There is relatively little information available on Syria CW-related imports. Open source information suggests that the initial construction of Syrian chemical weapons production facilities in the early to mid-1980s was heavily dependent on substantial imports of equipment, precursors, and expertise from European companies and suppliers. Important sources of imports were France, Switzerland, and West Germany, with the United Kingdom and the United States also playing a role. It is alleged that East German experts were employed for the final stages of construction and initial facilities operation. Since the establishment of the program, it has apparently continued to be dependent upon foreign suppliers for imports of key precursors and production equipment. Due to the increasing effect of Australia Group restrictions and the prohibitions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Syria has been obliged to turn to second-tier suppliers such as China and India for some of its needs. Despite these restrictions, Syria has been able to maintain imports of chemicals required for its civilian industries by providing acceptable end-use certificates.
It is likely that some imports—serving as the basis for CIA reports that Syria continues to seek precursors from foreign sources—are associated with the basic needs of Syrian industry. Syria has a growing pharmaceutical industry in addition to oil refining, paper and cement production, textile industry, and paint and dye industries. All these industries require significant quantities of dual-use chemicals to operate effectively. It is possible, though not demonstrated, that Syria is diverting some of these imports to the service of its chemical weapons program. An example of a chemical that may be imported in large quantities is triethanolamine (TEA), which is used to sweeten petroleum and hydrocarbon gas flows. This chemical can also be used in the production of mustard agent.
A handful of imports associated with Syria's CW program have been identified in open sources since the 1980s, and the bulk of these have involved trans-shipment through Cyprus. As a general statement, although it is impossible to ascertain the scale or costs of Syrian imports for its CW program, it is likely that these imports have been substantial in terms of the size of the Syrian economy. Those cases in which attempts to import precursors have been intercepted offer a unique insight into the capabilities and limitations of the Syrian CW program. It is notable that there have been few interceptions of Syrian precursor imports since 1995.
Syria has not been associated with exports of chemical weapons or chemical weapons-related precursors or materials since the mid-1980s. At that time, it was alleged that Syria was channeling precursors and even chemical weapons to Iran to assist it in its war with Iraq. These claims seem somewhat spurious given that there is no evidence of Iranian use of domestically produced CW agents during the 1980s. Syrian exports of civilian chemicals are insignificant.
Imports Table
| Year/Date |
Exporter |
Item(s) |
Remarks |
| 1972 |
Egypt |
Weaponized CW agents |
As a prelude to a combined offensive against Israel, Egypt supplies chemical weapons to Syria. |
| 1983(?) |
Germany |
Corrosion-resistant borosilicate glass pipes and vessels |
Apparently lab-scale equipment intended for the CERS facility. Possibly intended to aid in production of methylphosphoric dichloride for sarin program. |
| 1989 |
China |
11,000 MF-11 chemical masks |
Indication of defensive program; suggests no domestic production of protective masks. |
| May 1992 |
India |
45 tons trimethyl phosphite |
The shipment of the dual-use precursor to nerve agent arrives at the premises of the Setma company in Damascus. |
| July 1992 |
India |
45 tons trimethyl phosphite |
The shipment of the dual-use precursor to nerve agent is blocked in Cyprus. The Indian exporting company responsible for this shipment and the one listed above is United Phosphorus Ltd. |
| 1993 |
Russia |
815kg methylphosphonyl dichloride |
Lt-Gen Anatoliy Kuntsevich is reported to have arranged the export of this nerve agent precursor. |
| 1994 |
Russia |
5 tons methylphosphonyl dichloride |
This shipment is related to the one listed above but was blocked by Russian authorities. |
| 1998 |
Netherlands |
Unspecified precursor |
Shipment blocked by Dutch authorities. |
Sources: W. Seth Carus, "Chemical Weapons in the Middle East," Research Memorandum No. 9, (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy), 1988; John J. Fialka, "Fighting Dirty: Western Industry Sells Third World the Means To Produce Poison Gas," Wall Street Journal, 16 September 1988, p. 1; Dany Shoham, "Guile, Gas and Germs: Syria's Ultimate Weapons," Middle East Quarterly (Summer 2002), <http://www.meforum.org>; ASA Newsletter, No. 2, 1990, p. 4; "Poison gas for Syria is intercepted," International Herald Tribune, 10 August 1992, p. 2; "Poison gas for Syria is intercepted," International Herald Tribune, 10 August 1992, p. 2; Interfax (Moscow) in English, 22 October 1995, as in FBIS-SOV-95-204, 23 October 1995, pp. 29-30; Vil Mirzayanov, statement before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 1 November 1995; "Hearing on weapons of mass destruction," Interfax (Moscow) in English, 22 October 1995, as in FBIS-SOV-95-204, pp. 29-30; Vil Mirzayanov, statement before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 1 November 1995; "Hearing on weapons of mass destruction"; Expatica.com, 7 October 2003, <http://www.expatica.com/index.asp?pad=2,18,&item_id=34776>.
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Updated November 2003 |
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