Known or Suspected CW Agents

Descriptions

Mustard (HD)

Syria is believed to have first obtained mustard from Egypt in 1972 or 1973 in the form of pre-filled artillery shells and air-dropped bombs.[1] Since that time there have been a handful of reports alleging a Syrian capacity for the production of mustard. Isolated reports have suggested that initial bulk production of mustard agent took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[2] In 1988, it was firmly claimed that Syria had obtained the capability to produce mustard solely from its own resources.[3] Production may take place at facilities to the north of Damascus and near Hama.[4] A 1993 report claimed that Syria had begun to produce tube and rocket artillery rounds filled with mustard-type blister agents, suggesting that this production had not taken place earlier.[5] This report may be consistent with other information if it is assumed that Syria prioritized the production of strategically oriented nerve agents before turning to tactical agents. These reports are not detailed; it is difficult to draw any firm conclusions about quantities of agent produced or the degree to which this agent has been integrated into the Syrian military. If mustard is currently in the Syrian arsenal, it is likely to be intended for use as a tactical weapon in defensive military operations around the Golan Heights. Delivery of the agent may be achieved by use of artillery shells or rockets, air-dropped bombs, or potentially spray tanks mounted on piloted or drone aircraft. Syria imports significant quantities of dual-use chemicals, some of which, notably triethanolamine (TEA), could be used in the production of a nitrogen mustard agent. The production of basic varieties of mustard agent is well within the capabilities of Syrian chemical industry.

Sarin (GB)

Syria may have first obtained weaponized sarin from Egypt in 1972 or 1973.[6] Sarin is claimed to be the primary CW agent in Syrian possession. Bulk production is variously asserted to have begun in 1982, 1983, or 1984.[7] The first open source mention of this specific agent was in 1986,[8] and in 1988, US officials claimed that Syria had converted several pesticide plants to the production of sarin.[9] Syria's development of a sarin program is generally seen as having been assisted by the ability to obtain access to precursors and production technology from western suppliers,[10] including the United States,[11] prior to the introduction of export restrictions in the late 1980s.[12]

Syria has been alleged to possess an indigenous capability for the production of bulk sarin agent since the mid-1980s. Sarin production is reported to take place at dedicated CW production facilities near the towns of Damascus,[13] Homs,[14] Hama,[15] and Latakia.[16] Syria's sarin production capacity has been estimated at several hundred tons per year; however, it is unclear whether this represents a theoretical capacity or actual production.[17] The size of the Syrian stockpile has been consistently estimated as approximately 500 tons, which suggests that production is not continuous.

Syria's sarin stockpile is believed to be loaded into aerial bombs and Scud-C and -D missile warheads.[18] The first description of the size of the Syrian sarin stockpile was in 1992, when an estimate of several thousand aerial bombs and 50 to 100 ballistic missile warheads was given.[19] Subsequently this estimate was increased to 100 to 200 warheads loaded with CW agents, though it was unclear how many of these contained sarin as opposed to other agents.[20] It is possible that since 1997, Syria has made a point of retro-fitting Scud missiles with new cluster-type munitions in place of the warheads that would have been used previously.[21] There are additional claims of several thousand tactical munitions such as artillery rockets and shells filled with sarin.[22] From these reports, it appears that Syria may prefer to store its agent in a weaponized state rather than in bulk. Estimates of Syrian stockpiles and production rates have not changed significantly since 1992, and this consistency suggests either that there is a lack of new intelligence or that Syria has problems maintaining the stability of its agents in storage. Since the mid-1990s, the CIA has consistently described Syria as possessing a stockpile of sarin.[23]

Despite claims that Syria has the most advanced chemical weapons program in the Middle East,[24] it is unclear to what degree Syria is capable of producing sarin from local resources. Syria is believed to be capable of producing some precursor chemicals from its own resources including alcohols, sulfur and phosphorus derivatives.[25] Open sources continue to refer to Syrian attempts to obtain access to foreign expertise and import precursors and process equipment, suggesting some limitations on internal capabilities.[26]

Tabun (GA)

Syria is alleged to have produced tabun at a production facility in Hama.[27] The production of tabun is within the capabilities of Syria's indigenous chemical industry.[28] It is unclear whether this agent is currently in bulk production, stockpiled, or deployed. If currently deployed it is likely to be in artillery or aircraft delivery systems.

V Agent[29]

A single report claims that Syria first acquired a V agent by importing it from the Soviet Union during the period 1979-1982.[30] A further isolated report claims Syrian production of V agent began as early as 1986; however, this assertion is inconsistent with other information and may simply refer to initial explorations of the agent for defensive purposes.[31] More consistently, there are reports claiming that Syria has been engaged in research and development of a V agent since 1988. It is believed that Syria has been pursuing a Soviet-type of V agent similar to the US VX agent. The first reports of Syrian production of V agent surfaced in 1991 and have been regularly repeated since that time.[32] Several Syrian efforts to import potential V agent precursors were publicly revealed in the early 1990s, including 850kg of an unspecified CW precursor from Russia in the late 1980s or early 1990s.[33] A shipment of 45 tons of trimethyl phosphite from India in 1992 was interrupted.[34] In 1994, it was claimed that Syria was stockpiling VX filled munitions.[35]

In 1996, it was alleged that Russian scientists were assisting Syria in the production of V agent.[36] V agent production has been reported at a research facility on the outskirts of Damascus,[37] at a production plant near Damascus,[38] at an underground CW production facility outside of Hama,[39] and at a petrochemical complex just south of Homs.[40] In 1998, a senior Israeli military intelligence official claimed that Syria would soon have the capability to manufacture V agent, contradicting previous claims of production and weaponization.[41] In the United States, CIA and State Department sources refer to Syrian attempts to develop more persistent and lethal agents—a statement regarded as shorthand for V agents—but do not mention production, storage, weaponization, or deployment.[42] An exception was in 1997, when a DOD briefing referred to the production of V agent at a plant near Damascus.[43] More recently, the US Defense Department has limited itself to references to Syrian efforts to begin development of V agents.[44]

Israeli sources in 1997 claimed that V agent was being loaded into Scud warheads.[45] Successful Syrian development of cluster bomb type warheads for the Scud missile was implied in early 1997, when US Defense Department sources claimed that Syria had established an underground production line for V agent filled bomblets for installation in Scud warheads near Damascus.[46] There are isolated reports of weaponization efforts focused on artillery rockets such as the FROG-7 and short-range missiles such as the SS-21; however, these are inconsistent and make it difficult to reach conclusions.[47] In May 1998, it was claimed, apparently on the basis of satellite images, that Syria had conducted a live agent test of V agent mounted on a Scud-C missile.[48] It is not known how many Scud missiles have been fitted with so-called VX-containing warheads.

Open source reports do not make any claims as to the size of Syria's V agent stockpile. Where there is mention of quantities, these aggregate several different CW agents. Without more consistent evidence, it is difficult to firmly conclude that V agent production has progressed beyond small-scale (kilograms) batch production for research, testing, and development purposes. Until October 2003, the balance of available evidence suggests that, contrary to some assertions, Syria may not yet have successfully completed development, weaponization, and deployment of V agent.

Sources:
[1] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 210; W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Research Memorandum No. 9 (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 1988, p. 5.
[2] "Syria's Chemical and Biological weapons (CBW) programmes," Jane's Chem-Bio web, 27 September 2002, <http://chembio.janes.com>.
[3] Robin Wright, "Chemical Arms Race heating Up," Los Angeles Times, 9 October 1988, p. 1.
[4] Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August/September 2001, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_s1.htm>.
[5] Michael Eisenstadt, "Syria's Strategic Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Review 5 (April 1993), <http://www.janes.com>.
[6] G. Shumeyer, Chemical Weapons proliferation in the Middle East (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College), 1990, p. 29.
[7]Ahmed S. Hashim, The Deterrence Series Case Study 1: Syria (Washington, DC: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1998), p. 7. 1984 claim is in Anthony Cordesman, Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p. 17.
[8] Aharon Levran, ed., The Middle East Military Balance 1986 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1987) pp. 94-95 [quoting unnamed U.S. government sources] in Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 211, fn. 38.
[9] Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly, 12 September 1988, p. 1 in Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 212, fn. 45.
[10] Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 214.
[11] Syria, The Wednesday Report, <http://www.mobrien.com/twr/syria/syria.htm>.
[12] [CW related exports were increasingly restricted following the revelations of Iraqi use of CW in its war with Iran after 1984. The main restrictions took effect from 1986 onwards.]
[13] Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August/September 2001, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_s1.htm>.
[14] Anthony Cordesman, Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p. 19.
[15] On sarin at Hama see "Investigation: Syrian CW programs," Middle East Defense News (Paris), 28 September 1992, pp. 5-6. Also Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August/September 2001, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_s1.htm>.
[16] Global Security, "Syria: CW facilities," <http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/facility.htm>.
[17] "Investigation: Syrian CW programs," Middle East Defense News (Paris), 28 September 1992, pp. 5-6.
Anthony Cordesman, Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p. 19.
[18] Proliferation Threat and Response (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), pp. 37-40.
[19] "Investigation: Syrian CW programs," Middle East Defense News (Paris), 28 September 1992, pp. 5-6.
[20] "Ballistic, Cruise Missile, and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, March 1995-June 1995," Nonproliferation Review 3 (Fall 1995), p. 179.
[21] Paul Beaver, "Syria to Make Chemical Bomblets for Scud C's," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 September 1997, p. 3.
[22] Dany Shoham, "Poisoned Missiles: Syria's Doomsday Deterrent," Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2002), <http://www.meforum.org>. Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August/September 2001, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_s1.htm>.
[23] Unclassied Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2002 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2003), <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/721report_jan-june2002.pdf>.
[24] Aharon Levran, ed., The Middle East Military Balance 1986 (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1987) pp. 94-95; [quoting unnamed U.S. government sources] in Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree, International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 211, fn. 13.
[25] "Middle East, CW Production Site," Jane's Intelligence Review 10 (April 1998), p. 25.
[26] Unclassied Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 1995 to 2002), <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports>.
[27] "Investigation: Syrian CW programs," Middle East Defense News (Paris), 28 September 1992, pp. 5-6.
[28] [Presuming an ability to produce sarin, GA is within Syrian capabilities.] Discussion with M. Kosal, Ph.D., E. Croddy, and J. Mazur (Branch Head, OPCW Chemical Demilitarization Branch, 6 August 2003).
[29] Public sources generally use VX as shorthand, but discussion focuses on Syria producing Russian style V-agent; see "Syria," The Wednesday Report, <http://www.mobrien.com/twr/syria/syria.htm>.
[30] Paul Beaver, "Syria to Make Chemical Bomblets for Scud C's," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 September 1997, p. 3.
[31] "Syria's secret weapons," Jane's Intelligence Digest, 2 May 2003, <http://www.janes.com>.
[32] Bill Gertz, "North Korean Scuds added to Syrian arsenal," Washington Times, 13 March 1991, p. 3; Dany Shoham, Chemical Weapons in Egypt and Syria: Evolution, Capabilities, Control (Ramat Gan (Israel), Begin-al-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 1995) reported in Ha'aretz, 26 May 1995.
[33] Interfax (Moscow) in English, 22 October 1995, as in FBIS-SOV-95-204, pp. 29-30; Vil Mirzayanov, Statement before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 1 November 1995, "Hearing on weapons of mass destruction."
[34] "Poison Gas for Syria is intercepted," International Herald Tribune, 10 August 1992, p. 2; Michael Rotem, "Indian chemical company won't stop shipment to Syria," Jerusalem Post, 22 August 1992, p. 1; "Syria's secret poison-gas plants," Economist Foreign Report, 10 September 1992, pp. 1-2.
[35] Shlomo Gazit, ed., The Middle East Military Balance 1993-1994 (Boulder Colorado, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1994), p. 229.
[36] Steve Rodan, "Syria's Chemical Arms to Head Agenda at US-Israel Talks," Jerusalem Post, 2 December 1996, p. 2; "The Great Arsenal of Autocracy: Syria's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, February 1999, <http://www.meib.org/issues/9902.htm#me2>.
[37] Paul Beaver, "Syria to Make Chemical Bomblets for Scud C's," Jane's Defence Weekly, 3 September 1997, p. 3.
[38] Anthony Cordesman, Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p. 7.
[39] "Investigation: Syrian CW programs," Middle East Defense News (Paris), 28 September 1992, pp. 5-6.
[40] Richard M. Bennett, "The Syrian Military: A Primer," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, August/September 2001, <http://www.meib.org/articles/0108_s1.htm>.
[41] "Syria close to producing Nerve Gas," Ha'aretz, 24 June 1998, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com>.
[42] Unclassied Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 2002 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2003), <http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721_reports/pdfs/721report_jan-june2002.pdf>.
[43] Proliferation Threat and Response (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1997), pp. 37-40.
[44] Ibid., p. 45.
[45] Head of Israeli Defense Forces Intelligence, General Moshe Ya'alon, Jerusalem Post, 19 June 1997.
[46] Anthony Cordesman, Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p. 9.
[47] Dany Shoham, "Poisoned Missiles: Syria's Doomsday Deterrent," Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2002), <http://www.meforum.org>; Anthony Cordesman, Syria and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p. 2, states that "SS-21's in Syrian hands do not have chemical warheads."
[48] "The Great Arsenal of Autocracy: Syria's Weapons of Mass Destruction," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, February 1999, <http://www.meib.org/issues/9902.htm#me2>.

	Updated February 2006