The focus of Syria's CW program has been the creation of a force capable of deterring Israel from threatening the integrity of the Assad regime and its position in Lebanon, while also providing a residual tactical capability. Despite being created as a deterrent, it is not clear how effective a chemical weapons-based deterrent can be against a nuclear-armed opponent with superior conventional force capabilities that is well prepared for chemical attack.

With a high degree of confidence, Syria is believed to possess sarin (GB), a non-persistent nerve agent in bulk and weaponized forms and a mustard agent in weaponized form. There are less reliable signs that Syria developed and deployed a persistent V-type nerve agent. The non-persistent nerve agent tabun (GA) may have been developed and deployed in the past; however, there is no evidence that tabun is currently produced or stockpiled. There are no indications that Syria has developed or deployed blood or choking agents.

Syria's primary CW delivery system is an arsenal of Scud-B, -C, and -D ballistic missiles that can be equipped with chemical warheads. Until 1997, these were most likely unitary warheads potentially fitted with an airburst capability. It is possible that since 1997, some warheads have been converted to the cluster type, increasing their potential effectiveness. The warheads are reportedly filled with either sarin or a V agent. There are inconsistent reports suggesting that Syria has developed chemical warheads for its SS-21 missiles.

Syria is reported to have adapted Russian-supplied ZAB incendiary bombs, which are essentially large thin-skinned containers, to accept mustard or nerve agents in place of the usual incendiary materials. It is conceivable that Syria has also fitted bomblets filled with chemical agents into existing cluster bombs. These bombs could be carried on Syrian aircraft such as the MiG-23BN or Su-24 fighter bomber although it is not clear that such weapons would be able to reach strategic targets before being destroyed. The same aircraft could also be fitted with spray tanks, as could Syrian helicopters, for line dispersal of chemical agents. Reportedly, Syria has stockpiled several thousand chemical shells for its Soviet-supplied tube artillery systems.[1] It is likely that Syria has also made provisions for fitting chemical warheads to artillery rocket systems.

Syrian chemical weapons are largely focused on providing a strategic force capable of deterring Israel's superior conventional forces. The structure of Syrian chemical forces suggests that the most likely approach will be a barrage attack aimed at inflicting maximum damage and disruption on Israeli society by striking at civilian centers. The introduction of Israeli anti-missile defenses has made a large-scale attack by Syrian forces more likely, as a small attack using limited numbers of missiles can no longer be relied on to reach its targets. Some analysts suggest that Syrian strategy is to mask its chemical attack with a simultaneous barrage of anti-aircraft missiles fired on ballistic trajectories, so as to swamp Israeli defenses.[2] It is unlikely that Syria would mount such an attack unless all other means of defending the country and regime appeared to be failing. In addition, Syria is obliged to consider the consequences of using its deterrent forces against an enemy possessing a more powerful deterrent capability.

The reported size and character of the Syrian chemical weapons stockpile suggests that although there is a capacity for tactical uses, it is limited. Some sources have claimed that Syria might attempt interdiction strikes at Israeli assembly areas using persistent agents while flooding frontline positions with non-persistent agents in the event of war.[3] This scenario is tied to a Syrian offensive aimed at recovering the Golan Heights—which given Syria's strategic position and its military's technical and tactical inferiority compared to Israel—must be evaluated as unlikely.

Therefore, it may be presumed that the tactical function of the Syrian chemical arsenal is intended for use in the event of impending collapse of the Golan defenses. A problem for this arrangement, however, is the lack of reports indicating Syrian training in the tactical use of chemical weapons. Without such preparation, it is unlikely that Syrian forces would be capable of fully exploiting any effect on Israeli positions. It should also be noted that Israeli forces have made a point of training and equipping their forces for chemical warfare, which is likely to minimize the impact of any Syrian tactical use of chemical weapons.[4] In the event of severe defeat, Syria might make a limited chemical weapons attack against the opposing military force as a means of signaling its willingness to use chemical weapons on a larger scale if hostilities continue.

As far as is known, all decisions regarding the use of chemical weapons are concentrated in the president's office. Scant open source information is available detailing the operational plans or structures of Syrian chemical weapons capability. In part, this is a result of Syria's ongoing refusal to officially confirm the existence of a CW program. For Syria, the strategic situation has been greatly complicated by the alliance between Israel and Turkey and the introduction of US forces into the region. Even if it is capable of defending the Golan Heights against Israeli forces, which is far from certain, Syria now faces the additional threat of invasion from the north and east.

Sources:
[1] Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August/September 2001, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_s1.htm>.
[2] Dany Shoham, "Poisoned Missiles: Syria's Doomsday Deterrent," Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2002), <http://www.meforum.org>.
[3] Eric Croddy, Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen (New York: Copernicus Books, 2002), p. 44.
[4] "Syria's secret weapons," Jane's Intelligence Digest, 2 May 2003, <http://www.janes.com>.

	Updated October 2006