Summary of BW Capabilities

BW Agent Descriptions

Anthrax bacterium (Bacillus anthracis)
This causative agent of anthrax is one of the most frequently mentioned in discussions of Syria's BW program. An isolated report claims that Syria has weaponized anthrax bacteria, incorporating it into Scud missiles, possibly with the assistance of Russian scientists.[1] These charges provide no further details and are sufficiently isolated that they can be regarded as unreliable. It is noteworthy that US open source statements do not make any claims of Syrian weaponization, alleging only that weapons-related research is ongoing. B. anthracis is particularly suitable for weapons programs due to the organism's ability to form durable spores, simplifying the requirements for effective delivery. As a result, B. anthracis is often a early development choice for offensive BW programs. The bacteria is endemic to Syria and represents an ongoing threat to pastoralists and agricultural activity. Syria is likely to undertake ongoing studies in an effort to protect its agricultural sector against the dangers of this disease. Research efforts of this type would potentially be relevant to a BW program and may be the source of claims that the bacteria is being developed as an agricultural biological weapon.[2] On the basis of currently available evidence, it is possible that Syria has an ongoing program of research exploring the potential of B. anthracis as a biological weapon. There are no clear indications, however, that Syria has moved beyond this stage to active weaponization or deployment.

Brucellosis (Brucella sp.)
Brucellosis is caused by bacteria from the Brucella genus. Endemic throughout the Middle East, animal populations provide Syrian researchers with the opportunity to study this agent for possible weapons applications if so desired. Open source information indicates that Syrian researchers were able to isolate Brucella abortus and Brucella melitensis from the local animal population in the early 1990s.[3] No evidence indicates that this research was directed to the support of military research programs although such a development is possible. The U.S. military developed and deployed brucellosis-causing bacteria as a biological incapitant prior to the termination of its offensive biological weapons program in 1972.

Cholera bacteria (Vibrio cholerae)
An allegation of the production of the causative agent of cholera as a biological weapon was made in 1997.[4] This claim, which has been repeated subsequently, provided no details as to the method of dissemination or possible strategic thinking behind developing or producing this easily countered water-borne bacterial disease. Despite the specific claim that production has taken place on the basis of current information, it would be appropriate to treat this isolated report as unreliable.

Botulinum toxin
Botulinum toxin, from the Clostridium botulinum bacteria, has been produced as a biological weapon by a number of states in the past, including Iraq. In 2003, it was reported that German and Israeli intelligence believe Syria possesses and can weaponize botulinum toxin.[5] No other information was provided and it is impossible to make a determination as to the veracity of the assertion.

Ricin toxin
It is possible that Syria has produced and stored limited quantities of ricin. UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) records indicate that Syria produced between five and eighteen metric tons of castor beans annually between 1980 and 1995, allowing for the possibility that ricin has been isolated.[6] Ricin is destroyed by high heat (as is the case for all protein-based toxins) or exposure to high-intensity ultraviolet light. It is, however, environmentally robust, being able to withstand moderate heat (<100°C for short periods of time) and exposure to weak acids and bases. Nonetheless, the toxin has not been successfully developed as anything other than a contaminant or assassination weapon by any other state, which suggests that claims of its weaponization by Syria are extremely suspect.[7]

Smallpox virus (Variola Major)
The last outbreak of smallpox in Syria was in 1972.[8] It possible that Syria has retained stocks of this virus and might at some point seek to develop the virus into a weapon. Reports of cooperation between former Soviet bio-weaponeers and Middle Eastern governments have added to this concern.[9] These reports remain uncorroborated; in the absence of any definite information claims, reports that Syria has weaponized smallpox should be treated as purely hypothetical.

Key Sources:
[1] Steve Rodan, "Syria's Chemical Arms to Head Agenda at US-Israel Talks," Jerusalem Post, 2 December 1996, p. 2; "Syria's Secret Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Digest, 2 May 2003, <http://www.janes.com>.
[2] A. Venter, "Cooking Up Toxins," Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor, 1 July 2003, <http://www.janes.com>.
[3] M. Darwesh and A. Benkirane, "Field Investigations of Brucellosis in Cattle and Small Ruminants in Syria, 1990-1996," Scientific and Technical Review 20 (December 2001), p. 711, <http://www.oie.int/eng/publicat/rt/2003/DARWESH.pdf>.
[4] Briefing by a US government official to a 1995 workshop. The briefing was presented on a no attribution basis. David R. Tanks, Exploring U.S. Missile Defense Requirements in 2010: What Are the Policy and Technology Challenges? (Medford, Massachusetts, 1997), <http://www.ifpa.org/publications/archives/2010/chapter4s.htm>.
[5] "Syria's Secret Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Digest, 2 May 2003, <http://www.janes.com>.
[6] Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics, <http://www.fao.org/ES/ESS/index_en.asp>.
[7] "Syria's Secret Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Digest, 2 May 2003, <http://www.janes.com>.
[8] Jonathan B. Tucker, Scourge: The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001), p. 84.
[9] Dany Shoham, "Poisoned Missiles: Syria's Doomsday Deterrent," Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2002), <http://www.meforum.org>; Steve Rodan, "Syria's Chemical Arms to Head Agenda at US-Israel Talks," Jerusalem Post, 2 December 1996, p. 2.

	Updated February 2006