of the CMC and its working groups, always insisting that he had no leeway. In addition to serving as the intermediary between the CMC and the directors and scientists at the various CBW facilities, Basson's nominal superiors all concur that as Project Officer Basson managed the day-to-day affairs of Project Coast, operated with a very high degree of autonomy and independence, and provided the CMC with the bulk of the crucial scientific and operational information needed to make important managerial decisions, including budgetary authorizations.[32] In effect, the CMC apparently became dependent on Basson rather than vice versa. By the mid-1990s, when it became apparent that Basson was siphoning Project Coast funds for personal gain, several of Basson's erstwhile supervisors complained about being misled.
A parallel, unofficial command structure apparently operated alongside the official CMC chain of command for Project Coast. Army Surgeon-General Niel Knobel claimed that Basson was often either doing things on his own initiative or, as Basson himself later acknowledged, following operational instructions from other parties, including the Defence Minister, the head of the SADF, the Special Forces commander, the intelligence chief of staff, the Director-General of the National Intelligence Service, the Commissioner of the SAP, and possibly also members of the State Security Council or Cabinet. After receiving orders from such powerful figures as SADF generals A. J. "Kat" Liebenberg and Magnus Malan, Basson's practice was to pass instructions on verbally to Project Coast scientists and select members of covert SADF or SAP units with a "need to know," frequently without informing the CMC.[33] Perhaps it was just such a parallel command structure, to which Basson clearly belonged, that the National Intelligence Service referred to as the Binnekring ("Inner Circle") in its December 1992 report on illegal SADF activities.[34]
Project Coast's Financing and Budget
The SADF funneled funding to Project Coast front companies through various private bank accounts set up explicitly for such purposes. After the CMC approved requested amounts, the chief of staff for finance arranged the transfer of funds from the SADF's Secret Defence Fund. Most transfers went directly to Infladel, another SADF front company was also responsible for the technical information system, the operational coordination of the program, and the security and safety systems of Delta G and RRL. In 1990, the SADF dissolved Infladel transferred its functions to two new companies, Sefmed Information Services and D. John Truter Financial Consultants.[35] According to Hennie Bruwer, the Office of Serious Economic Offenses auditor who conducted a ten-year investigation of Basson's financial transactions, between 1 April 1983 and 28 February 1992 Project Coast cost the SADF a total of 418,226,509 rand, of which 98,432,657 went to RRL and 127,467,406 to Delta G. Basson and his cohorts set up an elaborate global network of front companies and secret accounts so that SADF money could be used to procure embargoed materials, set up businesses, pay foreign collaborators, and bribe foreign officials to facilitate the transfer of materials and equipment to South Africa. From 1 March 1987 to 28 February 1993, the period covered by the Basson indictment, the project had access to nearly 340 million rand, of Basson and his collaborators allegedly misappropriated 37 million rand.[36]
The Covert Poison Assassination Program
Undoubtedly, the most prominent aspect of Project Coast was the development, testing, and utilization of a wide array of hard-to-trace toxic agents to assassinate enemies of the South African state.[37] Clandestine SADF and SAP death squads, above all the Special Forces' Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB) and the SAP Security Branch's Counterinsurgency1 section, used several highly toxic substances made at Delta G and RRL in covert assassination operations.[38] As noted, after using toxic chemicals and biological agents against guerillas during the Rhodesian civil war, members of elite Rhodesian counterinsurgency units joined such SADF special operations units as the CCB's predecessors, the Delta 40 and Barnacle "hit teams," or the SAP's counterinsurgency forces (e.g., the Crowbar unit).[39]
Undoubtedly, high-ranking SADF and SAP officers and other "securocrats" in the South African government were generally aware of and often directly authorized these assassination activities. As early as 1969, the Bureau of State Security, which was staffed largely by SAP Security Branch personnel, set up a special unit known as the Z Squad to eliminate enemies of the state and other security risks. The SADF initiated a plan in 1979, codenamed Operation Dual, targeting guerrillas in neighboring countries, troublesome prisoners, untrustworthy members of the security forces, or activists in the African National Congress and other South African opposition groups. Selous Scout Commander Fritz Loots secretly authorized the hit missions, including a plan of Johan Theron, the SADF's chief assassin, to drug victims before tossing their bodies out of an airplane into the ocean. The aforementioned Barnacle Unit was the primary assassination team, with "eliminations" and "chemical operations" documented as two of the unit's six primary tasks. Targets who did not perish sometimes suffered terrible illnesses or injuries.[40]
In the mid-1980s, a higher-level and more formalized assassination program called the Counter-Revolutionary Intelligence Task Force replaced Operation Dual. Representatives from the SAP's Security Branch, the Division of Military Intelligence, the SF, and the NIS gathered partly to identify assassination targets, passing their recommendations to the SSC in monthly reports. A total of 89 assassinations were authorized on this task force's recommendation.[41]
The substances employed in the assassination program included potentially lethal chemicals such as aldicarb, brodifacum, cantharidin, colchamine, cyanide, digoxin, methanol, monensin, paraoxon, paraquat, phencyclidine, phosphide, silatrane, sodium azide, thallium, and vitamin D3; biological agents such as anthrax spores, botulinum toxin, brucella bacteria, salmonella bacteria, mamba venom, and cholera bacteria. A wide variety of foodstuffs, beverages, household items, and cigarettes were contaminated with these poisons. Following Basson's verbal instructions, RRL's director of research and development, André Immelman, secretly stored a host of toxic chemicals, freeze-dried pathogens, and contaminated items produced at Delta G and RRL in a refrigerator inside a fire- and bomb-proof walk-in safe in his office before delivering them to designated military and police personnel. Immelman handed off poisons to CCB operatives Dr. R. F. Botha (alternately known as "Koos", "Mr. R", and "Frans Brink") and Vernon Lange (otherwise known as "Mr. T" and "Theo Otto"); three Security Branch officers named Chris Smit, Gert Otto, and Manie van Staden for their own assassination missions or for distribution to C1/C10 "hit team" members; Basson himself; and ex-SO psychologist Johnny Koortzen, since 1988 the head of Systems Research and Development. Bioengineer Jan Lourens founded the company in part to turn items like rings, screwdrivers, walking sticks, and umbrellas into assassination devices by adding poison compartments and injectors and firing mechanisms for poisoned pellets.[42]
Among the most prominent targeted in poison assassination plots were Dutch African National Congress operatives Conny Braam and Klaas de Jonge; South African Communist Party military leader Joe Slovo; security force members who were deemed unreliable, such as Victor M. de Fonseca, Mack ("Fernando") Anderson, Roland M. Hunter, and Garth Bailey; anti-apartheid activist and United Democratic Front regional secretary Abdullah Mohamed Omar; and key African National Congress figures Vuyani Mavuso, Sipiwo Mtimkulu, Mandla Msibi, Gibson Mondlane, Gibson Ncube, Pallo Jordan, Ronnie Kasrils, Kwenza Mlaba, the Reverend Frank Chicane, Knox ("Enoch") Dhlamini. Nelson Mandela, if certain insider scientists can be believed, was also reportedly on the target list.[43] Excluding the hundreds of guerilla fighters who were drugged and secretly disposed of, the poison assassination program appears to have felled dozens of victims.
The Dismantling of Project Coast
Project Coast's activities were gradually phased out and exposed in the early 1990s as the apartheid regime reluctantly but peacefully ceded power. The process of dismantling Project Coast, initiated by the apartheid regime and completed by the new African National Congress-led government, was marked by irregularities. The natural assumption was that the old regime would do everything in its power to cover up the most sensitive aspects of Project Coast while shutting it down and the new government would be particularly keen to expose this illicit CBW program, particularly since most of South Africa's new leaders were steadfast apartheid opponents who in some cases were targeted for assassination. However, the new government also demonstrated an unanticipated reluctance to punish some of the individuals involved in Project Coast and to reveal crucial program details to the public.
Surgeon-General Knobel and others briefed South African President Frederik W. de Klerk in March 1990, after which de Klerk ordered a halt to the production of lethal chemical agents. However, de Klerk approved the continued production of irritating and incapacitating agents, and the CCB and Security Branch continued their violence and covert poisoning efforts.[44] With or without the knowledge and authorization of De Klerk's government, the SADF apparently accelerated its illegal international procurement activities in anticipation of the January 1993 signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).[45]
The situation finally came to a head in December 1992, the same month in which De Klerk officially announced the end of apartheid and released Mandela from prison. After revelations about illegal "Third Force" and Project Coast activities, de Klerk decided to dismiss 23 senior military personnel, including Basson, from active service in the SADF. In apparent contradiction to this decision, in January 1993 Basson was entrusted with supervising the destruction of Project Coast's chemical stores. That same month Basson and other high-ranking SADF officers authorized Delta G chemist Klaus Psotta and Dr. Kobus Bothma at Data Images Information Systems, a company owned by Delta G's managing director Mijburgh, to copying of all of the project's CBW technical and scientific information onto CD-ROMs and then destroy the original paper and electronic documents. After this year-long task, thirteen discs full of classified data were placed in safes to which only De Klerk, Surgeon-General Knobel, and the new Coast Project Officer, Colonel Ben Steyn, had keys.[46] At the end of March 1993, the government re-employed Basson for another year to tie up other Project Coast loose ends. After a brief subsequent period of retirement from the SADF, in 1995 the government rehired Basson as a physician at 1 Military Hospital hoping to forestall his continued collaboration with unscrupulous foreign parties. Meanwhile, the reassignment of Project Coast's scientific personnel proceeded apace, as did the privatization of the military front companies. Specifically with regard to Delta G, the company's shareholders briefly sold the firm to ARMSCOR before chemical conglomerates Sentrachem Ltd and Dow Chemical acquired the company.
Independent verification of the destruction of Project Coast's documents never occurred. Basson flagrantly violated the destruction order by retaining hard copies of thousands of Delta G and RRL documents. RRL scientists also admitted that they too had disobeyed instructions to turn over all their project reports for destruction.[47] Nor was the destruction of Project Coast's stocks of chemical and biological agents independently confirmed. On 29 January 1993, Basson told the CMC that he had dumped several drums of chemicals from an air force plane off of Cape Agulhas, but SADF oversight of the destruction process was hardly by the book. Surgeon-General Knobel admitted that he had simply taken Basson's word that these dangerous materials were destroyed.[48] Basson's claims to have overseen the incineration of Project Coast's biological agents in an oven at RRL were likewise never independently corroborated. Moreover, RRL and Delta G scientists may have removed samples of lethal agents from the premises.[49] If nothing else, the de Klerk government failed to take adequate steps to dismantle Project Coast in a way that would prevent potential future proliferation of CBW data and materials.
Next, governmental and nongovernmental sources alike agree that the current South African government has not been forthcoming about Project Coast's CBW activities. First, the American and British governments protested in 1994 and 1995 that South Africa's declarations to build confidence in compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) were not credible because they downplayed the offensive features of the program. Second, Gould and Folb have characterized the portion of South Africa's 1995-2000 BTWC declaration that specifically dealt with South Africa's past offensive and defensive research and development programs, contained statements as "incomplete," "misleading," and "deliberately conceal[ing] relevant information about the programme."[50] Third, in May 1998 the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Surgeon-General's office, and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) summoned TRC commissioners to high-level meeting to pressure the commissioners to prevent revelations about Project Coast that might tarnish South Africa's foreign relations. The TRC commissioners refused, but agreed to a process whereby authorities could identify sensitive documents to restrict their dissemination. Fourth, on 8 June 1998 the government unsuccessfully sought to persuade the TRC not to open its CBW hearings to the public.[51] Many of these actions may have been undertaken in good faith to prevent the release of sensitive scientific information that might lead to further proliferation or to facilitate societal reconciliation, but the new government also seems to have sought to conceal portions of the historical record to forestall embarrassment and/or to protect influential individuals compromised by their association with Project Coast.
In January 1997, Basson was arrested in a sting operation for possession of 3,158 capsules of the illegal drug MDMA, also known as Ecstasy, apparently manufactured at Delta G. The police later discovered several trunks of Project Coast documents that Basson had stashed with friends or in storage facilities, a small but important portion of the historical record of the CBW program.[52] Indicted for murder and a host of other crimes that he allegedly committed as manager of Project Coast, Basson was acquitted of all the charges in April 2002. Disillusioned prosecutors appear to have abandoned plans to file an appeal for a new trial.
Proliferation Concerns Stemming from Project Coast
Before, during, and after Project Coast's dismantlement, key personnel may have shared information on CBW techniques and perhaps some of Project Coast's toxic substances with rogue regimes and/or individuals with questionable integrity and intent.[53] Among Basson's many alleged foreign interlocutors were North American, European, and Taiwanese CBW experts he claims to have met at conferences; former British intelligence officer Roger Buffham; Swiss military intelligence chief Peter Regli and one of his operatives, Jürgen Jacomet; former Iranian government official, secret agent, and apparent con man Mohammed Ali Hashemi; senior Libyan intelligence officers Yusuf Murgham and Abd al-Razaq; Croatian police and intelligence officials; Danish intelligence officer Hendrik Thomsen; and a Russian named Vorabyov. In addition, Basson spent several months in Libya supposedly working on designing a transportation system and visited Germany and Eastern Europe to consult with businessmen reputedly associated with the so-called CBW mafia, such as Hubert Blücher. Basson claims to have traveled to Iraq to investigate the effects of CW attacks and to Iran to help the government deal with disease outbreaks.[54] Other Project Coast scientists may also have travelled to countries with dictatorial regimes.[55] South Africa has yet to clarify what Basson and his associates were up to overseas.
Questionable activities have also occurred in South Africa. For example, Immelman once met an alleged Syrian military officer in Johannesburg to discuss CBW matters.[56] Also, in the summer of 2002, foreign parties asked former RRL scientist Dr. Daan Goosen to provide biological materials from Project Coast. At the time, Goosen was an NIA employee. In the first deal, Goosen provided a 5 ml sample of goat serum used as an anthrax diagnostic agent for livestock and a 2 ml sample of freeze-dried E. coli genetically modified with the gene coding for Clostridium perfringens toxin to former CIA officer Robert A. Zlokie and his handler Donald G. Mayes, an ex-U.S. intelligence operative with a long history as an independent arms dealer. Accounts of the second Goosen deal differ. One version holds that a group of purported Germans offered Goosen $20 million for anthrax and other BW agents, but Goosen opted out when he learned that the Germans were Arabs, including a Qatari working at the Saudi embassy. Another version portrays Goosen as the target of an SAP sting, with a phony sheik offering $150 million for anthrax, the aforementioned goat serum, and other items. Fearing their use in acts of terrorism, Goosen refused to provide such materials to Arabs. Either way, Goosen reported the attempted purchase to the NIA.[57] The middleman between Goosen and the foreigners for both deals was a retired SADF major-general with CCB ties named Tai Minnaar, who in 1989 established a private company called Military Technical Services that was linked Executive Outcomes, the mercenary recruitment agency.[58] Minaar died shortly after the collapse of the second deal, perhaps of a heart attack, but Minaar's peculiar discoloration and bloating prior to death suggested a possible poisoning. No autopsy was performed, and cremation of Minaar's body precludes further investigation of the cause of death.[59] These experiences may be the tip of the iceberg of secret efforts by foreigners trying to acquire Project Coast's CBW materials.
Perhaps even more troubling is the possibility that Project Coast personnel may have transferred dangerous CBW materials or know-how to right-wing extremists. Some civilian Afrikaner paramilitary groups whose pro-apartheid members remain violently opposed to black majority rule and have publicly threatened to attack their enemies with chemical and biological agents.[60] Members of the SF, SADF and SAP-sponsored "death squads" may have collaborated with the civilian paramilitary right in South Africa, which has carried out terrorist attacks.[61]
Another concern is that Basson and other Project Coast scientists were associated with an even broader international right-wing network, purportedly known as The Organization, which may include expatriate Rhodesians and South Africans.[62] The existence of The Organization, it should be noted, remains to be substantiated, but American doctors Larry Ford and Jerry Nilsson, an outspoken white supremacist, may be members. According to a pair of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) informants, in the mid-1980s Dr. Ford transferred a suitcase full of dangerous pathogens to Surgeon-General Knobel at the Los Angeles residence of the South African trade attaché, Gideon Bouwer.[63] Nilsson volunteered to fight against nationalist guerrillas during the Rhodesian civil war, and Ford and Nilsson repeatedly visited South Africa. Knobel consulted with Ford on CBW matters and introduced Ford to Basson, who opened secret accounts in Ford's name. At Knobel's request, Ford lectured Project Coast scientists about the contamination of household items with biological agents.[64] Ford committed suicide in March 2000 suicide after being implicated in the attempted assassination of his Irvine business partner James Patrick Riley. Afterwards, police discovered an arsenal of small arms and explosives, Christian Identity militia literature, and over 260 containers of biological materials on Ford's properties, including a jar of ricin toxin was found in a refrigerator in his garage. Patients and former mistresses have testified that Ford poisoned them. [65] One of ex-Selous Scout and EMLC armorer Philip Morgan's "special applicators" was found among Ford's possessions, which also indicates a relationship between Ford and key Project Coast personnel. Finally, Stephen J. Hatfill, an American biological warfare expert who the FBI once designated as a "person of interest" in the 2001 U.S. anthrax mailings, was involved in various Rhodesian intelligence or counterinsurgency operations, received his medical degree in Rhodesia and may have had been involved with the activities of SAMS, including the 7 Medical Battalion Group, the Selous Scouts, and the right-wing Afrikaner Resistance Movement. [66]
The extent to which the activities undertaken by Project Coast may have resulted, inadvertently or intentionally, in the proliferation of WMD to other regions has yet to be determined.
Sources:
[1] Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South Africa's
Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute for
National Security Studies, 2001), p. 7. SADF personnel sent to Angola to gain
counterinsurgency experience reportedly observed these activities.
[2] J. K. Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (London: Croom Helm, 1985).
[3] See especially the insider accounts of former members of the Rhodesian and South
African security services, including Eugene de Kock (with Jeremy Gordin),
A Long Night's Damage: Working for the Apartheid
State (Saxonwold, RSA: Contra Press, 1998), p. 71; Ken Flower, Serving
Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981
(London: John Murray, 1987), p. 137; Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front
War: Counter-Insurgency and Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980 (Gweru,
Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989), pp. 109-12; and Peter Stiff, The Silent War:
South African Recce Operations, 1969-1994 (Johannesburg: Galago Press,
1999), pp. 308-10. Compare also Jeremy Brickhill, "Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy:
Secret War in Southern Africa," Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter
1992-93), pp. 7-10; and Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The
Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp.
214-23.
[4] Chandré
Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 26, citing an email from Mike Woods; and
Jeremy Brickhill, "Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa,"
Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 7-10.
[5] Peter Stiff, The Silent War: South African Recce Operations,
1969-1994 (Johannesburg: Galago Press, 1999), pp. 308-10. Stiff calls
Symington "Sam Roberts" and notes rumors that Symington may have
killed more guerrillas with poisons in certain months than the Rhodesian light
infantry managed to kill with conventional operations.
[6] Chandré Gould and
Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical
and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 27.
[7] See Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and
Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980 (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989),
pp. 110-11; Jeremy Brickhill, "Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in
Southern Africa," Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), p. 7; and
Ken Flower, Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia into
Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981 (London: John Murray, 1987), p. 137.
[8] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical
and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 27.
[9] Henrik Ellert, The Rhodesian Front War: Counter-Insurgency and
Guerrilla War in Rhodesia, 1962-1980 (Gweru, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1989),
p. 112. Compare Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast:
Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 28.
[10] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 27; Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague
Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's,
1999), p. 222 (quotes).
[11] Meryl Nass, "Anthrax Epizootic in Zimbabwe, 1978-1980: Due to Deliberate
Spread?," The PSR Quarterly 24:2 (December 1992), pp. 198-209.
[12] Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The
Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp.
224-7. Professor Symington of the University of Rhodesia purportedly prepared
the ricin, thallium, and parathion to be used for assassinations.
[13] Compare Eugene de Kock (with Jeremy Gordin), A Long Night's Damage:
Working for the Apartheid State (Saxonwold, RSA: Contra Press, 1998), pp.
58-9; J. K. Cilliers, Counter-Insurgency in Rhodesia (London: Croom Helm,
1985), p. 9; Stephen Burgess and Helen Purkitt, The Rollback of South
Africa's Biological Warfare Program (USAF Academy, Colorado: USAF Institute
for National Security Studies, 2001), pp. 7-8; and Ian Martinez, "The history of
the use of bacteriological and chemical agents during Zimbabwe's liberation war
of 1965-80 by Rhodesian forces," Third World Quarterly 23:6 (2002), p. 1170.
[14] Jeremy Brickhill, "Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa,"
Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 8-9.
[15] Klaas de Jonge, "The Chemical Warfare Case," The (Secret)
Truth Commission Files, November 1997, p. 4.
[16] Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of
Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 221-2.
[17] Jeremy Brickhill, "Zimbabwe's Poisoned Legacy: Secret War in Southern Africa,"
Covert Action Quarterly 43 (Winter 1992-93), pp. 58-60.
[18] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project
Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 22.
[19] The SADF White Paper of 1977 described the total war
concept. Compare Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarisation of South African
Politics (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986), p. 11; Mark Swilling and Mark
Phillips, "State power in the 1980s: From 'total strategy' to
'counter-revolutionary warfare'," in Jacklyn Cock and Laurie Nathan, eds.,
Society at War: The Militarisation of South Africa (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1989), pp 135-7; Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars:
The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999),
p. 247; and [General] Magnus Malan, "Die aanslag teen Suid-Afrika," ISSUP
Strategic Review 2 (1980). For the apartheid government, the establishment
of Project Coast had as much or more to do with controlling and suppressing the
country's black majority as it did with resisting external threats, which could
help to explain the program's emphasis on using CBW agents to eliminate domestic
opponents of the regime and to control unruly crowds.
[20] Compare Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on
South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of
Wouter Basson, Niel Knobel, and Daan Goosen; Centre for Conflict Resolution,
Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April
2002, testimony of Knobel; Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project
Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 36-8.
[21] Chandré Gould
and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 40-1; Brian Davey, "Degradation of Human
Performance with use of chemical protective clothing: Overview of Research
Programme," paper presented at the Fourth Annual Symposium on Protection Against
Chemical Warfare Agents in Stockholm, 8-12 June 1992.
[22] Centre for Conflict
Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of
Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, testimony of Jan Lourens,
Basson, and several in-theater military officers, including Major-General Leslie
Rudman, Lieutenant-General Deon Ferreira, Colonel Paul Fouché, and
Colonel Renier Coetzee. Compare Marléne Burger and Chandré Gould,
Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological
Warfare Programme (Cape Town: Zebra, 2002), pp. 39,
102-7.
[23] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 153-5. The document, dated 28 November
1989, is entitled "Project Coast: Possibilities for Privatization," and contains
passages enumerating the program's defensive dimensions.
[24] Only if one restricts
the term "offensive" narrowly to the large-scale production of lethal
battlefield and "area denial" CBW weapons can it be argued that Project Coast
was not offensive, although in a few instances South Africa apparently used such
weapons. Project Coast developed an extensive array of lethal, hard-to-trace
chemical and biological agents to assassinate enemies of the state, which is
hardly defensive activity. Project Coast bioengineer Jan Lourens rebutted
official claims that the South African CBW program was strictly defensive as
"unqualified absolute nonsense." Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
Hearings on South Africa's Chemical and
Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of Jan Lourens, Schalk van Rensburg,
Daan Goosen, and Mike Odendaal. Compare Milton Leitenberg, "Biological Weapons
in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis," paper prepared for the 7th
International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and Biological Warfare,
June 2001, in Stockholm, pp. 15-16, www.fas.org.
[25] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 43-4. Compare also Basson's testimony
before the TRC and at his trial, as well as that of Knobel.
[26] For Basson's meteoric career progress, see Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
Hearings on South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of Knobel and Basson. Compare
Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and
Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 43.
\[27] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 59. Among the many SO alumni were Basson,
Philip Mijburgh, Jan Lourens, Wynand Swanepoel, Johnny Koortzen, Gerrie
Odendaal, Hennie Bester, Ben Steyn, Deon Erasmus, Kobus Bothma, and James Davies.
[28] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 44-5.
[29] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 64-5.
[30] James Selfe, "South Africa's National [Security] Management System," in Jacklyn Cock and
Laurie Nathan, eds., Society at War: The Militarisation of South Africa (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp. 149-56.
[31] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on
South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of
Basson and Schalk van Rensburg. Members of the CMC (and Reduced Defence Command
Council) are listed in Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast:
Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 187-90.
[32] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on
South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of
Basson and Knobel. Compare RSA, Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Report (London: MacMillan, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 521-3.
[33] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on
South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of
Basson, Knobel, and Johan Koekemoer. Basson may also have received instructions
from SAP Lieutenant-General Lothar Neethling. Also, Centre for Conflict
Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October
1999-April 2002, testimony of Belgian businessman Charles van Remoortere;
Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and
Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 48.
[34] RSA, National Intelligence Service, "Staff Paper prepared for the Steyn Commission on Alleged
Dangerous Activities of SADF Components," December 1992, Annexure C, p. 2,
serial number 7. The Binnekring is described as an "underground organization"
that Basson founded. This odd report, written at a time of political transition,
contains many uncorroborated claims.
[35] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 58.
[36] Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of
Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, testimony of Hennie Bruwer; H.
J. Bruwer, Projek Coast: Forensiese Ondersoek. Aanvullende Verslag, 10
August 2000, p. 6.
[37] Several Project Coast scientists testified that they were instructed to develop
toxic substances that would be both difficult to detect and untraceable.
According to RRL lab director Schalk van Rensburg, "[t]he most frequent
instruction we obtained from Doctor Basson and Doctor Swanepoel was to develop
something with which you could kill an individual which would make his death
resemble a natural death, and that something was to be not detectable in a
normal forensic laboratory." See Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),
Hearings on South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme,
testimony of Van Rensburg.
[38] The identity of the substances used is known partly because of André Immelman's
list of some of the poisonous materials and devices that RRL produced in 1989,
including his handwritten annotations of the nicknames to identify the
recipients of some items. Marléne Burger and Chandré Gould
reproduce this list in, Secrets and Lies: Wouter
Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Cape
Town: Zebra, 2002), pp. 34-5.
[39] For more information on SADF and SAP death squads, see the insider accounts in Eugene de
Kock (with Jeremy Gordin), A Long Night's Damage:
Working for the Apartheid State (Saxonwold, RSA: Contra Press, 1998),
Jacques Pauw, Into the Heart of Darkness: Confessions of Apartheid's
Assassins (Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, 1997), and Gordon Winter, Inside
BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981). See also
official reports such as RSA, Commission of Enquiry into Certain Alleged
Murders, Report [of the Honourable Mr. Justice L.T.C. Harms] (Pretoria:
Government Printer, 1990), and RSA, National Intelligence Service, "Staff Paper
prepared for the Steyn Commission on Alleged Dangerous Activities of SADF
Components," December 1992. In addition, Keith Gottschalk, "The Rise and Fall of
Apartheid's Death Squads," in Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with
Deniability, ed. by Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (New York: St.
Martin's, 2000), pp. 229-59, Stephen Ellis, "The Historical Significance of
South Africa's Third Force," Journal of Southern African Studies 24:2
(June 1998), pp. 261-99, Kevin A. O'Brien, "Counter-Intelligence for
Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Police Security Branch,
1979-1990," Terrorism and Political Violence 16:3 (Autumn 2001), pp.
27-59, Kevin A. O'Brien, "The Use of Assassination as a Tool of State Policy:
South Africa's Counter-Revolutionary Strategy, 1979-92 (Part II)," Terrorism
and Political Violence 13:2 (Summer 2001), pp. 107-42, and Charl Schutte et
al, eds., The Hidden Hand: Covert Operations in South Africa (Pretoria:
Human Sciences Research Council, 1998), esp. pp. 167-362; Patrick Laurence,
Death Squads: Apartheid's Secret Weapon (London: Penguin, 1990).
[40] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 50-2; Centre for Conflict Resolution,
Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April
2002, testimony of Theron, Danie Phaal, Trevor Floyd, Jan Anton Nieuwoudt,
Gray Branfield, and Niel Kriel, another ex-Rhodesian soldier and the first
commander of the Barnacle unit. Kriel stated that Defence Minister Magnus Malan
authorized Loots and himself to establish a front company called NKTF Security
Consultants to carry out such operations.
[41] Keith Gottschalk, "The Rise and Fall of Apartheid's Death Squads," in
Death Squads in Global Perspective: Murder with
Deniability, ed. by Bruce B. Campbell and Arthur D. Brenner (New York: St.
Martin's, 2000), pp. 241-2; Kevin A. O'Brien, "Counter-Intelligence for
Counter-Revolutionary Warfare: The South African Police Security Branch,
1979-1990," Terrorism and Political Violence 16:3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 34-6.
[42] Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly
Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, testimony of
Immelman, James Davies, Jan Lourens, Mike Odendaal, and Basson, who denied
authorizing Immelman to issue these deadly agents; and the sales list in TRC
document 52. Immelman's annotations identifying the recipients are included in
the partial sales list reprinted in Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson,
Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), pp. 250-1.
[43] For further details, see Hooggeregshof, Die Staat teen Wouter Basson,
Akte van Beskulding [Indictment] (1999), pp. 184-202, 218-52.
[44] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project
Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 115-18, 134-41.
[45] Chandré Gould
and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 217.
[46] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on
South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of
Knobel and Philip Mijburgh; Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial:
Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings, October 1999-April 2002, testimony of Ben Steyn.
[47] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project
Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 222.
[48] For the destruction of the chemical agents, mainly the illegal drugs
used for calmatives research, see Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project
Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 215, 217-18; Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on South Africa's Chemical and
Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of Basson and Knobel.
[49] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), p. 214; personal communication with Ilan Ziv,
17 March 2003. See also Joby Warrick, "Biotoxins Fall into Private Hands,"
Washington Post (21 April 2003), who notes that during July 2002 meetings
with US officials, Basson admitted that "people working in the labs had probably
taken things with them."
[50] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project
Coast: Apartheid's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 210, 213-14.
[51] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 225-6.
[52] Basson arranged to store trunks at his friend Samuel Bosch's home, and he stashed two other
trunks in a storage facility, where the lost CCB files were found in a storage
area rented by Basson's Rhodesian associate Bill Grieve. Personal
communication with Robert Block, February 2003.
[53] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 209-11.
[54] For details on Basson's extensive foreign contacts and activities, see
Centre for Conflict Resolution, Basson Trial: Weekly Summaries of Court Proceedings,
October 1999-April 2002, testimony of Basson, Hennie
Bruwer, Charles van Remoortere, Bernard Zimmer, Sol Pienaar, David Chu, David
Webster, and many others. Compare Martin Stoll, "Peter Regli unterhielt Kontakte
auch zu Bassons Boss," Sonntagszeitung (28 March 1999); Marco Kalmann,
"L'affaire Bellasi et le mythe de la perfection Suisse," Largeur.com (23
August 1999); Yvette Jaggi, "Affaire Regli: Sous enquête mais pas sous
pression," Domaine Publique (7 September 2001); Bruno Vanoni, "Regli
rehabilitiert — und abgesetzt," Blue Win (1 November 2001); and the
official Swiss government report authored by Rainer J. Schweizer, Rapport
final de l'enquête administrative dans l'affaire "Service du
renseignement/Afrique du Sud" au Département federal de la
défense, de la protection de la population et des sports (DDPS), 16
December 2002, especially pp. 88-147.
[55] Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Hearings on
South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme, testimony of Jan
Lourens; Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 207-8.
[56] Chandré Gould and Peter Folb, Project Coast: Apartheid's
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Geneva: United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research, 2002), pp. 207-8.
[57] Personal communications with Robert Block of the Wall
Street Journal, Ilan Ziv, Joby Warrick of the Washington Post, and
Marléne Burger of the Centre for Conflict Resolution, December 2002-April
2003. See further Joby Warrick and John Mintz, "Lethal Legacy: Bioweapons for
Sale," Washington Post (20 April 2003); Joby Warrick, "Biotoxins Fall
into Private Hands," Washington Post (21 April 2003); Robert Block, "A
Cautionary Disarmament," Wall Street Journal (31 January 2003); and Sam
Sole, "SA general touted anthrax abroad," Mail & Guardian (25 January
2003). Goosen, Minaar, and Zlokie signed tje contract for Goosen's first
deal on 5 May 2002. According to Ziv, Minnaar was also apparently trying to
peddle missiles, laser guns, cases of depleted uranium, and possibly nuclear detonators.
[58] Khareen Pech, "Executive Outcomes — A Corporate Conquest," in Peace,
Profit or Plunder? The Privatisation of Security in War-Torn African
Societies, ed. by Jakkie Cilliers and Peggy Mason (Halfway House: Institute
for Security Studies, 1999), pp. 81-109. For Minnaar's association with the CCB,
see an undated 1998 NIA report entitled "The CCB and the Generals."
Available in "Secret South African Disruption", www.cryptome.org.
[59] Sam Sole, "SA general touted anthrax abroad," Mail
& Guardian (25 January 2003); "SA: Safe haven for al-Qaeda?,"
News24 (10 December 2002).
[60] See Vrye Weekblad (30 November 1990) and
Rapport (18 November 1990), both cited by Johann van Rooyen, Hard
Right: The New White Power in South Africa (London and New York: I.B.
Tauris, 1994), pp. 96-7, 199; Arthur Kemp, Victory or Violence: The Story of
the AWB (Pretoria: Forma, 1990), p. 47.
[61] For indications of collusion between personnel from covert SADF components
and the paramilitary right, see RSA, National Intelligence Service, "Staff Paper prepared for the
Steyn Commission on Alleged Dangerous Activities of SADF Components," December
1992, p. 5, Annexure A, p. 5, and Annexure B, p. 12. On Afrikaner right-wing
terrorism, Mark Klusener, "South African 'Coup Plotters' May Have Links
with US Groups," CNSNews (23 September 2002); Basildon Pela,
"Far right in South Africa foiled in plot to poison water in
townships," The Independent [London] (25 November 2002).
[62] Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: The Terrifying
Reality of Biological Warfare (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), pp. 250, 254,
277-9. The authors imply that The Organization was a jazzier name for Third
Force elements operating abroad.
[63] Edward Humes, "The Medicine Man," Los Angeles Magazine (July 2001), pp. 95-6.
[64] Compare CBS News, "'Dr. Death' and His Accomplice,"
60 Minutes (7 November 2002); Jeff Collins,
"Ford advised S. Africa on warfare devices," Orange County Register (15
March 2000); Arthur Allen, "Mad Scientist," Salon Magazine (26 June
2002); and Rachel Bell, "Larry Ford," Court TV's Crime Library,
www.crimelibrary.com.
[65] Edward Humes, "The Medicine Man," Los Angeles
Magazine (July 2001), pp. 97, 166-8; Michael Reynolds, "Memo on Larry Ford
and the Far Right," July 2002.
[66] Hatfill claimed to have served with C Squadron of the Rhodesian SAS
and to have seen action with the Selous Scouts. He may have operated out of the Bindura
Fort base, the launch point for McGuinnesss black operations, including CW actions. Neither of
Hatfill's claims has been confirmed, though an unnamed SADF veteran stated
that Hatfill was a medical orderly for the Selous Scouts, who might have
encouraged Hatfill to attend medical school. Hatfill obtained his medical degree
from the University of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Hatfill reportedly helped to train the
Aquila Brigade shock troops of Eugene Terre'Blanche's right-wing Afrikaner
Resistance Movement. Hatfield also claims to have received advanced medical
training from various SAMS components, as well as to have been assigned to its 7
Medical Battalion Group. 24 January 2003 email to the author by Stephen Dresch
of Forensic Intelligence. Peter McAleese, a former member of the Rhodesian SAS,
mentions that a "Steve Hartful"— undoubtedly Hatfill — worked for
the Rhodesian police's Special Branch. See Hatfill's curriculum vitae, p.
3; Peter McAleese, No Mean Soldier: The Story of
the Ultimate Professional Soldier in the SAS and other Forces (London:
Cassell & Co., 1993), pp. 163-4;Tony Weaver, "US anthrax suspect had links
with AWB," The Herald (1 July 2002); Marléne Burger, "Murky past
of a US bio-warrior," Mail & Guardian (15 August 2002). See also note #77.
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and
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verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2010 by MIIS.
