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Chemical Chronology

1968-1989

This annotated chronology is based on the data sources that follow each entry. Public sources often provide conflicting information on classified military programs. In some cases we are unable to resolve these discrepancies, in others we have deliberately refrained from doing so to highlight the potential influence of false or misleading information as it appeared over time. In many cases, we are unable to independently verify claims. Hence in reviewing this chronology, readers should take into account the credibility of the sources employed here.

Inclusion in this chronology does not necessarily indicate that a particular development is of direct or indirect proliferation significance. Some entries provide international or domestic context for technological development and national policymaking. Moreover, some entries may refer to developments with positive consequences for nonproliferation.

17 December 1968
Syria accedes to the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

Late 1972 through Mid-1973
Egypt supplies Syria with weaponized CW in preparation for Yom Kippur War. The shipment is variously described as mustard and sarin or mustard only.
—W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Research Memorandum No. 9, (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 1988, p. 5.

October 1973
Syria suffers a major defeat by Israel in the Yom Kippur war. Some reports indicate that Israeli forces capture samples of Syrian chemical weapons.
—Statement in U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Bobbi Fielder (California), Congressional Record, Daily Edition, 17 May 1984, p. H4088.

1979-1982
It is claimed that Scud-B missiles have been fitted with VX warheads since 1979-1982.
—Paul Beaver, "Syria to Make Chemical Bomblets for Scud C's," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 September 1997, p. 3.

February 1982
There are unsubstantiated claims by Amnesty International that Syrian forces employ cyanide gas during the suppression of Moslem brotherhood in Hama.
—Walter Andrews, "Assad: Terrorism's Master of Disaster," Washington Times, 9 December 1985, p. 4; Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 209.

June 1982
Syria suffers a major defeat by Israeli forces in Lebanon, including the destruction of air-force and air-defense network.
—Statement in U.S. House of Representatives by Representative Bobbi Fielder (California), Congressional Record, Daily Edition, 17 May 1984, p. H4088.

Late 1982
The Syrian leadership decides to build an indigenous chemical weapons capability.
—M. Zuhair Diab, "Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations," The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Fall 1997), p. 110.

1983
Syria receives a shipment of corrosion-resistant glass vessels and pipes and other lab equipment apparently destined for a Damascus Research facility. The materials, imported from Germany, have the potential to be used for the production of chemical weapons agents.
—John J. Fialka, "Fighting Dirty: Western Industry Sells Third World the Means To Produce Poison Gas," Wall Street Journal, 16 September 1988, p. 1.

15 September 1983
A U.S. Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) asserts that Syria is "a major recipient of Soviet CW assistance, [and] probably has the most advanced chemical warfare capability in the Arab world, with the possible exception of Egypt. Both Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union provided the chemical agents, delivery systems, and training that flowed to Syria. As long as this support is forthcoming, there is no need for Syria to develop an indigenous capability to produce CW agents or materiel, and none has been identified."

Note: This intelligence assessment is potentially at odds with later assessments that Syria obtained its initial CW capability through Egypt. Additionally it should be noted that there is no direct reference to the size of the Syrian CW arsenal although the clear implication is that it is not insignificant.
Implications of Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxin Weapons for US Security Interests, SNIE 11-17-83, Central Intelligence Agency, 15 September 1983, p. 11, <http://www.foia.cia.gov/ browse_docs_full.asp? doc_no=0000273395&title=IMPLICATIONS+OF+SOVIET+USE+OF+ CHEMICAL+AND+TOXIN+WEAPONS+FOR+U%2E+S% 2E+SECURITY+INT&abstract=NARA+%3Bpound%3B%3A+NN3%2D263% 2D94%2D008%3B+04%2F04%2F1994&no_pages=0025&pub_date=9%2F15% 2F1983&release_ date=4%2F4%2F1994&keywords=ESTIMATE% 7CSOVIET+ESTIMATE%7CSOVIET+MILITARY+ESTIMATE% 7CSOVIET+SCIENCE+ESTIMATE%7Cindexf199400566% 7Ctgdnotsu&case_no=SC%2D1999%2D00013©right=0 &release_dec=RIPPUB&classification= U&showPage=0001>; Don Oberdorfer, "Chemical arms curbs are sought," Washington Post, 9 September, 1985, pp. A1, 6; Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 209.

1985
US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith indicates that Syria has a production capability for nerve agents.
—Tom Diaz, "Syria said to have offered chemical weapons to Iran," Washington Times, 9 December 1985, p. 4.

Early 1986
Unidentified US officials describe Syria's chemical weapons capabilities as including domestically produced sarin.
—Aharon Levran, ed., The Middle East Military Balance 1986 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1987), pp. 94-95.

5 June 1986
The United States bans the sale of eight chemical precursors to Syria.
—David B. Ottaway, "Syria included in ban of chemical arms ingredients," Washington Post, 6 June 1986, p. A35.

7 August 1986
In a speech before Israel's National Defense College, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres announces that Syria is spending large sums to acquire surface-to-surface missiles and to develop chemical warheads. This publicly reported statement represents a change in Israeli policy, which had previously censored all mention of Syrian chemical weapons capabilities.
—Reuters, "Syria plans 'poison gas warheads'," Daily Telegraph, 8 August 1986.

7 August 1986
Syria is reported to be helping the Iranian CW program, which is described as much smaller than the Syrian program.
—Michael Gordon, "Talks resume to stop spread of chemical arms," New York Times, 25 August 1986, p. A4.

2 December 1986
Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin tells parliament, "we are aware that Syria is armed with chemical weapons—artillery shells, bombs, and ground-to-ground missile warheads...including nerve gas." He also states that Syria is engaged in the production of gas carrying bombs.
—Andrew Meisels, "Israel Confirms Syria has Chemical Weapons," Washington Times, 3 December 1986, p. 1.

4 August 1987
The United States adds eight more chemicals to the list of precursors banned from export to Syria.
The Journal of Commerce, 4 August 1987, p. 6a.

24 March 1988
Colonel-General Vladmir K. Pikalov, chief of the Soviet Union's Chemical Troops, visits Syria and holds meetings with the defense minister, the commander in chief, and the deputy chief of staff of the Syrian armed forces. The purpose of the visit is reportedly to express the USSR's displeasure over the Syrian pursuit of chemical weapons in the wake of controversy generated by the Halabja incident in Iraq.
—Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), pp. 216-217.

December 1988
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy publishes a report stating that Syria received a small number of chemical weapons from Egypt prior to the1973 Middle East war.
—W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Research Memorandum No. 9, (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 1988.

1989
China sells Syria over 11,000 MF-11 gas masks. The exact date of the sale or the delivery remains unspecified.
ASA Newsletter, No. 2, 1990, p. 4.

9 February 1989
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, CIA Director William Webster states, "Syria is stockpiling a variety of chemical warfare agents for various battlefield missions [and] producing and amassing a variety of munitions that can be used as delivery systems for chemical agents....Syria has nerve agents in some weapon systems."
—William Webster, Prepared Testimony, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 9 February 1989, p. 5.

22 February 1989
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, the US Director of Naval Intelligence, Rear-Admiral Thomas Brooks, describes Syria as a country that has obtained or is developing CW capabilities.
—Admiral Thomas Brooks, prepared testimony, House Armed Services Committee, 22 February 1989, pp. 38-39.

September 1989
Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iran, and Iraq are all listed as openly deploying or suspected of producing chemical weapons.
—David Fairhall, "US-Soviet convention would help reverse trend to poison warfare," The Guardian (London), 26 September 1989, <http://web.lexis-nexis.com>.



 

Updated September 2007


1968-1989

1990-1999

2000-2007



Maps
WMD in the Middle East
China's Missile Exports and Assistance to Syria
Treaties and Organizations
GlobalSecurity: Nuclear Weapons Programs
Syria's Secret Nuclear Program and Long Term Threat
Syria and WMD: incentives and capabilities. (2004)
The Nuclear Capabilities and Ambitions of Iran’s Neighbors (2005)
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (2003)
Syria’s Chemical Weapons (1997)
Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing Capabilities and Motivations (1997)



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CNSThis material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2007 by MIIS.

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