Constrained by limited resources, Syria has nonetheless shown interest in and taken steps to acquire chemical weapons, biological weapons, and ballistic missiles. Syria is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and has a Comprehensive Nuclear Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, Damascus faces unresolved allegations that it may have illicitly built a plutonium production reactor at Al-Kibar, and is currently under IAEA investigation. Syria has allegedly received direct assistance from Russia (and formerly the Soviet Union), China, Iran, and North Korea in developing its WMD and ballistic missile programs. Syria's primary motivation for pursuing unconventional weapons and ballistic missiles appears to be the Israeli threat, as Israel has superior conventional military capabilities and is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons.[1]

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Nuclear Chronology  May 15, 2009 Chemical Overview  Mar. 25, 2009 Biological Overview  Mar. 25, 2009

Nuclear
Syria signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1969. Seeking to expand its nuclear capabilities, Syria has vigorously pursued external assistance since the 1980s, including reactor and technology transfers from states such as Argentina, China and Russia. [2] [3] These efforts, however, produced few tangible results. It was not until 1991 that the Chinese began to construct Syria's first research reactor at Dayr Al Hajar (or Der Al-Hadjar). The SRR-1 30KW miniature neutron source reactor went critical in 1996 and is not large enough to be of proliferation concern. [4] However, in September 2007, the Israeli Air Force bombed and destroyed a building in northwestern Syria that U.S. and Israeli intelligence officials claim was a plutonium production reactor. The Syrian government denies these allegations; however, a February 2009 IAEA report revealed that inspectors found traces of uranium and graphite particles at the Al-Kibar site, calling Damascus's explanation of the site's purpose into question. The agency continues to request access to Al-Kibar and related documents, but has been rebuffed by Syrian officials. [5] As of March 2009, the IAEA investigation remains inconclusive.

Biological
There is very limited open-source information regarding Syria's biological warfare (BW) capability. German and Israeli sources have asserted that Syria possesses Bacillus anthracis (which causes anthrax), botulinum toxin, and ricin. However, there is no reliable evidence to the effect that Syria has the capability to weaponize these or other agents. Syria has a pharmaceutical infrastructure that could support a limited BW program, and it engages in trade of dual-use equipment and goods with companies in Western Europe, Russia, and North Korea that could support such a program. Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968 and signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) on April 14, 1972, but has not yet ratified it.

Damascus ratified the Geneva Protocol in 1968, but is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). However, Syrian officials have shown interest in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) since 2004, having met its Director-General on several occasions and attended OPCW seminars and conferences. In the absence of information on the motivations

Missile
Syria's missile program began in the early 1970s and has grown in tandem with Syrian chemical weapons (CW) development. Damascus possesses one of the largest arsenals of ballistic missiles in the region, composed of hundreds of Scud-derived missile systems. [6] Syria relied on Soviet technology transfer to build its program, and imported FROG-7, Scud-B, and solid-fueled Scarab SS-21 missiles from the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s. [7] In the 1990s, Iran provided Syria with technical assistance for solid-fueled rocket motor production, while North Korea supplied it with equipment and technical assistance for liquid-fueled missile production. Syria reportedly purchased 150 Scud-C missiles from North Korea in 1991. [8] Demonstrating its continued commitment to expanding its missile capabilities, Syria tested a North Korean 700 km-range Scud-D in September 2000, reportedly testing another Scud-D in January 2007. [9] However, Syrian efforts to establish an indigenous production capability have so far failed, forcing Damascus to rely on continued imports from countries such as North Korea and China to sustain its program. Syria expressed interest in purchasing the Russian Iskander missile as early as 2004, but has so far been unable to acquire this surface-to-surface missile. Reports also indicate that Syria has been trying to purchase modern air-defense systems, such as the S300-PMU 2 Favorit and the Pantsyr S-1, from Russia. [10] Damascus is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Sources:
[1] Anthony H. Cordesman, "Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction: An Overview," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2 June 2008, www.csis.org; Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, (Washington, D.C: 2004), pp. 83-110.
[2] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[3] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, "Syria: Country Profile," www.sipri.org.
[4] Nuclear Programmes in the Middle East (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008), pp. 73-82.
[5] International Atomic Energy Agency, "Report by the Director General: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic," 19 February 2009, www.isis-online.org; Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Israeli Nuclear Reactor Strike and Syrian Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Background Analysis," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 24 October 2007, www.csis.org.
[6] Deputy Director for National Intelligence Analysis, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," 31 December 2006, p. 6, www.fas.org; Claremont Institute, "The Threat from Syria," www.missilethreat.com.
[7] Global Security, "Missile Programs: Syria," www.globalsecurity.org.
[8] Arms Control Association, "Fact Sheet: Worldwide Ballistic Missile Inventories," May 2002, www.armscontrol.org; Deputy Director for National Intelligence Analysis, "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," 31 December 2006, p. 6. www.fas.org.
[9] Global Security, "Missile Programs: Syria," www.globalsecurity.org.
[10] Anthony Cordesman, "If it's Syria: Syrian Military Forces and Capabilities," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 April 2003, pp. 5-9, www.csis.org.

See Syria Missile Profile

	Updated May 2009