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Chemical Facilities

Overview

There is very little detailed information available about the organizations and facilities associated with the Syrian CW program. It appears, however, that all research, development, and production activities and facilities associated with the CW program are under the direct control of the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique (CERS). This agency is run by a Director-General, with the rank of minister, who is directly responsible to the President.[1] The Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique provides most research and development functions for the Syrian military. Since the 1970s, the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique has also been responsible for the development of civilian science and technology in Syria, and it was in this context that the institute was able to develop cooperative relationships with Western chemical companies.

Although no private companies have been directly connected with the CW program, the Syrian economy has only begun to be privatized in the last decade. The government has established front companies to acquire chemicals from overseas sources, none of which has been publicly identified. The exception to this is the company known as Setma Limited, which was associated with the import of chemical weapons precursors in the early 1990s.[2] No further mention of this company has been made since 1993.

Open sources assert that there are at least four, potentially five, Syrian chemical weapons production facilities. One or two are located near Damascus, and one each situated in Hama, Latakia, and Al-Safira village (in the Aleppo area). The facilities are spread throughout Syria, which may indicate a deliberate effort to avoid concentrating its strategic facilities in a single center. All the production facilities are described as heavily defended and located underground to maximize survivability in the event of conflict, as Syria has apparently accepted that it is not currently capable of effectively maintaining control over its airspace. In addition, some sources claim that the Syrian CW program has been able to use the increasing number of pharmaceutical plants spread around the country as a covert means to import restricted precursors.[3] It is difficult to make a clear determination of the value of these facilities to the CW program without a better understanding of the capabilities and requirements of the individual plants.

All Syria's chemical weapons production facilities appear to have been constructed in the same period of the early to mid-1980s. The construction of these facilities would have been impossible without technical and material support from foreign companies, especially West European firms.[4] Reports of efforts to modernize and expand these production facilities since their initial construction have focused on Damascus and Al-Safira. The Damascus chemical weapons production facility, which may or may not be co-located with the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique (CERS), appears to have added a production line for chemical bomblets in 1997.[5] No clear indications exist as to the number or location of facilities responsible for loading CW agents into munitions or the production of the specialized munitions themselves.

Two facilities—Khan Abu-Shamat and Furqlus—were positively identified in 1993 as storage depots for CW munitions.[6] Chemical weapons storage facilities may also be presumed to exist at, or near to, launch facilities for those Scud missiles claimed to be armed with chemical warheads. One such facility is co-located with the Al-Safira chemical weapons production facility.[7] Depending on the quantity of stockpiled chemical weapons agents available and the degree to which there are plans for their tactical use, it is possible that CW munitions are stored near units deployed for the defense of the Golan Heights. It should be noted that no information on any such storage facilities is currently available in open sources.

There is no detailed information available on facilities for testing Syrian chemical weapons or CW agent delivery systems. On 1 July 2001, Syria tested a Scud-B missile fitted with a simulated chemical warhead. The missile was fired from Haleb in northern Syria, traveling to an unspecified target area 300km away in southern Syria.[8] Earlier reports of chemical weapons-related testing have simply referred to unidentified bombing and practice ranges in the Syrian Desert.[9]

The main focus of the Syrian CW program has been on the provision of a strategic deterrent, and this now exists in the form of warheads for Scud-C and -D missiles. These missiles may be held outside the regular command structure of the Syrian military, under direct presidential control. Reportedly, there is a chemical department within the Syrian general staff that is responsible for coordination of all NBC related activities within the Syrian Army.[10] It remains unclear to what degree chemical weapons have been integrated into the Syrian Army at an operational or tactical level.

Sources:
[1] Dany Shoham, "Gas, Guile and Germs: Syria's ultimate weapons," Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2002), <http://www.meforum.org>.
[2] "Poison Gas for Syria is intercepted," International Herald Tribune, 10 August 1992, p. 2.
[3] Global Security, "Syrian CW," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/cw.htm>.
[4] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 214-215.
[5] Paul Beaver, "Syria to Make Chemical Bomblets for Scud C's," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 September 1997, p. 3.
[6] E.J. Hogendoorn, "A Chemical Weapons Atlas," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53 (September/October 1997), <http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/1997/so97/so97hogendoom.html>.
[7] Global Security, "Syrian CW facilities: Al-Safir," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/al-safir.htm>.
[8] David C Isby, "Syrian Scud carried a simulated chemical warhead," Jane's Missiles and Rockets (September 2001), <http://www.janes.com>.
[9] "Israeli claims that Syria is making VX nerve gas," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 May 1997, p. 6, "Syria's ‘nerve gas' missiles," Jane's Foreign Report, 31 July 2003, <http://www.janes.com>; "The Great Arsenal of Autocracy: Syria's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin (February 1999), <http://www.meib.org/issues/9902.htm#me2>.
[10] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 215.



 

Updated November 2003



Overview
Al-Safira
Banias Oil Refinery
Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique
Furqlus Depot
Hama
Homs
Homs Oil Refinery
Khan Abu Shamat Depot
Latakia
Setma Limited
Syrian Centre of Ecological Protection


Limiting the Use of WMD between Regional Powers: Israel vs. Regional Adversary (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria)
Issue Brief: Islamist Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Region
China's Missile Exports and Assistance to Syria
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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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