Very little open source information exists on supposed Syrian biological warfare (BW) activities. The bulk of open source references to Syrian BW activity consist of claims by U.S. or Israeli government officials that there are reasons to believe that Syria supports an offensive BW program. In contrast to allegations of Syrian chemical warfare (CW) capabilities, no evidence has been produced supporting the BW allegations. This may be due to concerns about protecting intelligence sources or a lack of relevant information. As a consequence, most analysis on this subject is limited to repetition of official assertions or extrapolations based on assessments of Syrian dual-capability industry and political motivations. Such analysis can generate only educated conjectures of maximum capability. Furthermore, a defensive biological weapons research capability, while suggesting interest—and expertise—in the BW field, does not imply or confirm the existence of an offensive BW program. Lastly, Syria is an authoritarian state surrounded by perceived enemies, so it makes efforts to conceal all its military activities and capabilities, especially those associated with its strategic programs. Thus, intelligence collected by foreigners is probably incapable of providing a complete, or conclusive, assessment of any of Syria's WMD programs, including of course its putative BW program. Even if foreigners can roughly gauge Syria's technical capabilities in biotechnology, there is no sign that they can divine any of the Syrian governments intentions in regards to acquisition, development, and deployment of biological weapons.

History

Syria signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC) in April 1972, but has not ratified it. There are no indications that it might do so in the future. While Syria has expressed its opposition to WMD, it has at the same time supported the right of states to take those measures that they deem most appropriate to protect their security. Some security experts interpret this as a political argument for the "right" of states to acquire WMD.

Syria appears to have acquired a limited defensive capability against biological weapons in the early 1970s, when they acquired modern Soviet land warfare systems such as tanks and armored personnel carriers equipped with protection against NBC weapons.[1]

It is unclear whether Syria's protective capability against WMD has improved since that time. Perhaps the opposite is the case: in the absence of relevant indigenous production capabilities, Syria's defense capability has decreased since the late 1980s because of its inability to replace or repair aging or obsolete equipment.

In the civilian sphere, Syria has since the late 1980s made a sustained effort to increase its capabilities in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology fields. For this purpose, it has established a number of joint-venture companies and constructed approximately 12 pharmaceutical factories. It is possible that as a result of the construction and operation of these new facilities, Syria has gained skills and technologies that are of relevance to a BW program, should its leaders wish to acquire one.

The few allegations that have been made about Syria possessing an offensive BW program claim that its primary biological weapons facility is located at the Damascus-based Scientific Research Council, where anthrax, cholera, and botulism are investigated by the Biological Research Facility.[2] In 1992, an allegation was made that an additional facility located near or in the coastal town of Cerin was producing biological weapons.[3] Since that time, open sources have tended to assert that Syria is probably developing biological weapons, rather than make definitive statements to that effect.

Status

Similar to many developing countries that possess a rudimentary pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry, Syria perforce has the technical and scientific potential to research, develop, produce, and deploy biological weapons of low technical level. However, there is no convincing evidence that Syria possesses an offensive biological weapons program. It is probable, though not proven, that the Syrian military has and is supporting limited R&D to defend its forces against biological weapons. As in many countries at its level of development, such R&D might include an attempt to identify how biological weapons could be used against its forces. Claims that Syria has weaponized botulinum toxin and ricin are dubious given the difficulties associated with transforming them into useful weapons agents.[4] Research on Bacillus anthracis may be undertaken to protect animal husbandry in Syria from anthrax since this disease is endemic to its territory. Such research could be used as a cover to conceal a BW program. Further, it may be the basis of allegations concerning Syria's weaponization of B. anthracis. If it has weaponized this bacterium, it is possible that Syria would seek to fill bomblets, such as those developed to disperse CW agents, with the resulting product.[5]

Statements made by Western intelligence agencies tend to describe Syria as possessing a limited biotechnical capability—one that would require significant technical assistance from a competent outside party before it would be capable of producing and weaponizing BW agents on a large-scale. At the same time, some of these reports maintain that Syria has ongoing BW R&D efforts, but that they have not yet yielded a viable biological weapon. Occasional assertions that Syria has weaponized and deployed biological agents or toxins are unsupported by facts and probably reflect media-directed stories rather than technical analyses. In the absence of new revelations, it is impossible to support or refute allegations that Syria has an active BW program. It is equally difficult to make any claims regarding military or strategic aspects of this alleged program. The paucity of reliable information prevents us from drawing any conclusions about Syria having a BW program or being in the process of acquiring one.

Key Sources:
[1] John W. Finney, "Abrams cites Intelligence Gained from Soviet Arms in Mideast," New York Times, 15 February 1974, p. 4.
[2] Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August/September 2001, www.meib.org/ articles/ 0108_s1.htm.
[3] "Investigation: Syrian CW programs," Middle East Defense News (Paris), 28 September 1992, pp. 5-6.
[4] "Syria's Secret Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Digest, 2 May 2003, www.janes.com.
[5] Paul Beaver, "Syria to Make Chemical Bomblets for Scud C's," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 September 1997, p. 3.

	Updated March 2009