Since the early 1980s, Syria has made determined efforts to acquire and maintain an arsenal of chemical weapons. The objective of this pursuit was to provide Syria with a long-range strike capability that could deter Israel from taking advantage of its superior conventional warfare capabilities. As such, the Syrian CW program can be seen as strategically defensive. The CW program has been pursued despite the damage this has done to Syria's international reputation and the negative impact on the Syrian economy as a consequence of increasingly stringent export controls aimed at preventing proliferation. Regardless of a substantial investment of material and resources, Syria has remained dependent upon imports for CW production. Since the early 1990s, Syria has switched its primary focus away from the development of chemical weapons in favor of improving delivery systems, such as Scud missiles, for which it is also dependant upon overseas sources. Since the late 1990s, the limited information made available about the Syrian CW program has suggested that it is in a form of stasis, having achieved its core production and capability goals earlier in the decade.

History

Syria reportedly first obtained chemical weapons from Egypt in the period of 1972 to 1973 as part of their preparations for a joint attack on Israel. Reports that Israeli troops were able to capture stockpiles of Syrian chemical weapons support the view that these weapons were made available to combat units during the October 1973 war with Israel. Although Syrian forces were severely defeated, at no point did they make use of their CW capability.

The next major development in Syrian efforts to acquire chemical weapons came as a result of the defeat of the Syrian air and land forces deployed to Lebanon during Israel's invasion of that country in 1982. A decision to pursue chemical weapons as a counter-balance to Israel's strategic nuclear superiority may have been nascent prior to 1982. Nevertheless, it appears that the brutal exposure of Syrian vulnerability to Israeli conventional forces was the determining factor in making the decision to build a CW arsenal. Large-scale acquisition of materials and construction of facilities was not reported prior to 1982.

The Syrian CW program was established under the aegis of the Centre D'Etude et Recherché Scientifique (CERS), an ostensibly civilian research institute that appears to be responsible for all research, development, and production activities and facilities. Once the decision to proceed with a CW program had been made, it appears that the initial focus was the establishment of a facility for research and development, and possibly pilot production, in the Damascus area. This facility has continued to be used for CW-related research. Simultaneously, work commenced on the construction of larger dedicated CW production facilities. These plants in Al-Safira, Hama, and Homs all came online in the mid- to late 1980s. The first priority of the Syrian CW program was the production of sarin; initial, small-scale production appears to have started in 1984. Originally, this agent was to be carried by Syrian Air Force bombers, but this was an unreliable means of delivery given Israeli air superiority. Intense efforts were undertaken to provide a more dependable delivery system. By 1987, Syria was able to fit sarin-filled warheads on some of its Scud missiles creating a long-range CW strike capability. Since that time, the focus of Syrian efforts has been on increasing the range and effectiveness of their strike capability by obtaining longer-range missiles from foreign suppliers such as North Korea and by improving the sophistication of the warheads. The fitting of bomblet-filled cluster warheads to Scud-C missiles after 1997 was a significant development that greatly increased the potential effectiveness of Syrian chemical weapons. Additionally, Syria has sought to increase the lethality of its force by developing V-agents. Syria has been researching this type of agent since the late 1980s. Throughout the 1990s, reports pointed to continuing work on V-agents but also suggested a lack of success.

Following the successful weaponization of sarin in the 1980s, Syria turned to developing additional agents, most notably vesicants. Syria appears to have built up a stockpile of mustard and sarin for tactical uses in the 1990s. By the mid-1990s, the Syrian CW program seems to have reached a plateau in terms of capability and production. There was nothing to indicate that Syria was engaged in full-scale production of agents.

The driving motivation behind Syria's CW program has been the need to find a way to balance the growing conventional warfare capabilities of Israel. During the 1980s and 1990s, the differences in the relative capabilities of the two countries rapidly widened, leaving Syria in a position of heightened vulnerability. The distancing of Syria from its Soviet patron in the mid-1980s—combined with the all too apparent inadequacies of Soviet-supplied equipment—required Syria to seek an equalizer. In this sense, the objective of the Syrian CW program has been to provide Syria with room to attempt escalation dominance by expanding a conventional conflict to the civilian population or, alternately, by inflicting unbearable losses on Israeli forces. The key dilemma facing Syria in all its efforts has been the need to maintain a credible threat while not being so threatening as to trigger Israel's use of the full power of its non-conventional warfare capabilities. In this regard, it has been to Syria's advantage to adopt an opaque policy, not unlike that of Israel, in which it does not confirm the existence of these weapons even as it continues to improve and deploy them.

From the beginning of its CW program, Syria has been a voracious importer of materials, technologies, and expertise. This was an unavoidable necessity because of the country's low level of industrial and technological development. Although indigenous development efforts have been made, they have been constrained by Syria's relative isolation from the world community, its relative poverty, and the diversion of substantial proportions of its national resources to military activities. Consequently, it is not clear that Syria has achieved significant breadth or depth in terms of its ability to pursue indigenous development of chemical weapons or their delivery systems. Open sources continue to refer to extensive efforts to secure materials and expertise from overseas suppliers, pointing to substantial limitations on internal capabilities. However, these open sources generally do not provide details on these imports; and, as a consequence, it is difficult to identify any changes in the character of import activity except in the broadest sense. In the early 1980s, Syria was engaged in importing the key process equipment and technology required to establish its CW infrastructure. Since that time, it appears that the scale of imports, though not the need for them, has declined precipitously as the requirement becomes one of supporting an existing program.

The Syrian development program involved surprisingly few tests, whether of agents or delivery systems. Those that are known to have occurred took place in the early 1990s. It is likely that additional tests took place that have not been reported in the open sources or that the levels of outside support Syria has received have enabled it to have a high degree of confidence in its systems despite an absence of testing.

Syria has not publicly announced doctrines related to the use of chemical weapons; indeed, it has continually denied possessing such weapons. All conclusions regarding doctrines or policies are accordingly extrapolations from the limited information about force structures and production history available in the open sources. At all times, it has been presumed that the focus of Syrian chemical weapons was an attack on the Israeli civilian population. However, confirmation of this strategy is impossible, and commentary on any possible changes is highly speculative.

Very little information exists regarding Syrian CW defensive efforts in part because open source information has been focused on Syrian offensive rather than defensive capabilities. A major part of the Syrian protective capability consists of military vehicles from the Soviet Union that were fitted with chemical protection systems as standard equipment. It is believed that a full range of decontamination equipment was supplied by the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. It is assumed, though not demonstrated, that personal protective equipment was distributed to individual Syrian soldiers during the same period. There is one known instance in which Syria purchased approximately 10,000 protective masks; however, it is not clear whether this was a single purchase or part of a broader effort.

For several decades, Damascus has expressed a generalized opposition to WMD. At the same time, Syria has supported the right of any state to adopt those measures that it feels are most appropriate to securing itself against outside threats. On numerous occasions at the United Nations, in negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and in more general forums, Syria has repeatedly indicated that it would not renounce the right to possess chemical weapons, nor destroy any arsenal if it possessed one, until Israel first abandoned its nuclear weapons program. It is unclear whether this position represents a willingness to bargain away Syria's CW program in exchange for Israel's nuclear weapons program or is simply a useful argument to justify the possession of chemical weapons. In practice, Syria remains adamantly opposed to membership in the Chemical Weapons Convention, aligns politically with Egypt in opposition to membership, and attempts to discourage other Arab nations from joining.

Status

Syria is currently believed to deploy between 100 and 200 Scud missiles fitted with sarin warheads. Some of these missiles may be fitted with V-agent warheads although this is still unconfirmed. In addition, Syria is believed to have stockpiled several hundred tons of sarin and mustard agents for tactical uses in the form of artillery and air-dropped munitions. Syria retains its production infrastructure of at least three and possibly four facilities; however, it is not known whether these are currently being used to produce new agent. Syria conducted one missile test in July 2001, which may have included a simulated chemical warhead. Since that time, the CW program has maintained a very low profile.

In general, previously noted trends established in the early 1990s continue. Public reports suggest that Syria is yet to perfect its V-agent capability despite ongoing efforts. It is reasonably clearly that Syria is committed to ongoing efforts to enhance its delivery capabilities, most notably those utlizing ballistic missiles.

In 2003 the US renewed its focus on Syrian WMD capabilities, leveling numerous accusations that Syria had received and hidden Iraqi chemical and biological weapons. Although the claim that Syria received Iraq's WMD prior to the spring 2003 U.S.-led invasion seems unsustainable, it was nevertheless important, signaling US determination to pursue WMD issues and a refusal by the United States to maintain relations with Syria on a "business as usual" basis. This new approach resulted in a number of policy shifts, the most significant of which was US support for ultimately successful efforts to expel Syria from Lebanon. Additional pressure came on Syria as a consequence of the public repudiation of all WMD efforts by Libya in late 2003 and the subsequent dismantling and conversion of all WMD related equipment and facilities in 2004 and 2005. In 2004 Syrian officials met with the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Syrian representatives also began to attend regional seminars organized by the OPCW. In November 2005, a Syrian delegation attended the Annual Conference of the States Party in The Hague. In the absence of information on the motivations behind these actions the significance of these developments remains unclear at this time. However, they may be the first signs of an impending change in Syrian policy on chemical weapons, or more likely, an attempt to relieve international pressure on Syria by suggesting that a change is being considered.

In late 2007 Syria finds itself confronting a difficult international situation that is further complicated by its suspected WMD capabilities. A military capability that was established to enhance national security through its deterrent effect, now endangers it, by threatening to attract the wrath of Syria's enemies. Although abandoning these programs might actually improve national security, too much has been invested in the combined missile and CW arsenals to easily surrender them, the more so given the critical role they play in Syria's national strategy. Given the circumstances, Syria will need to examine its priorities in the near future and decide whether retaining its chemical weapons is worth the risk of war with greatly superior foes.

Sources:
[1] W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Research Memorandum No. 9 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 1988.
[2] Statement in U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Bobbi Fielder (California), Congressional Record, Daily Edition, 17 May 1984, p. H4088.
[3] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 215.
[4] David C. Isby, "Syrian Scud carried a simulated chemical warhead," Jane's Missiles and Rockets, 1 September 2001, http://www.janes.com.

	Updated September 2007